473 F. App'x 477
6th Cir.
2012

Sandra CHAMBERS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. State of MICHIGAN, et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 11-1442.

United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.

April 5, 2012.

477

reached a guilty verdict on all eleven counts.

The district court acknowledged its error, but concluded that the error did not warrant a new trial. Under these circumstances, the district court did not act arbitrarily in concluding that the alternate jurors’ presence for the first ten minutes of deliberations, before the twelve non-alternate jurors received the verdict form or trial exhibits, was not grounds to grant a new trial. See United States v. DeBoer, 966 F.2d 1066 (6th Cir.1992) (finding an alternate juror‘s presence in the deliberation room for approximately three minutes as the jury “select[ed] a foreman and commence[d] its deliberations” to be harmless).

D. Constitutionality of Section 841(b)(1)(A) under the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments

O‘Neal challenges the constitutionality of § 841(b)(1)(A)‘s mandatory life sentence for defendants with two or more prior convictions for a felony drug offense, contending that it violates his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process, his Eighth Amendment right against cruel and unusual punishment, and his Fifth Amendment right against double jeopardy. We have previously considered and rejected all of O‘Neal‘s arguments. In United States v. Kelsor, we reiterated our rejection of the “contention that the enhancement of a sentence under § 841(b) on the basis of prior felony drug convictions violates double jeopardy.” 665 F.3d 684, 701 (6th Cir.2011); see also United States v. Pruitt, 156 F.3d 638, 645-46 (6th Cir.1998); United States v. Flowal, 163 F.3d 956, 963 (6th Cir.1998). Furthermore, our decision in Kelsor expressly rejected O‘Neal‘s contention that § 841(b)(1)(A) is cruel and unusual punishment because the “imposition of a life sentence without parole for a third felony drug conviction is not ‘grossly disproportionate’ to the crime.” 665 F.3d at 701; see also United States v. Hill, 30 F.3d 48, 50-51 (6th Cir.1994). Finally, we have found that the lack of discretion afforded to sentencing judges under § 841(b)(1)(A)‘s mandatory life sentence requirement does not offend due process. See United States v. Levy, 904 F.2d 1026, 1034 (6th Cir.1990) (rejecting defendant‘s argument that § 841(b)(1)(A) violates due process because it prevents consideration of mitigating evidence and individualized sentencing determinations).

III. CONCLUSION

The Defendants’ convictions and sentences are AFFIRMED.

Before: SUHRHEINRICH, STRANCH, and DONALD, Circuit Judges.

OPINION

DONALD, Circuit Judge.

Sandra Chambers (“Plaintiff“) filed a complaint for declaratory, injunctive, and equitable relief against Nadine Chambers (“Nadine“), Judge Nick Holowka, the State of Michigan, and Lapeer County Circuit Court (collectively, “the Defendants“) alleging they violated her constitutional rights. Plaintiff appeals the district court‘s grant of the Defendants’ motion to dismiss or alternatively for summary judgment. Plaintiff argues that the district court erred in (1) determining that it lacked jurisdiction, (2) applying the Younger abstention doctrine, and (3) refusing to grant declaratory and injunctive relief. For the following reasons, we affirm.

Background

In 1993, Judge Holowka entered a judgment finalizing a divorce between Plaintiff‘s husband, Merle Chambers (“Merle“), and Nadine, his former wife, and awarding Nadine permanent alimony. In March 2008, Merle filed a motion to modify and/or terminate the permanent alimony obligation based on income reduction from his retirement. In September 2008, Judge Holowka held an evidentiary hearing on Merle‘s motion and on April 27, 2009 issued a written opinion holding that there had been no change in circumstances to warrant a modification of alimony. Judge Holowka considered all income sources for all parties. In December 2008, between the hearing date and issuance of the court‘s opinion, Merle transferred promissory notes, issued by his employer, to Plaintiff. Judge Holowka, nonetheless, considered these promissory notes in the income calculation for Merle‘s motion to modify the alimony he owed Nadine.

On June 24, 2010, Plaintiff filed a Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief against Defendants setting forth nine counts. Plaintiff challenged the constitutionality of Judge Holowka‘s decision to consider certain assets and property in his income calculation determination. On July 26, 2010, Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff appeals from the grant of that motion.

Analysis

Under the domestic relations exception federal courts are precluded from exercising jurisdiction over cases whose substance is generally domestic relations. Barber v. Barber, 62 U.S.(21 How.) 582, 584, 16 L.Ed. 226 (1858). The exception, as articulated by the Supreme Court since Barber, encompasses only cases involving the issuance of a divorce, an award of alimony, or a child custody decree. Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 703, 112 S.Ct. 2206, 119 L.Ed.2d 468 (1992). Even when brought under the guise of a federal question action, a suit whose substance is domestic relations generally will not be entertained in a federal court. Firestone v. Cleveland Trust Co., 654 F.2d 1212, 1215 (6th Cir.1981).

Plaintiff argues that since she is not seeking a divorce, alimony, or child custody decree, the domestic relations exception does not apply. This would be true if Plaintiff‘s complaint did not revolve around a state court order issuing alimony. Although couched as a constitutional violation that deprives her of her marital and personal property, Plaintiff ultimately wants this Court to enjoin the state court from using property she characterizes as her “federally protected ERISA, marital, and personal property” to determine the amount of alimony owed. Based on the domestic relations exception, this Court lacks jurisdiction.

Since the district court lacked jurisdiction over this matter, we affirm on that ground and need not address the issues of abstention or injunctive and declaratory relief.

Accordingly, we affirm the district court‘s judgment.