*1 Here, remand for new reversal and 1)
ceedings is essential for two reasons: facially
the Commission’s order is deficient fact and findings
because its conclusions legally support
of law are insufficient decision; the omission of the “optimal
requirement qualifi- of undefined position
cations” from the announcement posting requirements
violated the of 74 841.19(A)(6).
O.S.Supp.1985 For these
reasons, vacant, position is declared
and the cause is reversed and remanded to proceedings
the Commission for new
must conform to the standards set forth
herein.
THE TRIAL ORDER VA- COURT’S AND THE
CATED CAUSE IS REMAND-
ED TO THE ETHICS AND MERIT COM-
MISSION FOR NEW PROCEEDINGS.
DOOLIN, ALMA WILSON
SUMMERS, JJ., concur.
HARGRAVE, C.J., and HODGES and
SIMMS, JJ., dissent. SANCHEZ, Appellant,
Joleen SPRINGS, Appellee.
CITY OF SAND
No. 61832.
Supreme Court Oklahoma.
241
claim,
requested
the
information
a
until
(2)
the actions of the
provided?
was
Did
appellant
carrier lull the
City’s insurance
filing
so
delaying the
of her lawsuit
into
City
equitably
es-
that the
should now
raising the statute of limita-
topped from
(3)
recovery?
as a bar to
Can the
tions
plaintiff bring an
City
tit. 11
the
under Okla.Stat.
escape
filing require-
the
23-104 and
Richard, Tulsa,
appellant.
Joe
each of
ments of the Act? We answer
Secrest, II
byHill
K.
&
James
Secrest
negative.
questions
these
Tulsa,
appel-
Dreiling,
and Theresa G.
Questions one and two were ad
lee.
in the recent decision in Doe v.
dressed
1-89,
District No.
780
Independent School
HODGES, Justice.
(Okla.1988). Doe affirmed a trial
P.2d 659
1982,
(appel-
April
Joleen Sanchez
On
ruling
request
that a
for additional
Sanchez)
injured when a
lant or
was
information
a
subdivision did
struck her vehicle from behind.
car
Thus, the
90-day period.
not toll the
Doe
City
appellee,
the
police car was owned
question
disposes of
one.
decision
driver, police
Its
a
Springs (City).
of Sand
the
City,
two,
within
officer for the
question
both Sanchez
As
employment at the time of
scope of
argued that the
plaintiff
and the
in Doe
accident.
delaying
lulled them into
had
period of
filing
beyond
a lawsuit
claim,
her
gave notice of
Sanchez
They
Act.
further
time allowed
the Political Subdivision
brought under
that as a result
the subdivision
asserted
(Act),1
City May
on
Tort Claims
estopped
raising
equitably
from
should be
later,
City’s in-
days
Three
1982.
recovery.
a
the time limitation as
bar
Sanchez's attor-
surance carrier contacted
information con-
ney to
additional
decision in
followed the
Jarvis
Doe
Although
of the claim.
cerning the amount
(Okla.
Stillwater,
P.2d 470
City of
further communications be-
there were
1987),
situations
outlined three
which
insurance carrier and Sanchez’s
tween the
equitable estop-
may assert
party
which a
requested information was
attorney,
estoppel may
raised
pel.
Af-
provided until November
when:
concerning ap-
receiving no decision
ter
(a)
as-
made
some
defendant ha[s]
[t]he
claim,
ac-
filed her
proval of her
Sanchez
rea-
negotiations
surance of settlement
July
tion on
plaintiff
sonably calculated to lull
judg-
delay
granted summary
security and
The trial court
into sense
(b)
City
grounds
period,
on the
statutory
beyond
ment
commenced her action
liabili-
repeated
that
had not
admission of
express
Sanchez
statutory filing period. The
promises
pay-
conjunction
within
with
ty in
stating
(c)
that the
Appeals reversed
ment,
performance,
Court of
settlement or
information
City’s request
false,
misleading
con-
fraudulent or
filing period until the information
act of conceal-
affirmative
duct or some
provided.
suspicion
preclude
ment to exclude
to refrain
induces one
inquiry (1) Did the
presented:
Three issues
timely bringing an action.
information
City’s request for additional
In
the actions
at 472-73.
which the
Id.
90-day period, within
toll the
ap-
support the
did not
deny political
approve
must
political subdivision
Act,
Claims
Governmental Tort
Effec-
title
151-170
§§
1. Okla.Stat.
(Supp.1984).
1, 1985,
superseded by
§§
Act was
October
tive
plication
equitable estoppel.
Appellant
contends
if she can set
action,
“[a]ppellees
stant
as in
never
“exemptions
this case within one of the
negotiations
appellant
undertook
nor
liability”
enumerated in section
claim,
they
did
ever admit
the case will then fall outside the Act and
*3
they simply
investigating
were
the inci-
filing period.
its
She further asserts
dent.”
6. Civil insurrection (Okla.1983). Conway brought against suit provide, or rebellion or the failure to or company providing, insurance as well police, method of as the law enforce- protection; ment or fire claiming school district that title permitted right alternative of Liability 2. Police brought against department and fire suggest insurance such to vehicles— any municipal governing body hereby the existence A insurance which autho- covers whole, may purchase liability part, any judgment and rized insurance on or in or award vehicles, machinery, equip- all motorized may or plain- be rendered in favor of the by police department ment owned used tiff, or by jury and if verdict rendered department municipality. or fire of the applicable exceeds the limits of the insurance payment Such insurance shall effect, in force and the court shall reduce the damages persons sustaining bodily inju- to amount of said or award to a sum sustaining damage properties, ries or proximately to their equal applicable limits stated in the negligent operation caused policy policies, or which are in full force and vehicles, machinery, of such motor motorized effect. To the extent that an insurer has equipment, operation or in the course of their indemnity vided in a contract of insurance to such. Such insurance shall be on standard section, department described in this policy approved by forms the State Board of may plead any said insurer as a defense in Rates, Property Casualty compa- and with involving purchased by insurance nies authorized to do business in section, authority governmental of this paid and shall be for out of administrative immunity municipality department or departments funds of such for whom the in- purchasing pursuant thereof to this purchased. may surance is Such insurance section. Venue of all actions only department cover not of the munici- county herein shall be in the where the cause pality purchased, for whom the insurance is arose, may of action but summons be served may personal liability also cover the upon the chief executive or administrative operator operators. ownership, municipality being officer of the sued and maintenance, operation and use of motor ve- alleged purview to come within the of this equipment, hicles and motorized movable section, wherever such officer be found. owned, leased, used, operated by such de- (1981) (repealed by § 23-104 partments named in this section are added). (emphasis 1984 Okla. Sess. Laws governmental declared to be functions. damages may An action pay to Insurance —Actions departments, such but the im- school district munity department such shall be waived any The board of education of school district only to the extent the amount of departments transportation may pur- authorized to furnish Such full force effect. purpose paying chase insurance for the negligence only shall be liable for while such effect, persons sustaining injuries proxi- insurance is in force and exceeding but in no case mately coverage any operation caused of motor ve- limits such attempt transporting insurance in force and effect. No hicles used in school children. operation shall be made in the trial of said vehicles school dis- argued OF THE AP- avail- OPINION COURT OF action. This action directly PEALS IS VACATED. JUDGMENT OF to the suit able in addition THE TRIAL COURT REINSTATED. under the Act. the school district super- had been held that section 9-106 We HARGRAVE, C.J., of the Act by the Act. Section 170
seded DOOLIN, JJ., concur. SIMMS supersedes all This is exclusive and WILSON, and ALMA special home rule charter JJ., SUMMERS, KAUGER and dissent. heretofore, subject laws on the same Justice, OPALA, dissenting. Vice Chief here- parts acts of acts in conflict *4 repealed. opinion I dissent from the court’s for Trent v. Board by me in expressed reasons addition, it was that section 168 of noted Com’rs, County 755 P.2d 619 [Okl. specifically the Act deals with v. J., Whitley (Opala, dissenting) 1988] districts. for school Rogers Cty., Oologah P.2d S.D. I-4 analogous is same J., (Opala, concurring). 455 [Okl.1987] The re- analysis applies to this case. now pur- for pealed section 23-104 WILSON, Justice, dissenting. ALMA liability by municipali- chase of my principié I dissent for the stated injured by fire compensate persons ties Independent v. dissent in School Dist. Act, however, has vehicles. The I-89, No. [Okla.1988]. provision insurance for munici- its own palities By operation section 170, section 23-104 like section 9-
section superseded repealed. Fur-
thermore, liability political of the state or be shall exclu- under this place liability sive and in other state, a and the State of Michael PARSONS employee at common law other- Petitioners, .... wise 153(B) (emphasis add- § CHILDERS, Respondent. Walter Jack
ed). 0-90-0269. No. timely action was filed. Appellant’s The time limitations of Act were Appeals of Oklahoma. of Criminal Court City’s appellant’s delay Nor information. by promises justifying settlement
duced if this estoppel. Finally, even into one of the
case did fall liability exemption is from
section independent cause of
and did not confer an under title section 23-104. granted summary correctly
trial City. however, tricts, the district of insurance between be a contract declared to function, said be shall collectible and no action insurer only. provisions of this insurer shall be a school creating any be construed this shall not district under insurer, district which school whatever said insurance. does not recoverable shall the amount of the limited in amount to that