Louis SANDOVAL, Appellant (Plaintiff Below), v. Cynthia Marie HAMERSLEY, Appellee (Defendant Below)
No. 3-280A43
Court of Appeals of Indiana, Third District
April 27, 1981
Rehearing Denied June 4, 1981
419 N.E.2d 813
“When a new trial is granted because the verdict, findings or judgment do not accord with the evidence, the court shall make special findings of fact upon each material issue or element of the claim or defense upon which a new trial is granted. Such finding shall indicate whether the decision is against the weight of the evidence or whether it is clearly erroneous as contrary to or not supported by the evidence; if the decision is found to be against the weight of the evidence, the findings shall relate the supporting and opposing evidence to each issue upon which a new trial is granted; if the decision is found to be clearly erroneous as contrary to or not supported by the evidence, the findings shall show why judgment was not entered upon the evidence.”
In Nissen Trampoline Company v. Terre Haute First National Bank (1976) 265 Ind. 457, 358 N.E.2d 974, our Supreme Court spoke of the procedural requirements for the lawful grant of a new trial as “paramount.” Id. at 978. Justice DeBruler wrote:
“The purpose of authorizing the trial judge to grant a new trial, when the judge considers the verdict to be against the weight of the evidence, is to erase the occasional unsupportable jury verdict. It is to supplant that which is irrational with something that is rational. An order of court can fulfill this extraordinary and extreme function only if it is based upon a complete analysis of the relevant facts and applicable law, and sets out on paper the constituent parts of that analysis. It is compliance with the arduous and time-consuming requirements of the Rule which provides assurance to the parties and the courts that the judge‘s evaluation of the evidence is better than the evaluation of the jury.”
Id. In the present case the trial court granted a new trial but made no special findings of fact as required by the rule. Nor did the trial court‘s entry relate supporting and opposing evidence on the issues reserved for a new trial. From the trial court‘s statement, “the Court finds ... no tenable basis in the evidence upon which to impute contributory negligence to the plaintiff,” we infer the trial court found insufficient evidence on the issue of contributory negligence, yet chose not to preclude relitigation of that issue. In such a case it was incumbent upon the trial court to explain why judgment on the evidence was not entered as to the issue of the plaintiff‘s negligence.
In short, the trial court failed to comply with the mandatory provisions of our trial rules which govern the granting of a new trial. There is, however, no indication that the trial court‘s order cannot be corrected after a remand. This cause is therefore remanded to the trial court with instructions that the court‘s order of July 25, 1980 be revised so as to comply with
MILLER, J., and YOUNG, P. J., concur.
Lenore S. Perry, Legal Aid Society of Gary, Inc., Gary, for appellant.
Robert E. Stochel, Merrillville, for appellee.
STATON, Judge.
Sandoval‘s appeal from the dismissal of his Petition to Establish Paternity has been consolidated with his appeal from the granting of the Hamersleys’ Petition for Adoption for the purposes of our review. While raising a number of issues for our consideration, Sandoval asks, in essence, whether the court erred in dismissing his paternity petition on the basis of the statute of limitations as set forth in
We reverse and remand.
Initially, we note that the alleged errors, as set out in Sandoval‘s appeal from the dismissal of his Petition to Establish Paternity deal basically with a statute of limitations question. He claims that because the court improperly relied upon the statute of limitations, set forth in
In appealing the granting of the adoption petition, Sandoval claims, among other things that the court erred by not making a specific finding as to the issue of paternity. He claims that “the resolution of that issue was the pivotal point upon which all his rights vested, it was incumbent upon the Court to make a finding upon the issues in order to render a just decision in the adoption.” We agree.
Pursuant to Sandoval‘s Trial Rule 52 motion, the court made findings of fact and conclusions of law in the granting of the Hamersleys’ adoption petition. The following findings of fact are pertinent to our discussion:
“3. That the natural mother of said child is Cynthia Marie Hamersley and that she has given her consent to the adoption of Lisa Rosemarie Hamersley by the Petitioners herein;
“4. That in her verified consent the natural mother, Cynthia Marie Hamersley stated that the natural father is unknown;
“5. The [sic] the minor child Lisa Rosemarie Hamersley was born out of wedlock and child‘s paternity was never established;
“6. That Cross-Petitioner, Louis Sandoval asserts that he is the putative father of Lisa Rosemarie Hamersley and filed objections to adoption of child by Petitioners;
“7. That the natural mother, Cynthia Marie Hamersley and Cross-Petitioner Louis Sandoval, on occasions during their teenage years lived together;
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“11. That prior to the hearing of this matter Shirley Sandoval and Louis Sandoval filed with the Court their Cross-Petition for the Adoption of Lisa Rosemarie Hamersley;
“12. That Shirley Sandoval and Louis Sandoval have insufficient standing in which to object to the Petition for Adoption filed by Cynthia Jane Hamersley and James William Hamersley;”
The purpose of making findings of facts and conclusions of law is to provide the parties and the reviewing courts with the theory upon which the case was decided. Such findings effectively preserve the right of review for error. Miller v. Ortman (1956), 235 Ind. 641, 136 N.E.2d 17. Generally, the requirement of making such “special findings” has been interpreted to mean all those facts necessary for a judgment for the party in whose favor the conclusions of law are rendered. The trial court need not recite the evidence in detail as long as the ultimate facts found are stated in the findings. Salk v. Weinraub (1979), Ind., 390 N.E.2d 995. In order to determine whether the findings are adequate, we will look to see if they are sufficient to disclose a valid basis under the issues for the legal result reached in the judgment. In so doing, we will accept the findings made by the trial court if they are supported by evidence of probative value. In Re Marriage of Miles (1977), Ind.App., 362 N.E.2d 171. We may, however, add nothing to the findings of fact by way of presumption, inference or intendment. Malbin & Bullock, Inc. v. Hilton (1979), Ind.App., 387 N.E.2d 1332, 1334.
When one considers that the foregoing findings are the only findings which are even remotely related to the paternity issue, it becomes apparent that a finding necessary to the judgment is missing. Even when we construe the findings together in support of the judgment, Malbin & Bullock, Inc., supra, they are insufficient, in this respect, to disclose a valid basis for the legal result reached. The court found only that the “child‘s paternity was never established;”5 it never stated that Sandoval was or was not the father of Lisa Rosemarie Hamersley. From these findings, we are not allowed to imply anything other than a paternity relationship was never established. The findings are, in fact, neutral as to the identity of the father.
A finding as to whether Sandoval is or is not the father of Lisa Rosemarie Hamersley is crucial to the proper disposition of the adoption petition. If Sandoval is found to be the father of Lisa, his posture in the matter of the Hamersleys’ Petition for Adoption would be changed from one who has no standing,
Reversed and remanded.
GARRARD, J., concurs.
HOFFMAN, P. J., dissents with opinion.
HOFFMAN, Presiding Judge, dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the majority‘s conclusion that this case should be remanded for a specific finding of fact as to Sandoval‘s alleged paternity.
“(a) Except as otherwise provided in this section, a petition to adopt a child under eighteen [18] years of age may be granted only if written consent to adoption has been executed by:
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(2) The mother of a child born out of wedlock and the father of such a child whose paternity has been established by a court proceeding;
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“(g) Consent to adoption is not required of:
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(2) The natural father of a child born out of wedlock whose paternity has not been established by a court proceeding[.]” (Emphasis added.)
I agree with the majority that Sandoval suffered no prejudice as a result of the dismissal of his petition to establish paternity. Sandoval had an ample opportunity to present evidence of paternity during the adoption proceeding. The key issue is whether the trial court erred in finding that paternity was never established.
Sandoval had the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he was the natural father of Lisa. The trial court‘s finding that paternity was never established was a negative judgment against Sandoval. Where an appellant has suffered a negative judgment in a bench trial in which the trial court made specific findings of fact and conclusions of law, that judgment may be disturbed only if clearly erroneous.
The evidence in this case is not without conflict. Sandoval presents evidence of his cohabitation with the mother and his support of the child for a time after her birth. On the other hand, in the mother‘s verified consent to the adoption she stated that the father of Lisa is unknown. There is also evidence that Sandoval voluntarily established his paternity of two prior children but failed to do so in Lisa‘s case. Additionally, the evidence shows that while Lisa was in the custody of the Hamersleys, Sandoval failed to communicate significantly with her. Although Sandoval presented much testimony to show that he was unable to communicate with Lisa due to the efforts of both her mother and the Hamersleys, the issue before the court was not whether the child was abandoned under
Consent to adoption is not required of the natural father whose child was born out of wedlock unless his paternity has been established by a court proceeding. The evidence is sufficient to sustain the trial court‘s finding that paternity was not established. Sandoval‘s consent was not required. I would therefore affirm the judgments of both trial courts.