*1305The juvenile court issued an order finding B.S. is a presumed father of L.L., a 10-year-old girl, pursuant to *1306Family Code
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
L.L. was born in 2006. Her birth certificate named Mother and T.L. as her parents.
In June 2016, a probation department search of Mother's home found drugs, drug paraphernalia, and sulfuric acid. Mother was arrested for probation violations and placed in custody at the Las Colinas Detention Facility. L.L. was taken into protective custody and detained at the Polinsky Children's Center.
On June 9, the San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency (Agency) filed a dependency petition on behalf of L.L. pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b), alleging she was at substantial risk of neglect by her parents' failure to provide her with adequate food, clothing, shelter, or medical treatment. In its report for L.L.'s detention hearing, Agency stated that L.L. had previously been taken into protective custody on her birth in 2006 because she tested positive for amphetamines and methamphetamines. Mother and T.L. reunified with L.L. later that year.
*1307Mother told the Agency social worker that L.L.'s biological father was B.S., who was a "murderer" sentenced to state prison in 2010, and T.L. was the only father L.L. had ever known. Although B.S. sought and was awarded visitation with L.L. shortly after her birth, Mother stated she rarely allowed him to visit L.L.
At L.L.'s detention hearing, the juvenile court amended the petition to designate T.L. as a presumed father pursuant to *908sections 7611, subdivision (d), and 7573. It detained L.L. out of the home, ordered Agency to offer voluntary services to the parents, and set a date for the jurisdiction and disposition hearing.
At the jurisdiction and disposition hearing, the court recognized B.S. as an alleged father of L.L. T.L. submitted a 2013 family court stipulation and order for custody of L.L. The court stated it was in possession of a file from another family court case in which B.S. was the petitioner and involved custody orders. It then set a date for a trial on the dependency petition's allegations. Prior to that trial, the court received a letter from B.S. in which he stated he was awarded joint custody of L.L. after filing a court case, but Mother and T.L. refused to allow L.L. to interact with him. Records from B.S.'s criminal case showed that in 2005 he stabbed and killed a person, pled guilty in 2011 to voluntary manslaughter, and was sentenced to a prison term of 12 years.
In July, Mother was sentenced in her criminal case and later released on the condition that she complete a residential drug treatment program. At a settlement conference in L.L.'s case, the juvenile court raised a question regarding B.S.'s standing in the case. B.S.'s counsel requested a paternity test, which the court denied, but B.S. remained an alleged father.
The court held a contested jurisdiction and disposition hearing and found it had jurisdiction, removed L.L. from parental care, placed her with relatives, ordered visitation with L.L. for Mother and T.L., and set dates for review hearings.
A couple of months later, the court held a special hearing on B.S.'s request to address the issue of L.L.'s paternity. B.S. submitted, inter alia, a 2007 family court order finding he established a parental relationship with L.L. and awarding him joint legal custody of her with Mother and regular visitation with L.L.
The results of the genetic test showed that B.S. is L.L.'s biological father. The court amended the dependency petition to reflect that B.S. is her biological father.
In November, Mother was released from custody and began drug treatment, individual therapy, and a parenting course. She regularly visited L.L. Although T.L. had struggled with homelessness, in January 2017, he entered a sober living environment, maintained his employment, engaged in services, and tested negative for drugs. He regularly visited L.L. L.L. stated she loved spending time with T.L. and felt safe when visiting him.
In its report for the six-month review hearing, Agency recommended that the court offer an additional six months of services for Mother and T.L. and continue L.L.'s placement out of the home. Agency *909reported that T.L. loved and cared for L.L. and wanted her back in his care.
On January 23, 2017, the court first conducted the contested hearing on B.S.'s request for a finding he is a presumed father of L.L. T.L., Mother, L.L.'s counsel, and Agency all argued that B.S. did not qualify as a presumed father. T.L. and Agency additionally argued that B.S. did not qualify as a third parent. When the court asked what detriment L.L. would suffer if B.S. was named a third parent, an Agency social worker replied that L.L. did not want to visit B.S. or his father (i.e., her biological paternal grandfather). L.L. did not know B.S. and was uncomfortable because she knew why he was incarcerated. L.L.'s counsel confirmed L.L. was uncomfortable with B.S., had no relationship with him, and would experience instability if she had to deal with him while trying to reunify with T.L. and Mother. L.L.'s counsel opined that adding B.S. as a parent would be detrimental to L.L. at that time.
B.S. argued it would be detrimental to L.L. if he was not found to be a presumed parent. He argued he met the requirements of a presumed father because he supported L.L., listed her on his insurance, and told everyone she was his child. He had also filed a family court action to obtain a custody and visitation order.
*1309The court found B.S. was a presumed father under section 7611, subdivision (d). It further found it would not be detrimental to L.L. if a third parent for her was added and therefore found B.S. was a third parent under section 7612, subdivision (c).
The court then conducted the six-month review hearing. It ordered supervised telephone calls for B.S. and supervised visits if L.L. was willing to have visits with him. The court adopted Agency's recommendations and set a date for the 12-month permanency hearing. Mother and T.L. timely filed notices of appeal challenging the court's January 23, 2017 order.
DISCUSSION
I
Substantial Evidence to Support Finding That B.S. Is a Presumed Father under Section 7611, Subdivision (d)
T.L. and Mother contend there is insufficient evidence to support the juvenile court's finding that B.S. is a presumed father under section 7611, subdivision (d). In particular, they argue the evidence showed that B.S. did not have an existing relationship with L.L. at the time of the January 23, 2017 hearing, had not visited her since 2010, had not held her out as his own child for many years, never received her into his home, and never had a parental relationship with her. Taking a position contrary to its position below, Agency argues there is substantial evidence to support the court's finding that B.S. is a presumed father of L.L. under section 7611, subdivision (d).
*910A
The Uniform Parentage Act (UPA) (§ 7600 et seq.) "provides the framework by which California courts make paternity determinations. (§ 7610, subd. (b).)"
*1310( Dawn D. v. Superior Court (1998)
On appeal, we independently interpret statutes and apply the substantial evidence standard in reviewing a juvenile court's finding whether a person is a presumed parent. ( In re M.R. , supra , 7 Cal.App.5th at p. 898,
B
T.L. and Mother initially argue that for B.S. to be found a presumed father under section 7611, subdivision (d), he was required to show that he qualified as a presumed father under that statute at the time of the parentage determination (i.e., on January 23, 2017). Citing the present tense language of *1311section 7611, subdivision (d), In re Alexander P. (2016)
In J.O. , supra ,
On appeal, J.O. concluded the juvenile court erred by finding the appellant did not qualify as a presumed father under section 7611, subdivision (d). ( J.O. , supra , 178 Cal.App.4th at pp. 143, 149-151,
Without citing or discussing J.O. , supra ,
Although T.L. and Mother correctly assert that the language quoted above from In re Alexander P. , supra ,
Contrary to the argument of T.L. and Mother, the fact that section 7611, subdivision (d), uses present tense verbs (i.e., "receives" and "holds") in describing its two-element test, does not persuade us that we should interpret that statute as including the additional implied requirement of an existing relationship. Rather, we construe its use of present tense verbs as applying those requirements actively as of any point in time during a child's life. Therefore, we conclude that if there is substantial evidence to support the juvenile court's finding that B.S. met the requirements of section 7611, subdivision (d), *913at some point in L.L.'s life, he qualified as a presumed father under that statute and his subsequent failure to continue to meet those requirements or otherwise have an existing relationship with L.L. as of the time of the January 23, 2017 hearing did not rebut the presumption.
As J.O. , supra ,
C
T.L. and Mother also argue the record shows that B.S. never received L.L. into his home or openly held her out as his own child as required to qualify as a presumed father under section 7611, subdivision (d). Agency and B.S. disagree and argue there is substantial evidence to support the juvenile court's finding that B.S. met those two requirements and qualified as a presumed father under section 7611, subdivision (d).
Based on our review of the record, we conclude there is substantial evidence to support the juvenile court's finding that B.S. qualified as a presumed father under section 7611, subdivision (d). In 2007, B.S. filed an action in family court and obtained an order that found he had established a *1314parental relationship with L.L. and awarded him joint legal custody of her with Mother and regular visitation with L.L. In his parentage inquiry form submitted in this case, B.S. stated, under penalty of perjury, that L.L. had been to his home "a couple of times a month, from birth thru 4 1/2 [years] old (I wish more)." He also stated he told "everyone" that he was L.L.'s father, including "my family, friends, co-workers, acquaintances, and anyone else, even perfect strangers, because she's perfect and she's mine." He listed the names and addresses of seven or eight individuals whom he had told L.L. was his child. He also supported L.L., stating: "[E]very time I saw [Mother] I'd give her money. Every time I went to her house I brought groceries and money and toys ... and DVDs and rubberized flooring and fencing material and jewelry and clothes and books and musical instruments and car seat and stroller and landscape materials." Although he was not listed on L.L.'s birth certificate, he had agreed to be listed as her father on it. Also, when he worked at a grocery store, he listed L.L. "as my daughter on everything (insurance, etc.)."
The above evidence is sufficient to support a finding that B.S. received L.L. into his home by regularly and consistently visiting with L.L. in his home over a period of four and one-half years, successfully filing a family court action to obtain a joint legal custody and visitation order, and by supporting Mother and L.L. with money, groceries, clothing, books, and other children's items. Contrary to the argument of T.L. and Mother, L.L. was not required to live with B.S. in order for him to receive her into his home within the meaning of section 7611, subdivision (d). (Cf.
*914In re M.R. , supra , 7 Cal.App.5th at pp. 899-900,
The above evidence also is sufficient to support a finding that B.S. held L.L. out as his own child by telling family members, friends, and strangers that L.L. was his child, naming her as his child on insurance and other employment forms, and filing an action in family court to obtain joint legal custody to, and visitation with, L.L. Based on the above evidence, the juvenile court reasonably found B.S. had received L.L. into his home, held her out as his own child, and had developed a parent-child relationship over a four and one-half year period. Therefore, there is substantial evidence to support its finding that B.S. qualified as a presumed parent under section 7611, subdivision (d). As discussed above, contrary to the argument of T.L. and Mother, the fact that B.S. went to prison in 2011 and no longer maintained that relationship with L.L. did not preclude him from qualifying as a *1315presumed parent under section 7611, subdivision (d), as of the January 23, 2017 hearing. ( J.O. , supra , 178 Cal.App.4th at pp. 149-151,
II
Insufficient Evidence to Support Section 7612, Subdivision (c), Third Parent Finding
T.L., Mother, and Agency contend the juvenile court erred in interpreting section 7612, subdivision (c), and by finding B.S. is a third parent under that statute.
A
At the January 23, 2017 hearing, T.L. and Agency argued, inter alia, that B.S. did not qualify as a third parent under section 7612, subdivision (c). Agency stated B.S. did not have a relationship with L.L. It stated L.L. did not want to visit B.S. Its social worker stated L.L. did not know B.S., but L.L. knew why he was incarcerated and that made her uncomfortable. L.L.'s counsel stated she did not "see a relationship" between L.L. and B.S. B.S.'s counsel implicitly conceded that B.S. did not have a current relationship with L.L., stating: "He did try to maintain a relationship with [L.L.]." The record showed that in 2011, B.S. was sentenced to a prison term of 12 years.
The juvenile court stated that L.L. did not "at this time ... have a strong relationship with [B.S.]" After finding B.S. is a presumed father under section 7611, subdivision (d), the court further found that "it would not be detrimental to [L.L.] to have a third parent added" under section 7612, subdivision (c). Accordingly, it found B.S. is a third parent under section 7612, subdivision (c).
B
"As a general rule, ' "there can be only one presumed father." ' " ( Donovan L. , supra , 244 Cal.App.4th at p. 1086,
"In an appropriate action, a court may find that more than two persons with a *915claim to parentage under this division are parents if the court finds that recognizing only two parents would be detrimental to the child. In determining detriment to the child, the court shall consider all relevant factors, including, but not limited to, the harm of removing the child from a stable placement with a parent who has fulfilled *1316the child's physical needs and the child's psychological needs for care and affection, and who has assumed that role for a substantial period of time. A finding of detriment to the child does not require a finding of unfitness of any of the parents or persons with a claim to parentage."
In enacting section 7612, subdivision (c), the Legislature expressed its intent that it "only apply in the rare case where a child truly has more than two parents, and a finding that a child has more than two parents is necessary to protect the child from the detriment of being separated from one of his or her parents." (Stats. 2013, ch. 564, § 1.)
In Donovan L. , supra ,
C
We agree with T.L., Mother, and Agency that the juvenile court misinterpreted and misapplied section 7612, subdivision (c), in finding B.S. is a third parent under that statute. First, the court misunderstood the detriment required for designating a third parent under section 7612, subdivision (c). Under its express language, section 7612, subdivision (c), allows the designation of a third parent only in appropriate cases where " 'recognizing only two parents would be detrimental to the child.' " ( Donovan L. , supra , 244 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1090-1092,
Furthermore, we agree with the argument of T.L., Mother, and Agency that B.S. could not be recognized as a third parent under section 7612, *1317subdivision (c), because there is no evidence in the record showing he had an existing relationship with L.L. In fact, like the juvenile court in Donovan L ., supra , 244 Cal.App.4th at page 1092,
III
Section 7612, Subdivision (b), Weighing Process
T.L., Mother, and Agency contend the juvenile court also erred by not conducting the weighing process required by section 7612, subdivision (b), and determining the competing claims of T.L. and B.S. as L.L.'s presumed father. T.L. and Mother further argue no remand is necessary for the court to conduct that weighing process because no court could reasonably conclude B.S. should be L.L.'s presumed father. Agency argues we should remand the matter for the juvenile court to conduct that weighing process. We agree with Agency.
A
If a third parent is not recognized under section 7612, subdivision (c), then a juvenile court generally must weigh the competing presumptions of two or more presumed fathers and determine which one should be recognized as the child's presumed father. (§ 7612, subd. (b); Donovan L ., supra , 244 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1087, 1093-1094,
B
In this case, because the juvenile court found B.S. is a third parent under section 7612, subdivision (c), it did not undertake the weighing process to resolve the competing claims of T.L. and B.S. under section 7612, subdivision (b). By failing to do so, the court erred. (§ 7612, subd. (b); Donovan L. , supra , 244 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1093-1094,
DISPOSITION
We reverse the January 23, 2017 order to the extent it found that B.S. is a third parent under section 7612, subdivision (c). In all other respects, we affirm the order. The matter is remanded with directions that the juvenile court: (1) enter a new order finding that B.S. is not a third parent under section 7612, subdivision (c); and (2) conduct an evidentiary hearing under section 7612, subdivision (b), make factual findings as to the claims of T.L. and B.S. as L.L.'s presumed father, and weigh their competing claims as required by section 7612, subdivision (b).
WE CONCUR:
HUFFMAN, J.
DATO, J.
All statutory references are to the Family Code unless otherwise specified.
L.L.'s older brother also tested positive for drugs on his birth in 2004, was declared a dependent of the juvenile court, and ultimately was adopted in 2005, after Mother and T.L. failed to reunify with him.
The 2007 family court order stated that L.L. would be in B.S.'s care on Monday, Wednesday, and Sunday from 1:00 p.m. to 6:00 p.m.
B.S.'s documents used a different name for L.L., which he explained was the name he and Mother agreed on at the time of L.L.'s birth, but Mother subsequently changed it to L.L.
Given L.L.'s obvious interest in the resolution of the issues on appeal, we question why counsel was not appointed to represent her interests on appeal. Nevertheless, we doubt our disposition of this case would have been different had counsel been appointed for her.
T.L. and Mother argue that Agency forfeited the position that B.S. qualified as a presumed parent under section 7611, subdivision (d), by not so arguing below and instead arguing B.S. did not qualify as a presumed father. We disagree and conclude Agency may take a position on appeal that is contrary to its position in the juvenile court. In any event, T.L. and Mother are not prejudiced because B.S. makes the same argument as Agency does on appeal and we agree with that position. None of the cases cited by T.L. and Mother are apposite to this case or otherwise persuade us to reach a contrary conclusion.
Specifically, the appellant accepted the youngest child into his home for one year, the middle child for three years, and the oldest child for four years. (J.O., supra, 178 Cal.App.4th at p. 146,