Sanders v. Wright

SANDERS, Appellant/Cross- Donald

Appellee,

Stephen WRIGHT, Appellee/Cross- C.

Appellant. 92-CV-307,

Nos. 92-CV-440.

District of Appeals. Columbia Court of

Argued Feb. 1994.

Decided June Regan,

Patrick M. whom Marc Fied- DC, Long, Washington, ler and E. Victor brief, appellant/cross-appellee. were on Rockville, MD, Ethridge, ap- Paul H. pellee/eross-appellant. FERREN, Judge,*

Before Acting Chief After and Mitchell determined KING, injuries and and that neither as a result SCHWELB Associate had sustained Judges. of the Mitchell exited her vehicle determine the condition of the driver KING, Judge: Associate vehicle with which she had collided. She steering slumped found over his court, Appellant, in plaintiff ap- wheel, having suffered head Mitch- peals damages reduction awarded ell walked her car her back to and activated to him in this action. so, emergency As she an off- flashers. did Appellee Wright cross-appeals the denial of uniform, officer, duty police in who was not judgment notwithstanding his motion for stopped inquire about the accident. After verdict. Since we conclude that two, remaining a moment or the officer denying appellee’s erred motion for departed, stating po- she call for judgment notwithstanding the verdict we do and officer nev- lice rescue assistance. That respect reach claim with however, scene; er returned to the accident damages award. emergency personnel approximately arrived ten minutes later. I. Meanwhile, appellant had Mitch- exited the During evening February 11, the late on standing ell vehicle was on the shoulder and 1988, Wright driving was his automobile passenger the road door of between on Interstate southbound Southeast guardrail. During the that vehicle and the Washington. Appellant passenger awas moments, traffic next few on the Mitchell, vehicle driven which Geraldine passed by inci- the accident scene without travelling was the same at direction af- Approximately dent. five to ten minutes unspecified Wright’s distance behind vehicle. collision, however, a vehicle ter initial The weather conditions were described as Jones,2 engine driven James with the raining “heavy bad: it had been and off at roaring,3 sped ramp from off the access times, times,” light temperature Capitol appellant, and South Street struck thirty-five visibility forty degrees, who was still on the shoulder be- fair, wet, heavy the road was and guardrail. tween the Mitchell vehicle and the posted travelling speed below limit. collision, appellant a result suf- As of that exit, Capitol Wright, Near Street South injuries, including partial fered severe observing lights the brake activate leg, amputation his left as as serious well him, travelling applied

vehicle in front of damage, requiring surgery reconstructive causing begin spin- own brakes his vehicle to grafts, leg. to his ning out-of-control. Mitchell’s vehicle then vehicle, Wright’s pushing Appellant Superior collided with it fif- this action in the filed thirty against Wright. Appellant teen to feet. Both came to also cars rest Court brought an on the of the road one-behind- action in the United Dis- shoulder States front, the-other. vehicle was trict Court for the District of Columbia Jones; pointed Hill both vehicles were in the same di- James Edward Cedar Inc., Cemetery, they travelling before the vehicle rection which owned Jones; Corporation, par- collision.1 HIG * gave Judge Judge impression an Associate of this court behavior Jones was Ferren him changed argument. eyes at the time of His status under influence of alcohol because his Acting Judge red, forth, on March 1994. swayed there he back and Chief was, was a smell of alcohol on his breath. There part Appellant at trial testified however, appellee testimony from Mitchell and tires,” “hangs extend- over the they did not smell alcohol on Jones’ breath. Mitchell, roadway; stated ed into the deposition, jury, her read to 3.According testimony, to Mitchell’s Jones’ car way her car all the off the road.” “was travelling speed had to be at an be- excessive trial, engine "roaring” Rainey, operator would not be other- Clayton truck 2. At the tow wise. testified that Jones’ demeanor and at the (citation (D.C.1984) ter, company Cemetery; 479 A.2d ent of Cedar Hill omitted). Marketing Technology, quotation judg- Innovative Mr. internal marks (the defendants”). employer may only “HIG notwithstanding verdict ment juror settled with the HIG defendants awarded when “no be for million. After this settlement with $1.9 opponent a of the mo- reach verdict for the defendants, appellant the HIG entered into a McKnight Properties tion.” v. Wire stipulation Wright, provided (citations with which (D.C.1972) 405, A.2d 406 and 288 purposes liability, judg- of in case of a for omitted). “Thus, upon review of a footnote Court, Superior ment in favor of n.o.v., judgment question for us is not the Wright joint a tortfea- be considered there evidence the whether is sufficient sor. findings support and decision of record judge, jury a of rea- [trial] but whether liability phase

At the of the trial before properly women] men Webber, [and sonable Judge jury returned a verdict appellant, a favor of finding have reached verdict in Wright liable for party proof upon the onus of judgment motion whom notwithstand- Chesapeake ing imposed.” & verdict or for a was thereaf- Faniel v. Potomac new (D.C.1979) (cita- Co., damages 147, phase denied. 404 ter Tel. A.2d 150 omitted). Kann, jury Judge trial before von award- and tion internal modifications $1,900,000, which, apparently ed coinci-

dence, cases, is identical to the sum received in the such as the Judge settlement with the defendants. HIG one, question proximate of instant Kann, ruling Wright von was entitled to usually question jury. a fact for the is of pro a tanto credit the settlement based Freeman, 477 A.2d District Columbia v. of HIG, by appellant reached entered a (D.C.1984). 713, question 716 “The becomes judgment of now claims that $0. law, however, one of evidence ad Judge von Kann error committed because support a at trial will not rational duced damages pro should have reduced rata (citation finding proximate of cause.” Id. pro Wright Judge tanto. contends Web- omitted).5 is a test of “Proximate cause erred in ber his denial the motion for proba natural is the whether judgment notwithstanding the verdict. As consequence negligence wrong ble above, we that the noted conclude motion for ought light act ful to be foreseen judgment notwithstanding the verdict Coleman, Corp. v. the circumstances.” Ceco we, therefore, granted should have been (D.C.1982) (citations 940, 441 A.2d 944 respect do not consider the raised with issue omitted). par internal modification third damages.4 ty’s negligence superseding a cause of is actor original “where the should not harm

II. (citations Id. anticipated that act.” have omitted). analysis by an act a begin observing “A cause is We our person its judgment “[a] motion for notwithstand third or other force 50(b) prevents being actor from Super.Ct.Civ.R. the verdict under intervention evidence, granted only for harm which his anteced be when the liable to another light factor in viewed favorable to the ent is substantial most only bringing (Second) nonmoving party, permits one reason about.” Restatement (1965). Therefore, 440, § proper judgment.” conclusion as to at 465 able Torts Ass’n, only Washington Wright’s primary negligence could be Inc. v. Poindex- Welfare sonably Appellee Wright challenges jury is the in- find that also superseding cause. injury, question struction on the issue of is one for the cause of the court); trial court Since we conclude that the erred in Washington Transit Auth. v. Metro. Area submitting jury, we do not reach the case to the Jones, 45, (en banc) (D.C.1982) (only 443 A.2d issue either. can be drawn cases where one conclusion law on rule as matter of should McCoy Quadrangle Corp., Dev. 5. See also v. cause). (if (D.C.1983) there are no facts A.2d jury could rea- or circumstances from which Tull, injury.” appellant’s injuries if He relies Walton (1962), “played bringing contending it Ark. substantial 356 S.W.2d injuries sufficiently ... are injury] [and about the of Walton “facts compel reasonably proba- either a direct result or a close to of this case so as those Freeman, that, too, question consequence ble of the act.” conclusion here su- negligence proximately pra, (quoting [appellee’s] 477 A.2d at 715 whether STANDARDIZED Juey properly is one [appellant’s] caused Civil Instructions for the District (Rev. 1981)). Appellant’s Columbia, No. 5.11 to decide.” reliance on ed. misplaced. Walton is There is no case, passenger In that Tull was a in a losing initial collision caused the control being by wagon station driven Walton. As of vehicle. The evidence established that ear, attempted pass to another Walton the Mitchell vehicle collided with by Brigham, began Brigham the a left- out-of-control, spun into vehicle after it turn, causing vehicles to collide. The the two path Mitchell of the vehicle. There was stop on the vehicles “came to a lefthand testimony also uncontradicted that the cars facing origi- in their highway, shoulder of the came to rest on the of the road shoulder Walton, supra, nal direction of travel.” thirty to feet from fifteen the site of Brigham’s vehicle com- S.W.2d at 21. Although differing impact. initial there was road, pletely Walton’s vehicle off the while testimony any part about whether of the right rear angle was at an with “the wheel jutted Mitchell vehicle into the encroaching pavement a foot two.” on the no that all of the tires there is four Id. after station “About ten seconds entirely off and on Tull, was in wagon stop who came to of the road. evi shoulder There was also seat, opened the door on his side front rest, after the dence that vehicles came get out. As he extended his started to pass traffic continued to without leg open pavement left door toward incident, any was no that and there indication by Glenn] was struck a ear travel- [driven following vehicles to safe of the were unable to that the direction of Indeed, ly proceed past the accident scene. added). (emphasis other two vehicles.” Id. many as at least five and as ten minutes went uneventfully by, passing the two Walton, Brigham, brought Tull suit vehicles, ap before Jones vehicle struck per jury “assigned 60 and Glenn. The cent pellant he was while between Glenn, per negligence of the cent to guardrail. Finally, and the Mitchell vehicle Walton, Brigham, per per cent off-duty po also evidence that an there was appeal, cent to Tull.” Id. On Walton shortly lice officer arrived on scene attempting claimed that his departed and then the initial collision without pass Brigham proximate not the any steps that would taking suggest concern Supreme Tull’s The Arkansas that on the officer’s the two vehicles although Walton could not Court that held facts, posed a hazard. On these we conclude Tull in which was to be foresee the manner Wright’s negligence matter law that as a injured, injury a direct result of remote, space especially too placing Tull in a Walton’s carelessness time, injuries; from that Jones’ court, however, The de- position. hazardous cause, was a question was vital whether termined that the impartial no reach a of Glenn and Tull subsequent conduct contrary conclusion. rejecting superceding factor. became contends, proximate claim was not that Walton held injuries, the court that it “effectively [placed appellant] position into a cause Tull’s extraordinary” that Tull peril heavily “highly of a was not on the shoulder travelled or confused” when highway rainy, night— excited interstate winter would “have been it stepping “highly nor was exposing precisely him the sort of hazard out be struck ultimately brought injury— extraordinary” that Tull could about his Therefore, ques- passing causing was a substantial factor in ear. Id. at [and] tion of facts, whether Walton’s was the On these we conclude that injury cause of Tull’s was for the lacking cause although Wright because jury to decide.6 collision, created situation with the initial was not the There are at least two crucial differences—(cid:127) law, appellant’s injury. As a matter of temporal one spatial and one —between in this ease was caused a new and facts of Walton and the circumstances of the independent force that broke the chain of instant principal case. The difference is the original wrong; causal connections with the gap time between the first and second colli- therefore, tortfeasor, Wright, as the initial is Walton, sions. the second collision oc- not liable for the inflicted Jones. curred when Tull stepped out of the See, Columbia, e.g., Grant v. District side of the vehicle ten seconds after the (D.C.1991) (“Where Here, A.2d initial collision. 368-69 two disputed it is not involved, between five and tortfeasors are elapsed ten minutes unforeseeable be- subsequent tween the first and action second collision. The tortfeasor abe Walton court ‘superseding concluded that because of the cause’ which breaks the chain of time, causation.”) (citations passage brief omitted); it “highly was not Corp., Ceco extraordinary” that Tull supra, became either excit- 441 A.2d at 944. inference, however, ed or confused. No such Simon, Wright relies on Owens v. 245 Md. Indeed, could be drawn in this by case. all (1967), provides 226 A.2d 548 accounts, appellant calmly stood between support compel some but does not the result Mitchell’s guardrail vehicle and the from the pre- reached here because the circumstances time he exited Mitchell's vehicle until he was go beyond sented in Owens somewhat by struck by the vehicle driven Jones. Owens, however, facts of this case. does set Moreover, Walton, the cars came to rest clarity legal forth principles with we find roadway, the left side of the pointing in Owens, applicable in ease. In this a vehicle direction approaching ve- by Simon collided with the Owens him,

hicle which struck with Walton’s stop stop vehicle after failed to at a Simon extending one to two roadway. feet onto the sign. police officer arrived at the scene a It is under those pre- circumstances that a few moments later and Owens .instructed sumably excited or stepped confused Tull out move his vehicle out of the intersection. As of the Walton vehicle on the side closest to so, doing “car Owens was moved forward directly traffic path into the of the Glenn rapid speed striking at a rate of [the] [o]ffi- contrast, appellant vehicle. In exited the cer.” Id. 226 A.2d at 549. The officer subse- Mitchell vehicle onto the shoulder on the died; quently brought an action side of the at least one car Owens, his behalf both due to his away lanes, width from the traffic to what officer, striking Simon appear relatively have been a safe original as the tortfeasor. appellant was off the and he haven — rejected Maryland Appeals The Court of by was shielded the Mitchell vehicle from the contention that Simon was the oncoming primary negligence traffic. The cause of the officer’s death because Simon Walton was still motion Tull reasonably case, could not have foreseen that his by struck the Glenn vehicle. In this police activity would cause the death of a by caused the initial officer and because his “had come appellant had come to rest and independent intervening to rest and an had been for five to ten —and at away minutes —at least one car had taken dominion over the action.” Id. -width from approaching traffic that where a when he was struck 552. The court also concluded vehicle. Jones reasonable could “draw but one infer- intervening regard highly person 6. The Arkansas court held that the was done would not it as negligent person act a person third does not make it a extraordinary act- that the third so cause, origi- Walton, does not relieve the supra, (quoting ed.” 356 S.W.2d at tortfeasor, person "knowing nal if a reasonable supra, Restatement, 447). at § existing the situation when the act of the third FERREN, Acting Judge, dissenting: presented, ence from the as Chief facts resolve the issue as accident, case, Mitchell-Wright In this (citations law.” matter of Id. at 551 omit- to ten minutes later followed five ted). above, As we facts in observed Sanders, on a place took late collision with present Owens circumstances are some- fair; rainy day. Visibility evening of a beyond what here. what established heavy. Mitchell-Wright traffic was After Nonetheless, Wright’s we are satisfied that Mitchell discovered just negligence had come to rest as Simon’s “slumped steering over his wheel” head impartial juror negligence had and that no appel- Ante at Mitchell [848]. contrary could have come to a (Mitchell’s passenger) lant remained Sanders circumstances, conclusion. those there- injured man an at with the while the scene fore, original tortfeasor is not liable for by, saw off-duty police happened officer what subsequent intervening caused happened, “police and res- and left to obtain cause. As a cue Ante at result [848]. assistance.” negligence, car re- Wright’s sum, we a matter of that the hold as law road, creating danger- partly in the mained sequence put of events into motion passing the affecting ous obstruction negligence came primary to rest accident scene.1 point exited the Mitchell circumstances, say I cannot Under these began standing apparently in an car and safe find Sanders’ failure leave place guardrail, between the car and but off-ramp, in the safe haven area onto before the Jones vehicle came the scene injury, to ten minutes of within five him. no and struck There is evidence a matter of law—to break amounted —as confused, disoriented, appellant was or excit- causation; negligence in the chain of injured person ed as was the Walton injuring striking car Sanders waiting simply case. He was superseding did to a cause of not amount emergency personnel he when was seri- injury altogether exonerated Sanders’ injured by ously independent superseding an Wright jury-triable negligence claim.2 from a act of for which cannot be responsible. held therefore, I Respectfully, dissent. Accordingly, hold that the trial court we judgment denying

erred the motion Therefore, remand the case with

n.o.v. we judgment notwithstand-

directions enter

ing the verdict.

Reversed and remanded. Miller, automobiles); Hester v. right between two other 1. The front end of Mitchell’s Thunderbird 509, (1979) (as but, guardrail, according N.C.App. 255 318 S.E.2d slowing vehicles or testimony rear of car was rear-end collisions between "[t]he Sanders' left road”; road, warning signals, proper stopping without was not in the but the in the tire vehicles, following preceding “hangs vehicle is ... was driver over tires second, liability indepen- not unless in the Sanders further testified relieved out road.” accident, have passed act of could not that after the cars that dent foreseen; necessary that They going it is entire lane. "weren’t foreseen, road, So, sequence something events be but had to be in around. Tabb, occur); v. gone Dickenson they us.” wouldn’t have around (1967) (where negli- 156 S.E.2d 795 Va. See, gence Frito-Lay, had caused both lanes e.g. F.2d of deceased driver Morrison driver, (5th Cir.1977) highway continued (negligence to be blocked and situation of truck trouble, another collided with engine parking to time when automobile when he encountered automobiles, neg- high- decedent's protruding one of the wrecked with at two feet onto truck least ligence subsequent situation and started chain way accident created por- occurred as events from which further occurred motorist collided with result, negligently who and motorist protruding highway came of truck onto tion vehicle was not highway causing struck wrecked collision to rest center plaintiff’s preced- accidents in which car struck cause); Heintz, Johnson v. 73 Wis.2d traveling and another car (1976) (jury N.W.2d 815 could have found that plaintiff's attempt direction struck car in an during first car which occurred bliz- protruding avoid collision with car from earlier zard protruding and left one car onto two-lane accident). subsequent cause of two

Case Details

Case Name: Sanders v. Wright

Court Name: District of Columbia Court of Appeals

Date Published: Jun 9, 1994

Citation: 642 A.2d 847

Docket Number: 92-CV-307, 92-CV-440

Court Abbreviation: D.C.