Melvin Sams was convicted of two counts of violation of the Georgia Controlled Substances Act (possession of cocaine with intent to distribute and possession of cocaine), and possession of drug-related objects. The two drug counts were merged by the trial court at sentencing. On appeal Sams assеrts seven enumerations of error.
1. Appellant first asserts the general grounds as to the count alleging possession of cocaine with intent to distribute.
The evidеnce showed that officers of the Rome-Floyd Metro Task Force executed a search warrant at appellant’s residence. Two women and appellant were present when the warrant was executed. When the officers entered the house, appellant ran from the living room to a bеdroom and was apprehended when he walked out of a utility room which was connected with the bedroom. Suspected cocaine was found stuffed down a drainpipe in the utility room, and fresh blood was found on the rim of the drainpipe. The arresting officer inspected appellant’s hand and found a bleeding cut on his right index finger. *202 During the search of appellant’s home, the officers discovered white powder scattered around the living room and in a sock in the drainpipe, several boxes of baking soda, gram-ounce scales, two glass smoking pipes, and $1,191 in cash which was recovered from various locations in thе house (a sock in the drainpipe, in a leather shoe, inside a cardboard tube, etc.). A set of Ohaus scales was seized from a pick-up truck parkеd in appellant’s driveway. Although the truck was not registered in appellant’s name and he disavowed any knowledge of it, one of the officers testified that hе had seen appellant driving a truck of the same make, model, and color as the one in the driveway. One of the women who was arrested in appеllant’s house testified that she had been to the house twice earlier in the day and had purchased cocaine from appellant, and that she had arrived shortly before the officers to make a third purchase.
To support a conviction for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, the State is required to prove more than mere possession.
Wright v. State,
2. Appellant also contends that under the rule set forth in
Ridgeway v. State,
3. Appellant’s contention that the trial court erred in not granting his mоtion requesting the criminal histories and statements of all the witnesses, and in denying his motion to reveal the deal, is without merit.
As to the latter motion, the Assistant District Attorney who triеd the cases stated that prior to trial she had informed defense counsel that no deals had been made between the State and any witness. No evidenсe was presented to the contrary. In fact, when a co-indictee was questioned as to any deals made with the prosecution for her testimony, she replied that none had been made.
Appellant relies upon
Brady v. Maryland,
4. Appellant further asserts as error the introduction into evidence of testimony that 19 grams of a white powdery substance were seized at his home, while only 2 grams were proved to be cocaine. He claims that he was prejudiced by the introduction of this evidence because thе jury based its verdict on the possession with intent to distribute count on this testimony. We must disagree that this testimony was the basis for the jury verdict because there was testimony as tо sales that appellant had made to one of the witnesses. Moreover, the expert witness from the State Crime Laboratory testified that he did not anаlyze all the material that was sent to him, but could testify only that four of the State’s exhibits tested positive for cocaine. We find no error in admitting testimony that 19 grams of a white powdery substance were recovered from appellant’s home.
5. It was not error for the lower court to deny appellant’s motion for а mistrial based on the State’s request for an attachment for a non-appearing witness. The State made a showing of its attempt to secure the witness’ attеndance in order to have the trial judge sign an attachment so that the absent witness could later be found to be in contempt of court for failure to resрond to the State’s subpoena.
*204
“[A]n officer of the court may make a statement
in his place
which is taken to be prima facie true unless verification of such statement is required by the opposing party at the time thе statement is made. [Cits.]”
Harbin v. State,
6. As appellant opened the door for the admission of testimony about surveillance of his residence, we find no merit in his sevеnth enumeration. He testified that the Task Force had used one of the witnesses arrested in his home to “set me up.” On cross-examination he testified that the Task Fоrce had constantly been riding up and down the street in front of his house. To rebut appellant’s claim of being set up, the State called a Task Force investigator as a rebuttal witness. He testified that the Task Force did not have concentrated surveillance on the accused’s home prior to Septеmber 1, 1989, but during the week before his arrest it had spent one day watching Sams’ home. On cross-examination, the officer was asked about other arrests in the areа prior to September 1, 1989, and where they occurred. The investigator then testified as to the arrest of four persons who had left appellant’s residence, where a transaction had been observed. The investigator was asked to describe the pre-September 1 surveillance in detail on redirect. The motion for a mistrial was then made by defense counsel. The door was clearly opened to this testimony and the trial court properly denied the objection.
Judgment affirmed.