*1 penitentiary, having ty-four years in the to consult as- require our trial courts second-degree guilty by jury found of powers to com- been psychic trologers or invoke 6-2-104, murder in violation of W.S.1977. Rule W.R.Cr.P. ply with 10,1987, appli- appellant March filed an On Affirmed. district cation proceed He filed a motion to also pauperis appointment and for forma on March counsel. The filed a motion to dismiss and a memoran- support dum in thereof. 15,1987, grant- May the district court SANCHEZ, On Appellant
Israel Appel- motion to dismiss. (Defendant), ed State’s appeal lant’s from the order of dismissal 10,1987, July was dismissed on for want Wyoming, STATE prosecution. Wé reinstated (Plaintiff). Appellee us for July and it is now before No. 87-138. decision. presented in concern The issues this case Wyoming. appoint- the sentence after conviction and 7, 1988. June is- attorney. ment of an These identical 29, 1988.
Rehearing En Banc Denied June Whitney sues were considered (1987), and decided ad- position appellant versely to the required by pronouncements our case. As Sanchez, pro se. Israel Whitney the doctrine of stare deci- sis, Gen., Atty. W. Joseph Meyer, B. John Gen., Renneisen, Deputy Atty. and Karen affirm. We Gen., appellee. Atty. Asst. Byrne,
A. MACY, JJ., each URBIGKIT THOMAS, BROWN, C.J., Before dissenting opinions. separate filed MACY, CARDINE, JJ. URBIGKIT URBIGKIT, Justice, dissenting. CARDINE, Justice. Whitney appel- is from the denial litigant brief benefit petition for lant Israel Sanchez’s review, of this court majority ing or presented for our relief. The issues determined appellant’s sen- determination are whether post-convic not be considered punish- tence constitutes cruel and unusual 7-14-101 et process review “good not accrue to ment in that time” will as stated by defining conviction W.S.1977 sentence below reduce his maximum entry of the crimi statute to exclude twenty-two required minimum sentence of the time constraints sentence. Under nal years and whether his constitutional con opinion existed to release by failure of process was violated to due currently attorney to appoint court to an the district and represent him the dis a more extended this decision improvident. Since sent was affirm. We same constitutional again raises the analysis is concepts, expanded 14, 1984, appel- statutory February By order filed problems penumbra justified for the of not less to a term lant was sentenced presented.1 twenty-two years nor more than twen- adjourned. legislative As effec- session originally the 1988 circulated before 1. This dissent was *2 decisis, recognition appar- analysis stare it is this court’s exclusion of sen- deny is to tencing questions ent that Sanchez now intended in relief previously right of counsel validated in the under the state and federal constitutions Alberts, Long, and Fondren v. precedential find in Even if any jurisdiction other with similar segments out constitutional issues of court dures. the Certainly exclusionary ap- subject presenta- be proach, except under the Rule 36 method- 36, W.R.Cr.P.,2 by tion in state court Rule ology, in a on denial of constitu- Alberts, Long, and counsel under Fondren questions tional in appointed required as in should be proceedings involving sentences, is not vali- proceedings to establish whether by processes, dated federal 28 U.S.C. issues considered other should 2255, 2241 and nor statutory post- §§ Otherwise, and resolved. the is conviction, corpus habeas and coram nobis magnified by is what now before Yackle, error in writs of state courts. for initial contest on decision where sen- Remedies, Post-conviction 38 at 169 § tencing is made then when (1981). See also Morgan, United States v. filed, argument petition the 346 U.S. L.Ed. presented by the State that it is a second (1954). (See foreclosed. illustrative, As the ABA clearly standard pending before Kallas encompasses post- the sentence the within court.) requested Denial of counsel when process: conviction relief indigent for “A proceeding should be under Constitution in sen- sufficiently broad to relief: tencing only ignore would not “(a) for challenging meritorious claims recognized the statute as in Alberts and judgments of conviction and in- Long, rights but excise constitutional cluding cognizable claims: process provided Con- stitution Art. and the § “(i) that the conviction was obtained or guaranteed accused defend with counsel imposed sentence in violation of the 1, 10, well Art. as the nondiscrimi- Constitution of the States United or operation implicit natory law as Art. the constitution or laws of the state in 34. rendered; judgment which the however, “(ii) divisively, More as first applicant that the was convicted Whitney repeated, and as now this court statute that is in violation of renders an issue briefed the Constitution of the United States appeal. relegates judicial atten- or constitution the state in responsibili- rendered, tion to what be judgment should counsel or that ty, including analysis. My research and applicant the conduct for which the tive June Ch. S.L. 2. Rule W.R.Cr.P. was amended March effective, be provi- was enacted. 1987 to effective June 1987. For current When the new (1987 Cum.Supp.). text see Rule W.R.Cr.P. post sions as amendments to the conviction Rule W.R.Cr.P. stated: singularly coverage relief statutes reduce may illegal “The court any correct sentence at protections available. may imposed time and correct sentence appears text This new to have no coun- illegal provided in an manner within the time terparts jurisdiction. any in the laws of other herein the reduction of sentence. The Constitutional to be issues involved whether may reduce sentence within 120 Young Ragen, this means that the 337 U.S. days receipt after court of mandate (1949) 93 L.Ed. 1333 upon judgment issued affirmance of the or Nebraska, Case v. appeal, days dismissal of the or within 120 exhaustion criteria has been entry any judgment after order or of the briefing proper left eliminated will be having upholding effect of Consequent- future cases. of conviction. The court
ly,
past
compared
little
can be
with what
upon
also reduce a sentence
revocation
aof
in the future will remain.
probation
provided
law.”
constitutionally
ment of
prosecuted
pro-
the omnibus treatment and resolu-
tected;
post-conviction inquiries
tion of all
complete
one
Stan-
“(in)
rendering judg-
final
18.3,
dard
National Prosecution Standards
jurisdiction over the
ment was without
(National
Association)
Attorneys
District
or the
person
applicant
subject
(1st
1977).
ed.
matter;
*3
remedy
The Wyoming
for violation of
“(iv)
imposed
that the sentence
exceed-
rights (post-conviction-relief
by
or
ed the maximum authorized
law
statute),
63,
1961,
of Wyoming
Ch.
S.L.
otherwise
in accordance with the
Ill,
sponsored by
attorneys
two
in H.B.
law;
by
sentence authorized
passed
major
in the session without
“(v)
there
evidence of
that
exists
mate-
change
legisla-
not until
the recent
not, and
rial facts which were
in the
tive
significantly
session been amended
diligence
of
exercise
could not
except
provi-
passage
since initial
in modest
been,
presented
theretofore
have
relating
right to
sion
to
a 1987
proceedings leading
in the
to
heard
Digest of
of
recodification.
the House
and that
conviction
now
111,
Representatives,
p.
House Bill
357.
require vacation of the conviction or
State, supra
See
v.
sentence;
State, supra.
The
statute was
“(vi)
significant
there
that
has been
originally
response
Young
enacted
v.
law,
change in
or
whether substantive
235,
1073,
69
93
Ragen, 337 U.S.
S.Ct.
applied
process
procedural,
lead-
L.Ed.
1333
similar decisions
ing
applicant’s
or
conviction
sen-
Supreme
the United States
Court. See
reason
tence where sufficient
exists to
Nebraska,
336,
v.
381
Case
application of the
allow retroactive
(1965).
text,
14
422
In
the
standard;
changed legal
the
bill followed
Illinois
“(b)
challenging
for meritorious claims
statute,
entitled Ch. 38
legality of
restraint
custody
the
or
based
Ill.Ann.Stat.,
122-1
en-
et
and since
conviction,
including
upon a
legislature
acted
Illinois
has
the
fully
claims that
sentence has been
largely
except
remained
unamended
served or that there has been unlawful
change
limiting
years
years
five
to 20
parole
probation
revocation
or
or con-
explicate
apparent
of ade-
ABA
ditional release.” IV
Standards for
quacy
Constitu-
under the United States
Justice,
22-2.1 at 22.-
Criminal
Standard
history of
significance
tion.3
of the
16.
examination
Additionally, the
direction this
now jurisdiction
an absence
of derivation shows
antagonistic
any justification
present
takes is
to the recommenda-
court’s
for
disparate
tion of the National Association of Prosecu-
treatment of consti-
for
Any
goal
inquiry.
tutional
case
tors for whom
desired
achieve-
remedy
post-conviction-relief legislation
supposes
adequate
history
some
state
3. The
concurring opinion
recognize
related in
of Justice
exists. We
the difficulties
Nebraska, supra,
in Case v.
381 U.S. at
which
Illinois
Court is faced
Clark
337-338,
procedures
adapting
85 S.Ct. at:
state
to [this]
available
Nevertheless,
require-
requirement_
however,
out,
pointed
"It should be
that as
Young
supra,
Ragen,
at
ment
met.’
v.
must be
Young
early
Ragen,
v.
as 1949
Court
at
238-239
"Thereafter,
S.Ct.
[69
1074-1075].
1333],
L.Ed.
U.S. 235
S.Ct.
93
[69
Hear-
the Illinois Post-Conviction
principle
that the States must
articulated
adopted.
It was followed
Act was
‘clearly
prisoners
defined
afford
some
method
passage
Carolina in 1951
of a statute North
they
claims of
which
raise
denial
Mil-
Illinois Act.
Id.,
which was ‘modeled’
rights.'
at
1074-
[69
federal
at
Holohan,
v.
N.C.
74 S.E.2d
ler
compare Mooney v.
But
1075].
(1953).
is the
State
Nebraska
seventh
L.Ed. 791]
U.S. 103
[55
Ragen,
Young
adopt
a statute since
stating
such
proposition
noted:
* *
*
remedies,
supra.
[Fn. 3]
state
"The doctrine
exhaustion of
Maine, Oregon Wyo-
Maryland,
required
scrupu-
‘‘[Fn. 3]
ming
to which this Court has
**
legislation.
*.”
passed
pre-
similar
federal courts
lous adherence
all
...
precedent,
nearly
Furthermore,
as now continued for
support
no
for this sen-
years
passage
tencing
after initial
in Illinois and
withdrawal
is found in Wyoming
years
state,
precedent.
since enacted in this
case
lacking
statute enacted
as Ch.
decision.
S.L. of
People
Wyoming,
Dale,
406 Ill.
demeanor to achieve
result
(1982):
evidentiary
search
raised
penitentiary
confinement. The ma
following
appeal;
trial and direct
affirmed.
jority concluded that a constitutional issue
post-conviction,
court held
On
that
by any
not
assertion
was
raised
of trial
judicata,
prior appeal
were res
issues
that,
irregularities,
though
even
not
also
retrial would
that
guilty-plea arrange
case
from a
occurred
changed
Morgan v.
the result.
ment,
fore
was
(1985):
Wyo.,
pled
defendant
P.2d
issue submitted should
closed because the
larceny
alleged mischarge.
and later
ap
post-plea
have been resolved
earlier
majority
The
held that
peal.
allege deprivation
did
a con
charge
right,
only
could
stitutional
and this
State, Wyo.,
Next followed Johnson
post-convic
appeal
raised on
for which
P.2d
denied 442 U.S.
Justice Thomas
tion was
a substitute.
(1979):
L.Ed.2d 300
as to
complaint
apprising that
concurred
appeal,
some issues raised
claim,
analysis
of the record
did state
but
applied
judicata
determined that res
from
transcript that the ele
demonstrated in the
appeal.
trial and affirmed
Other
charged
appropri
ments of the crime
were
appeal
issues not
considered on
previously
presented
arraignment.
ately
at
Matlack
factually
were considered as not
sustained
Wyo.,
cert. denied
justify
in a fashion
relief re
sufficient
87 L.Ed.2d
472 U.S.
sulting in
of the trial-court de
affirmation
entered,
(1985): guilty plea
was
Berger, Wyo.,
nial of
relief. State
compliance
post-conviction relief
raised
(1979): trial-court
problems now evidenced
ately
subject
(now
supra
pending before this
relief,
be other is-
court),
provident
it
to consider the
would be
case,
Additionally
sues.
if
is
it
by appel-
questions briefed and submitted
relief,
right
there is a
lant in this case:
counsel,
and if it is not
re-
“THE
APPELLANT RE-
SENTENCE
lief,
petitioner
then
is not
foreclosed
AMOUNTS TO CRUEL AND
CEIVED
presenting
post-conviction-re-
both
another
IN VIOLA-
UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT
instituting
lief
remedial de-
TION OP THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT
mand under Rule 36 for curative action
THE
TO
UNITED STATES CONSTITU-
against
what
contended to be an uncon-
TION AND ARTICLE
OP THE
apparent,
stitutional
It
if
sentence.
one
WYOMING CONSTITUTION.
contemplates the substantive issue involved
“APPELLANT WAS DENIED DUE
relationship
of maximum sentence to
THE
PROCESS BY THE FAILURE OF
legislative
primacy in
branch
determination
APPOINT AN
DISTRICT COURT TO
department pri-
of sentences and executive
IN
ATTORNEY TO REPRESENT HIM
macy
good
pa-
time and
POST-CONVICTION RELIEF.”
Duffy
role,
that our decision
arguments,
Appellee considered those two
I
dis-
and, anticipating Whitney
part,
added
sented,
actually dispositive. Although I
contention that:
not receded from the
stat-
views there
“APPELLANT’S CLAIM IS NOT COG-
otherwise,
ed,
majority determined
NIZABLE UNDER
POST-
WYOMING’S
this fact
is noted to illustrate how much
CONVICTION RELIEF ACT 7-14-101
time, effort,
and cost
to both
TO 7-14-108 W.S. 1977.”
counsel and this court would be saved
argument
preclu-
The thrust
brief is
an immediate
on a substantive
sion results
virtue of the
to be
disingenuous
basis rather
and ham-
subject
considered on
which is a
pering disposition
on a
revela-
comprehensively
that has been
considered
tion.
*7
Cutbirth
by this writer
in dissent
appointment
I would remand for the
(1988).
counsel under
resulting
The vice of the
statute
order to afford the trial court the
self-
case as a
status should be
and,
appropriate,
if
obligation
this court the
that,
question,
evident
opportunity to resolve and settle constitu
Fondren,
Alberts,
Long the denial
by the
tional
issues raised
incarcerated
—
Aiken,
appointment
in error.
If it
prisoner. Yates v.
of counsel was
U.S. -,
said that the
is not one
(1988),
is to be
tion-relief
Preclusion
preferable to a career invocation of contin procedural litigation.
ued
MACY, Justice, dissenting. The district court erred
I dissent. when attorney appoint represent
it failed to
