Sanchez v. State

disagreement and majority my the s parole. eligible date he would the require I would reach the merits reached. additional The Court did not a petitioner the showing by had not al- reasonable petitioner because the claim if at petition that he had of a more favorable result probability habeas leged his claims; parole majority his trial in such the would properly advised as to all been guilty showing not such a claims of pled require would have not eligibility, he Hill, respect going penal trial. errors or omissions and insisted on consequences. Nor had he 106 S.Ct. 366. U.S alleged any “special circumstances the that he

might support conclusion SHEPARD, C.J., concurs. parole his particular emphasis on placed or eligibility deciding whether not a claim Id. Absent such or

plead guilty.” circumstances, said, the

special the Court insufficient

“petitioner’s allegations [were] satisfy Washington the Strickland v. ” ‘prejudice.’ Id. requirement analysis to mean majority reads this of a probability more “reasonable SANCHEZ, Guadalupe Appellant A. that the court used earli- favorable result” (Defendant Below), opinion apply in the does not er Hill involving counsel’s errors omis-

claims consequences of concerning penal sions Indiana, Appellee I guilty reading think a better STATE plea. (Plaintiff Below). and of Hill is language from structure a probability of more “reasonable No. 92S03-0009-CR-518. all applies result” test claims favorable necessary that it not to even reach Court of Indiana. Supreme re- the test in Hill because threshold petitioner alleging that quirement June on pled guilty would have insisted

going to trial was not met. said, think there is having

That been I agreement majority

broad between approaches myself as to how court assistance of counsel

claim ineffective First, plea.

respect guilty peti- demonstrating burden of

tioner has the was deficient. performance

that counsel’s

(We case.) in this question open leave that

Second, has the burden of petitioner probability

demonstrating reasonable defendant hypothetical reasonable pled guilty not have and elected to

would only It is

go properly to trial advised. are cleared that

after those two hurdles

5X0 “grabbing

to leave after he accused of girls’ all the butts.” trailer soon returned to the Sanchez remaining He held four gun. occupants hostage the trailer while he of a woman who had al- attempted to find four ready party. left the After the hos- tages they did not convinced Sanchez was, know the woman he ordered where to hostages one of remove all of the trailer, phones, telephones in the took seventeen-year-old and forced H.S. to him. leave with thirty min- Sanchez and H.S. walked for utes to forced a cornfield where Sanchez raped H.S. to her and then remove clothes that he complained her. When she was her, hurting performed oral sex Sanchez her, raped on then her several more and then three pair times. The walked and Carpenter, K. Public Defender of Susan house, hiding in one-half miles to Sanchez’s Lewis, Indiana, L. Gregory Deputy Public passed. they ditches when cars When Indiana, Defender, Indianapolis, Attorneys house, reached took H.S. to Sanchez for Appellant. again her. Both raped the basement and Modisett, Attorney A. General of Jeffrey asleep. then fell Sanchez and H.S. Hines, Indiana, Gasper Deputy Barbara Early morning, police arrived General, Indiana, Attorney Indianapolis, asleep and found next H.S. Sanchez Attorneys Appellee. weapon his hand loaded near neck. At and his hand around H.S.’s left TRANSFER PETITION FOR ON trial, gave following court the trial “Vol- objection: over Sanchez’s instruction BOEHM, Justice. to the untary is not a defense intoxication section hold that Indiana Code 35- We and You charge Rape Confinement. 41-2-5, prohibiting the use voluntary intoxication into not take negate mens voluntary intoxication determining whether consideration eases, rea criminal does not requirement intentional- knowingly Defendant acted violate the Indiana Constitution. in the This ly, alleged as information.” Background and Factual Procedural law, accurately reflects Indiana instruction 1, 1997, codified in July effective 6, 1998, Guadalupe night July On the 35-41-2-5. Pub. L. Indiana section Code birthday in a party attended a Sanchez 210-1997, 3,§ Acts 2938. A No. Ind. All nine County, in Allen Indiana. trailer and crimi- jury rape convicted Sanchez of drinking at the were and people party he nal confinement and was sentenced marijuana. Sanchez smoking some were forty years imprisonment. noticeably consuming intoxicated after was that it argues Sanchez twenty-four appeal, two and beers On between give He was asked error glasses tequila. several the Due might because Course of evidence of intoxication be al instruction Law the Indiana Constitution provision of lowed in certain homicide crimes. O’Her pro- and several other state constitutional 420, 420, rin v. 14 Ind. 1860 WL his visions establish (1860). years later, Thirty this Court defense. The voluntary intoxication Court held that evidence of intoxication was ad Appeals, after an extensive examination a first-degree missible to reduce murder I, origin of Article Section second-degree. conviction to Aszman v. defense, history as a of intoxication 347, 353-59, 123 Ind. 24 N.E. provided had found that Sanchez no inde- 125-27 By Court had pendent supporting a analysis due course extended the use of intoxication evidence of the Indiana law claim under Constitu- proof to all crimes requiring specific of tion, and therefore evaluated this issue State, 435, intent. Booher v. 156 Ind. 448- under process federal due doctrine. San- (1901). 49, 156, 60 N.E. 160 This became (Ind.Ct. State, 165, chez v. 732 N.E.2d 173 in majority position the United States. of App.2000). Appeals The Court found Egelhoff, 37, See Montana v. 518 U.S. 46- 37, Montana v. 518 U.S. Egelhoff, 116 47, 2013, 116 S.Ct. 135 L.Ed.2d 361 2013, (1996), S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 361 disposi- tive. The court concluded that there was 1980, In legislature added Indiana because, no federal due violation in process 3—5(b), Code section which attempt- 35-41— plurality opinion Egel- the terms of the in ed to voluntary limit the use of intoxication hoff, of prohibiting evidence intoxication a required as defense to crimes that “with justice did principle not offend “a of so intent to” or “with intention to.” Four in rooted the traditions conscience of later, years in Terry our people so to be ranked as fundamen- 1085, (Ind.1984), that, this Court held Sanchez, tal.” N.E.2d at 173. “[a]ny factor which serves as denial of Voluntary I. Intoxication the existence of mens rea must be consid- as a Defense Under ered a trier of fact before a guilty Indiana Law entered,” finding is and concluded that the opinion

The Court Appeals contains a statute was unconstitutional. more the history detailed account of In the United Supreme States voluntary intoxication as defense to the Court held that a prohibit state could mens In summary, rea element of crimes. criminal offering defendant from at the surrounding time of the debates of voluntary negate intoxication to req- Constitution, drunkenness and intoxi uisite violating mens rea without the Due cating liquors quite harshly. were viewed Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend- Proposals to the were Constitution made ment. Egelhoff, prohibit liquor to sell licenses and to Therefore, as observed in State prevent from benefiting the State from Cleave, v. Van 1302 n. 15 liquor law, sales. At common (Ind.1996), the doctrine offense, longer is “no was itself an and the prevailing good grounded law” insofar view was no that one crime was defense to Court, federal By guarantee another.1 consistent of due states, with process. had come to the view (No. 14,868) (“Drunkenness vice,

1. This gross attitude towards intoxication was not is a E.g., limited to contemplation Indiana. United and in the States v. Cor- of some of our laws nell, (C.C.D.R.I.1820) ”). 25 F. Cas. 657-58 is a crime.... provision. of Law State terse- Course response Egelhoff, In that, “Clearly [voluntary ly responds Indiana section enacted Code “Intoxi- does not violate provides: intoxication] instruction This section 35-41-2-5. Constitution,” relying in a for on the prosecution the Indiana is not a defense cation into may not be taken course of law claims proposition offense and due determining the existence using analy- same consideration are to examined is an element of a mental state that claims. We process as federal due sis exceptions conclusion, ... not relevant but not agree [with offense with State’s with If is consistent this statute reasoning. here].” its constitution, the instruction the state from other than Ter No case this Court captured the law properly trial Sanchez’s (Ind. ry v. a claim lack of governing Indiana 1984), the need a volun has considered voluntary intoxication. intent reason of under tary intoxication defense either below, compatibility of the explained As Terry did or state constitution. federal with the federal constitution in so that a many not state words statuto con- Egelhoff, the state established ry the defense abolition have not been resolved stitutional issues by is the Indiana prohibited intoxication by this Court. nevertheless have the We Constitution. I, 12—Due II. Article Course Section pre that the issue from proposition Due of Law and “Substantive in that case whether elimina sented Process” voluntary of intoxication a defense tion of the argues Indiana’s “is violative the Constitution Sanchez first that the of Indiana.” when read States and State provision, Due Course of Law United at 1087. The constitu conjunction Terry, the other in constitutional for that the ability Terry’s to tional basis conclusion “protected Sanchez’s provisions, is “void and by voluntary intent intoxication statute challenge proof of his the State’s effect” not clear. Id. at 1088. voluntary intoxi without is on a defense putting in Sanchez, concurring Terry adopted opinion According to Indiana cation.” (Ind. State, v. 463 N.E.2d Sills section 35^11-2-52 unconstitutional Code 1984) (Givan, C.J.), I, other in overruled on Article because violates Section v. grounds Wright addition to several other constitutional (Ind.1995), view which took the analyze he not 569-70 Although does provisions. necessarily a mens every has constitu crime independently Section not clear ar did make phrases requirement. his rea Sills provisions, tional Sanchez specific provision law. His a of due course of whether gument terms thought requirement, such impose that the criminal was contention seems to be so, or, of the federal or provision what other sections of protections in the sum, although In it was. “pro create state constitution Indiana Constitution either Sills, Indiana suggests via Terry, tectable interest” under Due Course a limitation on the forbids provision Law or establish that the volun Constitution defense, neither “firmly in intoxication tary defense is and, therefore, provision what opinion be abol indicates grained” cannot supports Due constitution conclusion. state ished because argument present separate under challenges Code sec- does 2. Sanchez also Indiana section, provides the de- tion 35-41-3-5 which for address it. do not he involuntary Because fense of intoxication. true of the same is concurrence in this thrust is that “courts will adhere to the law, case. rather than whim or corruption, dispensing justice litigants.” Jennifer points Sanchez “due Friesen, § State Constitutional Law 6- phrase as the course of law” source of his 2(a) (2d 1996). ed. provisions These have Questions Indiana constitutional claim. interpreted been response to be a to the arising under the Indiana Constitution are abuses that England were “by examining language be resolved time, including delay bribes to or ex history of the text the context of the pedite judicial system. Twenty- Id. ratification, surrounding drafting its one states share provisions similar encom the purpose and structure of our constitu passing the idea that “very essence of tion, interpreting and case law the specific civil liberty certainly consists in provisions.” Gaming Indiana Comm’n v. every individual to protection claim the (Ind.1994). Moseley, 643 N.E.2d laws, whenever he receives an injury.” And, inquiry the first line of consti 6.2(b) Id. at & App. 6 (quoting Marbury tutional case is the text of the constitution (1 Madison, Cranch) v. 137, 163, Ajabu itself. (1803)). L.Ed. 60 (Ind.1998). I, Article Section 12 provides: “All open; courts shall be and every per viewed, So the Due Course of Law son, injury done to him in person, his provision applicable to civil proceedings, property, reputation, remedy shall have provides none of the criminal protec by due law. course of Justice shall be tions of its federal counterpart. As we freely, purchase; administered and without Melroe, recently noted in 729 N.E.2d at denial; completely, and without speedily, 2, 976 & n. all of previous cases that and delay.” By without the terms of Sec any have found protection criminal in the 12, tion only the second sentence of that I, first sentence of Article 12 Section have context, section is relevant in the criminal done so based process” on “due without and that sentence gives guidance no on the any analysis of the independent meaning need vel non for a defense based on lack of of the Due Course of provision. Law Be reason, mens rea for alone let for cause the federal required constitution voluntary intoxication. cases, results in those appending a state Other in interpretative tools addition to process” “due doctrine explanation without language analysis are also limited use and, think, was unnecessary, we incorrect here. There unique is no Indiana history Rather, as well. “[b]y terms, its [Thefirst surrounding the adoption of this clause in I, sentence of Article Section applies 12] 1816 or redrafting its McIntosh v. only in the civil context.” Id. at 976. Co., (Ind. Melroe 974 2000), but interpretation suggested I, second sentence of Article Section this 12 language supported by “justice” refers to history being administered “completely.” I, due course of law doctrine and Article Section 1 embod- I, the case surrounding provision law Article ies the Section in the Declaration In- 12. Due provisions appear dependence course of law that guarantees “life, stem from Sir Edward Coke’s liberty, commen pursuit and the of happiness.” tary on the Magna these, Carta.3 Their basic Neither of and no provision that, 3. Lord "[Ejveiy Subject Coke stated remedy by lake his the court of Law ” Realm, bonds, this injury done him in .... Explicat- Lord Coke’s Second Institute ferris, land, persona [goods, person] (4th vel ing 1671). ... Article 55-56 ed.

515 But we think recognized defense. Constitution, to ment or claimed can be the Indiana rea redefined the mens legislature has governmental limitation on express to render irrelevant the in Indiana element Fifth and Fourteenth in the action found concurrence and the evidence that Sanchez Nevertheless, we are satis- Amendments. reason, although For that present.4 would implicit in its was correct Terry fied I, right in Article the state constitutional fairness fundamental assumption due are not process 12 and federal Section re- and is assumed judicial proceedings identical, instance, we this necessarily The com- constitution. by our state quired conclusion under our state reach the same building long been a basic law has mon Supreme constitution as United States Ind. Code 1- law. See of Indiana block the Four- Egelhoff reached in under Court (1998) 1 language from (adopting 1-2-1 teenth Amendment. (1852)). § As ch. Ind. Rev. Stat. noted, has this Court III. and the Debate Appeals Sills

Court Liability to a “federal over Strict referred frequently “due requirement of state” constitutional Terry v. agree do not We Sanchez, N.E.2d at 171-72. process.” (Ind.1984), the extent N.E.2d inaccurate, we think technically Although that the Indiana Constitution suggested common un- reflect the these references bar to the elimination an inherent contains state are that courts of this derstanding a means of by the basic con- constitutionally bound of a crime. negating the mens rea element identi- frequently fairness that are cepts of with the concur- although agree And federal con- process” fied with “due should precedent rence that stitution. con- disregarded, we do not lightly not be Terry and Sills sider terms, that, agree general We (Ind.1984), on other overruled opportu- of fairness embraces concept State, 658 N.E.2d by Wright v. grounds de- relevant to a present evidence nity to (Ind.1995), more to contain 569-70 fense, is also whether or not consti- references to the state than casual I, of the Article by the terms supported tution. compel attendance Section noted, on are limits already have no there quarrel We thus As witnesses. criminalize, even legislature may the constitu- claim that the concurrence’s what specific a constitutional a in the absence of that defendant requires of our state tion pro- due general there is no Because evidence bar. opportunity have the constitution, and in our state clause any other ele- cess a mens rea element on Constitution, Bilionis, Process, the D. by concurrence Louis very articles cited 4. The Law, legislature to Mich. point that it is for Criminal make and Substantive Indeed, put Bilionis the crimes. As Professor define it is nota- L.Rev. literature discussing the classic academic in liability strict of the articles on ble that none liability: criticizing strict Egelhoff ex- by concurrence discuss cited this, as Hart well problem with all of The knew, example demise an of the cept to observe it as never defines is that the Constitution on process limitations due of substantive few who have as such and that "crime” no acci- legislation. We think that is criminal sensed in judicial robes have worn the quite from problems are distinct dent. The trump capacity an individual themselves point precedential jurisprudential and both a forthright legislative decisions to attach of view. any act or stigma to X or to other criminal a privileged virtue of that is not omission right. recognized constitutional issue, (1959), addressing the L.Ed.2d 205 specific provision no is cited for the requirement a mens rea that the proposition every there is that crime in- requires imposes any constitution on this or tent, state though expressly even that case stat- crime, derive from this fair it must that, “it competent ed is doubtless for the But courts must be careful concept. ness to create States strict criminal liabilities substituting judgment to avoid their for criminal defining offenses without ele- politically responsive those of the more ment of scienter.” Id. at 80 S.Ct. 215. process Federal due limitations branches. explain rejection To this apparent provisions of criminal law on substantive element, necessity of a mens rea the Sills today, having a letter largely are dead laws, concurrence that contended some (Brady5) yielded procedural and struc statutes, e.g., drug regulatory food and Batson7) (Miranda6, tural reforms require liability pur- strict to serve their century. Finding last half substantive and, therefore, poses, “necessary” it is criminal law constraints our state consti imply intent under some circumstances. tution is even harder where there is no 463 N.E.2d at 241. We assume the refer- specific provision such as the Ex Post Fac- ence is to cases such as United States v. to clause. Federal substantive due pro Park, 658, 672-73, 421 U.S. 95 S.Ct. judicial a jurisprudence cess as means of (1975), 44 L.Ed.2d 489 and United States legislative policy override of is often criti Dotterweich, 277, 281, cized as anchorless. In the Indiana Con (1943), upholding 88 L.Ed. 48 strict stitution, a process we have not even due liability criminal under some circum- jurisprudential clause to hold our vessel stances. think it We is more candid to steady against shifting judicial tides of holds, acknowledge, as Smith that some inclinations. We also have the constitu crimes do not component, have mens rea I, tional directive in Article Section that rather than to contend intent is al- power “all This people.” is inherent ways required, implied if nec- too suggests legislation deference to essary. 361 U.S at 80 S.Ct. 215. does not run constitu specific afoul of provision. tional agree We do that a requires crime some action, perhaps is all reasons, For foregoing all of the we Terry and Sills address. Sills cites think grounded constitutional rights not example that was contended to illustrate a specific provision should the need for an requirement intent not be readily Specifically, discovered. every Although crime. acknowledging concurrence, do agree with the Sills running light red is an as to offense Terry, cited with approval to the extent defense, which lack of intent is no Sills it takes the view that intent is a constitu- it as a case implied cites where intent is tionally required every element of crime. view, necessary. 463 prove To N.E.2d at 241. To support that the concurrence in point, posed Sills its Sills explains supporting example the case law the of a liability strict in reality finding criminal as motorist who is struck a rock and ren- an “implied intent.” 463 N.E.2d at 241. dered unconscious while the car proceeds 147, California, Smith v. through U.S. light. S.Ct. Id. The contention is 83, Brady Maryland, Kentucky, v. 373 U.S. 83 S.Ct. v. 7. Batson 476 U.S. 106 S.Ct. (1963). (1986). 10 L.Ed.2d 215 90 L.Ed.2d 69 Arizona, 6. Miranda v. (1966). 16 L.Ed.2d 694 voluntary act. general requirement under of jury should convict judge or

that no place voluntarily That is sufficient gener The conclusion is conditions. those intoxicated offender at risk for the conse- correct, example we think this ally actions, if it quences of his even is claimed an ele that intent is not establish does obliterated to capacity that the has been ment, reflects the usual as but rather requisite achieve the otherwise mental voluntary compo action is a sumption that specific state for a crime. Ind. 35-41- of a crime. See Code nent (1998); v. 2-1 McClain cf. contends that the need The concurrence (Ind.1997). 104, 107 voluntary supplied by acts cannot be it, the voluntary intoxication. As we see sug the extent some have To first, the legisla- issues are: what conduct similar to this elimi that statutes gested second, prohibit; ture has chosen to and require commonly nate the understood whether there is constitutional bar to necessary for voluntary actions ment un- criminalizing may that conduct. It be pro The statute disagree. culpability,8 liability for actions impose wise to strict “may not voluntary that intoxication vides voluntarily persons. taken intoxicated determining taken into consideration be But the issue before us is whether that is an of a mental state the existence and, so, if legislature provided, has so of the offense.” Like all statutes element If whether it is unconstitutional. the stat- law, of the common it is derogation pres- the constitution provides, ute so strictly construed. Durham U-Haul be legislation, ents no barrier to (Ind.2001). Int’l, We voluntary pre- not be think “an element of the offense” refers negate sented to mens rea. element set forth unique each mental crime, voluntarily intoxicated Providing and not to defining the statute her actions person responsible ac for his or general requirement crimes, person does typi degree but is to the same as a sober tion that all underlies activity wholly inno- except in the not criminalize cally not articulated statutes of an obscure overriding provision ignorance cent because as it is found knowledge of relevant facts. 35-41-2-1.9 The law or lack of Indiana Code section Rather, of volun- it substitutes an element Indiana intoxication eliminates that a tary point person intoxication to the voluntarily that the intoxicat requirement actions for ignorance “inten can claim his own “knowingly” defendant acted ed required rea otherwise as to the tionally” crimes that include mens as to those respect, In this it may wrongful But even if there conduct itself. those elements.10 murder, accepts felony which involuntary by an act rendered intoxi is similar felony cation, underlying rea of the premise in most the mens itself doubtful circumstances, Both involve at- sufficient for murder. has decreed intoxication, consequences voluntary, taching penal more serious supplies 10.Thus, Allen, although Egel awareness of the likelihood J. Foreward: Montana v. 8. Ronald Legislative bodily ordinarily on the Limits ele- injury is of severe hoff—Reflections Authority, J. Imagination murder, Judicial necessary for the ment of is not Criminology Crim. L. & voluntarily to be convicted intoxicated killer of murder. reads, "A 9. Indiana Code section 35-41-2-1 only he volun- person commits an offense if tarily engages in conduct in violation of defining the offense.” legislature may Assuming that the as a matter of law. activity to an view produces in itself if it reprehensible person incapable as has both rendered a of typically it does. As greater harm than apprehending consequences wrong- or such, presents problem neither fulness of his acts and still left him capable criminalizing activity that most would re- them, performing think legisla- we blameless,11 or even the gard wholly may constitutionally provide ture that the responsibility of individual criminal issue perpetrator ignorance whose prod- is the proof failures without organizational uct of self-induced intoxication than rather mens rea.12 individual equally moral blindness is In culpable. case, individually and alone inflicted this there can be no doubt from Sanchez on his victim. His night of terror sequence extended of events that Sanchez plainly at the core of the conduct was voluntarily, acted impaired however he culpability. circle of The issue is whether may legislature have been. The has cho- him legislature may criminally hold ignorance sen to treat consequences of the notwithstanding a claim of in- responsible by act voluntary one’s induced intoxi- think the had toxication. We simple ignorance cation the same as murder, battery, conventional crimes— strong opponents law. Even of strict lia- pro- mind when it rape, and so forth—in bility agree may doctrine that it be appro- vided that intoxication does not priate for some crimes. Professor Hart’s negate applied, the mens rea element. So usually work is cited as one of the foun- treatment of intoxication does not liability. tainheads attacks on strict See activity ordinary citizens criminalize Hart, Jr., Henry M. The Aims Rather, supple- benign. would consider Law, Contemp. Criminal 28 Law & Probs. “intentional” ele- “knowing” ments the But recognized “any he ments with a third condition. The statute member of the community who does these felony mur- qualitatively acts the same as things without knowing they are criminal der, and both are constitutional forms of blameworthy, as much for his lack of liability. strict If when we are con- knowledge as for his actual conduct.” Id. fronted with a claim that intoxication was at 413. wholly accompanied by an act innocent IV. as a Statute Redefinition person, taken a sober can consider Requirement of the Mens Rea the issues those facts raise. Because we conclude that a statute voluntarily Until 1997 a intoxicated de- properly impose criminal liability for some fendant claim that Indiana could his element, actions without a mens rea “knowing” actions were or “inten- neither question becomes whether the statute be- tional.” pages Yet the the Northeast fore us does that. We think Montana v. Reporter reciting are full of cases that the Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 116 S.Ct. “executing plan,” defendant’s action in (1996), L.Ed.2d 361 vehicle, is instructive on that operating a motor otherwise point. Four demonstrating physical capacity plu- were Justices constituted the enough requisite rality sustaining establish the mens rea the Montana statute in See, Dotterweich, 280-81, California, e.g., 11. See Lambert v. 320 U.S. at 229-30, (1957), 2 L.Ed.2d 228 (upholding liability 64 S.Ct. 134 strict of cor- (holding process it a violation of federal due porate organiza- officers for violations Angeles to convict under a ordinance Los rea). tion without an individual mens prohibiting register failure to as a convicted residing days felon five after in the within city.) 35-41, may that a state Article Egelhojf ground on the entitled “Substantive Crimi- reading nal Provisions.” This relevant evidence its exclusion is reinforced exclude knowledge our that the Indiana statute principle justice not offend “some does adopted Egelhojf, after and with the in the traditions and conscience so rooted analysis benefit of its and the knowledge to be ranked funda- people of our as as Egelhojf that the result in turned on Jus- 43,116 Id. at 2013 (quoting mental.” S.Ct. Ginsburg’s tice reading of the Montana York, 197, v. New 201- Patterson U.S. Breyer, joined by statute. Justice Justice (1977)). 2319, 53 L.Ed.2d 281 Stevens, pointed out that reading the Mon- examining history voluntary After tana statute equivalent to a redefinition intoxication much more detail than is of the mental elements of crimes has some here, recounted the Court then concluded potentially “anomalous results.” Id. at voluntary that a intoxication defense is not why, 116 S.Ct. 2013. He asks if this were right protected by a fundamental federal result, the intended legislation would the process. due explicitly. not have done so Id. at Souter, Ginsburg, Justices and O’Con- Egelhojf S.Ct. 2013. We think sug- itself nor, dissents, in individual concurrences or gests the answer to that question for agreed that a state could constitutionally Indiana. language of the Indiana define the mental element of a crime to be essentially statute is identical to the Mon- by voluntary satisfied intoxication. Justice version, tana already passed which had Ginsburg thought proper that this was the federal in Egelhojf. constitutional muster view of the Montana concurred That a good enough reason for the 59-60, 116 on that basis. Id. at S.Ct. 2013. Indiana to stick with the tried thought Justice Souter also the statute Second, and true. and less important, the that, seemed to do but felt constrained criminal laws of this state are filled with Supreme position the Montana Court’s provisions. attempt various mens rea An prevented the statute the introduction single provision redefine all in a would of relevant evidence and therefore violated poorly fit with the codification effort to 73-74, due Id. at process. 116 S.Ct. 2013. group logically statutes catego- related agreed Justice O’Connor that a state could ries, amending crimes piecemeal these rea, constitutionally define mens but read daunting drafting would be a much more evidence, the statute to exclude relevant task. we in- Because view the and, therefore, deny procedural due defining toxication statute as the elements 71-73, 116 process. Id. at S.Ct. state, of crimes in this we do not find it to either the process offensive federal due Supreme Unlike the Montana clause or fair- notion fundamental Court, we read the Indiana statute as re ness embedded in our state constitution. crimes, defining the elements of and not as excluding relevant evidence. aAs matter Because the not statute does “exclude form, speak statute does not evidence,” relevant necessarily does not terms of admissible evidence. It was add proscribe evidence of the defendant’s use Rather, ed to the Indiana as a new Code section of alcohol or drugs. as occurred 35^41-2, Chapter case, which “Ba is entitled in this this evidence be admissi- Liability,” sis of part general background,13 Criminal itself a of ble as or as relevant recognize leeway 13. See Elliott v. must that a considerable (Ind.1994); McFarland v. 271 Ind. is allowed even on direct examination for (1979) (“Moreover, proof really of facts which are offered as 520 rea, charged disagree lack of mens offense. But we with the than something

to voluntary that may it also be rele- concurrence identity. Perhaps e.g., re- right. statute denies this The statute accident under other a claim of vant to requirement of mens rea to defines But none of these issues circumstances. intoxication, in voluntary include addition say, This is not to as the are here. raised states, i.e., to the traditional mental inten- contends, that other rules concurrence Thus, tionally, knowingly, recklessly. evidence, Indiana Rule of Evi- specifically, voluntary intoxication does not evidence 404(b), use of this may preclude not dence negate requirement, the mens as the rea objects. defense To the if the evidence Rather, it concurrence contends. satisfies State, 666 N.E.2d contrary, v. Swanson this element of the crime. (Ind.1996), by cited concur- 398-99 404(b) rence, may preclude that Rule holds I, Right Article V. Section 13— think “bad acts.” We evidence of other to Present a Defense fully consistent with our holding that exclu Sanchez also contends Here, evidence of defen- ruling today. voluntary in showing sion evidence his admitted and em- dant’s intoxication was I, toxication Article 13 of violates Section If such evidence by braced the defendant. That the Indiana Constitution. section admitted, given by the the instruction provides: prosecutions, “In all criminal Moreover, the trial proper. trial court is right ... accused shall have to exclude evidence of properly court by heard himself and counsel....” He content, as was done in this blood alcohol right provides claims that his to be heard case, solely if it finds that it bears on the right present him a his defenses. It is degree of intoxication. correct the Indiana Constitution “places unique upon value the desire of agree with purports The concurrence speak an individual accused of a crime to in Egel- concurrence Justice O’Connor’s noted, personally out the courtroom and state although already But as Jus- hoff. predicate what in his mind constitutes a plu- with the readily agreed tice O’Connor charges.” Camp for his innocence of the constitutionally rality that a state could (Ind. State, v. 622 N.E.2d 498 bell to elevate redefine the mens rea elements 1993), abrogated grounds on other intoxication, she felt bound n. Richardson v. Supreme the Montana Court’s view of the (Ind.1999). The United States Su Egelhoff, Montana statute. U.S. preme similarly Court has described the 71-73, 116 2013. Because we con- S.Ct. right federal “to defendant’s redefining the requi- strue our statute as in his present his own version of events rea, O’Connor site mens we assume Justice words” as “fundamental.” Rock v. Arkan would the Indiana statute is agree sas, 44, 52, 107 S.Ct. law. constitutional under federal L.Ed.2d 37 sum, In the concurrence agree we prove I, all obligated the State is But Article 13 does Section agree of a that a claim a require any specific elements crime. And present recognized by defendant relevant Indiana law. has defense be Rather, gives evidence to it defendants the negate element defined, 321, 325, bearing dispute, on the however 258 Ind. (1972); advisory merely background generally as details which fill in the see Fed.R.Evid. 401 interest, color, note; give 1 McCormick on Evidence narrative and committee's ed., (John 1999). lifelikeness.”) (citations omitted); Strong W. 5th ed. Buise support Specifically, argues of those de- he that the voluntary recognized by jury that are the law of intoxication instruction the fenses binds find intent where it language provision the of the not have state. been proved, disregard or to right refers to the of a defendant to be evidence that ne- gates intent. It protects heard himself and counsel. against right limitations on defendant’s persua- We do not find Sanchez’s claim testify at trial and to be represented by sive. The intoxication instruc- or either himself counsel. As this Court unconstitutionally tion does not compel the recently held Roach v. under the jury effect, finding to make a of intent. In right present federal constitutional provides the crime is committed if it defense, accused, required “the as is of the is with requisite done mens rea or aas comply must with established rules result of voluntary intoxication. This stat-

of procedure designed and evidence to as; utory scheme does not violate either the reliability sure both fairness and jury’s federal constitution14 or the ability guilt ascertainment of and innocence.” to determine “the law the facts.” (Ind.1998) (quoting I, Equal Article VII. Section 23— Mississippi Chambers U.S. Privileges and Immunities (1973)). S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 297 finally Sanchez contends that Indiana of the rules of require- One evidence is the Code section 35-41-2-5 violates Indiana’s ment of relevance. Ind. Evidence Rule clause, Privileges and Immunities Article 401. If the substantive law renders the I, Section He claims that the statute evidence irrelevant —which is what voluntarily created a class of intoxicated statute does to Sanchez’s claim of volun- criminal defendants who are not allowed to tary right intoxication'—-there is no under disprove their intent to commit the crime I, present Article Section 13 to it. We criminally responsible and are held even agree concurrence that a defen- they did not act knowingly intentionally. right dant has a evidence to two-part This Court has enunciated a test negate any element of crime. We determining whether a granting disagree point is relevant here unequal privileges or immunities to differ- statute, by because the definition with ele- ing persons passes classes ments different than the concurrence I, “First, muster under Article 23: Section like, would renders the evidence irrelevant. disparate treatment accorded Accordingly, we hold that Indiana Code legislation reasonably must be related to section 35-41-2-5 does violate Article inherent distinguish characteristics which I, 13 of Section the Indiana Constitution. Second, unequally treated classes. I, Jury VI. Article Section preferential uniformly treatment must be 19— Determine Law and Facts applicable equally per- available to all similarly Day, sons situated.” Collins v. I, reads, Article “In all Section (Ind.1994). In applying whatever, jury criminal cases shall test, judgment have the to determine the law and to “substantial deference.” Id. entitled the facts.” Sanchez contends that Indiana I, Code section 35-41-2-5 violates his inquiry The first under Article Section jury to have the determine the law and the reasonably 23 whether the statute is I, pursuant facts to Article Section 19. related to the inherent characteristics that Park, 672-73, 14. See United States v. 95 S.Ct 44 L.Ed.2d 489 J., SULLIVAN, concurs result with This statute classifies the classes. define (1) RUCKER, J., those not groups: separate opinion three which persons into (2) intoxicated, voluntarily intoxicat- those concurs. (3) involuntarily intoxicated.

ed, and those these, Indiana Code the second As for SULLIVAN, Justice, concurring in re- legislative reflects the 35^41-2-5 section sult. who are vol- that defendants determination a defendant’s This case is not about for responsible are untarily intoxicated criminal acts culpability to avoid for right actions, recognizes resulting their Nor is grounds on the that he is drunk. intoxicated who become individuals legislature’s ability to this case about the own are not to be fault of their through no criminal statutes. What draft and redraft for actions taken while responsible held to about is a defendant’s this case is permissible legisla- a intoxicated. This is jury to a that an element present evidence distinction between judgment. tive This of a crime has not been satisfied. involuntarily intoxicated voluntarily rationally legisla- related to is defendants I balancing of goals permissible and is a

tive involved. The dif- competing interests ago, this Court Nearly years seventeen voluntarily intoxicated of the ferentiation Terry in v. State that a crimi determined lack mens rea reasons from those who to nal defendant has a constitutional drunkenness other than self-induced intoxication to ne introduce evidence of voluntarily former rational. The also charged by of an offense gate an element harmful to be placed a mode themselves (Ind. 465 N.E.2d State. others, not. to and the latter did 1984). “[a]ny Terry held that Specifically, prefer- that the which selves as a denial of the requires Section 23 also factor legisla- provided ential treatment existence of mens rea must be considered similarly all uniformly finding to a applicable guilty tion be the trier of fact before face, its the volun- persons. age, situated On such Historically, is entered. facts every- applies condition, tary intoxication or intoxication mental mistake differently is treated no one. Sanchez negate capacity have been offered to voluntarily person from who is a intent.” Id. allowed formulate a he or she commits intoxicated when defendant to relevant evidence section 35-41-2-5 crime. Indiana Code carry its show that the State has failed I, 23. does not violate Article Section beyond a reasonable burden to establish a requirement rea doubt that mens Conclusion crime been satisfied.1 This is what has court af- judgnent The the trial DeBruler meant when he stated Justice firmed. “[wjhenever a later case that the State is J„ SHEPARD, DICKSON, prove particular state C.J., required defendant, evi part mind on the concur. knowingly when the offense contains such majority suggests Defendant en- The See, requirement. e.g., Ind. Code gaged by consuming rea culpable alco- mens conduct (1998) (stating rape occurs Majority Opinion How- 35-42-4-1 hol. See at 517-518. ever, person knowingly ... intentional- obligation "when a or the State has a constitutional charged ly intercourse with a member every of- has sexual to establish fense, element of showing opposite certain defined cir- sex” under and that includes Defen- cumstances). engaged intentionally or dant conduct his added), permitted (emphasis intoxication is to ne reh’g granted dence of on other the existence of that element of the gate grounds, (1997), 681 N.E.2d 181 cert. de State, v. nied, crime.” Fowler (Ind.1988). McClain v. Indeed, L.Ed.2d 121 we have Cf. (Ind.1997) (holding as a found the constitutional principles ex statutory

matter of law that “evidence of pounded Terry to be so fundamental presented automatism can be to show lack gave that we its rule retroactive applica ....”), reh’g of criminal intent denied. Pavey tion. See (Ind.1986) (applying Terry retroac majority opinion Terry. overrules I tively holding because its “corrected a flaw think wrong. this is directly which and persuasively affected Terry’s holding That from the stems the fact finding process and the determina beyond question, Indiana Constitution is innocence.”). tion of a guilt defendant’s the fact that despite opinion does not yet We have as of articulated no doubt First, specific provision. Terry cite a stat about the constitutional source of the Ter ed the statute at issue there was “void See, State, ry e.g., rule. Owens v. 659 and without effect” and “violative of the 466, (Ind.1995), denied; N.E.2d 472 reh’g Constitution of the United and the States Fowler, 526 N.E.2d at 1182. State of Indiana.” 465 N.E.2d at 1087-88. (“A See also id. at in 1088 defendant Exceedingly persuasive arguments must can Indiana offer defense of intoxication be set out for us to turn our back on such crime.”).2 Moreover, any Terry’s reli York, established law. See New C. & St. ance on the Indiana Constitution is further Henderson, 456, 465, L. R. Co. v. 237 Ind. sharpened by incorporation its of Justice (1957) (“We 531, 146 N.E.2d 537 are not concurring opinion Givan’s in Sills v. unmindful importance and the desir where he stated that a defendant could ability principles of stable of law upon negate evidence of intoxication to litigants may rely, which where rule an element of an offense “under our con an opinion announced in works obvious firmly stitution and under the established injustice upon litigants and not sup principles required of the mens rea in find, ported by any authority that can (Ind. 228, criminal law.” 242 463 N.E.2d body should be eliminated from the 1984) added), (emphasis majority opinion precedents jurisdiction.”), reh’g of this de part grounds overruled in on other nied; Prudential Ins. Co. America v. (Ind. 563, Wright v. 570 Smith, 403, 408, 108 61, 231 Ind. 1995), reh’g Terry’s denied. constitutional (1952) (“This court is reluctant to overrule pedigree by is bolstered our treatment of precedents any justifica its if there own years it in the since Although in legal principles by they tion which can majority opinion “Terry asserts that did ....”). be sustained As Em- Chief Justice many not state in so that a words statuto mert stated State ex rel. Hale v. Marion ry abolition of the defense of Court, County Municipal Room 3: prohibited by intoxication is the Indiana Constitution,” Nor Majority Opinion casually should this court over- rule recognized Terry’s prior precedents State Van Cleave if there is to be roots “the Indiana and ... stability U.S. Constitu the law. is not a [This] (Ind.1996) tions.” 674 N.E.2d case where the reasons for the rule have Supreme 2. The United Egelhoff, States Court overruled tana v. component holding the federal of this in Mon- L.Ed.2d if element is not con- Even a mens rea exist, or there never ceased as a matter of sub- stitutionally required first place, in the the rule reason for law, the rule that stantive for good cause which either solely to the pertains Terry set out—which If this precedent. prior overruling been vindi- of evidence—has presentation prior precedents overrule court is to aspects of this by procedural cated particular in a force a result order to Supreme court’s and the United States justice by men case, we will administer jurisprudence. law See criminal Court’s law, the law de- and have by and not Process, Bilionis, the Constitution Louis D. by courts. judges and clared Law, 96 Mich. Criminal and Substantive 484-85, 234 Ind. (1998) (“[PJrocess 1269, 1272 con- L.Rev. C.J., (1955) (Emmert, dissenting). Accord shaping the Su- have been siderations Int’l, 745 N.E.2d Durham v. U-Haul at the inter- jurisprudence preme Courts (“We (Ind.2001) quarrel no have and substantive section of Constitution Appeals the Court of reached result seventy-five criminal law for at least writing were If we policy. as a matter of is a criminal law years.”). Constitutional would find Court a clean slate we on whereby governmental each actor process analysis persuasive.”). Appeals’ legislative role. The an established plays crimes, defining responsible branch is we should re- principles, these Under procedural rules while courts must craft intervening cir- only to see view legislative choices. Id. that vindicate those to its foundation have eroded cumstances 1293, one Terry I view as at 1320-21.3 in “justification there is no the extent that the such intersection of Constitution can sus- [it] which legal principles produced that a criminal law substantive 408, Prudential, at 108 231 Ind. tained.” Therefore, right. Id. at 1272. procedural justifica- of the My review N.E.2d 63. to legislature is free define while that its rule Terry indicates tions behind crimes, it to elements of was not free are as that salient features has several criminal the rule of constitutional override strong today as Terry pronounced. that procedure that the volun- majority would hold position. alone in this Sev- Terry should be tary intoxication defense suggest eases that crim- eral older Indiana the elements of merely “defining read right present have a to inal defendants Majority Opinion at a crimes this state.” to rebut the States case on evidence may prop- “a statute example, 519. This is because rea element. For we stat- mens for some ac- erly liability Legisla- v. that “the impose criminal ed Dedrick State Id. at that certain power rea” element. has no to declare tions without a mens ture (and facie evidence of the prima he reads facts shall be 518. And because intent, Sills) rea element fact of criminal where such that a mens ultimate suggest facts, legisla- without majority standing alone and required, constitutionally them, not be to aid would law. tive enactment says, (they) good are not 736, failed, suggests id. at that ap- amendment see Constitution 3. The drafters of the Indiana proposed A parently grant legislature to this view. subscribed an the drafters did not Ar- that became amendment to the resolution power to write rules of criminal unfettered 1, person provided shall ''[n]o ticle 15 reading procedure. This is reinforced charge any criminal be held to answer to separation power the draft- concept of prescribed except as shall be in such manner 3, § 1. ers embedded in Article fact that by law.” at 735. The Id.

525 deprive To find otherwise would a crimi- a verdict.” 210 Ind. support sufficient (1936) right nal of the 278, 409, defendant defend 259, (citing 418 against one of essential elements of State, N.E. 549 v. 204 Ind. Powers effect, then, In every criminal case. (1933)). v. 210 Ind. See also Jacobs finding deprive such a would the defen- (1936) 107, 110, (“Any dant of means to challenge aspect instruction, upon or not it is based whether prosecution’s of the case and remove the enactment, which undertakes legislative a proof burden of on that element con- jury that certain evidence is to tell the travention of constitutional and statuto- the ultimate fact of sufficient to establish law. ry fact, intent, or other ultimate criminal v. Phipps, State 883 S.W.2d presumption a of such an

or to create (Tenn.Crim.App.1994) (discussing constitu- fact, ultimate invades the constitutional present tional of dimin- evidence jury.”); Walter v. province Brown, capacity). also ished See State (1935) 231, 237, 195 N.E. 208 Ind. 122 N.M. 931 P.2d (holding providing that statute “the failure, involuntary suspension, liqui- fact, In four members of the United thirty days dation of the bank within after Supreme States Court believe deposit, time which is receiving negating the ele- embezzled, charged ingrained to have been shall be ment of intent is the federal Egelhoff, constitution. See Montana v. facie evidence of intent to defraud” prima 37, 61, 1, § 19 of Indiana Con- violated Article (1996) (O’Connor, J., L.Ed.2d 361 dissent- stitution). the prop- These cases stand for much ing). Justice O’Connor based of her that the cannot set out osition dissent on what she deemed to be “sim- prevent the elements of crime but ple principle”: process “Due demands that negating defendant those elements from a criminal defendant be afforded a fair through presumptions irrebuttable of fact. opportunity against to defend the State’s is similar to what occurred in Defen- This Meaningful adversarial test- accusations. case, legislature rape dant’s as the defined requires that ing of the State’s case the include an element of intent but also set to prevented raising from defendant not per preclusion a se of the evidence that up defense, an which must include effective negate that element. would relevant, right probative to present a adopting posi- Indiana is not alone at 116 S.Ct. 2013.4 evidence.” Id. that a defendant has a constitutional tion justices Egelhoff Four other determined right present negating to evidence an ele- ability present exculpatory that the to such rea. ment mens Several courts from principle a “fundamental evidence was not jurisdictions have found a constitu- justice,” (opin- 2013 id. S.Ct. J.) Scalia, right present to evidence to rebut and a fifth on other tional ion of voted Id. at grounds uphold conduct: to the conviction. proof the State’s decipher essentially melding law. 4. somewhat difficult to whether both bodies of It is Cf. right O'Connor sees this as substantive page proce- Justice supra grants 513. It a discussion procedural because she cites substantive ability present dural evidence of —the Winship, re U.S. cases such as In order to serve substantive intoxication —in (1970), as well as S.Ct. 25 L.Ed.2d 368 prove goals requirement that the State —the procedural cases such as Chambers Missis- every beyond a reasonable its case on element sippi, 410 U.S. 35 L.Ed.2d doubt. However, (1973). opinion I see her J.). carry out acts behavior of others or Ginsburg, (opinion of 56, 116 S.Ct. skill. physical opin requiring O’Connor’s that Justice But the fact votes demonstrates four ion also had added). I (emphasis at 1088 so Terry has not faded thinking behind limited extremely are an agree that there where the reasons “a case much that in a I will discuss number of cases—as exist, or there have ceased the rule moment, think this is one of I do not for the rule reason never a can meet them —where defendant Hale, at 905. place.” first defen- But it is criminal Terry standard. try.6 dants not Terry does work I note Finally, injustice” against the Moreover, kind of “obvious Terry produces little while its abandonment. require majority that would opin- State unfairness to Henderson, 146 N.E.2d at Ind. at unfairness to defen- produces great ion defendants simply affords nu- legislature has defined dants. The evidence.5 It relevant present chance an element of merous crimes to include and we acquittal, See, guarantee not e.g., does Ind. Code intentional conduct. that: Terry’s (1998). admonition repeated have the statute § 35^42-4-1 Under is de- today, a criminal defendant upheld defense should of this potential The evidence opportunity nied the reality not be confused legislatively en- that is relevant to these to envision a It is situation. difficult precludes The acted elements. reason intoxi- guilty by finding any reference to its require this evidence without the acts committed cation when it unavail- instead makes reliability or intel- physical significant degree the likelihood of to increase proposition, simply able general As a lectual skills. of a certain class of defendants relieved of conviction not be a defendant should prove able to might de- who otherwise be he was able to responsibility when element of they satisfy requisite did not instruct operate equipment, a plan, vise evidence based on some exclusion of relevant retained 5. The fact that the value, involuntary evidentiary demon unre such as its defense of flaw in its Here, of intoxi prevented evidence liability. strates it considers the defendant intent. See Ind. to the issue of cation relevant presenting exculpatory not be from majority value, Code 35-41-3-5 evidentiary of a failure in its cause seemingly evidence of intoxi also would find ensure that the State’s desire “to because of reliable, as it would cation to be relevant required lacked the even a defendant who “general back it allow to be introduced is therefore not mental-state element—and This conclu ground.” discussion See infra. guilty convicted of the of nevertheless —is Shep Justice appears contradict Chief sion to S.Ct. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. at 116 fense.” State, v. 666 N.E.2d opinion ard's in Swanson J., (O'Connor, dissenting). See also id. 2013 (Ind. 1996), reh’g denied. 397 ("[The statute bars] at 116 S.Ct. 2013 relevant, category of ex defendant's use of a from other situations 6. This case is distinct express purpose of culpatory evidence for the poten upheld the exclusion where we have winning improving the State's likelihood See, e.g., tially exculpatory Hub evidence. plurality's observation .... The conviction (Ind.2001) State, 924 bard v. 742 N.E.2d exculpa evidentiary that exclude that all rules polygraph test re (upholding exclusion tory reduce the State's burden to evidence sults). See also Duff prove point. pur The its case is beside J., (dis (Ind. 1987) (DeBruler, dissenting) alleviate the pose familiar rules is not to of the present cussing right to "the of the defendant burden, vindicate some State’s but rather to opportu to have a fair relevant evidence and ....”) origi witnesses”), goal (emphasis in or value nity opposing to cross-examine nal). cases, upheld reh'g denied. In those at II the offense. 518 U.S. S.Ct. (O’Connor, J., And, dissenting).7 I concur the result because I am

course, majority’s opinion gives convinced that the trial court’s error was carte blanch to eliminate a de- beyond harmless a reasonable doubt. The evidence in oth- right fendants proved beyond a State reasonable doubt theory er circumstances on the that it is that Defendant was not so intoxicated that merely defining per- elements. This is incapable forming he was the intent disturbing aspect todays haps the most required by the statute. “Evidence that holding. shows a defendant was not so intoxicated so that he could indeed form the requisite agree I with Justice O’Connor’s state- things mens rea includes such ability as his “A legislature certainly ment that: state plan, operate ‘to devise a in- equipment, authority identify has the the elements others, carry struct the behavior of out punish, of the offenses wishes to ” requiring physical acts skill.’ Owens v. written, a once its laws are defendant has (Ind.1995) prove to insist that the State 1088). (quoting Terry, at beyond every a reasonable doubt element at presented trial shows that De- of an offense.” Id. at trailer, fendant party returned to a at a overruling Terry 2013. This unfairness in partygoers held the at gunpoint and or- majori- is exacerbated the fact that the dered them to phones handover all the ty opinion allows the introduction of evi- inside the trailer. He then forced the “general dence of intoxication as back- victim to walk to a secluded cornfield. Af- Majority ground.” Opinion 519. Under her, repeatedly raping ter he led her to his approach, the State would be allowed house, which was more than three miles to attack the with what defendant amounts away. Along way, he forced the victim to evidence of bad character —i.e. that the to hide from passing caught cars and on However, defendant drinks to excess. attempted when the victim to trick him. would not allowed defendant to use the home, Inside his Defendant hid the victim charges exact same evidence to rebut the in the basement and told others Swanson, against him. 666 N.E.2d at Cf. house not come downstairs. Defendant (disapproving prior the use of bad act then the victim raped again. Police later gestae” evidence to show the “res found Defendant and the victim asleep crime). gun bed. Defendant had a loaded and here My purport discussion does not cocked near his hand. This evidence that I compelled adopt show would feel beyond is sufficient to show a reasonable the rule enunciated that case doubt that Defendant capable form- us in were before the first instance. ing required by rape the intent statute. underlying There are valid reasons both majority’s opinion and Justice Scalia’s J., RUCKER, concurs. However, opinion Egelhoff. argu- I have forth

ments set demonstrate that principles underlying remain

sufficiently that we viable must adhere to precedent.

this well-settled Egelhoff opinion construing apparently response 7. The useful was drafted Egelhoff. Ind.Code 35-41-2-5 because the statute

Case Details

Case Name: Sanchez v. State

Court Name: Indiana Supreme Court

Date Published: Jun 26, 2001

Citation: 749 N.E.2d 509

Docket Number: 92S03-0009-CR-518

Court Abbreviation: Ind.