Sanders v. South Carolina Department of Motor VehiclesSanders v. South Carolina Department of Motor Vehicles
- Reporters:
- ,
- Before:
- Beatty, Few
I. FACTUAL/PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On November 21, 2012, at approximately 4:10 a.m., the Columbia Police Department dispatched an officer to Whaley Street after a single vehicle ran off the road and struck a tree. Upon arrival, the officer found Sanders standing nearby at a gas station, bleeding from the head. The officer questioned Sanders and noticed that he slurred his words, had an odor of alcohol, and appeared to be “off-balance,” both physically and
The officer advised Sanders of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), and informed him that he was under arrest for DUI. The officer also gave Sanders notice, both verbally and in writing, of his rights under South Carolina‘s implied consent statute. See
The DMV issued a Notice of Suspension to Sanders informing him that it had suspended his driver‘s license for refusing to submit to testing in accordance with the implied consent statute. Under the statute, the South Carolina General Assembly has declared that “[a] person who drives a motor vehicle in this State is considered to have given consent to chemical tests of the person‘s breath, blood, or urine for the purpose of determining the presence of alcohol, drugs, or the combination of alcohol and drugs, if arrested for an offense arising out of acts alleged to have been committed while the person was driving a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, drugs, or a combination [thereof].”
Sanders challenged the license suspension in a contested case hearing before the OMVH. The issue before the OMVH centered on whether Sanders had refused to submit to a test pursuant to section 56-5-2950. Because Sanders was asked to submit to a blood test, the hearing more specifically focused on whether the officer was justified in requesting a blood sample because licensed medical personnel had determined Sanders was unable to submit to a breath test.1
The officer also provided a one-page, standardized form, the “South Carolina Law Enforcement Division - Urine/Blood Collection Report” (SLED Report), which documented the officer‘s investigation. The officer indicated on the form that Sanders had been arrested for an offense related to intoxication and was advised of his implied consent rights. There was also a section for completion by licensed medical personnel, which contained alternative statements describing whether blood and/or urine samples had been sought or collected. The following statement was marked regarding Sanders:
A blood sample is requested by the arresting officer because a licensed medical person has informed the officer that the subject is unable to take a breath test at this time due to any reason deemed acceptable by that licensed medical person.
In the line designated for “Name and [Title] of Licensed Medical Personnel,” Nurse Albright wrote in “Angela Albright, RN,” and she signed on the line reserved for “Signature of Licensed Medical Personnel.” The officer signed the bottom of the form, documenting that his request for a blood sample had been “Refused.” Sanders also signed to confirm that he received a copy of the SLED Report.
Sanders‘s counsel objected to the SLED Report stating that, although Nurse Albright “may well be a registered nurse,” he could not determine whether she actually was one because she was not there to cross-examine as to her credentials, and anyone “can have hospital garb on,” citing State v. Frey, 362 S.C. 511, 608 S.E.2d 874 (Ct. App. 2005).2 Sanders‘s
The officer reiterated that he personally witnessed Nurse Albright wearing a hospital identification badge with her name and the designation of her title as “RN” and saw her performing her duties in the emergency room. He also noted that Nurse Albright had identified her hospital title on the SLED Report as “RN.” The officer lastly added that he was told that the reason why Sanders could not supply a breath sample was because Sanders “would not be able to get out [of the hospital emergency room] in a timely manner in order to provide that breath sample.” See
Sanders‘s counsel provided the officer with a copy of Sanders‘s medical records and asked him to recite for the record the portions that counsel had highlighted about Sanders‘s diagnosis and symptoms. The officer read the portions stating Sanders was diagnosed with “[s]calp contusions, scalp laceration[s], cervical strain, and [a] closed head injury,” and that the common symptoms of a head injury could include, among other things, dizziness, headaches, and “slow bleeding or other problems inside the head.” Sanders‘s counsel asked the officer, “Does it sound like he may have had a concussion and was out of it?” The officer declined to discuss this point.
Sanders then testified as to his injuries and medical condition following the accident. At his counsel‘s urging, Sanders also recited the findings in his medical records, confirming he was diagnosed with “[s]calp contusions, scalp lacerations, cervical
During closing remarks, Sanders‘s counsel made a general request to renew his hearsay objection. In the alternative, counsel asserted Sanders had “absolutely no knowledge of what was going on” after the accident because Sanders “had a significant head injury, had a concussion” and he did not “remember anything until he woke in jail the next morning” with “blood all over the back of his head.”
The OMVH issued a written order upholding the suspension. The OMVH found Sanders was lawfully arrested for DUI and was advised of his implied consent rights. The OMVH found the officer made a reasonable request for a blood sample after being informed by licensed medical personnel that Sanders was unable to submit to a breath test. The OMVH noted Sanders had argued this information was hearsay because he did not know if Nurse Albright was an RN and he did not have the opportunity to question her as to the reason why she made this finding. The OMVH “conclude[d] that the testimony was not hearsay because it was not admitted to prove that [Sanders] was actually unable to leave, only that the blood test was warranted because licensed medical personnel determined he was unable to provide a breath sample.” The OMVH further concluded that the officer “presented a prima facie case that the person who told him and signed the form [the SLED Report] was licensed medical personnel - she was in the hospital, treating patients, represented herself as a nurse, and wore a name tag that indicated she was a registered nurse,” and Sanders made no attempt to refute this evidence.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The South Carolina Administrative Procedures Act establishes the “substantial evidence” rule as the standard for judicial review of a decision of an administrative agency. Lark v. Bi–Lo, Inc., 276 S.C. 130, 133, 276 S.E.2d 304, 305 (1981). The appellate court may not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact, but may reverse or modify the decision if substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced because the administrative findings or conclusions are affected by an error of law, clearly erroneous in view of the substantial evidence in the record, or are arbitrary, capricious, or characterized by an abuse of discretion. Peake v. S.C. Dep‘t of Motor Vehicles, 375 S.C. 589, 594, 654 S.E.2d 284, 287 (Ct. App. 2007).
III. DISCUSSION
Sanders contends the decision of the court of appeals should be reversed due to a lack of substantial evidence in the record to support the suspension. Specifically, Sanders argues the court of appeals erred in (1) determining there was substantial evidence that Nurse Albright qualified as licensed medical personnel, and (2) holding the statements used to establish his alleged inability to submit to a breath test were not hearsay. We disagree. We begin with an overview of the remedial purpose of the implied consent statute, along with a consideration of the proper scope of a civil suspension hearing, as we believe these two points provide the appropriate framework for our decision.
A. Remedial Purpose of Implied Consent Statute
“Being licensed to operate a motor vehicle on the public highways of this state is not a property right, but is merely a privilege subject to reasonable regulations under the
“One immediate purpose of the implied consent statute is to obtain the best evidence of a driver‘s blood alcohol content at the time when the arresting officer reasonably believes him to be driving under the influence.” Leviner v. S.C. Dep‘t of Highways & Pub. Transp., 313 S.C. 409, 411, 438 S.E.2d 246, 248 (1993); see Skinner v. Sillas, 130 Cal. Rptr. 91, 95 (Ct. App. 1976) (stating the purpose of the statute is to take the test soon after arrest because “alcohol in the blood system dissipates quickly“).
It also promotes traffic safety by expeditiously removing dangerous drivers from the public roadways in a summary civil procedure. See Nelson, 364 S.C. at 522, 613 S.E.2d at 548 (“The State has a strong interest in maintaining safe highways and roads.“); see also Krueger v. Fulton, 169 N.W.2d 875, 878 (Iowa 1969) (“It is obvious the purpose of the Implied Consent Law is to reduce the holocaust on our highways part of which is due to the driver who imbibes too freely of intoxicating liquor. The civil license revocation provided for under the Implied Consent Act was intended to protect the public from the irresponsible driver and not merely punish the licensee.” (citation omitted)).
“An operator of a motor vehicle in South Carolina is not required to submit to alcohol or drug testing; however, our legislature has clearly mandated that should one choose not to consent to such testing, his or her license must and shall be suspended . . . .” Nelson, 364 S.C. at 522, 613 S.E.2d at 548. “Were drivers free to refuse alcohol and drug testing without suffering penalty, the current system of detecting, testing, and prosecuting drunk drivers would simply fail.” Id. at 522, 613 S.E.2d at 548–49.
The South Carolina General Assembly has imposed a greater length of suspension for refusing to consent to testing than for those who take a test and have an alcohol concentration below a certain threshold and have no prior convictions. Id. at 522, 613 S.E.2d at 549. “The disparity in suspensions demonstrates the legislative concern over an individual[‘]s refusal to consent to testing.” Id. at 523, 613 S.E.2d at 549; cf. Quintana v. Mun. Court, 237 Cal. Rptr. 397, 401 (Ct. App. 1987) (“The purpose of the implied consent statute is to fulfill the need for a fair, efficient and accurate system of detection and prevention of driving under the influence. That purpose is obviously thwarted by the inebriated driver who refuses the test. . . . He has thus proven to be more dangerous to the public than the inebriated driver who has consented to a test.” (citations omitted)).
A civil license suspension is distinguishable from the criminal prosecution on the DUI charge. The provisions for an administrative suspension are liberally construed to advance the statute‘s purpose of promoting the public interest, and decisions restricting the application of implied consent laws are narrowly construed. See State v. Price, 333 S.C. 267, 273 n.7, 510 S.E.2d 215, 218 n.7 (1998) (stating the fact that the State affords procedural due process to a motorist prior to suspending a driver‘s license does not transform the suspension from a remedial sanction into a punitive one); see also Illinois v. Johnson, 758 N.E.2d 805, 811 (Ill. 2001) (stating “the implied-consent statute is remedial in nature and, therefore, ‘should be liberally construed’ to preserve its overall purpose” (citation omitted)); Minnesota v. Juncewski, 308 N.W.2d 316, 319 (Minn. 1981) (observing decisions restricting the application of the implied consent law are to be narrowly construed (citation omitted)); Wisconsin v. Reitter, 595 N.W.2d 646, 652 (Wis. 1999) (“Given the legislature‘s intentions in passing the statute, courts construe the implied consent law liberally.“).
B. Scope of Administrative Suspension Hearing
In furtherance of the goals described above, the General Assembly has statutorily prescribed the permissible scope of an administrative hearing challenging the suspension of a driver‘s license. The statute contemplates an expeditious civil review but also “guards against an automatic or rote elimination of this [important] interest.” S.C. Dep‘t of Motor Vehicles v. McCarson, 391 S.C. 136, 148, 705 S.E.2d 425, 431 (2011). As with the penalties imposed, the General Assembly has differentiated
Section 56-5-2951(F) sets forth the permissible scope of the suspension hearing in cases where a motorist has refused to submit to testing as follows:
(F) A contested case hearing must be held after the request for the hearing is received by the [OMVH]. The scope of the hearing is limited to whether the person:
(1) was lawfully arrested or detained;
(2) was given a written copy of and verbally informed of the rights enumerated in Section 56-5-2950; [and]
(3) refused to submit to a test pursuant to Section 56-5-2950 . . . .
There has been no dispute as to the first two factors to support the suspension: Sanders was properly arrested and he was informed of his implied consent rights. Therefore, the suspension hearing turned on the third factor, refusal to submit to a test pursuant to the implied consent statute. See
The officer was authorized to ask for a blood test if any of the exceptions in section 56-5-2950(A) applied. See
C. Licensed Medical Personnel
We first consider Sanders‘s argument that the court of appeals erred in finding there was substantial evidence in the
This Court has recognized that the South Carolina Rules of Evidence (SCRE) are applicable to driver‘s license suspension hearings. McCarson, 391 S.C. at 147, 705 S.E.2d at 430 (citing
Under the implied consent statute, “licensed medical personnel” includes “physicians licensed by the State Board of Medical Examiners, registered nurses [RNs] licensed by the State Board of Nursing, and other medical personnel trained to obtain [blood and urine] samples in a licensed medical facility.”
Although Sanders argued at the hearing that he should have been able to cross-examine Nurse Albright as to whether she qualified as licensed medical personnel, personal attendance by the hospital employee has never been required to establish this fact. See State v. Frey, 362 S.C. 511, 514, 608 S.E.2d 874, 876 (Ct. App. 2005) (stating, in a DUI trial, that the “suggestion that [the hospital employee‘s] qualifications could be established only by his presence and testimony at trial is specious“). This fact, like any other, may be shown by several means.
The officer testified as to his first-hand observations of Nurse Albright, noting that she wore a hospital identification badge providing her name and title as an “RN,” and he saw her performing the duties commensurate with the position of an RN in the emergency room. These personal observations
The officer‘s recollection of Nurse Albright‘s nametag is significant because, under South Carolina law, “[a] licensed nurse must clearly identify himself or herself as officially licensed by the board [State Board of Nursing].”
While Sanders belatedly opines to this Court that Nurse Albright could have engaged in a false “holding out” regarding her status (citing a news article about a “fake doctor“), Sanders made no contemporaneous attempt at the suspension hearing to allege that Nurse Albright engaged in any misleading conduct in this regard, nor did he dispute the officer‘s substantive testimony regarding Nurse Albright‘s status as an RN. Sanders could have rebutted the DMV‘s prima facie case, without the need to cross-examine Nurse Albright, by investigating Nurse Albright‘s licensing status (or alleged lack thereof) himself.3 See generally
D. Officer‘s Request for a Blood Sample
Sanders next contends the court of appeals erred in holding there was substantial evidence in the record to support the officer‘s request for a blood sample, as the evidence of his alleged inability to submit to a breath test was inadmissible hearsay.
At the suspension hearing, the officer testified that he requested a blood test after arriving at the emergency room and being advised by licensed medical personnel (Nurse Albright) that Sanders was not able to take a breath test. Sanders‘s counsel made a general hearsay objection, arguing Nurse Albright should be present so he could question her as to her qualifications and the reason why she found Sanders was unable to take a breath test:
[A]nybody can have hospital garb on . . . [the] defense needs to be able to cross-examine that particular person on his or her credentials. Secondly, this [SLED Report] doesn‘t say he wasn‘t able to leave the hospital. It says for some reason deemed acceptable by the licensed medical personnel. We have a right to ask that licensed medical personnel what that reason was. And we can‘t ask that person that reason without that person being here and we‘re not sure, again, she may well be a registered nurse, but we don‘t know that for sure and we don‘t have a right to cross-examine her credentials . . . .
Here, the officer relied on the exception that licensed medical personnel found the motorist could not submit to a breath test.
The soundness of this procedure is readily apparent. Sanders asserts that, if given the opportunity, he would have cross-examined Nurse Albright as to whether his medical treatment could have been expedited to secure his discharge sooner (theoretically to permit breath testing).4 Asking Nurse Albright to opine on this question is of dubious value, particularly where Sanders never specifically testified that he would
testimony centered on the nature of his injuries, and he maintained he did not recall being asked to take a blood test, nor anything else about his time in the hospital. Cf. Taylor v. S.C. Dep‘t of Motor Vehicles, 368 S.C. 33, 627 S.E.2d 751 (Ct. App. 2006) (holding the driver showed no prejudice from the fact that he did not receive a copy of the implied consent form from the officer, where the driver did not argue that he did not receive his implied consent rights at all or that he would have provided a blood test if he had received the implied consent rights in writing), aff‘d, 382 S.C. 567, 677 S.E.2d 588 (2009).
The essential question here is—Did the officer comply with the implied consent statute in requesting a blood sample from Sanders? The limited scope of the administrative hearing is to test the conduct of the officer (not medical personnel) by requiring the officer to have probable cause for the arrest, to advise the motorist of his implied consent rights, and to request tests in compliance with the procedure outlined in the implied consent statute (which the motorist refused).
Nurse Albright signed the SLED Report, as did Sanders, so he was contemporaneously informed of Nurse Albright‘s determination (that he could not submit a breath sample) and he was given a copy of the SLED Report, all in compliance with the officer‘s reporting duties. While we conclude the information communicated to the officer was not hearsay for purposes of this implied consent hearing, we note that, if Sanders believed the officer‘s testimony that Nurse Albright had made a determination of any kind was also false, he always had the recourse of rebutting it by calling her as a witness himself.
Lastly, we observe that, at the hearing, Sanders‘s counsel urged the OMVH to overturn the suspension on the alternative ground that Sanders “had a significant head injury, had a concussion,” and did not “remember anything until he
IV. CONCLUSION
We conclude the substantial evidence in the record supports the DMV‘s suspension of Sanders‘s driver‘s license.
AFFIRMED.
KITTREDGE, HEARN, FEW and JAMES, JJ., concur. FEW, J., concurring in a separate opinion.
JUSTICE FEW: I concur with the majority. I write to share my thoughts on whether the nurse‘s statements are hearsay. As with many hearsay questions, it is actually not a hearsay question. It is a statutory interpretation question. Sanders argues subsection 56-5-2950(A) of the South Carolina Code (2018) requires the State to prove a suspect was “physically unable to provide an acceptable breath sample.” The Department argues subsection 56-5-2950(A) requires only that the State prove the medical professional had an “acceptable” reason for determining the suspect was “physically unable” to provide a breath sample. If
Under Sanders’ interpretation of the subsection, the question at the hearing is, “Was the suspect ‘physically unable to provide an acceptable breath sample.‘” If Sanders is correct, the State would need the nurse‘s statements to be true to prove Sanders’ physical condition. Necessarily, the State would offer the statements in evidence for the purpose of proving the truth of the matter asserted in the statements. The statements—in that event—would be hearsay.
The Department, however, is correct. I do not believe subsection 56-5-2950(A) can be read to require the State to prove the suspect‘s physical condition. As the Chief Justice explained, proving such a subjective point of medicine is beyond the scope the General Assembly intended for these hearings. “Whether the licensed medical personnel was infallible in her determination is not within the limited scope of this administrative proceeding.” Rather, the most sensible reading of subsection 56-5-2950(A) is it requires only that the State prove the licensed medical professional made the determination the suspect was “physically unable” for a reason the professional “considered acceptable.” See State v. Stacy, 315 S.C. 105, 107, 431 S.E.2d 640, 641 (Ct. App. 1993) (“[W]e hold that the statute requires a licensed [professional] . . . to determine whether an acceptable reason exists for finding that a person is unable to provide an acceptable breath sample.“). Thus, to prove what subsection 56-5-2950(A) requires, it is not necessary that the professional‘s statements be true. The State may offer the statements in evidence for the sole purpose of proving the statements were made, and the statements are not hearsay.