Sandra Krause v. Brian Jones

videos” recovered from the defendant’s IV. computer Binney. appears No evidence The district court did not plainly err suggesting

in the record that Mabee main- when it applied the five-level enhancement tained “friends pro- list” the ARES 2G2.2(b)(3)(B) § described U.S.S.G. gram, and Mabee asserted that he did not the defendant’s Therefore, offense level. people” “communicate with other as to the the defendant’s sentence is AFFIRMED. files, availability “[n]obody of the else was involved,” and “as far as con- [he was]

cerned, personal it was [to him].”

However, the circumstantial evidence of bartering trading or by is bolstered one

crucial item: acknowledgment Mabee’s “got that he por into distribution of [child it, nography in order because] to receive agree he had to that it was open for distri KRAUSE, individually Sandra and as added). (Emphasis bution.” That ac personal representative of the Estate knowledgment permits an inference that Krause, of Matthew deceased, Thomas Mabee decided to distribute files with an Plaintiff-Appellant, because, “expectation of receipt,” by his admission, he knew that if he did not make available, his own files he could not receive JONES; Gillman; Brian D. Eric any files in return from other file sharers. Dwayne Gregg; Redford Police De The inference is arguably weak because partment; Township, Redford Defen acknowledgment by Mabee came dants-Appellees. through attorney’s his response affirmative leading question

to a posed the court. No. 13-2498. Nevertheless, whole, viewed aas the evi United States Appeals, Court of dence satisfies us that the district court Sixth Circuit. did not commit clear or obvious error when it engaged determined that Mabee Argued: June 2014. child pornography] “[distribution [of receipt, for the or expectation’ receipt, Decided and Filed: Sept. thing value.” U.S.S.G. 2G2.2(b)(3)(B).

§ On a less compelling set facts, similarly held that “it was not plain error to apply [trading] enhance

ment where joined [the a P2P defendant]

network, allowing others access to files on computer in exchange for access to

files on computers,” their where

defendant “admitted that he had used the P2P network to images download view

of child pornography and to allow others to

download similar images comput from his Frazier, er.” United States v. 547 Fed. (6th Cir.2013). Appx.

negotiating hours, the officers decided bedroom, to enter using something called a bang” “flash in the process. followed, the seconds that Krause fired a officers, shot at the and one of the officers fatally shot Krause in response. At issue is whether the officers used excessive force entering the bedroom and in shoot- ing Krause. affirm We the district court’s grant qualified immunity to the officers.

I.

The United States Marshals at arrived Matthew in Krause’s home Redford at nine in morning the on December They had a warrant for Krause’s arrest for Timothy Flynn, ARGUED: P. Karl- felony possession of fifty grams more than Clarkston, Cooney, LLP, strom Michigan, of cocaine. opened When Matthew for Appellant. Daley, Karen M. Cum- Marshals, door and saw the he slammed it Acho, P.L.C., mings, McClorey, Davis & shut ran into a bedroom. The Mar- Livonia, Michigan, for Appellees. ON shals followed. Deputy One Mar- Timothy Flynn, BRIEF: P. Karlstrom shals entered the bedroom but left to take LLP, Clarkston, Cooney, Michigan, for cover when he found Krause in standing Appellant. Daley, Cummings, Karen M. pointing handgun corner at him. As McClorey, Acho, P.L.C., Livonia, Davis & up positions took others around the Michigan, Appellees. for bedroom, they again announced them- again selves and they had a explained war- COOK, Before: SUTTON and Circuit rant for his arrest. Krause told them he MARBLEY, Judges; Judge.* District multiple guns had in the bedroom and he SUTTON, J., opinion delivered the kill anyone would who to tried come in. court, COOK, J., in which joined, and As to him encourage continued D.J., MARBLEY, joined unarmed, part and come out he continued to threat- MARBLEY, 682-85), result. (pp. them, D.J. kill saying en to at point, one separate delivered a opinion concurring this, die[,] ready do I’m “[L]et’s are part and in the judgment. you[?]” R.14-3 at 2. The Marshals called the Redford Town- OPINION ship Department. Police The Redford

SUTTON, Judge. Circuit up SWAT team took positions house, law When enforcement officers tried to negotiator and its Sergeant Duane arrest, execute a warrant for Gregg began talking Matthew to Krause from the Krause fled into up his home and holed in hallway open outside the bedroom door. a bedroom gun. closet armed awith After They eight talked the next or so hours. * Ohio, Algenon Marbley, The Honorable sitting by designation. L. United Judge States District for the Southern District him. Officer Jones behind tenant Gillman Sergeant responded Krause

Sometimes flash of a the muzzle seeing stayed remembers he sometimes questions; Gregg’s Krause bang,” handgun “after yelled and Krause silent. Sometimes 81-82). (Tr. at at 22-23 at him. Id. shot “got very quiet.” screamed; he sometimes he 51). heard shots before Lieutenant (Tr. Gillman at Krause was at 15 R.14-4 shot, round, one the room—“one De- entered Livonia Police upset” with “very and then pause, there was short and then department neighboring partment, R.14-6 multiple rounds.” arrest, was some there for his the warrant had issued 67). inside, (Tr. Once at at him. Id. at get out to it was thought sit- saw Officer Jones 46). Lieutenant Gillman (Tr. Sergeant Gregg 13, 14 if he to see “checking himself’ ting down than once threaten “more Krause heard 63). (Tr. at He been shot. Id. knew shooting because ... to come out 53). in closet with (Tr. seated the also saw Krause at Id. at 15 would end.” how that exchange a The entire gun. hand on brought in his Gregg Sergeant point, At one (Tr. 67). at Id. at 19 took “seconds.” to talk girlfriend father and Krause’s from gun the Butler removed Officer “went not Krause, conversations those but 70-73). transported Krause was (Tr. 56, hand. 16, Krause’s 20 at at too well.” Id. pronounced he was hospital, to the where camera showed thirty, pole Around six of the bedroom investigation An dead. sleeping the to be that seemed Krause from a round had fired one showed Krause team to think closet, the SWAT prompting from the doorway the revolver toward .38 briefly They bedroom. entering the about at 3. A medical examination R.14-3 closet. of the team having one member considered twenty Krause had suffered revealed that shield, fall on behind a enter the room 4-14. R.17-6 at gunshot wounds. they But Krause, him. try to secure and Gregg, Sergeant mother sued extravagantly, Matthew’s rejected idea. More that Jones, Gillman, the Lieutenant Officer using SWAT team’s considered the they and Redford Department Redford Police wall of the the exterior bring tank to down claimed, rel- Township. complaint way. Her seize Krause bedroom and to here, the violated officers They evant idea as well. they rejected that But Fourteenth) (and Amend- Krause’s Fourth bang,” “which using a “flash settled on bang rights by using flash flash ment bright bang emits a loud Krause, actions Dawkins, and that their 83 Fed. v. light,” States United negli- gross Cir.2003), amounted to (6th designed independently 48, Appx. 49 court law. district gence under state The not have an ... “stun so would Krause for sum- the defendants’ motion granted who was the on and going idea what was 55). (Tr. qualified- all on judgment on claims mary at him,” 16 with R.14-6 at room immunity grounds. bang and enter the flash deploying Before room, weapons the set their ing II. Krause automatically was

fire because rifle in had “an the armed assault immunity Qualified shields (Tr. 59). at room.” Id. torts so section 1983 constitutional from the did not violate as the officers long rolled the flash Sergeant Nick Lentine rights of constitutional clearly established Officer Jones bang into the bedroom. Callahan, v. Pearson See simultaneously “with claimant. crossed into the room 808, 231, 172 223, (Tr. at 75- 555 R.14-5 bang.” the flash (2009). that im- assessing 81). L.Ed.2d 565 76, with Lieu- Butler followed Officer munity summary judgment at the phase pect room, isolated one precluding case, give plaintiff the benefit of bang risk the flash could harm others, all reasonable factual inferences from the children, including elderly or record, asking only whether the officers wrong others in the place at wrong judgment are entitled to aas matter of Boyd time. See Cnty., v. Benton 374 F.3d Qualified law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. immunity (9th Cir.2004); United States v. protects the officers in this instance. (10th Myers, Cir.1997). 106 F.3d The officers had a clear view into the bang. Use There are flash closet, bedroom and allowing ig them to problems several with Krause’s claim that nite the bang away from the closet the officers her violated son’s Fourth and not on Krause. See Estate Escobe rights Amendment used a flash Martin, do v. 702 F.3d 407-08 bang entering before the room. The com Cir.2012). Nothing indicated that Krause an plaint as initial matter does not identify problems other health that could be way in which the device improperly triggered by the device. See Estate of seized or otherwise harmed him. And nei Marasco, (3d Smith 430 F.3d ther appellate argument briefs nor oral Cir.2005). And nothing indicated that the gap. fill this condition of the room could create other case, Even if that were not problems if a flash bang ignited. were See bang officers’ use of a flash in this instance Bing Bing Whitehall, ex rel. v. City of was reasonable. Faced with a troubled (6th Ohio, Cir.2006). 456 F.3d 555 young man resisting drug arrest on them, charges, threatening to shoot ex- Bing illustrates the two sides of the line. pressing die, willingness his to and refus- police The responded report to a an of ing requests all peacefully, to surrender man, Bing, intoxicated who had shot at a the sought officers to minimize the risk of group of children on his street. After injury to in themselves and others enter- unsuccessfully trying persuade to Bing to Connor, ing the room. See Graham v. 490 leave his hours, house for two police the 1865, 109 S.Ct. 104 L.Ed.2d pepper threw spray bang and a flash into a (1989). Waiting until ap- Krause Bing window. then shot at police, the who peared to be asleep part was one of the bang threw another flash into the house. plan. Using bang a flash was the other. fire, The caught Bing house and died in- it, As the officers reasonably saw both side. Id. at 558-63. We held that the plan features of the diminished the risk of officers reasonably using acted the first injury Yes, to themselves and others. bang try flash to Bing to force out of his light and noise would wake Krause. But house. The officers needed “to disarm light and surely noise would stun and Bing place him under arrest to abate Krause, confuse giving the officers a posed people threat that he in the chance to subdue Krause before he could area.” Id. at 570. Yet the second flash act. And bang of course the flash dealt bang crossed the reasonableness line be- only with the risk that Krause appeared to cause the knowledge officers had “full that sleeping be but was not. it likely ignite [would] accelerants and

All of safety “mortal,” these increases in officer cause a fire” and thus created a downside, came with little including the unnecessary, “threat” to suspect. (internal omitted). of kinds downsides that have led quotation other Id. marks to be skeptical instance, courts of the use of a comparable safety flash this no con- bang or to it find unreasonable. The sus- cerns cloud the record. reasonably could him threaten to microscope of under the put

When shoot— threat to a serious posed that Krause true, did not think the encounter it is hindsight, him. For behind say him the two officers that it is difficult But end well. reason, acted reason Jones perspective that Officer from bang, even See, deadly e.g., it. At force. Sim ably using to do with anything hindsight, “from F.3d Cnty., 682 events, judge reasonableness monds v. Genesee all Cir.2012) (6th officer on that officer reason (holding a reasonable perspective a with the vision faced with scene, deadly than force when ably rather used 20/20 Graham, drinking,” “was “had been hindsight.” suspect who vantage point, suicidal,” heavily- From into a “fled possibly reasonably. also See area,” repeated acted orders “ignored the officers wooded Bowles, 643- Fed.Appx. hands,” the officers “threatened Graves show his Cir.2011) (6th of a flash (finding the use gun,’” a and “brand ‘I have yelling, car suspect’s reasonable a of a ... as if it were bang object outside a silver ished] to believe had “reason v. Lu officers ex rel. Rohm weapon”); where Livermore Cir.2007) dangerous might belan, be 404-06 Graves 476 F.3d Dawkins, him”); 83 Fed. reasonably to arrest officer (holding tried that a (“[T]he use of officers’ Appx. suspect prevent “to decided to shoot objec diversionary [was] device flash-bang light officers in firing at” other from [him] executing a search tively reasonable” to the suspect’s “proximity [other of the a man rifle, with apartment prior at the warrant armed with while officers] facilitating a murder behavior, prior conviction continued refusal and his violent rifle.). arrest”). an assault likely possessed and who and face to surrender complied with Because the rejoinders to The claimant offers several using the flash Fourth Amendment that Krause suggests She this conclusion. violate did not bang, it follows on the may asleep with his hand have been doing so. law any clearly established have fired gun might and trigger of found a constitutional Bing, Even which bang jolted accidentally the flash the flash use of the second intent, violation with lack of Krause’s or him awake. Yet did not that the officers bang, determined intent, play. no role to firing gun has law. clearly established violate reasonableness judge Officer Jones’ We offi- perspective reasonable “from shooting. The officers’ use Fatal Rickard, scene,” cer on the Plumhoff Krause —also deadly force— - 2012, 2020, -, 134 S.Ct. Amendment his Fourth did not violate (2014) (internal quotations L.Ed.2d reasonably an officer rights. Whether omitted), officer in his and a reasonable “the turns on whether deadly uses force knowing way no would have shoes cause to believe probable officer has intentionally gun his whether Krause fired physi threat of serious suspect poses required not be accidentally would or —and harm, oth the officer or to cal either to for a second shot see. to wait Garner, ers.” Tennessee v. (1985). expert questioned adds that her Offi She 85 L.Ed.2d S.Ct. at all. But gun Krause fired his the whether at Krause after he saw cer Jones fired in the any support lacks argument this An in Officer gun. flash of another officer any such ex- never identified of a record. She saw the flash position Jones’ who —one record does a search of the him, pert, at who knew gun pointing ex- deposition or up report turn armed, had heard Krause was and who pert. argument, option. At she elaborated that a risk-free The reasonably county performed another coroner from a waited until Krause fell asleep opted autopsy second on Krause and did not doubt, find to act then. No plan did not well, any gunpowder residue on his hands. But leaving end us with the seen conse- autopsy performed (the this was Krause quences of the officers’ actions regret- after embalmed, precluding any brother) was reasonable table death of a child and and the inference that Krause did not fire the first possibilities unseen of what might have explaining why all). shot and report itself (perhaps been no death at Yet when nowhere concludes that Krause did not fire the Supreme Court warns lower courts not at Officer Jones. judge the reasonableness of an officer’s action from peace safety of their if right Even Officer Jones had the chambers “with the vision of hind- 20/20 self-defense, deadly use force in she Graham, sight,” 490 U.S. at questions the use of so much force—twen 1865, this is what they mean. ques- The But, ty rounds in all. far so as the record tion for us is: Did the officers act reason- shows, the number of rounds fired ably on based what at knew the time? officer flows from the reasonable decision The answer on this record is: Yes. to engage automatic-trigger function on gun entering before the room. And The concurrence questions the offi no evidence shows that Officer Jones con cers’ decision to enter the bedroom with firing tinued after he knew that he had weapons their set automatically. to fire already incapacitated Krause or that But it why. is not clear Krause had shown Krause given up. police “[I]f officers no concern for safety his own or that of justified are in firing suspect at a in order others many and had threatened times to public to end a severe threat to safety, the shoot the officers if entered. Once officers need not stop shooting until the Krause delivered on his threat and fired at threat has ended.” Jones, Id. agree Officer all that Officer Jones reasonably could fire keep back and could asks, all, Plaintiff why last of the officers firing “until the threat over.” Plum- [was] opted to enter the bedroom instead of hoff, 134 S.Ct. at 2022. agree And all waiting for Krause to exit on his own. But nothing suggests the record that Officer the officers try waiting did hours —ten kept firing Jones even after he knew all devoted to trying to coax Krause out of longer posed Krause no a threat. If it is the bedroom. This not an impulsive may true that officers fire “15 shots” in a entry. rate, At any “the need not span” “10-second when suspect the is not have taken that chance and hoped for the officers, even at the Plumhojf Harris, best.” Scott v. id., allowed, it must be true that officers (2007). 127 S.Ct. 167 L.Ed.2d 686 may return fire with an weapon automatic in Keep mind that Krause never backed Indeed, being upon. are fired off his suicidal threat during the stand-off that, argue accepting Krause does not that emerge to guns firing. assump- with The Jones, Krause shot at Office Officer Jones tion that waiting carried no risks of its own respond could not with shots from an auto that, by reality is belied so far as weapon. matic Not one of the cases cited knew, emerged Krause could have any at by the concurrence contradicts this rule. point and acted on this threat to “come out shooting” or could have taken his own life The concurrence adds that “There was during delay. why That is continuing no need for Matthew Krause to die.” We not, to wait was as the suggests, claimant a agree and have considerable sympathy to him confirms, a serious threat posed that Krause as the record But family. his officers, threat to other and Krause died was that and Matthew the reason every must be neutralized. Officer Jones first. he fired situation, proved dangerous in right such however, express separately, I write he entered the minute dangerous conclu my disagreement with the court’s func- room, the automatic-fire engage for Officer it was reasonable sion entering the room before gun tion on his twenty times. See to shoot Krause Jones entering the room it after and to use majority flatly an at 4-14. The R. 17-6 offer no plaintiffs The upon. fired being of rounds fired nounces that the number law, anything custom or else evidence, case from the reasonable by Jones “flow[ed] says otherwise. engage the auto decision” of the officer The com loose end. That leaves one weapon. Supra matic-fire function of his negligence gross a state law raised plaint 681; I a decision to be neither find such for that explain not basis claim. It did majority The reasonable nor inevitable. to the defendants’ response claim. The that, justified firing, in if an officer is particu of a first, wherein the “reasonableness” fired did not violate where Krause only on when it is “depends Amendment An lar seizure not rights. Krause’s Fourth made, Jones, on it is carried out.” who but also how position officer in the of Officer Connor, 386, 395, 109 threats, that he Graham v. had heard Krause’s knew (1989) 1865, 104 (empha armed, L.Ed.2d 443 muzzle of S.Ct. was and saw the determination re- original). This gun, reasonably Krause’s could determine sis

683 balancing of ‘the nature quires planners may “a careful lishes that be liable under section 1983 to the quality plan of the intrusion on the individ extent that a for a seizure, search or against ap ual’s Fourth Amendment interests’ formulated and proved by defendants, provides those countervailing governmental interests and results in an unconstitutionally exces 396,109 (quot at stake.” Id. at S.Ct. 1865 force.”); sive Young City use of v. Garner, Prov 1, 8, 471 105 ing Tennessee v. of 4, Napolitano, idence ex rel. 404 F.3d 22 (1985)). 1694, 1 S.Ct. 85 L.Ed.2d Of (1st Cir.2005) (“[0]nce it is clear that a course, inquiry the “reasonableness” must occurred, seizure has the court should ex judged objectively, perspective from the be amine the government actions of the offi scene, of a reasonable officer at the seizure.”) leading up cials to the (quotation hindsight, based on and must allow for omitted); Raso, 279, Abraham v. 183 F.3d police “the fact officers are often (3d Cir.1999) 291-92 (disagreeing with judgments.” to make split-second forced “those courts which have analysis held that 397, 109 Id. at S.Ct. 1865. of ‘reasonableness’ under the Fourth struggle why But I to understand requires excluding any Amendment evi majority’s analysis is of exami- bereft dence of preceding events the actual ‘sei nation into the officers decisions not to ”); Smith, Billington zure.’ v. 292 F.3d longer, asleep wait or to leave Krause (9th 1177, Cir.2002) (Police 1188 “could be him, apprehending or at minimum to while held for shooting [suspect] liable —even merely incapacitate, shoot in order to rath- though reasonably shot him at the destroy. er than to Baker v. Compare shooting moment of the —because Hamilton, Ohio, 601, City 471 F.3d 607 in creating used excessive force the situa (6th Cir.2006) (“We repeatedly have held tion which caused [the man] to take the that the after a suspect use force has did.”) omitted); (quotation actions he Hol been incapacitated or neutralized is exces- Harrington, land ex rel. v. 268 Overdorff law.”). sive as a matter of The case sub (10th (The 1179, 1189 Cir.2001) F.3d “total judice Plumhoff, fleeing, is unlike where a ity of surrounding the circumstances a sei reckless motorist “never abandoned his at- immediately zure embraces conduct con tempt during span to flee” the 10-second seizure, nected with the police such as shot him 15 times. 134 S.Ct. arguably conduct creating the need for Here, at 2022. Krause —who admit- force where use of excessive force has tedly gun seemingly armed with a omitted); alleged.”) (quotations been Bella awake, eager once, to die—started fired (10th Chamberlain, 1251, v. 24 F.3d and died in a hail of 20 bullets. Cir.1994) (“Obviously, immediately events connected with the actual seizure are tak fired, Once Krause it is clear that the determining en into account in whether the officer’s decision to return fire was reason reasonable.”); seizure is but v. see Waller surely able. But this court is able to Danville, City Fed.Appx. question pre-shooting also the conduct (4th Cir.2006) (“Although circuits differ on See, e.g., Claybrook law enforcement. v. question pre-shooting how conduct Birchwell, 274 F.3d Cir. weighed should in an be excessive force 2001) (considering earlier in as ease, this circuit repeatedly has held that sessing the reasonableness of ulti officer’s generally such conduct is not relevant and force); mate use of fatal see also Terebesi inadmissible.”). is Torreso, 12-3867, No. 764 F.3d (2d decided, at *11-12 Aug. WL Cir. If for example, officers had 2014) (“Our launcher, clearly carry case law thus estab- grenade with them a or 684 citizen, drone, against any stealthy encroach- from a Predator a strike

call down should be recklessly cre- thereon. Their motto actions which ments other or take risk, be this court would principiis beginnings’].” [‘resist ated excessive obsta 635, officers acted States, 616, whether justified asking 116 6 Boyd v. United Com- preparations. (1886).1 in their unreasonably 524, 29 L.Ed. 746 S.Ct. Bing City v. White- rel. Bing ex pare of immunity qualified The doctrine of Cir.2006) 555, hall, Ohio, 456 F.3d purpose “pro importance serves the of (Even enough great had a police “if the from and its officials tect[ing] State deadly against [defen- force to use interest rights,” of federal John overenforcement they may that do dant], not follow it does Fankell, 911, 919, 117 S.Ct. v. 520 U.S. son desire, say, by burning any way inso (1997), 1800, allowing “of L.Ed.2d 108 than rather his house down harassing act without fear of ficials [to] him.”). that we equally appropriate is It 183, Scherer, litigation,” Davis v. 468 U.S. justified in en- were why officers inquire (1984). 82 L.Ed.2d 139 104 S.Ct. fully- to weapons their set with tering that, sight the blind But must not lose of the fact accept I cannot fire. automatic expected action reasonable. could to conclusion that this an official be “[w]here would violate know that certain conduct more, to deeply troubling is it is What statutory rights, or constitutional that, launching their raid before see be made to-hesitate.” Harlow should Krause, police consid- sleeping against S.Ct. Fitzgerald, truly out- including options, ered other (1982) (emphasis sup 73 L.Ed.2d 396 “using the of SWAT rageous possibility court cannot condemn the plied). This the exterior bring to down team’s tank peace actions of officers “from Krause in to seize wall the bedroom and safety of chambers with the [our] 20/20 deliberation This way.” Supra at 678. hindsight.” Supra (quota vision of disturbing for the fact is not omitted). equally tion But it is incumbent choice, because but opted for a different us, discharging duty “say our to what on option was militarized shockingly such a is,” jurisprudence that we craft a the law apprehension in the even a consideration empower that will eliminate comparison, of a drug low-level dealer. pre encouraging threat while still them merely fully- to use choice officers’ Garner, 10-11, life. 471 U.S. at serve See rifles, shields, and flash- riot automatic (“The deadly use of force is reserved. bang grenades seems almost way apprehending self-defeating jurispruden- But this sort precisely it is felony suspect”; is not better all “[i]t be at all creep tial which must resisted suspects escape. die than that costs; indeed, Supreme long Court as suspect poses no immediate warned, Where the duty of courts to be ago is “[i]t to oth- threat to the officer and no threat rights constitutional watchful for the [Wjhat egregious today will be considered is ior.... action that borderline —but Police be ultimately immunized'—-will tomorrow enough justify will be influ- exclusion also beyond dis- “clearly shielded enced, established” increasingly resulting in diminished recognized pute. has As one commentator right time.” respect to be secure over context, 'steady drumbeat' of "[a] a related Clancy, The Fourth Thomas K. Amendment’s will violations that [Fourth Amendment] Exclusionary Right, Rule as a Constitutional exclusionary subject will be- rule] be to [the (2013) (footnote L. 10 Ohio J.Crim. St. accepted tech- and more come more —not omitted). accepted behav- nical violations—-but as ers, resulting failing the harm from

apprehend justify him does not the use of so.”).

deadly force to do There was no need for Matthew Krause Despite to die. his threats that might shooting,” “come out prepared to enter his asleep, posing bedroom he was danger facing to no one. such

suspect, police do merely must more than array

select from an deadly options threaten an unreasonable risk of death —at safer, simpler options

least when remain. It duty second-guess is not our law emphatically enforcement. But is our duty to ensure that the law reflects our

society’s lives, saving commitment to meaninglessly taking them. reasons,

For respectfully these I concur in part and concur in the judgment. SCROGHAM,

Kenneth Owen Plaintiff-Appellant, Carolyn COLVIN, Acting W. Com- Security,

missioner of Social Defendant-Appellee.

No. 13-3601. Appeals, United States Court of Seventh Circuit. Argued May 2014. Decided Aug. notes motion not either. summary judgment did to fire until the threat has may continue (mentioning phrase See R.17 — Rickard, ended. See Plumhoff v. referencing exces but “gross negligence” —, 188 L.Ed.2d cases). did the motion for Nor sive force (2014). analysis ignores But this claim. mention the See reconsideration of the decisions—and the consideration court could have 4. The district R.21 at thereof —made reasonableness a forfeit undeveloped claim as treated this Indeed, to their entrance. run-up States, 545 Brown v. United ed one. See that, concluding majority has no trouble Cir.2013). It 437-38 Fed.Appx. waiting ten hours for Krause to exit after think, instead, assumed the we generously house, longer a minute waiting claim was on the gross negligence based True, concedes, majority unnecessary. bang flash and shoot same conduct—the plan “the did not end well.” at 681. Supra force claim. R.19 at ing excessive the—as majority to sanction the appears But the just given, the decisions the reasons 8. For arriving officers’ conduct in with blood and and to shoot Krause bang to use thunder, detonating bang despite a flash reasonable, “reckless,” Mich. were pre- sleeping, the fact that Krause was 691.1407(8)(a), § and so do Comp. Laws engaging the automatic-fire modes on their gross negligence. not amount to single weapons, thereby ensuring that a reasons, affirm the district For these trigger pull result in a fusillade. would judgment. court’s officers for use of exces against Claims MARBLEY, Judge, concurring District stop or arrest are during sive force concurring judgment. in the part “the properly analyzed keeping with prohibition against Amendment’s Fourth holding in the court’s that the I concur person,” case, unreasonable seizures of deadly force this officer’s use of

Case Details

Case Name: Sandra Krause v. Brian Jones

Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Date Published: Sep 3, 2014

Citation: 765 F.3d 675

Docket Number: 13-2498

Court Abbreviation: 6th Cir.