Samuel Jackson v. Jennifer HolleySamuel Jackson v. Jennifer Holley
Case Information
*1 Before SHEDD, DUNCAN, and HARRIS, Circuit Judges.
Vacated and remanded with instructions by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Roy Cooper, Attorney General, Joseph Finarelli, Special Deputy Attorney General, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellant. *2 Samuel R. Jackson, Appellee Pro Se.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. *3
PER CURIAM:
Jennifer Holley, a staff psychologist at Maury Correctional
Institution, seeks to appeal the district court’s order denying
her motion to dismiss North Carolina prisoner, Samuel R.
Jackson’s,
First, we disagree with Jackson that we lack jurisdiction
over this appeal. Admittedly, this court may exercise
jurisdiction only over final decisions,
An order denying a defendant’s claim of qualified immunity is immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine only “to the extent that it turns on an issue of law[.]” Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530 (1985). However, a district court’s determination that a genuine issue of material fact exists to preclude summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds is not immediately appealable. Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 313-20 (1995); Culosi v. Bullock, 596 F.3d 195, 201 (4th Cir. 2010).
Viewing the complaint’s allegations in the light most favorable to Jackson, and noting that a video allegedly exists to substantiate those allegations, the district court concluded that “qualified immunity is inappropriate given that the plaintiff’s complaint states sufficient factual allegations that, if true, show a violation of clearly established constitutional rights.” Thus, the district court found that Jackson’s “Eighth Amendment claims are alleged and supported by the facts[.]” Moreover, Holley asserts on appeal that even assuming all facts as alleged by Jackson are taken as true, Jackson’s allegations do not legally amount to an Eighth Amendment violation. Holley therefore presents only legal arguments on appeal. Because the district court’s disposition, *5 and Holley’s arguments on appeal, present this court with purely legal questions, we have jurisdiction over Holley’s appeal and deny Jackson’s motion to dismiss.
Having reviewed the parties’ submissions, we disagree with
the district court’s determination that Holley was not entitled
to qualified immunity. We review de novo a district court’s
decision on a motion to dismiss. See Coleman v. Md. Ct. of
App.,
However, “plaintiffs may proceed into the litigation
process only when their complaints are justified by both law and
fact.” Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 193 (4th Cir.
2009). Thus, to survive a motion to dismiss, the complaint must
“state[] a plausible claim for relief” that “permit[s] the court
to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct” based
upon “its judicial experience and common sense.” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal,
It is well-established that “the treatment a prisoner receives in prison and the conditions under which he is confined *6 are subject to scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994) (internal quotation marks omitted). There can be little doubt that sexual abuse is repugnant to contemporary standards of decency, and that allegations of sexual abuse can amount to an Eighth Amendment violation. See Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 118 (2006) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Accordingly, those inmates who are sexually assaulted by guards, or whose sexual assaults by other inmates are facilitated by guards, have suffered grave deprivations of their Eighth Amendment rights.”); Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834 (“Being violently assaulted in prison is simply not part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
The Supreme Court has held, however, that “not every
malevolent touch by a prison guard gives rise to a federal cause
of action.” Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34, 37 (2010) (internal
quotation marks omitted). Indeed, “[a]n inmate who complains of
a push or a shove that causes no discernible injury almost
certainly fails to state a valid excessive force claim.” Id. at
38 (internal quotation marks omitted). Moreover, “[a]lthough
prisoners have a right to be free from sexual abuse, whether at
the hands of fellow inmates or prison guards, the Eighth
Amendment’s protections do not necessarily extend to mere verbal
*7
sexual harassment.” Austin v. Terhune,
In this case, Jackson alleges only that Holley: (1) sent
him one “sexually explicit and lurid” letter; (2) “posed up
seductively before [Jackson] and whispered sexually explicit
words to [him;]” and (3) “plant[ed] her groin area in
[Jackson’s] face while [he] was seated for [his] haircut in the
barber’s chair.” We conclude that the conduct about which
Jackson complains does not amount to an Eighth Amendment
violation.
[*]
See Wilkins, 559 U.S. at 38-39. Thus, Holley was
entitled to qualified immunity and her motion to dismiss should
have been granted by the district court. See Henry v. Purnell,
*8
Based on the foregoing, we deny Jackson’s motions to
invalidate and to dismiss this appeal, and we vacate the
district court’s order denying Holley’s motion to dismiss and
remand with instructions to enter judgment in Holley’s favor on
Jackson’s
VACATED AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS
Notes
[*] Given the lack of circuit authority regarding whether sexual harassment by prison officials amounts to a constitutional violation, we also find that it was not unreasonable for Holley to have “failed to appreciate that h[er] conduct would violate [Jackson’s] rights.” Meyers v. Baltimore Cnty., 713 F.3d 723, 731 (4th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, even if the conduct about which Jackson complains is sufficient to state an Eighth Amendment violation, Holley is entitled to qualified immunity under the second prong of the qualified immunity inquiry.