*1 Kellogg 483 v Delton v SANDERS DELTONKELLOGGSCHOOLS Argued 8, (Calendar 6).
Docket No. 102406. October No. Decided December 1996. Barry brought Camille C. Sanders an action the Circuit Court against McBeth, the Delton Schools and M. Dean individu- ally Superintendent Schools, they alleging and as violated provisions her contract and the nonrenewal of MCL 15.4132(2) by reassigning her from school position position. teaching administrator to a nonadministrative court, Shuster, J., granted summary disposition The Richard M. defendants, finding plaintiffs employment the that the had not terminated, apply, been that therefore the statute did not and that reassignment assignment provision was a lawful exercise of the Appeals, P.J., the contract. The Court of L. and M. Fitzgerald, J., dissenting), J. reversed and remanded the Glazer, (Mackenzie, case, holding of an administrator position nonadministrative constitutes nonrenewal of the contract 380.132; (Docket 161752). within MCL MSA 15.4132 No. appeal. defendants opinion by joined by In an Justice Chief Justice Cavanagh, Supreme and Justices Levin Court held: Brickley, Mallett, position Nonrenewal of a contract for a school administrative position reassign- means termination from the administrative or position ment from an administrative to a nonadministrative position. ambigu- 1. “Nonrenewal” as used in MCL MSA 15.4132is ous, susceptible interpretations. may of two reasonable It be read terminating terminating legal as an administrative or relationship parties. between the The word is not defined under the act, merely let alone as “termination.” The statute states that notice given sixty days must be before the contract is to end. The term encompasses “nonrenewal” was used because it more than mere legal relationship. presented termination of a The issue is not may reassigned, plaintiff whether the be but whether the may arbitrarily. reassigned give Legisla- be In order to effect to the intent, plaintiff may district, ture’s the school proper given. but after notice has been Mich 483 reassign 2. district in this case to administrators to To allow the positions providing without first notice would subterfuge renewing reassignment as a for not allow it to use intentionally denying contract and protections addition, afforded the statute. In once an administra- *2 position, and tor is transferred to a nonadministrative the statute procedural protections longer applicable. If the school its are no entirely employment district were to decide to terminate after and, case, plaintiff acquired reassignment, as in this the had never any protec- tenure, provide procedural it would not have to of the tions afforded the statute. Affirmed. joined by dissenting, Boyle Justice Justices and Weaver, Riley, reassignment
stated that of a school administrator to a nonadminis position teaching trative does not constitute nonrenewal of con . 15.4132(2) 1979 PA tract under MSA ambiguous. measuring The term “nonrenewal” is not In the period notification, specifically for nonrenewal the statute refers to Clearly, legislative the contract termination intent is date. protect itself, administrators from termination of the contract not they reassigned pursuant will to insure contract. case, legal relationship, employment, In this the contract of parties parties between the continued. The continued to be bound by it, compensated according and the was to its terms. The merely option reassigning plain- defendants exercised their Although possible tiff under the contract. it is for the defendant’s conduct to result the effective nonrenewal of con- tract, simply did not occur in this case. At all times the defend- proceeding observing ants were under the contract and its terms. terms, Because the defendant adhered to the contract’s there was reassignment no constructive nonrenewal. The of the to a nonadministrative did not terminate her contract with defendants. Further, plaintiff, despite being reassigned, protected is still requirement long the statute’s for notice of nonrenewal. As as employee the school district continues to renew the contract of an originally assigned administrator, who was as an the district cannot employee’s employment terminate that without notice of non- statute, employee’s regardless renewal consistent with the of the reassignment. App 34; (1995)
209 Mich NW2d 114 affirmed. Bossenbroek, Britton & P.C. T. Britton (by Gary A. for the defendants. Mary Owens), v Delton Amici Curiae:
Gregory, Moore, Jeakle, Heinen, Ellison & Brooks, (by P.C. Gordon A. and Lisa S. Gregory Lane), for Michigan Elementary and Middle School Principals Association and Michigan Secondary Association of Principals. School J. requires This case us to determine
Cavanagh,
whether
of a
school administrator
to a nonadministrative
teaching position constitutes
“nonrenewal” of a contract under
In was hired as an administrator the Delton Kellogg During 1989-90, Schools. she was serving as a middle principal. school assistant Her *3 contract of year for the 1989-90 school provided part: in professional present
This contract
is for
services with the
assignment
being
principal
assistant
in the middle
school.
assignment
subject
change
employer
Such
to
proper
employee.
notice to the
380.132(2);
15.4132(2) provided:
MCL
MSA
may employ
superintendents,
principals,
The board
assistant
principals, guidance directors,
assistant
and other administrators
position,
terms,
who do not assume
in
tenure
for
not to exceed 3
years,
employ-
fixed
the board and shall define their duties. The
ment shall be under written contract.
nonrenewal
Notification of
given
writing
days
contract shall be
in
at least 60
of
contract
before
termination
date or the contract
is renewed
an addi-
period.
1-year
[Emphasis
tional
added.]
substantially
This statute was reenacted in
the same form. See MCL
380.1229; MSA 15.41229.
453 Mich
verbally informed that
plaintiff was
In June
over for the 1990-91
would be rolled
her contract
be
year
reassigned
and that she would
school
district at
within the school
teaching position
received
salary.
9, 1990,
On August
same
reassignment,
After the
written notice to this effect.
in
compensated
accordance
plaintiff continued to
parties agree
contract. Both
with her administrative
sixty-day written notice.
was not
given
that
that such notification
However, defendants contend
necessary
plaintiffs
reassignment
because
was
constitute a nonrenewal of her contract.
did not
court, asserting
Plaintiff filed suit2
circuit
district,
superintendent
and its
defendants,
the school
provisions of
violated her contract and the renewal
when she was
15.4132(2),
position. The court
to a nonadministrative
defendants,
in favor of
summary disposition
granted
plaintiffs
employment had not been termi-
finding
therefore,
apply.
the statute did not
Fur-
and,
nated
was a lawful
ther,
reassignment
the court held that
provision
plaintiffs
con-
assignment
exercise of the'
remanded,
Appeals
tract. The Court of
reversed
an administrator
to a
reassignment
holding
nonrenewal of
constitutes
meaning
of MCL
the contract within
App 34;
H before us is whether sole issue a nonadministrative the school administrator *4 2 Michigan’s rights act, alleged civil Plaintiff’s suit also a violation of seq.; seq. 3.548(101) et MCL 37.2101 et This issue was dismissed parties. stipulation of the 487 v Delton meaning
tion
a “nonrenewal” within the
constitutes
MCL 380.132; MSA 15.4132. “Nonrenewal” was not
parties disagree
act,
defined under the
and the
about
scope
resolving disputed interpre-
the
of the term. In
statutory language,
the
tations of
it is
function of the
reviewing
legislative
to
court
effectuate the
intent.
Quality
Market,
335;
Hiltz v Phil’s
Mich
(1983).
language
If
NW2d 237
the
used is clear, then
Legislature
meaning
must have
the
intended
it has
plainly expressed, and the
must be
statute
enforced
fairly
as written.
It is the
Id.
function of
court to
interpret
exists;
as it
it
statute
then
is not the func-
legislate.
tion of
the court
Roosevelt Oil Co v Secre-
tary
(1954).
Mich
State,
679;
We submit that the term “nonrenewal” is subject ous, because it is to at least two reasonable interpretations. may “Nonrenewal” be read as termi- nating terminating the administrative or legal relationship (as hold). the dissent would It is the legislative function of this Court to effectuate the intent. Wehold that the term “nonrenewal” means ter- mination or an from position.
If we hold were to that “nonrenewal” meant terminating legal relationship, require it would employee entirely relationship have ended her provisions the school district before the of the statute applied. Indeed, We find this definition too restrictive. possible acknowledged, as the dissent has it is effectively contract to be nonrenewed the defend- ants’ conduct. language
The defendants assert that the of the stat- clearly displays legislative protect ute intent to *5 453 Mich
Opinion of the Court the statu- from “termination” because administrators tory language reads: under written contract. Notifi- shall be writing given in at of contract shall be
cation of nonrenewal termination date or days least 60 before the contract 1-year period. renewed for an additional contract is [MCL added).] 15.4132(2) (emphasis 380.132(2); MSA argument best. We fail to find this strained at We all, at let alone how nonrenewal is defined here see merely that notice “termination.” The statute states as days sixty given is to must be before the contract period We fail to see how this reference to end. provides legislative intent that it for nonrenewal clear employ- only protect administrators from intended to termination of the termination, ment rather than position. employee’s The dissent’s analysis why simply Legislature does not resolve the word “termination” rather than “non- did use that the term “nonrenewal” was renewal.” We submit encompasses mere termi- because it more than used relationship. legal nation of the sure, To be it is essential to address defendants’ argument: at assertion as stated counsel oral you assume, Now, I like for exam- would [Ms. Owens:] contract, ple, administrator’s that three months into an particular determines that a individual school board totally totally incompetent, unqualified to assume that tion, tenure, her as an administrator is creat- and that his or Certainly, ing a local board of absolute chaos the district. individ- needs to have the discretion to move that education particular position, fact and I think that the ual out of that they specifically right reserve the to exercise that dis- given be full force and effect. cretion should v Delton wholeheartedly agree assertion. We with defendants’ very The contract is also clear that can be reassigned. presented plain-
However, the issue is not whether may may reassigned, tiff be but whether be reassigned arbitrarily. give In order to effect to the plaintiff may Legislature’s intent, proper district, school but after notice has been “totally given. Therefore, if the school district has a totally incompetent, unqualified” individual an *6 position, reassignment or termination scrutiny arbitrary would withstand under an standard during hearing. plaintiff’s In fact, contract even provides: professional present
This contract
is for
services with the
assignment being
principal
assistant
in the middle school.
subject
by
employer
assignment
change
Such
is
to
the
proper
employee. [Emphasis
notice to the
added.]
Wessely
App
In
v
Dist,
Carrollton School
139 Mich
(1984),
439, 443;
The Roberts Court 453 Mich dismissing an adminis- Where a school board’s action in by conditions, genuinely mandated economic trator is arbitrary pre- potential capricious behavior is all but for layoffs by [Legitimate . . . economic are their cluded. arbitrary capricious nor .... at nature neither [Id. 269.] present nothing case, In the there is to indicate posi plaintiff’s reassignment to a nonadministrative temporary. Furthermore, as the Court of tion Appeals suggests that action noted, the record may have, fact, defendants been arbi taken trary. precisely attempts This is the harm the statute prevent. Wessely, In the Court noted: allegations made no
Plaintiffs have that defendant laid subterfuge renewing contract, them off as a for not so intentionally deny procedural protections as to them the statute nonrenewal of offers for contract. at [Id. 444.] opposite is true this case. To allow the district reassign administrators to nonadministrative providing tions without first notice would allow it to subterfuge use the as a renewing the administrative contract and intention- ally protections denying afforded *7 statute. potential reassign
The school districts to admin- subterfuge renewing istrators as a for not a contract Appeals noted, superintendent As the Court of in determined that it would be the district’s best interest if position princi- did not continue in the of middle school assistant pal. any repeatedly provide specific He has refused to reason to explain my Instead, explained just his determination. he that “[i]t’s judgment.” App 39, Mich n [209 2.] v Delton light becomes evident in of defendants’ admission at argument. oral Counsel stated: we that a assume school board hires individual A to
[I]f principal they going reassign be and then decides are them, say position janitorial position, ato secretarial or question, raises the what are the limits of a school board’s reassign discretion to individuals and have it not be consid- ered a termination of their administrator’s contract]?] [A]nd say that, fact, to that I would school boards do have that they discretion if reserved their contract. potential for abuse is clear. Under the dissent’s analysis, an administrator, who entered a contract for position, an administrative indeed could be arbitrar- ily janitor. aas However, where “non- terminating employee’s renewal” means adminis- position, trative school districts would be able to reassign janitors only administrators as such if reassignments arbitrarily. were not done problem “subterfuge”
The other concerns the lan- guage question of the statute itself. The statute in only applies superintendents, principals, to “assistant principals, guidance assistant counselors and other administrators who do not assume tenure . . . .” 380.132(2); 15.4132(2). MSA This is evi- also denced subsection stated, which “nonrenewal of person may contract described in this section given arbitrary capri- for a reason that is not or 15.4132(3) (emphasis cious.” MCL added). Once an administrator is transferred to a janitor, such as teacher or procedural protections the statute and its are no applicable. longer If the school district were to decide entirely plaintiff’s employment terminate after the reassignment, acquired and, as here, never *8 453 Mich 483 492 Opinion by Dissenting Weaver, J. provide position, have to it would not in her
tenure by protections any procedural afforded of the purposeful superintendents This would allow statute. by statutory requirements transferring to avoid the position, plaintiff and then to a nonadministrative firing her without notice.4 injustices potential flowing from the dissent’s
analysis comport legislative seem to with the do not protect purpose statute is to admin- intent. The of the arbitrarily being removed from their istrators from Proper positions. notice allows the administrative employee seek sufficient time to positions. we Therefore, hold other administrative from that the term “nonrenewal” means termination position reassignment from an the administrative or position to a nonadministrative Appeals. tion. We affirm the decision of Court Levin and concurred C.J., JJ., Brickley, Mallett, Cavanagh, J. majority (dissenting). states, As the Weaver, J. reassign- this Court is whether the sole issue before ment of a school administrator to a nonadministrative teaching position “nonrenewal” of a con- constitutes 15.4132 tract under 1979PA MCL MSA argues The dissent that after is transferred to a nonadminis position, procedural protections against nonrenewal are still trative administrator, therefore, she was hired as an afforded to because by governed 15.4132(2). her is still How contract ever, support in the The stat there is no for the dissent’s statute. clearly applies person ute states it to “a described this sec Therefore, employee longer occupies an administra tion.” Id. once an no protections, inapplicable. position, statute, tive and its become v Delton Dissenting Opinion J. Weaver, repealed PA 289. I would hold
decision, not. it does majority’s conclusory disagree statement
I with the *9 resolving ambiguous. In term “nonrenewal” is that the statutory interpretations language, disputed it is reviewing leg- of a court to effectuate the function Quality Market, 417 intent. Hiltz v Phil’s islative language (1983). used NW2d 237 If the 335; Mich 337 Legislature intended the must have clear, then plainly expressed, meaning statute it has and the written. Id. must be enforced as provided, per- 15.4132(2) in part: tinent given
Notification of nonrenewal of contract shall days writing termination date at least 60 before tire contract 1-year period. for an additional or the contract is renewed period measuring notification, In for nonrenewal specifically refers to the contract termina- the statute protect Clearly, legislative tion date. intent is to itself, administrators from termination of the contract they pursu- will not be not to insure ant to the contract. parties plaintiff given agree
Both was sixty-day contend, written notice. Defendants cor- rectly believe, I that such notification was not neces- sary plaintiff’s reassignment did not consti- because tute a nonrenewal of her contract. Appeals Wessely v Car
As stated
the Court of
App 439, 443; 362 NW2d
Dist,
rollton School
139 Mich
Community
(1984),
and Roberts v Beecher
731
App
NW2d
266, 268-269;
Mich
372
Dist,
School
Despite plaintiff’s arguments contrary, to the of to a nonadministrative note, As the Wessely directly amici curiae neither nor Roberts on point. plaintiffs In both cases the were laid off for economic reasons. Both panels Appeals of layoff the Court of held that an economic did not con stitute nonrenewal of the contract under MCL MSA 15.4132. 2 Michigan Elementary Principals and Middle School Association and Michigan Secondary Principals Association of School have filed a brief as Plaintiff-appellee amici curiae. has not filed a brief with this Court. v Delton Opinion by Dissenting Weaver, J. with defendants. her contract did not terminate
tion pro- despite reassigned, plaintiff, being is still Further, requirement for notice of non- statute’s tected long district continues to as the school renewal. As origi- employee who was of an renew the contract nally assigned the district cannot administrator, anas employee’s employment without notice terminate that regardless statute, with the nonrenewal consistent employee’s reassignment. of the judgment of the Court I would reverse grant- Appeals court’s order and reinstate the circuit summary disposition ing in favor of defendants. Riley, JJ., J. concurred Boyle Weaver,