26 S.E. 170 | N.C. | 1896
The complaint alleges that the defendants are indebted to the plaintiff for lumber sold in the sum of $401.54, which is denied in the answer. On the trial it was in evidence for plaintiff that other persons, not parties to this action, were indebted to the plaintiff for $401.54 for advances furnished in the lumber business, and that (573) they sold the lumber to the defendants, the plaintiff not being the owner and having no lien thereon. There was evidence, admitted over defendants' objection, that after such purchase, the defendants promised to pay out of the purchase-money this debt of the vendor to the plaintiff, but the judge having charged the jury that this, being a promise to pay a debt of another and not being in writing, it would be within the Statute of Frauds and not binding on the defendants, we need not consider it. If there was error it was harmless to the defendants. It was, however, further in evidence over defendants' objections that at the time of the contract of sale of the lumber to the defendants, which was in writing, they further agreed verbally (Nissen v.Mining Company,
The interesting question whether a stranger to a contract for his benefit can maintain an action on it has been diversely decided in other jurisdictions (3 A. E. Enc., 863 and notes), but as stated in Haun v.Burrell, ante 544, it has not been — directly, at least — passed upon in this State. The exception, however, that the evidence and charge did not apply to the issues raised by the pleadings is well taken. The plaintiff sued upon a sale of lumber by him to the defendants. If the complaint is so worded that under the liberal procedure of The Code it could (574) have been construed to be either an action or an express or implied contract (Stokes v. Taylor,
ERROR.
Cited: Beach v. R. R.,
(575)