64 Cal. App. 3d 634 | Cal. Ct. App. | 1976
Opinion
In this declaratory relief action the trial court held that a homeowner’s insurance policy issued by defendant did not cover fire loss of a bam owned by plaintiffs Sandgren and Larimer. The Sandgrens appeal.
For the most part, the facts are stipulated. Mr. and Mrs. Sandgren lived at 3443 Nuestro Road, Yuba City. In 1964 they took out a
Although the stipulation did not describe the uses to which the bam was put, Mr. Sandgren testified it was used for the storage of personal property and also for cattle and sheep kept by his children as part of 4-H projects.
The insurance policy issued by defendant contains an extension clause permitting application of 10 percent of the policy limit to “private stmctures appertaining to the described premises of said dwelling and located thereon ....”
The bam was destroyed by fire in August 1973. The trial court concluded that the bam was neither appertaining to nor located upon the premises described in the policy and was not covered.
The trial court decided correctly. Contrary to plaintiff’s contention, the extension clause is not ambiguous. The face sheet of the policy gives the street address of the named insured. It then declares: “The described residence premises covered hereunder is [j/c] located at the above address, unless otherwise stated herein.” The policy contains no other description or designation of the insured premises. The extension clause describes two conjunctive, inseparable features of the covered private structures: (1) they must be appertaining to the described premises, and (2) they must be located “thereon,” i.e., on the described premises.
Out-of-state decisions construe the word “appurtenant” either in terms of use (i.e., as an auxiliary to the main dwelling) or in terms of the property’s location on the parcel or tract of land covered by the policy. (See Annot. 43 A.L.R.3d 1362.) Were appurtenance the only characteristic employed in the policy, the ambiguity of the clause would be self-evident. The policy goes farther. Not only must the structure be appertaining; it must also be “located thereon,” that is, on the insured premises, that is, on the premises described by the street number and designation, 3443 Nuestro Road, Yuba City.
A renewed insurance policy is chronologically new but perpetuates the terms and conditions of the original policy unless the parties provide otherwise. (Stowe Township v. Standard Life Ins. Co. (3rd Cir. 1975) 507 F.2d 1332, 1336; Davis v. Travelers Insurance Company (Iowa) 196 N.W.2d 526, 530; see additional cases cited, 44 C.J.S., Insurance, § 285, p. 1133, notes 64-65.)
Plaintiffs’ charge of ambiguity is simply a verbalism designed to fasten the insurer with expanded coverage of property at a new location without notice to or consent of the insurer. The so-called ambiguity arises entirely from plaintiff’s ex parte act of acquiring an undivided interest in a parcel which, in one part of its periphery, shared a common boundary with the parcel occupied by the insured dwelling. So described, the claim of ambiguity is self-defeating.
The annotation, 43 A.L.R.2d 1362, collects a small group of out-of-state cases dealing with the problem of “appurtenant” structures. To a greater or less degree, all these cases are distinguishable from the case at bar. For what it is worth, Bowlin v. Federated Mutual Implement & H. Ins. Co. (1962) 210 Tenn. 205 [357 S.W.2d 337], described on page 1367 of the A.L.R. annotation, is most similar on the facts.
Judgment affirmed.
Puglia, P. J., and Paras, J., concurred.
A petition for a rehearing was denied December 24, 1976, and the petition of the plaintiffs and appellants for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied February 3, 1977.