.This сase involves an indirect legal challenge to the massive settlement agreement between the nation’s largest tobacco companies and the attorneys general of 46 states and several territories. The 1998 settlement known as the Master Settlement Agreement, or “MSA,” resolved all of these states’ and territories’ claims against those tobacco companies, which the states had sued for billions of dollars in damages related to the harmful effects of smoking.
Plaintiff Steve Sanders, a smoker, alleges that cigarette prices have skyrocketed in the nine years since the MSA, and that the price increases are the result of an illegal price-fixing scheme that the MSA enabled. On behalf of a putative class of cigarette smokers, Sanders sued the Attorney Genеral of the State of California and the four largest tobacco companies: Philip Morris USA Inc., R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., and Lorillard Tobacco Co. 1 Sanders does not allege that the MSA itself is illegal, but rather alleges that the MSA, the post-MSA price increases, and the state statutes implementing the MSA’s terms (the “implementing statutes”) are evidence of a cigarette price-fixing cartel that violates the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 et seq.; the Cartwright Act, Cal. Bus. & Prof.Code §§ 16720 et seq.; other California unfair competition statutes, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200 et seq.; and California’s common law of unfair competition. Sanders also alleges that the Sherman Act preempts the implementing statutes.
The defendants moved to dismiss under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). The district court granted the motions and dismissed the claims with prejudice.
See Sanders v. Lockyer,
1. Background
The following facts are undisputed for the purpose of the motion to dismiss, unless otherwise noted. The United States cigarette market is dominated by four companies: Philip Morris USA Inc., R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., and Lorillard Tobacco Co. Their combined sales have accounted for more than 90 percent of cigarette sales for at least the last decade.
These four companies in the 1990s faced coordinated lawsuits by the attorneys general of most states and U.S. territories, who sought money and other relief to help their governments cope with the harmful effects of smoking and the costs imposed by those effects. In late 1998, the tobacco companies and the attorneys general signed the MSA. 2 State courts, including the California Superior Court, then ap *907 proved the MSA in consent decrees and dismissed the lawsuits against the tobacco companies.
The MSA requires the four major tobacco companies — who, as the initial signatories of the MSA, are known as the “Original Participating Manufacturers” — to pay the states billions of dollars each year. The total annual payments are based on a formula that considers inflation and the total number of individual cigarettes sold in the fifty United States, the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico. Each Original Participating Manufacturer (or “OPM”) must annually contribute a portion of the total payment that is equal to the OPM’s share of that year’s cigarette sales (the OPM’s “market share”). For examрle, if an OPM’s market share is 25 percent, that OPM must contribute 25 percent of that year’s settlement payment.
The OPMs expected to raise cigarette prices to help pay for the settlement and feared that smaller manufacturers, which were not part of the negotiations, would seize the chance to compete with cheaper cigarettes, possibly cutting into the OPMs’ market share. The settling parties addressed this problem in three ways. First, the MSA offered a carrot to non-OPM tobacco companies to join the settlement agreement. These “Subsequent Participating Manufacturers” (“SPMs”) could join the settlement within 90 days of the enactment of the MSA. They would not have to make any part of the payments due to the states so long as their market share remained at or below their 1998 market share (or 125 percent of their 1997 market share, whichever was greater). If an SPM’s market share increased, however, the SPM would have to contribute to the settlement payment, with the contribution based on the sales in excess of the SPM’s 1998 sales (or 125 percent of 1997 sales, if applicable). For example, if an SPM sold 250,000 cigarettes in 1998, and then one year later sold a larger share of the market — say, 300,000 cigarettes — the SPM would have to contribute to the settlement payment. If the extra 50,000 cigarettes equaled 1 percent of the market share, the SPM would have to pay 1 percent of the settlement payment. As of August 15, 2007, forty-four smaller tobacco companies are participating in the MSA as SPMs. 3
Second, the OPMs would pay less money under the MSA if their total sales drоpped below a certain amount. If the reason for this drop is competition by tobacco companies that did not participate in the MSA, the settlement payment would be reduced even further.
Third, most states have enacted two sets of statutes that allegedly make it harder for non-signatory tobacco companies (and any future market entrants) to undercut the OPMs’ and SPMs’ market shares. Sanders alleges that the states were motivated to pass these statutes out of fear that the OPMs’ higher prices would cause their market share to fall, thereby reducing the amount of the settlement payments to the states. These “implementing statutes” are known in most states as the “Qualifying Act” and the “Contraband Amendment.”
Under the “Qualifying Act,” non-signatory tobacco companies (also known аs “Non-Participating Manufacturers,” or “NPMs”) have to pay a portion of their revenues into an escrow account. The money in the escrow account acts as a liability reserve. If the NPMs are successfully sued for cigarette-related harms, *908 the money in the escrow accounts will pay the damage awards. Each NPM’s payment is based on market share, and is roughly the same per-cigarette cost as the amount that OPMs must pay to abide by the MSA. The payments can only be used to pay a judgment or settlement on a claim against the NPM, up to the amount that the NPM would otherwise pay under the MSA. Any remaining funds in the escrow account revert back to the NPM after twenty-five years.
This law allegedly prevents the NPMs from undercutting the prices of OPMs’ cigarettes by taking away the extra profitability that an NPM would enjoy. For example, say that OPMs’ sales are such that for a given year, they must pay 25 cents per cigarette to the states under the MSA. This would seem to give NPMs a cost advantage of 25 cents per cigarette. But under the Qualifying Act, if an NPM also sold cigarettes that year, the NPM would have to pay roughly 25 cents per cigarette into an escrow account, which the NPM could not touch for 25 years. In other words, the NPM’s cost advantage over the OPMs is erased.
The “Contraband Amendment,” for its part, penalizes NPMs who refuse to make escrow payments under the Qualifying Act. The Contraband Amendment allows a state to “de-list” NPMs from a list of approved tobacco manufacturers. De-list-ing effectively prevents the offending NPM from selling cigarettes in that state.
The California legislature has enаcted a Qualifying Act and a Contraband Amendment. Cal. Health & Safety Code §§ 104556, 104557 (Qualifying Act); Cal. Bus. & Prof.Code § 22979(a), (b), and Cal. Rev. & Tax Code § 30165.1(d), (e) (Contraband Amendment).
As expected, the OPMs’ cigarette prices rose when the MSA took effect. Sanders alleges, however, that the price increases have far exceeded the tobacco companies’ costs of complying with the MSA. The OPMs allegedly raised their prices by $12.20 per carton between late 1998 and early 2002 — more than twice the amount necessary to meet the OPMs’ obligations under the MSA. Also, the price increases have been “parallel.” Whenever one OPM has raised its cigarette prices, the others have generally matched the increase. Despite these increases, the OPMs’ cigarette sales still account for more than 90 percent of the market.
The price increases and othеr factors have prompted several legal challenges against the MSA, most alleging antitrust and constitutional violations. The challenges have been largely unsuccessful.
See, e.g., Tritent Int’l Corp. v. Kentucky,
II. The Present Case
Sanders alleges that the MSA has spawned a “cartel” because it lets the participating tobacco companies “raise prices without fear of losing sales or market *909 share.” Sanders does not allege that the tobacco companies have agreed amongst themselves to fix prices. Instead, he alleges that the MSA penalizes tobacco companies for competing on price, because they have to pay more money under the MSA as their market shares increase. As a result, tobacco companies allegedly will be reluctant to increase market share. Thus, when one tobacco company raises its prices, all other tobacco companies allegedly can raise prices in lockstep without fearing that their rivals will try to undercut them. “[I]n effect,” the complaint alleges, “the OPMs have agreed to compensate each other [f|or any market share increase ... by imposing a proportionate increase in the settlement payment for such market share gain.” 4
Sanders also alleges that the MSA encouraged other tobacco companies to join the cartel. Any company that has joined the MSA as an SPM will be reluctant to increase its market share beyond 1998 levels, because by doing so it would be forced to pay some money to the states. 5 As a result, the SPMs followed the OPMs whеn they increase their prices.
Sanders further alleges that the MSA encouraged the states to pass anti-competitive laws protecting the alleged cartel from price competition. This is because the OPMs’ payments to the states drop if their total sales drop below a threshold level, or if non-signatory NPMs take away OPMs’ market share. The states, Sanders alleges, therefore passed the Qualifying Acts and Contraband Amendments to keep NPMs from entering the market.
The sum of these parts, Sanders alleges, is an illegal “horizontal output-restriction cartel” in which the OPMs, backed by state authority (or, at least, state acquiescence), have raised cigarette prices to artificially high (or “supracompetitive”) levels without fear of price competition. This scheme is preempted by the Sherman Act, Sanders argues, because it so obviously conflicts with federal antitrust law. Furthermore, Sanders argues that even if the scheme consisting of the MSA and its implementing statutes is not facially preempted, the tobacco defendants have still committed illegal price-fixing, as evidenced by the parallel price increases. Finally, Sanders argues that the State of California failed to adequately supervise the tobacco companies’ pricing actions. 6
*910
The defendants filed motions to dismiss, arguing, among other things, that they are immune to antitrust liability under either (1) the
Noerr-Pennington
immunity doctrine, described in
E. R.R. Presidents Conf. v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc.,
The district court granted the motions to dismiss.
See Sanders,
III. Analysis
A dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is reviewed
de novo. See Knievel v. ESPN,
Review is generally limited to the contents of the complaint, but a court can consider a document on which the complaint relies if the document is central to the plaintiffs claim, and no party questions the authenticity of the document.
See Warren,
A. Preemption
Sanders argues that California’s Qualifying Act and Contraband Amendment are preempted by Section 1 of the Sherman Act, which states that “[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce ... is declared to be illegal.” 15 U.S.C. § 1. To be preempted by this Act, a state statute must be in “irreconcilable” conflict with the federal antitrust regulatory scheme.
Rice v. Norman Williams Co.,
Neither the Qualifying Act nor the Contraband Amendment explicitly allow price fixing, market division, or other per se illegal monopolistic behavior. Sanders argues, however, that these statutes create such high barriers to NPMs’ market entry and ability to price-eompete that they have “virtually guaranteed collusion and monopoly prices in the cigarette market.” (Quoting 1 Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert Hoven-kamp, Antitrust Law, ¶ 226(a), at 35 (2006 Supp.)). The statutes therefore place irresistible pressure on all cigarette companies to fix prices, Sanders argues.
The statutes do place some pressure on some new entrant tobacco companies to charge higher prices if they decide to enter the market. The Qualifying Act forces NPMs to place into escrow a per-cigarette payment roughly equal to the per-cigarette payment that participating manufacturers pay under the MSA. The Contraband Amendment prevents NPMs who fail to make the escrow payments from distributing their cigarettes. If NPMs wish to remain profitable, they must factor the еscrow payments into the prices they charge per cigarette. The statutes thus may cause higher prices and dissuade some potential market entrants. Nothing, however, forces the NPMs to either peg their prices to those of participating manufacturers, or to refrain altogether from entering the market. If the OPMs really are charging artificially high prices, and thus making artificially high profits, an NPM conceivably could compete on price by charging a “normal” price and still make a “normal” profit, even taking the escrow payment into account.
Sanders therefore has failed to adequately allege that the implementing statutes mandate or authorize conduct that “in all cases” violates federal antitrust law.
See Fisher,
B. Immunity
Sanders next argues that even if the Sherman Act does not preempt the implementing statutes, the tobacco companies have nonetheless violated the Act by using the MSA and implementing statutes to create a price-fixing cartel. The state of California, for its part, has allegedly fostered this cartel either by passing the im *912 plementing statutes and thus encouraging price-fixing, or at least by failing to prevent it from happening.
The defendants argue that Sanders has failed to allege any conduct that would violate the Sherman Act. The defendants also argue that even if Sаnders has adequately pleaded Sherman Act violations, they are nonetheless immune from prosecution under the Noerr-Pennington immunity doctrine, the state action doctrine, or both.
1. Noerr-Pennington immunity
The tobacco defendants argue that their acts of (1) negotiating the MSA, (2) petitioning the California courts for approval of the MSA, and finally (3) acting according to the MSA’s terms, are constitutionally protected from antitrust liability under the Noerr-Pennington immunity doctrine.
The
Noerr-Pennington
doctrine arises from two Supreme Court cases,
E. R.R. Presidents Conf. v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc.,
The Supreme Court has interpreted “petitioning” to encompass activities other than legislative lobbying. For example,
Noerr-Pennington
immunity protects private actors when thеy file court documents and enter contracts with the government.
See Trucking Unlimited,
Neither the Supreme Court nor the Ninth Circuit have specifically held that a settlement agreement like the MSA qualifies as “petitioning” that may be protected by
Noerr-Pennington
immunity. The Seventh Circuit, however, has explicitly held that
Noerr-Pennington
immunity protects private parties from liability for negotiating and entering into settlements or other agreements with the government.
See Campbell v. City of Chicago,
In
Noerr,
the Supreme Court reasoned that petitioning of government officials deserved immunity from antitrust liability for two reasons.
It is inevitable, whenever an attempt is made to influence legislation by a campaign of publicity, that an incidental effect of that campaign may be the infliction of some direct injury upon the interests of the party against whom the campaign is directed. And it *913 seems equally inevitable that those conducting the campaign would be aware of, and possibly even pleased by, the prospect of such injury. To hold that the knowing infliction of such injury renders the campaign itself illegal would thus be tantamount to outlawing all such campaigns.
Id.
at 143-44,
The act of negotiating a settlement with a state undoubtedly is a form of speech directed at a government entity. Given the Court’s desire to protect free speech from Sherman Act attack, it is clear why Noerr-Pennington immunity should protect a private party from liability for such an act. If a person undertaking to negotiate a way out of his legal troubles were to fear that the very act of negotiating would expose him to further liability, he might be afraid to attempt a settlement in the first place. The result would be fewer settlements, even when the parties would otherwise be willing to reach a principled compromise, and more cases dragging on for years to the detriment of all parties, not to mention the cоurt system.
Furthermore, holding that a private party’s settlements with the government are exposed to antitrust liability would surely, as the Supreme Court in
Noerr
warned, “substantially impair the power of [state] government to take actions through its legislature and executive that operate to restrain trade.”
Id.
at 137,
We therefore hold that Noerr-Pen-nington immunity protects a private party from liability for the act of negotiating a settlement with a state entity. 8 Immunity thus protects the tobacco defendants from liability for the act of negotiating the MSA with the State of California.
Sanders argues that even if
Noerr-Pennington
immunity protects the dеfendants from liability for the MSA itself, it does not protect the tobacco defendants from liability for increasing prices after the MSA. Sanders bases his argument on the plurality opinion in
Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co.,
Subsequent cases cast doubt on the precedential value of this fragmented opinion. The Court itself undercut the
Cantor
*914
plurality in
Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc.,
The lower courts have also interpreted
Cantor
narrowly. In
Greenwood Utilities,
the Fifth Circuit held that
Cantor
“cannot support” a broad rule that
Noerr-Pen-nington
immunity never extends to the consequences of government acts that result from immunized petitioning.
See
For our part, we have followed
Allied Tube
and explicitly held that
Noerr-Pennington
immunity protects a private party from liability not only for the petition, but also for any injuries that result “directly” from valid government action taken on the pеtitioner’s behalf.
Sessions Tank Liners, Inc. v. Joor Mfg., Inc.,
2. State action immunity
The State of California, for its part, argues that state action immunity, or *915 “Parker immunity,” protects it from liability both for entering into the MSA and for enacting the implementing statutes. We agree.
The
Parker
immunity doctrine protects most state laws and actions from antitrust liability. The doctrine originated in
Parker v. Brown,
The Supreme Court has never specified what conduct comprises a state action that is “directed” by the state legislature and is therefore immune. In post -Parker cases, however, the Supreme Court has articulated some general tests to help decide whether a particular action qualifies for Parker immunity. A threshold question, therefore, is whether a court approved settlement like the MSA may be protected by Parker immunity. The next question is whether the MSA scheme in particular meets the Supreme Court criteria for Parker immunity.
The answer to the first question is clear under our court’s precedents. If a government entity enters into a settlement like the MSA, the settlement is a “state action” that mаy be protected by
Parker
immunity. We have held that
Parker
covers not only state legislation, but also the acts of courts and executive-branch officials.
See Charley’s Taxi Radio Dispatch Corp. v. SIDA of Hawaii, Inc.,
The second question — whether the MSA scheme meets all the criteria for
Parker
immunity — is considerably more complex. Even though the MSA is probably a state act, it does not necessarily qualify for
Parker
immunity from antitrust liability. A series of Supreme Court cases holds that any action in restraint of trade is only immune if it satisfies a two-part test: The anticompetitive policy not only must be (1) “clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed as state policy,” but also must be (2) “actively supervised by the state itself.”
Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n. v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc.
(Midcal),
It is unclear whether
Hoover
and
Mid-cal
are coexisting “live” precedents, or whether one overrules the other. It is possible that the
Midcal
test is limited, as
Hoover
suggests, to cases in which the courts must decide whether private conduct is actually protected “state action.” The
Midcal
line of cases, however, never mentions the
Hoover
line of cases, even though they chronologically overlap. Indeed,
321 Liquor,
which was decided after
Hoover,
explicitly states that the way a state statute gets
Parker
immunity is by satisfying the two-part
Midcal
test.
See
Whether the
Midcal
test applies to the MSA is a critical question for the present case. The lower courts have split on whether the MSA should get
Parker
immunity, chiefly because some apply
Mid-cal,
and some — following the
Hoover
precedent — do not.
Compare Bedell,
Sanders argues that the Midcal test is appropriate here and reasons that since California has never “actively supervised” the tobacco defendants’ price increases, state action immunity protects none of the defendants from antitrust liability. The defendants, however, argue that the Mid-cal test is inappropriate because the MSA and the implementing statutes were “sovereign acts,” and that under Hoover, the MSA, the Qualifying Act and the Contraband Amendment are automatically immune from suit.
Our circuit precedent indicates that the defendants are correct. In
Deah-Perera Hawaii,
we held that a state “acting as sovereign” is “immune from the federal antitrust laws.”
Nonetheless, Sanders argues that the
Midcal
line of cases have overruled
Hoover,
and that
Deak-Perera
and
Charley’s Taxi
therefore are dead precedents. Sanders points to Ninth Circuit cases that, like the
Midcal
line of cases, apply the
Midcal
test without considering the
Hoover
rule that sovereign state acts are
per se
immune.
See, e.g., Snake River Valley Elec. Ass’n. v. Pacificorp,
First, it makes no sense to apply the
Midcal
test to a sovereign state act.
Mid-cal
holds that an anticompetitive restraint is protected under
Parker
only if the state “actively superviséis]” the anticompetitive conduct.
Second, the holding in
Hoover
is broader than the holdings in the
Midcal
line of cases. The Court in
Hoover
said that “[t]he starting point in
any
analysis involving the state-action doctrine is the reasoning of
Parker v. Brown.”
Midcal,
however, makes no such blanket statements. In that opinion, the Court was chiefly concerned with how to distinguish between a private price-fixing scheme and an immunized state act. Indeed, each of the
Midcal
line of cases involved a private body — not a state-making anticompetitive decisions under the aegis of a state regulatory scheme. In
Midcal
and
324 Liquor,
the Court considered whether state-authorized pricing schemes for wholesale alcohol, which gave price-fixing control to private parties, had enough active state supervision to qualify for
Parker
immunity.
Midcal,
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has repeatedly hinted that the
Midcal
test is limited only to situations in which private bodies opеrate under state regulatory authority. In
Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conf., Inc. v. United States,
Hoover therefore controls in cases where the state, acting as a sovereign, imposes restraints on competition. The state in such situations is immune from antitrust liability, regardless of whether the restraint in question would satisfy the Midcal test.
Since the California attorney general’s act of entering into the MSA is a sovereign act, as are the legislature’s actions in enacting the Qualifying Act and Contraband Amendment, the state is immune from antitrust liability for these actions, unless the MSA scheme is an attempt tо “give immunity to those who violate the Sherman Act by authorizing them to violate it, or by declaring that their action is lawful.”
Parker,
In so holding, we recognize that we disagree with two other circuits. The Second Circuit in
Freedom Holdings
and the Third Circuit in
Bedell
applied the
Midcal
analysis and held that
Parker
immunity does not protect the state from liability for entering into the MSA.
Freedom Holdings,
We also reject the
Bedell
Court’s conclusion that the MSA is not a sovereign state act, but rather resembles a “hybrid restraint” existing somewhere outside the realm of
Parker
immunity.
Bedell,
A hybrid restraint is one form of state law that is illegal per se under the Sherman Act. See Fisher,
Ninth Circuit and Supreme Court cases provide a few examples of hybrid restraints. Each of these cases hinged on a state’s decision to let producers dictate market conditions to others&emdash;for example, by “posting” prices that then became legally binding on buyers and other producers.
See id.
at 268-69,
Such a scheme necessarily involves a delegation of market power to private parties that is
per se
illegal under the Sher
*919
man Act.
See Miller,
C. State law claims
Sanders also brought claims under California antitrust law. California courts have held that the
Noerr-Pennington
immunity doctrine аpplies to protect private petitioners of the government from state-law antitrust liability in exactly the same way as it protects them from federal antitrust liability.
See Blank v. Kirwan,
As for the State of California’s liability under its own laws, the district court correctly noted that the California legislature could hardly have violated its own statutes by passing another statute.
See Sanders,
D. Conclusion
Sanders has failed to show that the MSA implementing statutes are per se illegal under the Sherman Act. Sanders also has failed to show that any of the defendants are liable undеr either the Sherman Act or under California antitrust law. Sanders therefore has failed to state a claim entitling him to relief, and the district court properly dismissed his lawsuit.
AFFIRMED.
Notes
. Unless otherwise noted, this opinion will refer to the tobacco companies as "tobacco defendants" and the attorney general as "the State of California.” It will use the term "defendants” when referring to both groups collectively.
. The MSA in its entirety can be found at www.naag.org/backpages/naag/tobacco/msa/ msa-pdf (last visited Aug. 23, 2007).
. The list can be found on the website of the National Association of Attorneys General, www.naag.org/backpages/naag/tobacco/msa/ participating_manu/ (last visited Aug. 22, 2007).
. It is not clear that a proportionate price increase, which would not affect the per-cigarette cost of doing business, would dissuade a tobacco company from attempting to increase its market share. We need not, however, address the merits of this claim, as the following discussion will show.
. It is not clear whether this extra payment would really dissuade the SPM from seeking extra market share. If an SPM would pay to the states less money than it would make by selling extra cigarettes, an SPM still might turn a higher profit by increasing its market share. Again, we need not address the merits of this claim.
. The relief Sanders seeks includes:
(1)A declaratory judgment that California's Qualifying Act and Contraband Amendment are both "facially void as a per se restraint of trade,” and therefore preempted by the Sherman Act.
(2) An injunction against the state to keep it from enforcing the MSA and the implementing statutes, and against the tobacco defendants to make them "cease their anticompetitive aсtivity taken in furtherance of the MSA.”
(3) Money damages against the tobacco defendants for operating an illegal price-fixing cartel.
Sanders’s complaint also seeks to enjoin implementation of the "anticompetitive provisions” of the MSA. His appeal, however, does not address whether the MSA itself is illegal. Sanders instead argues that the MSA is one part of a larger illegal scheme. We therefore need not address whether the MSA itself would be legal in the absence of the alleged larger scheme.
. The Second Circuit has held that the MSA and its companion statutes are preempted by federal law.
See Freedom Holdings,
. We do not address whether Noeir-Penning-ton immunity may protect an anticompetitive settlement agreement between two private entitles, who conceivably could claim that the act of petitioning the court to accept their agreement immunizes the agreement itself.
. The Second Circuit in
Freedom Holdings
found that the MSA implementing statutes were not themselves protected by
Noerr-Pen-nington
immunity because "the immunity for advocacy cannot sensibly protect the resultant anticompetitive legislation from being held to be preempted as in conflict with the Sherman Act. Otherwise, all such legislation would be immune.”
. The Sixth Circuit, in
Tritent,
reached a similar conclusion about the Kentucky version of the MSA scheme. The Sixth Circuit held that the
Rice v. Norman Williams Co.,
. The tobacco defendants argue that they, too, are entitled to Parker immunity. We need not reach this issue, since we have already held that they are entitled to immunity under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine.
