Samson v. StateSamson v. State
- Reporters:
- , , ,
- Before:
- Regnier, Turnage, Gray, Hunt, Trieweiler
For Respondents: David W. Woodgerd and Brendan R. Beatty; Special Assistant Attorneys General; Office of Legal Affairs; Department of Revenue; Helena.
JUSTICE REGNIER delivered the Opinion of the Court.
In July 1996, plaintiff and appellant Richard Samson and several other Montana property owners and taxpayers (collectively referred to herein as “Taxpayers“) filed a declaratory judgment action with the First Judicial District Court in Lewis and Clark County, against the State of Montana, its Department of Revenue and Attorney General, and all fifty-six Montana Counties (collectively referred to herein as “Department“). The Taxpayers request class certification and seek various forms of relief, including a court-ordered reduction of certain real property appraisals, as well as a partial refund of their 1989, 1990, 1991, and 1992 real property taxes. The Department subsequently moved to dismiss the Taxpayers’ first amended complaint on the grounds that each of their claims is barred by the statute of limitations and on the basis that the complaint fails to state a claim for which relief may be granted. On December 6, 1996, the District Court issued an order granting the Department‘s motion to dismiss. It is from that order that the Taxpayers now appeal. For the reasons discussed below, we affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In 1989, the Montana Legislature modified the State‘s real property appraisal system and enacted the stratified sales assessment ratio (SSAR) valuation adjustment, codified at
This Court delayed the effect of its decision in Barron, applying it prospectively after December 31, 1990, and additionally denied relief to those taxpayers who had not administratively appealed their property taxes prior to October 12, 1990. Barron, 245 Mont. at 115, 799 P.2d at 542; Woith v. Cascade County Treasurer (1993), 262 Mont. 170, 172, 864 P.2d 752, 753. In Woith, we clarified that our decision in Barron did not preclude taxpayers who had not filed timely administrative appeals from seeking refunds pursuant to alternative statutory remedies. Woith, 262 Mont. at 172, 864 P.2d at 753.
In 1991, in response to this Court‘s decision in Barron, the Montana Legislature passed Senate Bill 412, by which it again amended
In the instant case, the Taxpayers brought suit on July 3, 1996, alleging they paid real property taxes based on the unconstitutional SSAR method of assessment, but have since received no tax refunds or other relief. The Taxpayers filed their first amended complaint on
The Department responded to the Taxpayers’ amended complaint on August 9, 1996, by way of a motion to dismiss filed pursuant to
STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review de novo a district court‘s ruling on a motion to dismiss under
In Willson v. Taylor (1981), 194 Mont. 123, 634 P.2d 1180, we recognized that
[a] complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief. A motion to dismiss under
Rule 12(b)(6), M.R.Civ.P. , has the effect of admitting all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint. In considering the motion, the complaint is construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and all allegations of fact contained therein are taken as true.
Willson, 194 Mont. at 126, 634 P.2d at 1182 (citations omitted).
Thus, “[i]n reviewing a motion to dismiss, we construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and take the allegations of the complaint as true.” HKM Associates v. Northwest Pipe Fittings, Inc. (1995), 272 Mont. 187, 191, 900 P.2d 302, 304 (citing Goodman Realty, Inc. v. Monson (1994), 267 Mont. 228, 231, 883 P.2d 121, 123).
Pursuant to this standard of review, this Court will affirm the district court‘s dismissal only if we “determine that plaintiff is not
The District Court‘s determination that the Taxpayers’ complaint failed to state a claim is a conclusion of law. See Boreen v. Christensen (1994), 267 Mont. 405, 408, 884 P.2d 761, 762. This Court‘s standard of review of a district court‘s conclusion of law is whether the court‘s interpretation of the law is correct. Boreen, 267 Mont. at 408, 884 P.2d at 762 (citing Steer, Inc. v. Department of Revenue (1990), 245 Mont. 470, 474-75, 803 P.2d 601, 603).
DISCUSSION
Did the District Court err in granting the Department‘s motion to dismiss?
Although the Taxpayers identify no fewer than seventeen claims, and seek eleven forms of relief in their first amended complaint, their central argument is that, for tax years 1989 through 1992, they paid property taxes which were illegally collected, but have yet to receive any refunds or other relief pursuant to our decisions in Barron, Sheehy, and Woith.
The Taxpayers seek declaratory relief pursuant to several Montana statutes, including
A. Declaratory judgment pursuant to § 15-1-406, MCA .
On July 3, 1996, the Taxpayers filed suit pursuant to
The statute pursuant to which the Taxpayers seek declaratory relief specifically states that:
An aggrieved taxpayer may bring a declaratory judgment action in the district court seeking a declaration that:
(a) an administrative rule or method or procedure of assessment or imposition of tax adopted or used by the department of revenue is illegal or improper; or
(b) a tax authorized by the state or one of its subdivisions was illegally or unlawfully imposed or exceeded the taxing authority of the entity imposing that tax.
In the present case, the Taxpayers have sought to avail themselves of this statute and thereby challenge the legality of real property taxes assessed against them in 1989, 1990, 1991, and 1992.
[t]he action must be brought within 90 days of the date the notice of the tax due was sent to the taxpayer or, in the case of an assessment covered by the uniform tax review procedure set forth in
15-1-211 , within 90 days of the date of the department director‘s final decision.
The present version of
Upon consideration of the Department‘s motion to dismiss, the District Court concluded that the Taxpayers had neither brought their action within the applicable ninety-day limitations period, nor paid the challenged taxes under protest. The court thus held the Taxpayers had met neither of the conditions precedent necessary to maintain a declaratory judgment action pursuant to
On appeal, the Taxpayers first assert the District Court erred in applying the present version of
Because they challenge the legality of taxes imposed upon them from 1989 through 1992, the Taxpayers assert the 1991 version of
Although the 1991 statute did not require payment under protest, it did contain a limitations period similar to that included in the current statute. Specifically,
In analyzing the Department‘s motion to dismiss, the District Court first applied the current version of
As noted above, the Taxpayers seek to challenge the legality of property taxes assessed against them in 1989, 1990, 1991, and 1992, but they did not initiate the present action until several years later, in July 1996. Whether the present or former version of
Indeed, in an attempt to circumvent this obstacle, the Taxpayers argue the statute‘s ninety-day limitations period should be tolled in the present case. First, the Taxpayers contend the Department, in collecting and holding their tax money, acted as their fiduciary, thereby tolling the statute of limitations until they received actual knowledge of their right to bring this action. In a related argument, the Taxpayers next assert the limitations period should be tolled because their alleged fiduciary, the Department, failed to notify them of the Barron, Sheehy, and Woith decisions, or to explain the impact of those decisions. Accordingly, they assert the statute of limitations should be tolled until they acquired actual knowledge of their right to bring the present action.
The Taxpayers first argue the Department is their fiduciary, and the statute of limitations codified at
In its order dismissing the Taxpayers’ complaint, the District Court concluded the Department does not act as a fiduciary of Montana‘s taxpayers and, therefore, held the ninety-day statute of limitations codified at
For example, the Taxpayers cite to Usibelli Coal Mine v. State of Alaska (Alaska 1996), 921 P.2d 1134, in which a coal lessee appealed a ruling by the Department of Natural Resources that the lessee owed back royalties to the state under noncompetitive coal leases. Usibelli, 921 P.2d at 1138-39. Once in its statement of facts, and once in a subsequent footnote, the court notes that Alaska‘s Attorney General advised the Department of Natural Resources that, “pursuant to the state‘s fiduciary responsibility under” a “Mental Health Settlement,” it could not forgive certain back royalties owed. Usibelli, 921 P.2d at 1141 and 1150. In Usibelli, the court‘s passing reference to a fiduciary responsibility arising from an apparent “Mental Health Settlement” simply does not stand for the Taxpayers’ proposition that the Department in this case, in collecting and holding real property taxes, was acting as a fiduciary or trustee of Montana‘s taxpayers.
Having reviewed the cases cited by the Taxpayers, but without embarking on an exhaustive discussion of each one, we conclude that neither Usibelli nor any of the remaining cases relied upon by the Taxpayers offers compelling authority establishing a trust relationship between the State and its taxpayers. Rather, these cases differ substantially from the present case and involve discussion of such varying topics as special improvement districts, municipal bonds, and statutorily prescribed fiduciary duties. See, i.e., In re City of Columbia Falls (Bankr. D. Mont. 1992), 143 B.R. 750, 762 (recognizing special improvement district funds are trust funds); State ex rel. Clark v. Bailey (1935), 99 Mont. 484, 497, 44 P.2d 740, 744 (holding “fund derived from a special levy or one created for a specific purpose is in
Further, as the District Court recognized, the Department may assume an adversarial role against individual taxpayers, contravening the notion that it acts as their fiduciary agent. See, i.e.,
Concomitant with the Taxpayers’ assertion that the Department is their fiduciary is their contention that the Department failed to fulfill the obligations of that alleged fiduciary relationship by failing to notify them of the Barron, Sheehy, and Woith decisions or to explain any potential impact those decisions might have had on the Taxpayers’ rights. Accordingly, the Taxpayers contend, the statute of limitations should be tolled until they acquired actual knowledge of their right to bring the present action. In light of our holding that the Department is not in a fiduciary relationship with the taxpayers, we need not address the second prong of the Taxpayers’ argument to the extent it presupposes the existence of such a fiduciary relationship.
To the extent the Taxpayers assert the statute of limitations should be tolled until they acquired actual knowledge of their claim, regardless of any fiduciary relationship, their argument similarly fails. The general rule in Montana is that the statute of limitations begins to run when a party‘s claim accrues.
For the purposes of statutes relating to the time within which an action must be commenced:
(a) a claim or cause of action accrues when all elements of the claim or cause exist or have occurred, the right to maintain an action on the claim or cause is complete, and a court or other agency is authorized to accept jurisdiction of the action;
(b) an action is commenced when the complaint is filed.
Thus, even construing the complaint in the light most favorable to the Taxpayers, and taking as true all allegations of fact, we hold the District Court did not err in concluding the statute of limitations included in
B. Declaratory judgment pursuant to § 27-8-101, MCA .
The Taxpayers additionally seek a declaratory judgment pursuant to the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act, codified at
In its December 6, 1996, order, the District Court granted the Department‘s motion, concluding that neither this Court‘s decision in Woith v. Cascade County Treasurer (1993), 262 Mont. 170, 864 P.2d 752, nor the statutory framework of
The Taxpayers argue that this Court‘s decision in Woith authorizes them to proceed pursuant to
As noted above,
Although
Based on the foregoing, we hold the District Court did not err in concluding Woith did not authorize the taxpayers to proceed independently under
C. Declaratory judgment pursuant to § 15-2-307, MCA .
The Taxpayers additionally attempt to bring this action for declaratory judgment pursuant to
The remedy directed by the district court may apply only to taxes imposed during or after the year the rule or procedure is challenged. The remedy may not apply to the application or implementation of the rule or procedure as it applies to taxes imposed in years prior to the challenge under
15-2-307 .
D. Declaratory judgment pursuant to § 2-4-506, MCA .
Finally, the Taxpayers bring their amended complaint pursuant to
A rule may be declared invalid or inapplicable in an action for declaratory judgment if it is found that the rule or its threatened application interferes with or impairs or threatens to interfere with or impair the legal rights or privileges of the plaintiff.
Upon consideration of the Department‘s motion to dismiss, and following evaluation of the Taxpayers’ complaint, the District Court noted that the Taxpayers refer to administrative rules only three times in their complaint, and “at no time do [they] contend that any of the aforementioned rules are invalid or inapplicable.” Instead, the court observed, “the reference to the aforementioned administrative rules seems to be nothing more than a passing reference.”
Following review of the record, we similarly conclude that neither the facts nor the allegations contained in the Taxpayers’ first amended complaint provide a basis for application of this statute. Accordingly, we hold the District Court did not err in dismissing their complaint insofar as it was premised on
E. Class certification.
The Taxpayers additionally seek to bring this suit as a class action, and accordingly request class certification. Having held, however, that the District Court did not err in dismissing the Taxpayers’ complaint, we need not address the question of whether the Taxpayers are entitled to certification as a class.
Based on the foregoing, we hold the District Court did not err in granting the Department‘s motion to dismiss on the basis that the Taxpayers’ claims were either barred by the applicable statutes of limitations, or otherwise deficient as a matter of law.
CHIEF JUSTICE TURNAGE, JUSTICES GRAY, HUNT and TRIEWEILER concur.