57 Cal. 614 | Cal. | 1881
Lead Opinion
The appeal in this case was taken from an order dissolving a temporary injunction, and from a judgment dismissing plaintiff’s complaint, the demurrer of defendant to plaintiff’s complaint having been sustained, and judgment rendered upon plaintiff declining to answer. The case is, therefore, to be considered as the same is presented by plaintiff in its complaint, which, in brief, is this:
Plaintiff is, and was on the 10th of March, 1880, a corporation engaged in the manufacture and selling of gas to the city and inhabitants of San José, and to the town of Santa Clara, and adjacent places in Santa Clara County. Its capital stock was §600,000, divided into 6,000 shares, which were owned by stockholders, and not by the corporation. The corporation owned taxable property in Santa Clara County; viz., real es
The duty of making the valuation was cast upon the assessor. The method of arriving at the valuation, the process by which his mind reached the conclusion (in case where, as here, it is not pretended that he acted fraudulently or dishonestly), is matter committed to his determination. In fixing a valuation upon the mains, it was entirely competent for him to take into consideration the cost, as estimated by himself, of digging the trenches, laying the pipes, and making the connections. It was competent for him to determine that mains laid in the ground were of more value, as so laid, for the purposes for which they were laid, than would be the pipes in the warehouse of the dealer, or than would be the crude iron at the foundry. If he erred in his judgment, the remedy was by application to the board of equalization, and the courts will not revise the judgments of these officers upon such questions.
This disposes of the case, because the tax upon the entire valuation of the mains was not paid nor offered to be paid. If a»uy part of the tax complained of be legal, that part must be paid before a party will be heard to complain of an illegal portion.
2. The appellant argues, that under § 19, art. xi, of the Constitution, a franchise for using public streets, and laying pipes for supplying a city with gas and water, has no value. A sufficient answer to that is, the appellant admits (which it could not deny) that the right of laying down and maintaining pipes in the streets of a city, by means of which gas or water is to be conveyed, is a franchise; and by § 1, art. xiii, of the Constitution, franchises are declared to be property for the purposes of taxation. The method of assessment, and by whom, was to be and was provided for by law. Therefore it does not rest with the plaintiff or with the courts to determine that its franchise had no value. In a pecuniary sense, the value of franchises may be as various as the objects for which they exist, and the methods by which they are employed, and may change with every moment of time; but that franchises are property, and are to be taxed in some method in proportion to value, is a part of the paramount law of this State.
Judgment and order affirmed.
Concurrence Opinion
I concur in the judgment upon the ground first stated by Mr. Justice Myrick.