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Samuel Campbell v. City of Springboro, Ohio
700 F.3d 779
6th Cir.
2012
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*1 779 2113(e) Further, mandatory death nied his motion. the punished by be shall minimum sentence not unconstitutional. the statute imprisonment”). Because life upheld The Court has life sen- Supreme considering legislative its his- is clear after tences in death did not re crimes where structure, lenity the rule of tory and Michigan, v. 501 sult. See Harmelin U.S. Hill, States v. 55 inapplicable. United 957, 2680, 115 111 L.Ed.2d 836 S.Ct. Cir.1995). (6th 1197, F.3d 1206 (statutory mandatory life term for cocaine no possession by someone with felo III. constitutional); ny convictions is United a district court’s deni review We 516, Beverly, States v. 536-37 plea guilty to withdraw a for al of motion (6th Cir.2004) (858-month sentence not States v. El of discretion. United abuse punishment getaway cruel for and unusual (6th Cir.2006). 275, lis, 470 280 F.3d robberies, driver in four bank where no the right has waived defendant Whether killed). Moreover, one Parks’s sen pursuant to a valid sentence appeal his life imprisonment, tence is not 31 novo. reviewed de See agreement is plea years. Thomas, F.3d v. 605 United States correctly applied The court district this properly Parks was court’s mandate and found that statute minimum sen mandatory advised mandatory minimum requires a sentence pled he for offense which no tence life, though arranged even Parks for court asked Parks at contest. The district agreement plea of less than life. For the if he with the plea hearing agreed his stated, reasons we AFFIRM the decision plea agreement Rule 11 as terms court. district At by Assistant States recited United torney, Parks answered which court informed Parks

affirmative. The guilty, charged the offense found imprisonment,” of life

“requires a sentence A. CAMPBELL and Chelsie Samuel you asked “Do understand that?” and Gemperline, Plaintiffs- ‘Yes, The Parks answered sir.” court Appellees, Parks’s counsel if he was satisfied asked “fully understand^] that Parks consequences plea of a charges ... and SPRINGBORO, OHIO; The CITY OF answered, 3?” Counsel

guilty Count Kruithoff, individually Jeffrey and the court ensured Parks ‘Yes.” After capacity his official as Chief of Po lice; individually voluntarily, pleading guilty freely Nick and in capacity his official as Police Officer was a factual basis there Ohio, Springboro, De for the accepted guilty plea, plea. it dis fendants-Appellants. Parks to trict court then sentenced months in As evidenced prison. No. 11-3589. sentencing transcript, Parks did enter Appeals, United States Court plea an heart and con “unsure Sixth Circuit. Haygood,

fused mind.” United States v. Argued: June (6th Cir.2008) (quoting F.3d 29, 2012. and Filed: Nov. Decided Alexander, United States v. (6th Cir.1991)). En Rehearing Banc denying Rehearing its order 4, 2013. Denied Jan. plea, guilty to withdraw his Parks’s motion properly the district court considered id., factors, correctly

Haygood see de- *3 Weisenfelder, Jr., Rendigs, Fry, Kiely

G. Dennis, LLP, Ohio, Cincinnati, & for Ap- Brannon, pellants. Douglas D. Dwight D. Brannon, Associates, Dayton, Brannon & Ohio, for Appellees. KEITH, McKEAGUE,

Before: DONALD, Judges. Circuit *4 DONALD, J., opinion delivered the KEITH, joined, the court in which J. and McKEAGUE, J., joined in Parts II.A and McKEAGUE, 791-96), (pp. II.D. J. a separate opinion dissenting delivered II.B, II.C, from Part Part and the result. OPINION DONALD, B. BERNICE Judge. Circuit Plaintiffs Samuel Chelsie Gemperline were attacked on October 2007 and respectively, October by police dog with the canine unit of the Springboro Department. Police Plaintiffs suit against filed under U.S.C. handler, police, the canine’s the chief Springboro, and the alleging exces- force, sive failure to supervise, and failure properly train. Plaintiffs also asserted state law claims for battery. assault and The district court denied Defendants’ mo- for summary judgment. tion For the fore- reasons, going we AFFIRM the district summary judgment. court’s denial of I. Springboro Depart- Police (“SPD”)

ment selected Nick Officer Clark to form department’s canine first unit. Police, Jeffrey Kruithoff, The Chief of placed charge Clark in selecting a dog a training program. Clark chose a Weisenfelder, Jr., ARGUED: Wilson G. dog Lynwood Kennels, named from Rendigs, Fry, Dennis, LLP, Kiely & company specializes Cin- training ca- Ohio, cinnati, for Appellants. Matthew C. nines and their handlers for law enforce- Schultz, Associates, Dayton, Brannon & purposes. Lynwood ment provid- Kennels Ohio, Appellees. for ON BRIEF: Wilson training ed initial core 300-hour —a they allow him peatedly requested handling course that Officer Clark canine sessions, his After time to attend completed May, 2005. requests were denied. state certi- Spike and Clark completing training, lapsed during months According to fications for several certification. state obtained renewal summer of 2007. The dead- requires of Ohio the State Officer April for certifications were certified lines those regularly units be that canine May actually Training 2007. Commis- the Ohio Peace Officer September re-certified until Attorney Gener- and the Office sion Commission”) (“Ohio During deposition, testified that Training in order al police dog cannot be in service Ohio compliance. to remain the certifications are renewed. unless in the field deployed Spike The SPD However, interpreted due he “renewal certi- immediately after he became state certification posted date” forms not making responsible fied. Clark deadline, as the as a but rather earliest training require- that Spike sure fulfilled *5 upon date which renewal can occur. Dur- Spike he that and ments. Clark believed certification, lapse in ing Spike the Ohio eight supposed to hours complete were deployed approximately was in the field training every other week to maintenance ten times. testified that within that Clark not stayed sharp and did Spike make sure period, time he notified Kruithoff an- and Woods, op- the develop bad habits. Brian supervisor that the certifications had other and a master Lynwood Kennels erator expired. Spike’s recertification occurred trainer, monthly that mainte- testified the the to dates of the two bite incidents prior encompass all disci- training nance should in issue this case. at detection, including narcotics plines, obedience, never training, specifi- and rea- Kruithoff testified that he tracking, bite any particular cally designated a member his com- training sonable force supervise staff canine unit or any problem on areas. Without mand to the focus dog’s Spike duty. suitable for training, the level obedience to ensure was such Instead, dog oversight not of the canine unit fell to may may erode over time and the serving supervising com- officers as well to the handler’s the Clark’s respond as any given Spike sergeant he lieutenant and at time. mands. Clark admitted that and Similarly, always in maintenance Lieutenant Wheeler testified engage did not his own train- training regular Spike re- that Officer oversaw on a basis. Clark training September ing. no ceived between 21, 2007, the the 2007 and date of October agreed that Woods and Clark While Spike incident. also received as was trained a “bark and hold” thirty days to no for over they disagreed on how he was dog, sharply Gemperline incident,

the which occurred tracking to in a situation. trained behave 11, 2008. Clark testi- on October Officer explained dog a and “bark hold Woods although supervisors were fied person gets if a and up trained that was cur- Spike’s training aware that not surrenders, dog you. engage the will rent, they to sufficient time for failed allot literally detain him or bark and He will training. the him such as person hold until time flees, attacks, [ ] or is called back to incidents at issue either Prior both bite case, in a super- dog handler.” is trained “[I]f Clark notified his this Officer hold, that he keep up to and is what should that he had been unable bark visors ” however, According to training and re- do.... with the maintenance “bark approach and hold” does not apply Campbell club, later decided to leave the tracking situation. Clark testified he realized that he had Parker’s car keys track, that when engaged fugitive in a even and needed to return them to her. When subject where the compliant and not he house, arrived Parker’s he could see attempting flee, to resist or through her door, window the front expected to subject bite the unless Clark lying the couch. pounded He loudly on subject saw the restrained ver- the front door about or five ten min- bally physically. utes, but was unable to rouse her. Camp- bell walked around to pound- There disagreement was similar back on the ed on subject the back door for among testifying another two police offi- minutes, three cers. Chief Kruithoff then returned believed during front of Meanwhile, track that the house. Spike was not supposed the tenant bite subject subject other half of Parker’s duplex remained still. who Similarly, had Lt. Wheeler heard indicated that all pounding Clark called the had told Springboro him that a bark Police dog Department and hold about the supposed first bark noise. subject at a indicate subject’s presence. If the Officers Anderkin were dis- subject movement, any makes the dog is patched to Parker’s residence to respond expected to “bite and hold.” According to to possible domestic involving situation Parker, Lt. hand, on the other bark and male subject beating on Parker’s front *6 hold doesn’t apply tracks, during because door. By the time the got officers only it applies to “off-leash” situations. scene, Campbell already had left Parker’s He further testified that a tracking canine residence begun and had to head toward would always upon bite encountering a his house through on foot Parker’s back- subject, unless the handler commands oth- yard. Campbell heard the approaching erwise before dog engages.1 sirens suspected and that neighbor may The evidence Spike shows that was in- have called police because he had been

volved in biting incidents with growing pounding loudly on Parker’s door. He frequency in the first years three of his decided to ground lie on the near an out- deployment in the field. In he suc- building in attempt an to avoid a confron- cessfully apprehended suspects, three none tation with the police. of whom were bitten. In Spike ap- prehended fourteen suspects, neighbor five of whom told Anderkin that Par- he bit. he bit five of the ker’s six recently residence had been broken suspects apprehended. into and that at point some she had re- ceived death threats from someone. The Campbell A. Incident neighbor also stated that he had seen a On the evening male, of October white Sam- later Camp- determined be uel Campbell gone bell, had with girl- out kick the front door and then run friend, Parker, Lisa couple another around the side of the as the house officers nightclub. At approximately a.m., approached. 12:30 The officers then attempted Parker decided leave the club and walk unsuccessfully to rouse by pound- Parker home because she was intoxicated. When ing on the back and front doors to the conflicting This testimony at performed odds with he per- as had been trained to the dissent’s observation appears "there that form." to be dispute no about the Spike fact that engaged Spike Camp- that when that the doors reflects They noticed residence. bell, lying face down on the Campbell was they unable damaged, but were appeared his hands out to the side. ground both because entry to the residence gain Campbell leg on the left Spike bit securely locked. Clark were of the doors at Campbell to bite different suspect continued their belief that the it was testified time, sirens, period of leg on his for some places lead- hearing police upon had fled thirty forty-five seconds. they possibly were that officers to conclude ing the attempted burglary an dealing with Gemperline B. Incident likely in the area. was still suspect that the 1:30 a.m. on October approximately At in a harness outfitting After dispatched to 128 Deer Clark line, deployed tracking Clark twenty-foot Drive, to investi- Springboro, Trail Ohio of the house. him the side near party of a loud at gate report which in an eventually the officers to fence led were believed to be drink- underage teens outbuilding yard that led to adjoining alcohol. Based on his own ing observa- had laid on the Campbell down near where tions, fact he was in Clark determined maintains that he had no Clark ground. involving dealing party underage with a and that he was that close Campbell idea requested backup. drinking and Several after actually see until did not po- the SPD and other local officers from that he Campbell. Clark testified Spike bit including departments, Sergeant lice SPD on Campbell was somewhere believed that Zimmaro, responded Aaron to the scene. the fence side of based the other Zimmaro and Sergeant Both Officer Clark fence. jumping over the Spike’s interest teens, one of the Chelsie observed that claims, result, he not look- As a Clark intoxicated. Gemperline, appeared After exact moment at at the ing her, Sergeant Zimmaro in- questioning and bit from the fence Spike retreated Gemperline that she was under formed rather, moment Campbell; *7 arrest, handcuffs, placed and placed her discussing toward Anderkin was turned Gemperline in a vehicle. be- patrol her around to the other side ways get to belligerent Sergeant came after Zimmaro testimo- Campbell disputes Clark’s fence. that she was under arrest. told her Gem- Campbell until after ny that he did not see right hand out of the later slid her perline that he engaged. Campbell testified Spike handcuffs, car lowered the window the him on the lying saw was sure Clark escaped. fled down the street and She Spike when Clark and ground because plastic playhouse and hid a children’s from twenty-five feet approximately were seven backyard of a house six to hous- his Campbell raised approaching, him and party. location of the away from the es eyes head, and their right looked Gemper- was notified that that area in After Clark also stated Campbell met. escaped, saying, he was heard by line had lay was somewhat illuminated which he bitch, [unintelligible] ... this “Jeez Louise nearby light. parties agree Both a it,” gonna get and anything “[s]he’s ... I’ve had Campbell nor Clark said neither awakening here in one second or nice rude biting Campbell. Clark is- Spike to two, very good.”2 feel gonna ... it’s not Campbell, Camp- and warnings sued no to request, Zimmaro’s Sergeant At Clark Campbell to the officers. nothing bell said him on the placed same report Spike, harnessed Anderkin’s incident and contends ments, memorandum, recording although vehicle de- Clark’s According department to a only captured the second statement. state- vice to have made Clark was believed both 786 used in the II.

twenty-foot tracking line case, him deployed on a Qualified Immunity A. Spike fugitive “tactical track.” led Clark on the backyard opposite into a fenced-in quali A district court’s denial they entered side of the street. As immunity, fied “to the that it extent turns backyard, Clark air- interpreted law, on an issue of is an ‘final appealable indicating that scenting Spike behavior as decision’ meaning within 28 U.S.C. something the deck of smelled notwithstanding absence of a then across Spike house. darted Clark’s judgment.” Forsyth, final Mitchell v. 472 path leapt through head-first the "win- U.S. 86 L.Ed.2d playhouse dow of a child’s was (1985). located Qualified immunity “shields gate backyard. Spike near the government performing officials discre enough his through able to reach head far tionary liability functions from for civil playhouse nip the window the Gem- damages as their insofar conduct does not perline’s right upper chin and bite her statutory clearly violate or con established thigh. Gemperline grabbed screamed and rights stitutional which reasonable Spike’s jaws and tried him off pry her person have would Barker v. known.” leg. briefly of her go leg, let but (6th Goodrich, Cir.2011). F.3d clamped then down again. Gemperline he In order qual to determine whether struggle continued to with until she immunity applies ified in an excessive passed either out or into went shock. claim, force engage the Court must in a as testified as soon he heard two-step inquiry, addressing following scream Gemperline he reached into the (1) questions: whether, considering the al playhouse, grabbed collar, legations in a most favorable straight up cut off Spike’s lifted injured party, right constitutional has airway, a maneuver called “choke off.” violated, so, been whether that Gemperline hearing did not recall Officer right clearly Saucier established. Clark say anything to her. Officer Clark Katz, 194,201, 121 2151, 150 533 U.S. S.Ct. have, testified that he could did not (2001); L.Ed.2d 272 see also Parsons v. any warnings shout he when entered the Pontiac, F.3d backyard Spike. evaluating When the defense of

qualified immunity on a motion sum *8 mary the History judgment, adopt court must the C. Procedural plaintiffs Parsons, version the facts. 20, 2008, Campbell On October filed suit If, upon 500. based these against the of Springboro, Chief Krui- facts, violated, right no constitutional was thoff, alleging and Officer Clark several there is need for inquiry. no further Id. rights violations his civil under 42 However, if court the determines that a U.S.C. 1983 and and battery. assault out, violation could be made the Court 29, 2009, On June Campbell amended his must if right then ask the was clearly complaint to add as a Gemperline co-plain- alleged established at the time of viola the 15, 2010, tiff. On October Defendants filed tion. Id. a summary judgment motion for as to all alleged parties. claims both On April Right Violation Constitutional 26, 2011, the district court denied the De- summary judgment fendants’ motion. police De- Claims that officers used finally fendants filed present appeal. excessive force the of an course arrest Viewing light Fourth facts in a most favor- under the Amend- analyzed are Plaintiff, to the the district court “objective reasonableness” able did ment and the Krakowski, in finding jury not err that a reasonable Bennett v. standard. Cir.2011) could find that actions (citing Officer Clark’s were Graham 1865, unreasonable. Connor, 490 U.S. (1989)). In applying L.Ed.2d test,

objective court is reasonableness Gemperline b. required pay “careful attention to the to Gemperline’s underage drink- crime of each particular facts and circumstances ing, reprehensible, relatively a while mi- (1) case, severity of including the crime offense, and, nor under circumstances (2) issue, suspect poses at an whether issue, posed immediate threat to no safety to the offi- immediate threat safety Although of the officers or others. others, cers or whether he is ac- Gemperline the officers argue that was tively or resisting attempting arrest to committing escaping po- from felony by by flight.” evade Id. arrest violent, custody, not lice the crime was no weapons person, were found on her Campbell a. anything put anyone had not to she done way. hand, in harm’s the other On prior undisputed It to call validly officers were concerned for her unit, ing in not the K-9 officers did safety drinking because she had been crime, if any, know the extent appeared to After be intoxicated. Gem- committed, Campbell or if he had was perline escaped custody, they had no way stated actually armed. Clark that he did knowing harm herself she would or in any not that Parker was immedi believe else, attempt to cause harm to someone aware of danger specific ate and was not although they might still believed she be time. anyone threat to at the When the handcuffed. Campbell, lying he was face officers found at his side. According down with his arms parties dispute whether eye he and Clark made con Campbell, gave Gemperline warning, ac- prior engaging tact At him. no cording drifting she was off Gemperline, actively ar point Campbell resisting was sleep not make Clark did himself Thus, Campbell rest. has out a made biting to her known her. argument for excessive force colorable most Viewing the facts in a favorable improper handling by based upon Clark. Plaintiff, she was arrested nor flight, minor crime and was not addition, ample there is evidence to anyone she a threat to at the time she was suggest deployment of that the facts, apprehended. upon Based these it the search for itself irre- appears that the actions of when *9 unreasonable, sponsible and therefore ow- objective- apprehending Gemperline, were ing to main- adequately Clark’s failure ly unreasonable. By tain Spike’s training. Clark’s own admission, There is suggesting had issues "with exces- evidence perform sive the failure to real reason chose to a biting keep Spike may training regimen may choke-off have been that did accepted always to Clark’s verbal com- played aggres- respond well have a role was, behavior, consistently at mands as as he should have. argu- sive which least suggests possible ably, contrary training. again to his This evidence Gemperline’s injury causal link between qualified immunity, tled to court stat- Spike’s inadequate training. ed: Viewing the in a light facts most favor- The facts indicate that prob- Barnes had Plaintiff, able to the court district did able cause to Briggs, believe that a sus- finding jury not err in that a reasonable pected felon hidden inside a darkened could find that Officer Clark’s actions were building the middle of the night, unreasonable. safety threatened his safety and the the other officers present. As the dis- Clearly Right Established it, trict succinctly put court right “clearly For a to be estab reasonably competent officer would lished,” right contours of that “[t]he must nighttime believe that a burglary sus- be sufficiently clear that a reasonable offi who, pect, good officers had rea- cial would understand what he is do believe, son to knew the building was ing right.” violates that Wheeler v. surrounded, who had ... been warned (6th Cir.2011) Lansing, 660 F.3d used, dog that a would be and who (quoting Creighton, Anderson v. 483 U.S. gave every unwillingness indication of 97 L.Ed.2d 523 surrender, posed a threat (1987)). say This is not to that an official safety of the officers. protected by action is qualified immunity Gamer, Unlike the situation in this is very unless the action in question has been not a police case where a officer shot a previously unlawful, held but it say is to felon, fleeing who, suspect criminal that in preexisting law the unlaw in part least because of the fact he was fulness apparent. must be Id. To resolve fleeing, posed no threat to the officer. question, this this Court “must look first to Instead, this is a case where an officer Court, Supreme decisions of the then to explore was forced to an enclosed unfa- decisions of this court and other courts miliar area which he knew a man was circuit, within our and finally to decisions hiding. totality Under the of the cir- of other circuits.” Hickey, St. John v. cumstances, justified Barnes was in us- (6th Cir.2005) F.3d (quoting Hig ing whatever force necessary, even gason v. Stephens, 288 F.3d force, deadly protect himself and the Cir.2002)). other officers and to apprehend the sus- question The before this Court is wheth- pect. er or not Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment Id. at 913-14. protections against force, excessive as it relates to the police dogs, use of was clear- Jones, Matthews the court relied ly established at the time the incidents on Robinette when it affirmed the district occurred. The Sixth Circuit has ad- grant court’s of summary judgment in fa- dressed this issue three relevant cases. police captain vor of a who used a police dog to apprehend a man who had fled on Barnes, In Robinette v. the court af- foot from pursuing being officers after grant firmed the of summary judgment in pulled speeding over for and reckless driv- favor of the a burglary defendants where (6th ing. 35 F.3d 1046 suspect was killed after being bitten court concluded: (6th Cir.1988). police dog. 854 F.2d 909 *10 suspect’s estate filed suit claiming that [W]e hold that there is no evidence the officers unnecessary used deadly force. whatever in this sup- record which could Id. In that finding the officers port were enti- a claim that Roscoe was not used in biting important them. Even more to this manner.” See Robi- “appropriate an that nette, question is clear of whether or not The record case is the only warned Mat- In both in- properly Officer Watkins trained. releasing times before stances, thews several suspects attacked the with- him, when he but apprehend Roseoe to or a command from Clark. warning out weeds, his lying in the Matthews found present facts in the case are While the body, beneath his Wat- hands concealed White, as in the facts are not as extreme move, him not to explicitly ordered kins allowed a sufficiently analogous. Clark still, remained advising that Matthews dog, “bite and hold” whose Matthews be recalled. Roseoe would suspects to attack two who questionable, move, and Roseoe enforced chose to who, because actively fleeing were not order. proximity, ability showed no to evade Id. at 1051. police custody. Matthews, In both Robinette law, of Sixth Circuit case there suspects that the were court determined ample suggest evidence to that Clark dangerous upon based potentially contrary clearly to acted established law their irrational they crimes committed and inadequately an ca- when he used trained Further, spaces which behavior. nine, warning, apprehend without to two unlit un- suspects were located-—an suspects fleeing. who were not heavily area— building and a dark wooded vulnerable to ambush. The police made Liability Supervisory B. Krui- —Chief police dogs found that court also thoff properly cases were trained and these argues Kruithoff that he is enti- Chief gave suspects several the officers qualified immunity superviso- to in his tled allowing dogs to warnings prior to ry although the district court de- capacity, suspect. engage that a of fact question termined existed spectrum end of the opposite On the prevented granting summary which it from Harmon, in which the court de- White v. judgment on this issue. summary judgment to an officer who nied canine, a little-trained who had allowed delving into Krui Before Chief someone, bite a hand- previously bitten supervisory liability, must thoff s we first Harmon, suspect. White v. 65 F.3d cuffed jurisdiction if we have to ad determine (6th Cir.1995) 51886, at *3 1995 WL “A particular appeal. dress this issue on (Table). immunity qualified district court’s denial of appealable is an final decision under 28 In contrast to the facts in Robi only U.S.C. to the extent Matthews, in the nette and events Kennedy it turns on an issue of law.” unlikely occurred in areas present cases Cincinnati, (6th police suspects to ambush and the expose Cir.2010). Therefore, ordinarily, we would anyone a threat to were not believed to be jurisdiction ap lack hear defendant’s in. at the time the canine unit was called qualified immunity of a denial of peal Although Gemperline officers believed that Berry fact. herself, only questions raises See have a threat no may been Rieger, man v. person on her weapons were found Cir.1998). However, ... aside from “[i]f might believed she still be hand officers regarding arguments give warnings impermissible failed to cuffed. Clark also fact, disputes of the defendant also raises suspects prior to either of the *11 790 purely legal question of whether the seemingly oblivious to the increasing fre- alleged ... support

facts a claim of viola- quency dog-bite of incidents involving law, clearly tion of established then Spike. Furthermore, there ig- Chief Kruithoff juris- is an issue over which court this has nored many complaints Clark’s regarding Kennedy, diction.” 595 (quot- F.3d 334 keep Spike his need to up to date on his Detroit, ing Estate v. City Carter 408 Thus, training. Chief Kruithoff apparent s (6th 305, Cir.2005)). F.3d 310 indifference to maintaining properly functioning reasonably K-9 unit could be reason, For this we find that we have expected give just rise to the sort of jurisdiction claim, only review the injuries that occurred. The district court if, determine on alleged based the facts as correctly disputed determined that Plaintiffs, Chief Kruithoff violated preclude granting facts summary judg- clearly Plaintiffs’ established constitutional ment. rights. supervisor A pur is not liable Municipal Liability-City C. Spring- suant to failing 1983 for to train unless boro the supervisor “either encouraged spe City The of Springboro claims that the cific incident of misconduct or in some district court improperly denied its motion way directly other participated in it.” summary judgment because its failure Luttrell, (6th 295, v.

Shehee 199 F.3d 300 to train the K-9 unit does not amount to a Cir.1999) (quoting Hays v. Coun Jefferson policy of deliberate indifference on behalf (6th ty, 869, Cir.1982)). 668 F.2d “At City towards it inhabitants. minimum, plaintiff must show that the authorized, official at implicitly least ap Denials summary judgment proved, or knowingly acquiesced in the generally are appealable orders, final unconstitutional conduct of offending but certain summary denials of judgment officers.” Id. (quoting Hays, 668 F.2d at grounds of qualified immunity may be 874). appealed. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. Although 2806, Kruithoff was not (1985); active S.Ct. 86 L.Ed.2d 411 ly involved in Pontiac, the incidents involving Spike, Bomar v. Cir.2011). (6th causal connection between his acts and City, however is omissions and the alleged constitutional not entitled to invoke the quali defense of injuries suggested by the record. Chief fied immunity and therefore has no Kruithoff allowed in the field grounds even to seek an interlocutory appeal of after his training lapsed. had He never the district court’s denial of its motion for required appropriate supervision of summary the ca judgment. Floyd City De nine unit essentially troit, (6th allowed it to run Cir.2008). itself. He failed to publish Therefore, establish and jurisdiction we lack to entertain an official K-9 unit policy, City’s and he was appeal.3 suggests The dissent that this loosely applied court should as a matter of discretion” and jurisdiction pursuant assume over the matter "only prop- satisfied if the resolution of the pendent appellate jurisdic- doctrine of erly appealable 'necessarily issue and una- high tion. The necessary threshold voidably' to assume nonappealable decides the issue.” however, pendent jurisdiction, Setvices, LLP, Adoption “inextrica- Turi v. Main St. standard,” bly intertwined is not met here. F.3d 502-03 We have previously We have inextricably held that the pendent jurisdiction also assumed where the requirement intertwined nonappealable "is not meant to be "necessary issue is to ensure *12 judgment as to the officers and dismiss the Law Claims D. Ohio jurisdiction. City’s appeal for lack of argues that he is entitled Clark Gemperline’s immunity Campbell’s McKEAGUE, Judge, concurring Circuit of provisions based on the law claims state dissenting part. in part and 2744.03(A)(6). § This Revised Code Ohio holding I in the that defendant concur immunity employees of provides section quali- is not entitled to Officer Nick Clark except where of Ohio political subdivisions immunity plaintiffs’ in relation to fied (a) were employee’s acts or omissions Part 1983 excessive force claims. See the em manifestly scope outside II.A, I in the supra. holding also concur responsibil or official ployee’s employment not to immu- that Officer Clark is entitled (b) ities; employee’s acts or omission nity plaintiffs’ relation to state law faith, purpose, malicious bad were with battery. Part claims for assault and See (c) manner; or or reckless or in a wanton II.D, I supra. disagree with the conclu- imposed upon liability expressly civil Jeffrey sion that Police Chief Kruithoff is of the Revised by a section employee qualified immunity not entitled to in rela- Code. plaintiffs’ tion to claim that he is individu- jury upon presented, the facts Based ally use of excessive force liable for Clark’s acted reasonably conclude Clark could failure-to-train theory supervisory on a or reckless faith or in a wanton in bad II.B, I liability. supra. See Part also According Campbell, manner. disagree with the dismissal of the letting him eye with made contact II.C, Part Springboro’s appeal. See su- ground lay him as he on the Spike bite pra. his side. After Gem- his hands out to custody, Clark escaped police perline I a “nice rude awak- give threatened to her my grounds To understand the for dis- very “gonna feel ening” that was agreement, important recognize it is that he argues good.” Although Clark why, specifically, defendant Clark is ex- statement, he admits never made the first liability using exces- posed to individual making the second statement. When apprehending force in each of the sive in a most favor- viewing these facts plaintiffs. plaintiffs Each of the two sus- Plaintiffs, sug- this information able to fairly significant leg injuries as a tained a malicious gests that Clark acted with police dog “Spike’s” result of assistance Spike to track purpose when he used apprehending they them after fled from Therefore, prop- them. the district court Springboro Depart- officers of the Police it re- summary judgment as erly denied immediately ment. features Two lates to these claims. stand out are the facts that both victims harmless, relatively innocent and were III. history Spring- with the service reasons, Department affirm Police is marked we boro For above-stated summary and certification deficiencies. court’s denial of the district immunity municipal liability meaningful appealable one. involve review” Lanier, legal wholly stan- Cir. distinct sets of facts Archie v. 1996) Resolving County the latter issue here is not (citing v. Chambers dards. Swint Comm’n, meaningful necessary nor beneficial U.S. (1995)). qualified former. review the L.Ed.2d 60 issues *13 Campbell Plaintiff Samuel is a man young stances. Nor is there evidence that Clark police who drew unwanted attention when necessarily any duty by breached failing to in early he made too much noise morn- give verbal warnings as he continued each ing trying girlfriend’s hours to return his search Spike with or that such failure keys night after a out at the bar. He proximately caused suspect’s inju- either poor judgment exercised when he decided ries. to hide the darkness from the investi- question objective The real about the gating police Gemperline, officers. Chelsie reasonableness of the force used is wheth- too, was a victim of her own indiscretions. er, Spike when first identified and “en- old, Eighteen years caught by she was gaged” Clark, each suspect, who had at an police underage drinking party. Spike years worked for over two authority, When she resisted their she was knew his and propensities, acted placed handcuffed and under in a arrest unreasonably in the manner he called patrol car. And when managed she Spike off. question, And on this there are slither out of the cuffs and through the genuine issues of fact in relation to both car, patrol window of the she became an plaintiffs’ claims that preclude awarding “escapee-fugitive,” putative felon. In summary judgment Clark quali- based on apprehension, Spike each discovered the immunity. fied In relation to Campbell— suspect the darkness while leashed to even accepting that the officers did not handler, Officer and reacted to know what if any offense suspect had discovery of each suspect, by not barking, or posed committed whether he a dan- by biting. injuries The resultant are ger (1) disputes are about whether —there certainly regrettable seemingly avoid- Clark Campbell saw Spike before did and Yet, able. there is little evidence of a unnecessarily Spike allowed to engage causal Spike’s training connection between (2) Campbell place; in the first and wheth- plaintiffs’ injuries. deficiencies and er unreasonably delayed in calling In evaluating whether the record suffi- only off after he had repeatedly ciently shows that Clark’s conduct was ob- bitten the unarmed for 30—45 unreasonable,

jectively thus forfeiting his seconds. Gemperline, relation to who entitlement to qualified immunity, it posed Clark knew danger, no there is a helpful to first identify what is not at issue. dispute about whether Clark acted unrea- First, there appears to be no dispute about sonably in using the “choke-off’ method to the fact that Spike performed as Clark off, call Spike using instead of a verbal knew had been perform. trained to (as command he had done with Campbell), Second, despite evidence that certi- may which have Gemperline’s exacerbated fication always timely was not renewed injuries. and his biweekly training requirements cases, In both met, majority as the always recog- were not there is little indica- nizes, conduct, Clark’s any tion that such as evidenced deficiencies contributed plaintiffs’ injuries. record facts viewed in the Despite evidence most favor- plaintiffs, should have able been trained to evaluated with refer- assist as a ence to dog, “bark and hold” the factors rather outlined Graham v. Connor, than as “bite and dog, hold” there is 490 U.S. little (1989): (1) evidence that Clark’s use of Spike in a L.Ed.2d 443 severity (2) fugitive tracking help issue; situation to appre- crime suspect whether the hend either Campbell Gemperline posed or was an safety immediate threat to the per unreasonable others; se under the circum- officers or whether hardly argue can be heard to that a actively resisting arrest rea- suspect was by flight. arrest This attempting sonably competent to evade officer would not have standard, though susceptible general known his conduct unlawful. applica- or mechanical precise definition Hence, I concur the affirmance of the tion, clearly established at the time of qualified immunity district court’s denial of in relation to both these arrests. And record, . to defendant Clark. As I view the *14 militate in favor plaintiffs, all three factors however, exposure to suit lia- Clark’s finding Spike that once discovered and of bility due to evidence that he unreason- suspect, the minimal force was engaged ably discretionary authority abused his suspect. In other needed to subdue Spike engaged suspect, by the time each words, applied by Spike the force should calling Spike quickly not off as as reason- soon reason- have been withdrawn as as ably possible. exposure liability Clark’s to cases, ably possible. And in both there is is not to Spike due his failure to ensure proposition factual for the support certification; timely training received not call off as soon as Clark did deploy is not due to his decision to in in reasonably possible or the manner rea- incident; place during the first either sonably expected unnecessary to minimize is not to give due his failure to verbal in injury. Viewing the record warnings during the searches. This deter- plaintiffs, most favorable to Clark’s con- mination recognition is consistent with reasonable, objectively duct was the excessive-force assessment is based on by incompetence. marked malice or analysis” a “segmented totality 224, 229, Bryant, See Hunter v. 502 U.S. facing the circumstances Clark at the time (1991) 534, 112 116 L.Ed.2d 589 S.Ct. split-second judgments he made his in re- 335, Malley Briggs, v. 475 U.S. (quoting sponse Spike’s engagement of the sus- 341, 1092, 343, 271 106 S.Ct. 89 L.Ed.2d “ Cleveland, pects. Chappell City See v. immunity ‘gives ample (qualified 901, 585 F.3d 909 by Because judgments’ protect- room for mistaken it is the reasonableness of each ing plainly incompetent ‘all but or “seizure” ”)). issue, knowingly the law.’ that is the not the those who violate reasonableness of in segments leading Clark’s conduct time that he is nonetheless enti- Clark insists seizure, up deficiencies immunity un- qualified tled to because the training give and Clark’s failure to verbal dog in police reasonableness of his use of a warnings largely point. are beside the It clearly these circumstances had not been that such are follows considerations imma- by particular- established the case law a evaluating terial the excessiveness of ized sense. The district court and the Yet, employed by the force Clark. majority compare have endeavored to majority’s reliance on these considerations canine-attack scenarios with those instant analysis served to confuse its of the claims to have amounted to excessive deemed against Jeffrey Police Chief Kruithoff and Yet, existing every force case law. City Springboro. necessarily unique and ar- fact situation Still, considering guably distinguishable. apparent harmlessness of each of these II inju- plaintiffs and the seriousness of the sustained, City nor Chief Kruithoff can Neither

ries the facts show that held liable for conduct on a deliberately be Clark’s knowing Spike’s propensities, theory respondeat superior. Phillips v. allowed to continue his attack on Tenn., 531, unnecessarily, County, he Roane 543 Campbell Gemperline or 794

(6th Cir.2008); (1997)). County, Miller v. Calhoun 137 L.Ed.2d 626 (6th Cir.2005). Here, n. plaintiffs 3 The appear rely on the sec- City may be held liable under 1983 if it alternative, implicitly ond arguing that the policy maintained a or custom that caused City improve Spike’s failed to training plaintiffs’ rights. the violation of See Ellis though even Gemperline’s the violation of Pendergrass ex rel. v. Cleveland Mun. rights had become foreseeable virtue of Dist., (6th Cir.2006). Sch. F.3d Campbell’s experience year one earlier. way prove policy “One an unlawful or However, yet incident has policy inadequate custom is show a be shown to in a have resulted violation of supervision.” (citing Id. City Campbell’s rights. constitutional Until Harris, Canton 489 U.S. made, such determination is (1989)). 1197, S.Ct. L.Ed.2d cannot placed be deemed to have been *15 City plaintiffs’ can be held liable under notice of an improve “obvious” need to theory plaintiffs’ injuries failure-to-train training based on that single incident. “ City’s can be attributed to the failure to Moreover, ‘[deliberate indifference’ ais adequately train Spike and this failure fault, stringent requiring proof standard of amounted to “deliberate indifference” to that a municipal disregarded actor rights public. the of members of the See known or consequence obvious of his ac Canton, 388, City 489 U.S. at 109 S.Ct. of tion.” Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. Specifically, plaintiffs 1197. must show -, 1350, 1360, 179 L.Ed.2d 417 (1) three elements: that Spike’s training (2011) (quoting Bryan County, 520 U.S. at inadequate him prepare for the 1382). 117 If S.Ct. the need for more (2) expected tasks he was to perform; that or different training is so obvious that the inadequacy persisted City’s due to the City i.e., policymaker, Kruithoff, Chief indifference; deliberate that shown to deliberately have been indiffer inadequacy closely actually related to or need, ent to the then City may be caused plaintiffs’ injuries. Plinton v. deemed to policy have had a of deliberate (6th Summit, County 540 F.3d Id.; Miller, indifference. 408 F.3d at 815— However, allegations mere Plinton, ways the court identified two improperly injury trained or that an of demonstrating element, the second de- could have been avoided with better train First, liberate indifference. plaintiffs ing are insufficient to make out deliberate could show deliberate indifference through indifference. Id. at 816. evidence of instances of unconstitu- Further, City’s whereas the liability may tional conduct demonstrating that City premised be policymaker’s on its deliber- had notice that training was deficient indifference, ate Kruithoff cannot be held likely injury ignored cause it. liable in his Harden, capacity individual for (citing failing Id. Fisher v. (6th Cir.2005)). supervise unless he “either Alternatively, encouraged plain- specific tiffs could show incident of misconduct deliberate indifference or in through some way directly evidence of a other single participated violation of in it.” rights, federal accompanied by Phillips, 534 F.3d at showing (quoting Shehee City Luttrell, had failed v. employ- to train its Cir. 1999)). ees handle recurring present- situations To hold Kruithoff liable in his ing an obvious potential for capacity injuries such viola- individual for shown to be (citing tion. Id. County Bd. by Spike’s Comm’rs caused deficiencies in training Brown, Bryan County 520 U.S. or training, plaintiffs officers’ must show incidents, implicitly particular Kruithoff “at least author- it is clear that he ized, knowingly acquiesced” granted or should have been approved, summary judg- injuries qualified in the violations and sustained ment on immunity based —not- Gemperline. Id. plaintiffs Campbell withstanding responsibility, as Chief alleged present- have neither nor City Plaintiffs policymaker, deficiencies any support finding evidence to ed training. officers’ and/or involvement in these personal Kruithoffs City Springboro, The on the other incidents. hand, may be held liable for a policy of majority apply the cor- purports deliberate indifference to obvious inade- legal plaintiffs rect standard to failure-to- quacies training supervision. Fur- Further, train Kruithoff. against claim ther, majority recognizes, as the majority acknowledges that “Kruithoff may qualified immunity not assert in de- actively involved in the was not incidents fact, fense of a 1983 claim. In the ma- involving Spike.” It follows that Kruithoff jority justify uses this fact to its refusal Yet, qualified immunity. is entitled to City’s to consider appeal. To be qualified im- majority affirms the denial of sure, City’s the denial of the motion for munity based evidence Kruithoffs summary judgment is an interlocutory or- indifference to the need for better der that would not ordinarily subject be *16 canine unit. to immediate review under the collateral discretion, order doctrine. We have how- This that Kruithoff is ex- determination ever, pendent appellate juris in to exercise posed liability capacity his individual independently ap diction over issues not alleged adequately for his failure to train pealable if “inextricably those issues are supervise “improperly or the canine unit with properly §a intertwined” matters before conflates 1983 claim of individual su- Servs., us. v. Adoption Turi Main Street pervisory liability municipal with one of (6th LLP, 496, 543; 633 F.3d 502-03 liability.” F.3d at Phillips, 534 see (absent Miller, Considering manifestly at close relation also 817 n. 3 ship plaintiffs’ between theories of liabili personal evidence of involvement ty misconduct, against City, Kruithoff and the underlying failure-to-train pendent appellate jurisdic exercise of against individual defendants are claims City’s appeal tion over the would certain properly brought against them in deemed ly be appropriate this case. their official to be treated as capacities, against municipality). claims To the evaluating plaintiffs’ failure-to- plaintiffs extent have adduced evidence train claim against City, the district supporting findings that Kruithoff awas correctly court relied on the standard set City policymaker on matters of Canton, in City forth at U.S. deliberately and was so indifferent to the nominally 109 S.Ct. 1197. The court thus need for more comprehensive training as recognized City’s that the keep failure to training deficiency to render the a matter up Spike’s training requirements with had liable, City policy, of de he would be facto (1) a policy amount to of deliberate all, i.e., capacity, render official deficiency an indifference to obvious ing City Clay liable. v. See Scott foreseeably could of citi- result violation Tenn., County, 879 n. 21 rights, actually zens’ constitutional .2000). Cir plaintiffs’ injuries. cause The district Thus, requirements for lack of evidence of Kruithoffs court found that these two personal adequately though involvement in either of these were met even the rec- history

ord contains no constitu- AMERICAN BEVERAGE tional violations and fails to substantiate ASSOCIATION, Plaintiff-Appellant, fail- City’s causal connection between the keep Spike’s training ure to current and injuries. plaintiffs either These defects in SNYDER, Schuette, Rick Bill analysis particularly district court’s are Dillon, Andrew Defendants- glaring when the real for Clark’s basis Appellees, i.e., exposure liability kept in focus— respond Clark’s failure to en- Michigan Beer & Wine Wholesalers objectively of each victim in an gagement Association, Intervenor- totality reasonable manner under the Appellee. words, the circumstances. In other there No. 11-2097. is no link in the causal district court’s analysis City’s keep between the failure to United States Court of Appeals, up Spike’s training and Clark’s malev- Sixth Circuit. olent or call incompetent failure to off in a Argued: July reasonable manner. 2012. Decided and Filed: Nov. although City Thus can held lia- be policy ble for a of deliberate indifference to inadequacies

obvious in training super-

vision, the record falls short of establishing history sufficient of canine-unit-related

constitutional put violations to Further,

notice of inadequacies. obvious theory against

the failure-to-train City

suffers from a lack causally of evidence any

linking deficiency in training —wheth-

er of Spike or of Clark—to the

injuries sustained plaintiffs. The evi- supporting plaintiffs’

dence failure-to-train

theory liability against City

Clark’s use of excessive force is no more scintilla,

than a mere insufficient to fore- summary judgment.

stall Accordingly, in

my opinion, ruling denying summary

judgment of Springboro should

also be reversed.

Case Details

Case Name: Samuel Campbell v. City of Springboro, Ohio
Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
Date Published: Nov 29, 2012
Citation: 700 F.3d 779
Docket Number: 11-3589
Court Abbreviation: 6th Cir.
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