BRANDON LEE SANDOVAL, Aрpellant, v. STATE OF UTAH, Appellee.
No. 20150617
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
Filed April 3, 2019
2019 UT 13
On Direct Appeal. Third District, Salt Lake. The Honorable Randall N. Skanchy. No. 130907469
Attorneys:
Troy L. Booher, Freyja R. Johnson, Andrew G. Deiss, Jensie L. Anderson, Salt Lake City, for appellant
Sean D. Reyes, Att‘y Gen., Andrew F. Peterson, Asst. Solic. Gen., Salt Lake City, for appellee
JUSTICE HIMONAS authored the opinion of the Court in which CHIEF JUSTICE DURRANT, JUSTICE PEARCE, and JUSTICE PETERSEN joined.
ASSOCIATE CHIEF JUSTICE LEE filed a concurring opinion.
JUSTICE HIMONAS, opinion of the Court:
INTRODUCTION
¶1 Brandon Sandoval appeals the district court‘s summary judgment decision denying his petition for relief under
BACKGROUND
¶2 Sandoval was arrested and charged with aggravated burglary, theft, and criminal mischief in 2006. A jury convicted him on all counts in 2008. The court of appeals affirmed his conviction in 2010, and this court denied his petition for writ of certiorari on June 11,
¶3 Rule 4-206(4)(B) of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration directs court personnel to dispose of valueless property from exhibits in evidence “[a]fter thrеe months have expired from final disposition of the case.” Nearly two years after Sandoval‘s conviction was upheld, on May 9, 2012, court personnel disposed of all physical evidence from his case, including a “black knit beanie cap, [a] blue and white bandana, and [a bullet] shell casing, all of which were likely touched by the perpetrators of the burglary.”2 The Rocky Mountain Innocence Center (RMIC) began investigating Sandoval‘s case in the fall of 2012. On October 24, 2012, RMIC was informed that the evidence used as trial exhibits had not been returned by the court. RMIC was notified by the court regarding the disposal of evidence when it received the actual certificate of destruction on November 2, 2012.
¶4 One year later, on October 30, 2013, Sandoval filed a petition for post-conviction relief under rule 65C of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Sandoval made a number of arguments in the district court. Sandoval primarily argued that he is entitled to relief under
¶5 On appeal, Sandoval has abandoned his claims seeking relief under section 104 of the PCRA. Instead, Sandoval focuses his appeal solely on whether his due process rights under the Utah Constitution were violated when the evidence was destroyed and he became unable to seek post-conviction DNA testing under section 301 of the PCRA.
¶6 We exercise jurisdiction under
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶7 We review for correctness constitutional and statutory interpretation issues,
ANALYSIS
¶8 Sandoval has failed to articulate any relevant section of the PCRA under which he can seek relief. While his original petition alleged the potential for relief under section 104, he has dropped these claims on appeal. He does not present us with any constitutional or statutory violations of his rights that occurred at trial and he has dropped his claim for ineffective assistance of counsel. Accordingly, the PCRA itself offers him no relief.
¶9 Finding no relief in the PCRA, Sandoval presents a standalone state due process argument claiming that, by following rule 4-206(4) of the Utah Rules of Judicial Administration and disposing of the evidence two years after the final disposition of his case, the State violated his state due process rights by stripping him of the ability to exercise the right to post-conviction DNA testing created by section 301 of the PCRA. He additionally asserts that the lack of direct notice of the pending destruction of the evidence violated his due process rights. We do not pаss on these due process claims for a number of reasons. First, these claims are improperly before us, having been shoehorned into Sandoval‘s rule 65C petition. Second, even if these claims were procedurally proper, Sandoval has not carried his burden in persuading us that (1) such a due process right exists and (2) if that right exists, the destruction of the evidence violated that right. We therefore affirm the district court‘s grant of summary judgment.
Section 104 of the PCRA
¶10 Once all legal remedies—including a direct appeal—have been exhausted, the PCRA is the sole statutory remedy for any person who challenges a conviction or sentence for a criminal offense.
¶11 The relevant portions of section 104 require Sandoval to show either that his conviction was obtained or his sentence was imposed in the face of some constitutional or statutory violation or that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. See supra ¶ 4 n.3. Sandoval cannot demonstrate any such violation. He has dropped all appeals that pertain to any supposed due process violations at or before trial or during sentencing—as enumerated in subsections 104(1)(a)–(c)—and no longer asserts ineffectiveness of counsel under subsection 104(1)(d). The relief he now seeks is no longer rooted in section 104. Instead, he seeks relief on the basis that evidence was destroyed after his conviction was obtained and his sentence was imposed—a basis on which the PCRA offers no statutory remedy. See
Sandoval‘s as-applied challenge
¶12 No doubt because Sandoval recognizes that the PCRA itself offers him no remedy, on appeal he has staged an as-applied challenge under seсtion 301 of the PCRA, claiming that destruction of the evidence in accordance with rule 4-206 violated his due process rights under the Utah Constitution.
¶13 As an initial matter, a rule 65C petition is an improper procedural vessel for bringing standalone due process claims. Because rule 65C provides the procedure for filing a petition for post-conviction relief under the PCRA, a proper rule 65C petition must seеk relief under specific provisions of the PCRA. While Sandoval presented this type of claim below, his appeal has abandoned any such claims. See supra ¶ 10. Sandoval‘s standalone due process claim is therefore improperly before us. However, even if we allowed Sandoval to shift the focus of his rule 65C petition to a due process inquiry separated from the statutory rights granted by the PCRA, he has failed to carry his burden here in demonstrating a due process violation under the Utah Constitution.
¶14 Relying on a federal standard, District Attorney‘s Office for Third Judicial District v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52 (2009), Sandoval asserts that by enacting section 301 and providing procedures for post-conviction DNA testing the State created a substantive right to post-conviction DNA testing. Sandoval then asserts that this right to DNA testing creates a “liberty interest” in any procedures that are “essential to the realization” of the right created by the PCRA and that the state-created right to DNA testing begets “yet other rights to procedures essential to the realization of the parent right.” Osborne, 557 U.S. at 68. Therefore he claims that, by following rule 4-206(4) and disposing of post-conviction evidence, the State violated his state due process rights by stripрing him of the ability to exercise the right to DNA testing created by the PCRA. Sandoval has failed to do the requisite leg-work to persuade this court that (1) such a right exists under the Utah Constitution, and (2) even if such a right existed, the destruction of the evidence violated that right.
¶15 We have stated that “[t]here will be times when the legislature enacts laws that confer substantive rights . . . [and sometimes] the procedures attached to the substantive right cannot be stripped away without leaving the right or duty created meaningless.” State v. Drej, 2010 UT 35, ¶ 31, 233 P.3d 476. But Sandoval has not presented us with focused briefing on this issue. Instead, Sandoval simply argues that Osborne, a fеderal due process case, mandates the recognition of specific rights under the Utah Constitution. After citing Osborne for the proposition that such rights exists—an unclear proposition5—he turns to the Tiedemann standard, a state due process case discussing pre-trial destruction
¶16 Sandoval cannot establish state constitutional rights to post-conviction DNA testing—and any procedural rights related thereto—by citing to a federal case. Instead, Sandoval would havе to demonstrate that the due process clause of the Utah Constitution provides such rights. Such an argument would likely involve a thorough examination of Utah‘s constitutional history in an attempt to show that the original public meaning of the due process clause considered and encompassed such a right. Sandoval has not made that argument. Accordingly, we decline to comment on whether state due process dictates that the PCRA, by providing the right to DNA testing, creates a substantive right to post-conviction evidence retention, noticing, or any procedures related thereto.
¶17 Furthermore, even if such a right existed, Sandoval has not carried his burden in explaining why the destruction of the evidence violated that right. Sandoval argues that his supposed due process right was violated when the State destroyed the evidence two years after the final disposition of the case without giving Sandoval actual notice. But Sandoval fails to adequately explain why he was entitled to actual notice or why two years was an insufficient amount of time for him to exercise his statutory right to post-conviction DNA testing. Although Sandoval was not given actual notice of the destruction of the evidence, he did have constructive notice—in the form of rule 4-206—that the evidence would only be retained for three months. Sandoval does not explain why this constructive notice was insufficient, instead opting to squeeze his notice arguments into the Tiedemann framework—which he has failed to demonstrate is the appropriate framework in these cases. Additionally, Sandoval fails to argue that the two years between the final disposition of his case and the destruction of the evidence was an insufficient amount of time for him to avail himself of the DNA testing statute for purposes of due process. For these reasons, Sandoval‘s standalone due process claim fails.8
Rule 4-206
¶18 Because we foresee a potential due process challenge in a future case we now wish to comment on rule 4-206. Subsection (4) prescribes the procedure for disposing of exhibits used in evidence after final disposition of a case. The three-month time limit functionally imposes a temporal bar on the rights afforded to the convicted by the PCRA because the preservation of their evidence is not guaranteed beyond three months. Additionally, there is no formal notice sent to the convicted aside from the publication of the rule. We note that the Judicial Council may wish to explore whether the three-month time limit imposed by the rule so limits the rights granted by the PCRA as to implicate
CONCLUSION
¶19 A convicted fеlon may seek to have their conviction modified or vacated through the rights and remedies provided by the PCRA. Sandoval has failed to comply with any relevant section of the PCRA that could offer him relief. Additionally, he has failed to properly bring a case that demonstrates that the disposal of evidence years after the final disposition of his trial violated his state due process rights. As a consequence, we do not here decide what, if any, procedures are called for by the state due process clause regarding the right to post-conviction DNA tеsting. We affirm the district court.
ASSOCIATE CHIEF JUSTICE LEE, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment:
¶20 The case before us on appeal was filed in the district court under the Postconviction Remedies Act (PCRA),
¶21 The majority gives some effect to this provision. In affirming the dismissal of the claims presented on appeal the majority notes that “Sandoval has abandoned all claims seeking relief under the PCRA” and correctly concludes that “[t]he relief he now seeks is [not] rooted in section 104.” Supra ¶¶ 10, 11. Sandoval‘s remaining claim asserts that his right to due process was violated “when the evidence was destroyed without actual notice nearly two years after the final disposition of [this] case.” Supra ¶ 12. Because this claim seeks relief on “a basis оn which the PCRA offers no statutory remedy,” the court rightly holds that this claim is foreclosed by the sole remedy provision of the PCRA and is thus not properly before us on this appeal. Supra ¶¶ 11, 13 (holding that “Sandoval‘s standalone due process claim is therefore improperly before us“).
¶22 The majority fails to carry this conclusion to its logical end, however. Despite holding that Sandoval‘s claim is foreclosed by the PCRA, the majority nonetheless proceeds to opine on the merits of an asserted due process right to postconviction DNA testing. See supra ¶¶ 14–17. I write separately because I respectfully disagree with this portion of the court‘s opinion. By rejecting Sandoval‘s due process claim the majority fails to give effect to the sole remedy provision of the PCRA. Importantly, the court also runs afoul of the doctrine of constitutional avoidance.1
¶23 The doctrine of constitutional avoidance is an important “principle of judicial
¶24 The majority overrides this doctrine. Despite its conclusion that Sandoval‘s claims are statutorily barred, the court rejects Sandoval‘s claims on the alternative ground that they fail on their merits. It states that “even if we allowed Sandoval to shift the focus of his rule 65C petition to a due process inquiry separated from the statutory rights granted by the PCRA, he has failed to carry his burden here in demonstrating a due process violation under the Utah Constitution.” Suprа ¶ 13. In so doing the court proceeds to analyze the due process questions presented in this case—outlining a basis for a party to “demonstrate that the due process clause of the Utah Constitution” may establish a right to post-conviction DNA testing, supra ¶ 16, and adopting a standard for judging whether the the assertion of a purportedly meritorious constitutional claim. That is not the same thing. The constitutionality of the PCRA as applied to a particular claim cannot turn on whether the underlying claim is itself meritorious. (That would result in an odd scheme in which the threshold right to assert a сlaim would depend on whether the claim ultimately succeeds on its merits. I know of no constitutional principle that works like that; Sandoval certainly has not attempted to identify one.) It must instead depend on whether the legislature exceeded its constitutional authority in acting to foreclose a particular claim. Sandoval has raised no such as-applied challenge. And this accordingly cannot be a basis for overriding the doctrine of constitutional avoidance.
destruction of evidence would “violate[] that right” assuming “such a right existed.” Supra ¶ 17.3
¶25 We should not be opining on matters of state constitutional law in a case in which the constitutional claim is foreclosed by statute. Doing so ignores the sole remedy provision of the PCRA4 and fails to honor the doctrine of constitutional avoidance.
Notes
An as-applied challenge to the PCRA would identify a basis in the constitution for foreclosing the legislature‘s authority to limit the grounds for postconviction review to those set forth by the legislature. Such challenges have been raised in recent cases before this court. In Patterson v. State (No. 20180108) for example, the petitioner asserts that the sole remedy provision of the PCRA is unconstitutional to the extent it forecloses the authority of the Utah courts to issue “extraordinary writs” under article VIII of the Utah Constitution. Brief for Petitioner at 34, Patterson v. State (No. 20180108). Sandoval would be free to raise this kind of challenge to the PCRA. He is entitled to show that the PCRA exceeds the legislature‘s constitutional authority as applied to his case. But he has not attempted to do so—not in the district court, and not in the briefs on appeal.
Instead of raising an as-applied challenge to the constitutionаlity of the PCRA, Sandoval has simply asserted that he has a meritorious constitutional claim that is foreclosed by the PCRA. See supra ¶ 11 (noting that Sandoval “seeks relief on the basis that evidence was destroyed after his conviction was obtained and his sentence was imposed—a basis on which the PCRA offers no remedy“). But that is not an as-applied challenge to the constitutionality of the PCRA. It is (continued . . .)
[A] person who has been convicted and sentenced for a criminal offense may file an action in the district court of original jurisdiction for post-conviction relief to vacate or modify the conviction or sentence upon the following grounds:
(a) the conviction was obtained or the sentence was imposed in violation of the United States Constitution or Utah Constitution;
(b) the conviction was obtained or the sentence was imposed under a statute that is in violation of the United States Constitution or Utah Constitution, or the conduct for which the petitioner was prosecuted is constitutionally protected;
(c) the sentence was imposеd or probation was revoked in violation of the controlling statutory provisions;
(d) the petitioner had ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of the United States Constitution or Utah Constitution