225 Pa. 105 | Pa. | 1909
Opinion by
The first assignment seeks to convict the learned court below of error in not giving binding instructions for the defendant at the trial; and the second challenges the correctness of the ruling in refusing to enter judgment non obstante veredicto. The appellant contends that this case presents a question of law for the court and not of fact for the jury. This contention is predicated upon two grounds: first, that the injuries complained of resulted from collision with a train of cars moved by and belonging to another railroad company whose employees were in charge of the train, and that if there was any negligence in the case the company owning the train of cars and employing the servants in charge of the same is alone responsible; and second, that under the facts proven at the trial appellee was so clearly guilty of contributory negligence as to warrant the court in holding as a matter of law that there can be no recovery of damages. As to the first proposition the testimony is meager and unsatisfactory. It does not clearly show what the traffic arrangement between the two companies was. The letter of the superintendent of the appellant company dated September 10, 1902, refers to a former letter dated July 9, 1902, which contained the terms and conditions upon which trackage rights would be given, but this letter is not in evidence, and therefore the court is not in position to determine what the contractual trackage rights of the other company are. The testimony does show that the right of way, roadbed and railroad tracks belong to and are under the control and management of the appellant company. The accident occurred at a grade crossing on the tracks of the Pennsylvania Railroad Company, and this makes out a case of primary responsibility if negligence be shown. If for any sufficient reason this primary responsibility may be avoided, the burden is upon the company denying it to estab
Again, the general rule is, that where a railroad company simply permits another railroad company to run cars upon its tracks it is liable for damages caused by the negligence of the company enjoying the permissive use. Under such circumstances the arrangement for trackage rights is in the nature of a license, and the company enjoying the same, is a licensee. Of course, the application of the rule depends largely upon the nature of the contract between the companies. The lessor company may, and often does, transfer to the lessee company for a term of years, all of its property under a contract which gives the lessee exclusive control and management of the whole system. In such a case, depending upon the facts and circumstances, it may be that an action for personal injuries should be brought against the operating company. Then, too, there may be such a joint construction and use of tracks, under joint rules and regulations, as to make each company enjoying the joint use, liable for its own negligence. These are exceptional cases and depend upon their own peculiar facts. No such question arises under the facts of the case at bar. The safety gates at the crossing were under the control of the appellant company. While the train which caused the injuries belonged to another railroad company, it came upon the tracks of the appellant company only after orders so to do had been given by the employees of the latter company, the rules and regulations of which the employees of the former company were subject to at the time of the accident. We therefore hold under these facts that the action can be maintained against the appellant company. It may be that the plaintiff might have elected to have brought his suit against the Delaware and Hudson Company, but we are not dealing
As to the second proposition, we do not agree with the contention of the learned counsel for appellant, that the evidence showed such a clear failure on the part of the appellee to perform his duty on approaching the crossing as to justify the court in holding as a matter of law that there could be no recovery on the ground of contributory negligence. No useful purpose can be served by reviewing the testimony on this branch of the case. We are all of opinion that it was sufficient to go to the jury and that the learned trial judge committed no error in its submission.
Judgment affirmed.
