Corey SANDERS, Appellant v. William STRAUGHN, Warden, Maximum Security Unit; Ray Hobbs, Director, Arkansas Department of Correction, Appellees.
No. CV-12-728.
Supreme Court of Arkansas.
June 26, 2014.
2014 Ark. 312
Dustin McDaniel, Att‘y Gen., by: Nicana C. Sherman, Ass‘t Att‘y Gen., for appellees.
PER CURIAM.
Appellant Corey Sanders appeals the denial of his pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus. We find no error and affirm the order denying relief.
This court affirmed the judgment reflecting appellant‘s conviction in the Columbia County Circuit Court on two counts of capital murder and his sentence of life imprisonment. Sanders v. State, 340 Ark. 163, 8 S.W.3d 520 (2000). Appellant filed in the Jefferson County Circuit Court a petition for writ of habeas corpus under
A circuit court‘s denial of habeas relief will not be reversed unless the
The burden is on the petitioner in proceedings for a writ of habeas corpus to establish that the trial court lacked jurisdiction or that the commitment was invalid on its face; otherwise, there is no basis for a finding that a writ of habeas corpus should issue. Culbertson v. State, 2012 Ark. 112, 2012 WL 745303 (per curiam). Under our statute, a petitioner who does not allege his actual innocence and proceed under
In his first point, appellant contends that the circuit court was required under
In his next two points, appellant raises arguments concerning the validity of the information charging him, intertwined with other arguments concerning trial error that he had raised in his petition below. Assertions of trial error such as appellant has raised are not sufficient to implicate the facial validity of the judgment or the jurisdiction of the trial court. See Chambliss v. State, 2014 Ark. 188, 2014 WL 1673747 (per curiam). A habeas-corpus proceeding does not afford a convicted defendant an opportunity to retry his case and argue issues that could have been settled at trial. Tolefree v. State, 2014 Ark. 26, 2014 WL 260990 (per curiam). Appellant‘s allegations of trial error concerning the information—such as improper amendment of the information, lack of notice, and failure to include sufficient information to identify the crime—are not the types of defects that raise a jurisdictional issue, and such allegations
Although appellant couches the first of his two claims concerning the information as an allegation that his conviction was not for the crime for which he was charged, the claim is premised on his assertions that the original information was defective and did not sufficiently describe the crime. Appellant‘s argument is that the defective information could not be amended to cure the defects and the proceedings were therefore void.
Claims of a defective information that raise a jurisdictional issue, such as those that raise a claim of an illegal sentence, are cognizable in a habeas proceeding. Willis, 2011 Ark. 509. Appellant‘s argument hinges on his assertion that the information could not be amended, that amendment in itself is unauthorized and that, if authorized, the amendment changed the nature of the proceedings. This court has previously held that such a claim regarding a similar amendment did not challenge the personal or subject-matter jurisdiction of the court and was not cognizable in a habeas proceeding. Hill v. Norris, 2010 Ark. 287, 2010 WL 2210926 (per curiam).
The State is entitled to amend a felony information before the case has been submitted to the jury, provided the amendment does not change the nature or degree of the crime charged or create an unfair surprise for the defendant. See Green v. State, 2012 Ark. 19, 386 S.W.3d 413; Glaze v. State, 2011 Ark. 464, 385 S.W.3d 203. Although appellant asserts that the amendments there changed the nature of the crime charged in that he was charged with felony capital murder but convicted of premeditated capital murder, the changes made in this case did not change the nature of the crime charged. See Terry v. State, 371 Ark. 50, 263 S.W.3d 528 (2007) (citing Nance v. State, 323 Ark. 583, 918 S.W.2d 114 (1996)) (holding that whether amendment to capital felony-murder information to add the charge of premeditated and deliberate murder was improper turned on whether there was prejudice or surprise). Here, the nature of the offense remained the same, and the amendment only changed the manner of the alleged commission of the crime. See Green, 2012 Ark. 19, 386 S.W.3d 413.
Appellant additionally asserts that charging him by information rather than indictment was unconstitutional. However, a defendant may be charged by information rather than indictment. Dickinson v. Norris, 2011 Ark. 413, 2011 WL 4635034 (per curiam) (citing Peterson v. Norris, 2009 Ark. 445, 2009 WL 3047598 (per curiam), in turn citing Ruiz v. State, 299 Ark. 144, 165, 772 S.W.2d 297, 308 (1989)). Both claims based on appellant‘s contention that the charging instruments were invalid therefore fail.
Finally, Sanders alleges that a member of the jury panel was biased. Sanders raised the issue of the biased juror in his claim for post-conviction relief and a hearing was held by the circuit court and his claim was denied. We affirmed this decision in Sanders v. State, 2003 WL 22351933. As in Dickinson, we are precluded from reaching the merits of Sanders‘s argument “because we have held that trial irregularities and ineffective assistance of counsel issues are not grounds for issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.”
Affirmed.