Sanders v. StateSanders v. State
A jury found Harvey Sanders guilty of (1) aggravated child molestation for placing his mouth on the vagina of minor D. M., (2) child molestation for touching D. M.’s vagina with his hand, (3) child molestation for kissing D. M. on the mouth, (4) aggravated child molestation for placing his penis on the anus of minor L. B., (5) aggravated child molestation for placing his penis in L. B.’s mouth, (6) aggravated child molestation for placing his mouth on L. B.’s vagina, and (7) child molestation for kissing L. B. on the mouth. The trial court entered judgments of conviction and denied Sanders’ motion for a new trial. Sanders appeals, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence. Because there is sufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdicts, we affirm.
1. “ ‘On appeal from a criminal conviction, a defendant no longer enjoys the presumption of innocence, and the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the guilty verdict.’ [Cit.]”
Goss v. State,
“We neither weigh the evidence nor assess the credibility of witnesses, but merely ascertain [whether] the evidence is sufficient to prove each element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreover, conflicts in the testimony of the witnesses are a matter of credibility for the jury to resolve. As long as there is some competent evidence, even though contradicted, to support each fact necessary to make out the state’s case, the jury’s verdict will be upheld.” [Cits.]
Vaughn v. State,
Viewed in favor of the verdicts, the evidence shows that in 2005, Sanders moved
The girls told their parents about the incidents and were then interviewed separately by a police detective specializing in molestation cases. The girls reiterated to the detective what they had told their parents, with D. M. saying, among other things, that when Sanders put his mouth on her vagina it felt like “a fish tail moving back and forth,” and L. B. saying that when Sanders touched her bottom with his penis “[i]t hurted.” Both children also underwent forensic medical examinations at a sexual assault center. D. M. had no residual injury, which, according to the nurse who performed the examinations, was consistent with her outcry. L. B. had a “skin tag,” or loose skin, on her anus, which was consistent with trauma from attempted penetration.
(a) Sanders claims that this evidence does not support his conviction for aggravated child molestation of D. M. because during D. M.’s trial testimony, she did not use the word “vagina” when describing the alleged act of oral sodomy, and he further claims that his child molestation conviction for touching D. M.’s vagina with his hand must be reversed because D. M. did not testify about such a touching. However, D. M.’s trial testimony was not the only evidence introduced by the state. Her videotaped interview with the detective was also played for the jury. During that interview, D. M. labeled body parts on a diagram of an adolescent female, clearly indicated that the word she used for vagina was “business,” and stated that Sanders had put his mouth on her business and used his fingers and hands to open her business. “[T]he jury was entitled to consider the victim’s out-of-court statements as substantive evidence under the Child Hearsay Statute,
(b) As for his child molestation conviction for kissing D. M. on
the mouth, Sanders contends that there is no evidence of his sexual arousal. But his sexual arousal is immaterial. Rather, the relevant inquiry is whether he committed the immoral or indecent act “with the
intent
to arouse or satisfy the sexual desires of either the child or [himself].” (Emphasis supplied.)
(c) With regard to his four convictions for molesting L. B., Sanders claims that the only evidence was the victim’s testimony. But “ ‘(i)t is well established that in child molestation cases, the victim’s testimony alone is sufficient to support a conviction.’ [Cit.]”
Hughes v. State,
2. Although Sanders’ enumeration of errors challenges only the sufficiency of the evidence, he further argues that the trial court erred in failing to merge some of the convictions.
Of course, an appealing party may not use its brief to expand its enumeration of errors by arguing the incorrectness of a trial court ruling not mentioned in the enumera tion of the errors. And we are precluded from reviewing the propriety of a lower court’s ruling if the ruling is not contained in the enumeration of errors.
(Citations and punctuation omitted.)
Scott v. State,
Judgment affirmed.