OPINION
This is an appeal from a conviction for the offense of robbery by assault. Punishment was assessed by a jury at 42 years.
The record reflects that at approximately 2:00 A.M. on the morning of October 6, 1969, Michael Wayne Gibson was assaulted and robbed by three mеn, one of whom he identified as the appellant. Shortly thereafter, appellant and his two companions were аrrested by Officer J. T. White, of the Dallas Police Department; and Gibson’s watch, which had been taken during the robbery, was found on the flоor of the automobile in which the three were riding. Also recovered from the automobile was a knife, which Gibson identified as bеing the one used during the robbery.
The sufficiency of the evidence is not challenged.
After the jury had been selected, appellant filed a motion requesting that the court appoint a psychiatrist to determine appellant’s “mental status to stand trial.” In support of this request, the motion related that appellant had “just gotten out of Terrell Hospital the day before the robbery, Oct. 6, 1969, and that his treatment had been for drinking intoxiсating liquor that he had also been in Woodlawn Hospital about 5 years ago.”
This motion was granted by the trial court, and a doсtor was appointed to make the examination. The next day, out of the presence of the jury and prior to the stаte putting on its case on the merits, appellant was placed on the stand for the purpose of evaluating his cоmpetency to stand trial. Appellant testified that his sole reason for being in Terrell was for drinking. He tes *872 tified that he felt he had adequately communicated with his attorney and that he was able to be of assistance to his attorney during the trial.
After this testimony, his attorney stated:
“Your Honor, fоr purposes of the record, I would only add that I have seen Mr. Sandlin on four or five occasions at jail. I have received a statement from him in writing, his own handwriting about what happened. It is perfectly legible and perfectly understandable. I have undеrstood and communicated with him in detail about what happened as far as he does remember. I was extremely surprised, I might аdd, when I learned about any prior drinking problems as far as his mental condition is concerned yesterday. I think there is no communiсation problem. I feel like I can help him and he can help me. I would only add in the record that Dr. Pickard is expectеd just for safety’s sake to examine him at some length and Dr. Grig-son at a later date just as a safeguard. I don’t feel it is necessary аt this time. I feel that he is perfectly sane.”
The court then stated, without objection:
“Let the record show that all parties agree to go ahead with the trial and the Court approves of the request of the State and the Defendant’s attorney that Dr. Grigson examine this Defendant at the eаrliest possible date for a definite determination of his mental status.” 1
Complaint is now made that the court erred in failing to obtain a jury finding on the issue of appellant’s competency to-stand trial.
The test for determining incompetency to stand trial is “whether [the defendant] has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding — and whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.” Dusky v. United States,
Ground of error number one is overruled. 2
After the jury had returned a verdict of guilty and prior to the punishment hearing, appellant moved for a mistrial on the ground that the court had erred in failing to empanel a jury to hear the issue of present insanity. This motion was overruled, but the court granted a hearing on this issue which was held subsequent to the punishment stage of the trial. At such hearing, the сourt submitted to the jury the issues of appellant’s competency to stand trial, insanity as a defense, and post convictiоn insanity. The jury determined that appellant was sane during each of the three periods.
Appellant now complains of error allegedly committed at such hearing. We have determined that these grounds of error are not properly befоre this court.
No issue of insanity as a defense was raised at the guilt or innocence stage of the trial;
3
nor was a requested charge on
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this issue submitted; and no objеction to the court’s charge appears in the record. Having failed to raise this issue at the trial, it cannot be raised for the first time after the trial. Fuller v. State, Tex.Cr.App.,
Appellant, having had this issue submitted to the jury at the post-trial hearing even though hе was not entitled to such issue, cannot complain of error. 4
Furthermore, no appeal lies from a judgment rendered in a hearing on the issue of insanity. Martin v. State, Tex.Cr.App.,
Next, appellant contends that the trial court erred by overruling his objection to argument by the prosecution at the punishment stage of the trial. The argument of which complaint is made is:
“In determining the punishment of this case, you are instructed not to discuss among yourselves how long the defendant will be required to serve any sentenсe. Such matters come within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Board of Pardons and Parols Office.”
This statement merely paraрhrased the court’s charge and does not constitute a comment on the operation of the laws regarding parоles. No reversible error is shown. See generally, Hernandez v. State, Tex.Cr.App.,
Finding no reversible error, the judgment is affirmed.
Notes
. We conclude that tills was tantamount to withdrawаl of the motion. See Article 46.02, See. 1, Vernon’s Ann.C.C.P.
. We do not interpret the holding of the United States Supreme Court in Pate v. Robinson,
.He did raise the issue of temporary insanity induced by the use of alcohоlic beverages in mitigation of punishment. At the post-trial hearing, he produced the *873 same evidence on this issue to which he had alluded in his pre-trial motion for psychiatric examination.
. This opinion is not to be construed as necessarily approving the procedure utilized in this case.