185 Iowa 389 | Iowa | 1918
The second count alleges substantially the same facts, with the additional fact that, after plaintiff had entered into negotiations with Ohma, and had introduced him to the defendants as a prospective purchaser, the defendants wrongfully entered into a conspiracy to defeat plaintiff in its claim for commission, and, in pursuance of such conspiracy, made a contract of sale, ostensibly to a third person, though in fact to Ohma: that is, the contract, as written, was made with a third person, though the sale was in fact made to Ohma, and the written contract so entered into assigned to Ohma, in pursuance of such conspiracy. Plain
The answer was a general denial as to both counts.
Upon the issues thus tendered, the cause was tried to a jury, and at the conclusion of plaintiff’s evidence, the court directed a verdict for the defendants. Judgment being entered upon the verdict, the plaintiff appeals, and assigns as error: (1) That the court erred in directing a verdict for the defendants on both counts of the petition; (2) that the court erred in the admission of evidence.
To entitle plaintiff to recover in this action, it must prove all the material allegations of its petition. It alleges that the defendants engaged them to sell the premises, and gave them the exclusive agency to sell; that the price at which they were authorized to sell was $100 per acre; that this agreement of agency was to continue until August 1, 1913; that it was renewed thereafter, from time to time; that, in pursuance of such contract, and while the agency continued, it actually sold the premises,- or procured a purchaser who was ready, able, and willing to purchase the same at the price fixed in the contract of agency; that they introduced him to the defendants, or brought bim to defendants, and informed them of the fact that the purchaser was then ready, able, and willing to buy, at the price stipulated; that the purchaser so procured expressed himself as ready, able, and willing to buy; and that nothing remained for the defendants to do but to consummate the purchase by executing the deed. As said in Johnson Bros. v. Wright, 124 Iowa 61:
“The agency was to find a purchaser on certain terms, and, in order to earn the commission, it was incumbent upon plaintiffs to furnish a person ready, able, and willing to buy on the terms fixed. To accomplish this, where no sale is actually made, either a valid obligation to buy must be procured and tendered to the principal, or the vendor
In Beamer v. Stuber, 164 Iowa 309, the rule so announced was approved and followed, citing Flynn v. Jordal, 124 Iowa 457; McDermott v. Mahoney, 139 Iowa 292; and Nagl v. Small, 159 Iowa 387. In this Beamer case, supra, the court said, referring to the rule announced in Johnson Bros. v. Wright, supra:
“This does not necessarily mean that the offer shall be made in person by the purchaser to the seller, but that it shall be made in such circumstances that the latter may then exact the execution of a binding contract, if he so elects. There is no reason why the agent of the seller may not communicate to him an offer of purchase, and, if the proposed purchaser is immediately accessible, so that a written contract may then and there be executed, and he is ready, willing, and able to consummate the deal, this is enough.”
Applying these rules to the situation we have here,, it is apparent that the plaintiff could not recover in this suit if no sale had ever been made by the defendants to Ohma, for at no time did the plaintiff inform the defendants that it had found in Ohma a person who was ready, able, and willing to buy the land on the terms on which the plaintiff had a right to make the sale. They procured no valid obligation from Ohma to buy, nor did they bring Ohma and the defendants together, so that the defendants could secure such a contract if they wished to do so. At no time did they inform the defendants that Ohma was ready, able, and willing to buy at the stipulated price, nor did Ohma ever communicate that fact to the defend
We find ho error in the ruling of the court in sustaining defendants’ motion for a directed verdict, and the case is, therefore, — Affirmed.