MEMORANDUM
Presently before the Court is Defendants Methacton School District, Timothy Quinn, Robert Harney, and Judith Lan-dis’s Motion for Summary Judgment. (ECF No. 20.) For the following reasons, Defendants’ Motion will be granted.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Procedural History
Plaintiff filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) for disability discrimination on June 7, 2010. (Second Am. Compl. (“Compl”) ¶ 33, ECF No. 9.) Plaintiff received a Right to Sue letter from the EEOC on April 26, 2011. (Id.) Plaintiff filed her first Complaint on July 19, 2011. (ECF No. 1.) On September 16, 2011, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint. (ECF No. 5.) Plaintiff filed a Second Amended Complaint on October 5, 2011. (See Compl.) On October 18, 2011, Defendants filed an Answer to Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint. (Answer, ECF No. 10.) Defendants jointly filed the present Motion for Summary Judgment on September 17, 2012. (Defs.’ Mot., ECF No. 20.) On November 19, 2012, Plaintiff filed a response to Defendants’ Motion. (Pl.’s Resp., ECF No. 23.) Defendants filed a reply on November 30, 2012. (Defs.’ Reply, ECF No. 30.)
In this employment discrimination suit, Plaintiff Lana Sampson brings four claims against Defendant Methacton School District (“Methacton”) and one claim against-Defendants Dr. Timothy Quinn, Robert Harney, and Judith Landis. Plaintiff alleges that Methacton discriminated against her based on her disability, in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. (Count I), unfairly demoted her, denied her a promotion, suspended her, and forced her to resign for exercising her rights under the Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”), 29 U.S.C. § 2601 (Count II), retaliated against her for filing a complaint with the EEOC, in violation of the ADA (Count .III), and created a hostile work environment in retaliation for filing a complaint with the EEOC, in violation of the ADA
B. Factual History
At all relevant times, Plaintiff, Lena Sampson, resided in Williamstown, New Jersey. (Sampson Dep. 10, Defs.’ Mot. Ex. 1.) Sampson has a bachelor’s degree in health and physical education and a master’s degree in education administration. (Id. at 19.) Defendant Methacton is a School District located in Pennsylvania. (Compl. ¶ 7.) Defendant Dr. Timothy Quinn was the Superintendent of Methac-ton during the relevant times. (Defs.’ Mot. 1.) Beginning in June of 2008, Defendant Robert Haney was the Human Resources Director at Methacton. (Id.) Beginning in June of 2007, Defendant Judith Landis was the Principal of Methacton High School. (Id. at. 2.)
1. Plaintiff’s Hiring
In October of 2006, Plaintiff was interviewed by Dr. Jeff Miller, then Superintendent of Methacton, Fred Cummings, then Principal at Methacton High School, and Dr. William Kirk, Human Resources Director at the time. She was subsequently hired as the Assistant Principal at Methacton High School. (Sampson Dep. 23-25.) During the 2006-2007 school year, Plaintiff worked with Landis, who was also an Assistant Principal at Methacton. (Landis Dep. 12, Defs.’ Mot. Ex. 42.) At the end of the 2006-2007 school year, Lan-dis became the Principal of Methacton High School. (Landis Dep. 27.) On August 27, 2007, Plaintiff had a meeting with Landis and Cummings at which time the issue of Plaintiffs timeliness in arriving to work was discussed. (Sampson Dep. 40-41.) In conjunction with this meeting, Landis drafted a memorandum memorializing the meeting and the issues discussed. (August 2007 Mem., Defs.’ Mot. Ex. 2.) Landis’s letter outlined directives for Plaintiff to follow to verify her arrival time. (Id.) This was the only such meeting when Plaintiff was initially employed as Assistant Principal at Methacton High School. (Pl.’s Resp. 16.) Until February of 2008, Plaintiff satisfied Landis’s expectations as set forth at the August 27, 2007 meeting. (Landis Dep. 68.)
2. Plaintiff’s Tenure at Areola
In February of 2008, School District Human Resources Director Larry Feeley transferred Plaintiff to Areola Intermediate School (“Areola”) to be the Assistant Principal to replace the former Assistant Principal, Don Bontempo. (Sampson Dep. 27; Landis Dep. 90-91.) In April 25, 2008, Dr. Mary Anne DelCollo, then the Principal at Areola, conducted an Administrator Appraisal for Plaintiff. (April 2008 Admin. Appraisal, Defs.’ Mot. Ex. 3.) The Appraisal reflected ratings that entirely met or exceeded expectations with an overall rating of “Meets Expectations.” (Id.) Dr. DelCollo’s comments reflected that Plaintiff had “successfully transitioned to Areo-la,” and that DelCollo hoped Plaintiffs attendance would improve. (Id.; Defs.’ Mot.
On January 21, 2009, Superintendent Quinn appointed Plaintiff to the position of Acting Principal of Areola for twelve weeks, effective February 2, 2009, while Dr. DelCocco was on medical leave. (Sampson Dep. 74; January 21, 2009 Letter, Defs.’ Mot. Ex. 5.) As Acting Principal of Areola, Plaintiff received an additional $1,000 per month in compensation. (Sampson Dep. 74-75.) The position was temporary and Quinn informed Plaintiff that there would be a procedure in place for selecting a permanent principal, if necessary. (Id. at 75; Quinn Dep. 21.) In light of Dr. DelCocco’s need for additional time off from work, Methacton approved an extension of Plaintiff’s temporary status as Acting Principal at Areola for the 2009-2010 school year. (Sampson Dep. 76; July 22, 2009 Letter, Defs.’ Mot. Ex. 6.) As part of this temporary status extension, Plaintiff received an additional $1,050 per month in compensation. (Sampson Dep. 76.)
S. Plaintiff’s Knee Injury
Starting in August of 2009, an injury to Plaintiffs knee caused her to walk with a limp. (Id. at 63.) The injury caused pain and swelling. (Id. at 38.) In September of 2009, Quinn came into Plaintiffs office as part of a weekly visit and saw her limping to her file cabinet. (Id. at Dep. 66-67.) Quinn asked Plaintiff about her knee and she responded that it was swollen and hurting her. (Id. at 67.) Plaintiff did not recall Quinn saying anything else about her knee. (Id.) Quinn did not inquire, and Plaintiff did not volunteer, as to how Plaintiff was injured or about the severity of Plaintiffs injury. (Id.) In November of 2009, Plaintiff was not able to walk around the building and fulfill her duties at Acting Principal at Areola. (Id. at 77.) Between August of 2009 and February of 2010, Plaintiff performed her job duties at Acting Principal at Areola to the best of her ability. (Id. at 65.)
On November 4, 2009, Quinn wrote a letter to Plaintiff to follow-up a previous meeting. (November 4, 2009 Letter, Defs.’ Mot. Ex. 7.) At the meeting, Quinn told Plaintiff that handouts that she had used at a separate meeting were “garbage.” (Sampson Dep. 107.) In the letter that Quinn sent to Plaintiff, Quinn referenced a dozen statements made by Plaintiff at that separate meeting that “deeply eoncern[ed]” him. (November 4, 2009 Letter.) Quinn characterized Plaintiffs attitude and offensive responses as “insubordinate and unprofessional.” (Id.)
Plaintiff visited her doctor, Dr. Charles Sharkey, on February 9, 2010. (Sampson Dep. 64.) Dr. Sharkey diagnosed Plaintiff with a tear of her meniscus. (Id. at 38-40.) On March 4, 2010, Plaintiff requested to leave work early so that she could attend a medical appointment. (Id. at 100; March 4-5, 2010 E-mails, Defs.’ Mot. Ex. 11.) In response to Plaintiffs request to attend the appointment, Quinn wrote: ‘Tes. Good luck!” (Id.) Two days later, Plaintiff took a leave of absence pursuant to the School District’s employee policy and went on short-term disability in order to have surgery performed on her knee. (Sampson Dep. 86-87.) On March 8, 2010, Plaintiff had surgery on her knee. (Id. at 71.) On March 10, 2010, Plaintiff informed Quinn, Human Resources Director, Robert Harney, and Jane Martin that her surgery had gone well, that she had a follow-up doctor’s appointment on Friday, March 19, 2010, and that she planned to come back to work on Monday, March 21, 2010 “limp-free.” (March 10, 2010 E-mails, Defs.’ Mot. Ex. 12.) Quinn responded to Plaintiff, writing: “I am glad that everything went
That same day, at Plaintiffs follow-up doctor’s appointment, her doctor discovered scar tissue on her knee and gave her a prescription to be out of work for another four to six weeks. (Sampson Dep. 104.) Plaintiff did not communicate this update to Quinn until the Monday, March 21st meeting with Quinn. (Id. at 104-05.) Plaintiff attended the meeting with Quinn, while on crutches, rather than 'contact him beforehand to inform him of her doctor’s new prescription for additional time off “because [she] was fearful of the behavior that [Quinn] was displaying prior to [her] • leave.... ” (Id. at 104.) During the meeting, Quinn was pleasant and professional, but seemed upset that Plaintiff had not previously contacted him about her return. (Id. at 113.) Quinn accepted Plaintiffs prescription and said he would forward it to the Human Resources Director and extend Plaintiffs leave with an indication that they would stay in touch. (Id. at 112-13.) Prior to taking leave, Plaintiff filled out paperwork provided to her by Harney, but did not complete paperwork with respect to the FMLA. (Id. at 89-90.) Plaintiff wals familiar with Methacton’s policies and procedures, in particular, with the Family and Medical Leave Policy. (Id. at 90.) Plaintiff went on leave and received compensation commensurate to her position at the time. (Id. at 88; Pl.’s Resp. 6.)
A Interviews For Permanent Principal Position at Areola
While Plaintiff was on medical leave, Areola began the process of interviewing candidates for the position of Principal at Areola. (Sampson Dep. 91.) Plaintiff was given an interview for the position. (Id.) Her interview lasted approximately thirty-five minutes, during which she was asked the same questions asked of every interviewee. (Id. at 92-93; Harney Dep. 32.) During Plaintiffs interview, the interviewers took notes, seemed engaged in the interview, and never discussed Plaintiffs knee. (Sampson Dep. 93.) After the.interview, the interviewers did not discuss Plaintiffs knee. (Landis Dep. 98.)
Seventeen candidates interviewed for the position of Principal at Areola on May 4, 2010 and May 11, 2010. (Principal Interviews Candidate Scores, Defs.’ Mot. Ex. 49.) Methacton ranked each candidate who had interviewed for the Principal position at Areola. (Id.; Landis Dep. 96-98.) Based on the composite scores of the first round interviews, Plaintiff had a cumulative score of 59.64%, which was approximately 34% lower than the top-rated interviewee and was the worst score by a wide margin. (Principal Interviews Candidate Scores.) Only four interviewees from the first-round were selected for second round interviews, which took place on May 18, 2010. (Id.)
' On May 17, 2010, while still on medical leave, Plaintiff was examined by Dr. Robert Ponzio, her orthopedic doctor. (Sampson Dep. 134; May 17, 2010 Letter, Defs.’ Mot. Ex. 16.) Plaintiff had suffered- a setback after spraining her surgically repaired knee during a confrontation with a dog, and Dr. Ponzio recommended that
On May 21, 2010, Harney mailed a letter to Plaintiff indicating her designation was being changed to Assistant Principal in light of her disability status, which inhibited her ability to perform the duties required of the Acting Principal. (May 21, 2010 Letter, Defs.’ Mot. Ex. 18.) Plaintiff agreed that she could not perform the duties required of an Acting Principal at the time. (Sampson Dep. 136-37.) However, there is no indication that this was a permanent situation.
On May 28, 2010, Quinn prepared a Confidential Memorandum as part of his Weekly Report to the Board of School Directors. The Memorandum informed the Board members that Lucretia (“Lu”) Page had been selected as the new Areola Principal. (Confidential Mem., Defs.’ Mot. Ex. 19.) Within that Confidential Memorandum, Quinn described three highly confidential administrative transfers, including John Smink from Assistant Principal at Areola to the same position at Skyview Upper Elementary School, Ryan Creeden, Assistant Principal at Methacton High School to the same position at Areola, and Plaintiff, from Assistant Principal at Areo-la to the same position at Methacton High School. (Id.) Quinn made these transfers pursuant to District Policy 309 (“Assignment and Transfer”) to avoid having Page work at Areola with people against whom she competed for the position as Principal. (Quinn Dep. 93-94; see also District Policy 309, Defs.’ Mot. Ex. 22.) As part of her transfer to Methacton High School in the same capacity (Assistant Principal), Plaintiffs compensation was unchanged. (Har-ney Dep. 47-48.)
On June 7, 2010, Quinn called Plaintiff to inform her that she was being transferred from Areola back to Methacton High School as Assistant Principal. (Sampson Dep. 140-41; June 7, 2010 E-mail, Defs.’ Mot. 20.) That same day, Plaintiff filed a Charge of Discrimination with the EEOC, alleging discrimination by Methacton on the basis of a disability. (Sampson Dep. 142; EEOC Complaint, Defs.’ Mot. Ex. 21.) Methacton learned that Plaintiffs EEOC charges were pending on June 9, 2010. (Harney Dep. 42.) In July of 2010, Methacton learned that Plaintiff was alleging retaliation against Methacton. (Id. at 44-45.)
5. Assistant Principal at Methacton High School
As Assistant Principal at Methacton' High School, Plaintiff reported to Judith Landis, Principal at Methacton High School. (Sampson Dep. 150-52; Job Description, Defs.’ Mot. Ex. 23.) In her role as Assistant Principal, Plaintiff was expected to arrive at school at 7:00 a.m. to, among other things, go to her office, check in her with secretary and confer with her about her day’s agenda, organize and check in on substitute teachers, and answer questions from students and staff. (Sampson Dep. 52-53; Landis Dep. 239-40, 276; September 2010 E-mails, Defs.’ Mot. Ex. 24.) On September 20, 2010, Landis addressed issues related to Plaintiffs attendance and lateness in arriving for work. Landis spoke with Harney and Quinn about Plaintiffs lateness becoming an issue and they advised her that they could not take action unless Landis could show them documentation on the issue. (Landis Dep. 112.) On or around October 20, 2010, Landis began to keep a personal file on Plaintiffs late arrivals. (Landis Log, Defs.’ Mot. Ex. 44.) Landis claims that she opened this file because secretaries at Methacton High School told her that
On November 16, 2010, Landis contacted Plaintiff by e-mail noting that she had not arrived on time and reiterated the need for Plaintiff to be at school by 7:00 a.m. (Sampson Dep. 162-63; Nov. 16, 2010 E-mail, Defs.’ Mot. Ex. 25.) On February 8, 2011, Landis and Harney met with Plaintiff. (Meeting Notes, Defs.’ Mot. Ex. 26.) At the meeting, Plaintiff did not deny being late on a number of occasions. (Id.) Plaintiff also indicated that the meeting and scrutiny she was enduring felt like retaliation and that Landis and Harney were creating a hostile work environment for her. (Sampson Dep. 382-83.) Plaintiff informed Landis and Harney that the meeting made her stressed and indicated that she would be absent from work the following day because of the stress. (Id. at 383.) That same day, Plaintiff sent Harney a letter reflecting her view that’ she was enduring a hostile work environment. (Feb. 8, 2011 Letter, Defs.’ Mot. Ex. 27.) Two days later, on February 10, 2011, Harney wrote a letter to Plaintiff and requested that she provide him with the names, dates, and events that formed the basis of her belief that she was dealing with retaliation and a hostile work environment. (Feb. 10, 2011 Letter, Defs.’ Mot. Ex. 28.) Plaintiff did not provide Harney with any information, verbal or written, so that he could investigate her claim of a hostile working environment. (Sampson Dep. 172-74.) Plaintiff expected Harney to follow-up on her claim, but she never followed up with him about it. (Id. at 174-75.)
On March 3, 2011, Plaintiff became extremely ill with a stomach virus and could not attend work. (Id. at 180.) Plaintiff was too ill to call the school, so she directed her husband to do so. (Id.) Landis did not receive a call from Plaintiffs husband and she e-mailed Plaintiff to reiterate that Plaintiff should contact Landis directly when she was to be late or absent from work. (Mar. 7, 2011 E-mail, Defs.’ Mot. Ex. 29.) Plaintiff had been out of the building for half of the day on March 3, 2011 and no one at Methacton High School knew where she was. (Id.) Plaintiff did follow Landis’s request to contact her to inform Landis of her absence on Friday, March 4, 2011, and her late arrival on Monday, March 7, 2011. (Id.)
On March 9, 2011, Landis and Harney had another meeting with Plaintiff. (March 10, 2011 Letter, Defs.’ Mot. Ex. 30.) The next day, Quinn suspended Plaintiff for one day without pay for failing to communicate with anyone from Methac-ton regarding her absence on March 3, 2011, and for once again arriving late to work on March 7, 2011. (Suspension Letter, Defs.’ Mot. Ex. 31.) On March 15, 2011, Quinn sent Plaintiff a letter memorializing a March 14, 2011 meeting, at which Quinn and Harney explained the imposition of the suspension and reiterated their requests for Plaintiff to get approval for absences and to arrive at work in a timely manner. (March 15, 2011 Letter, Defs.’ Mot. Ex. 32.) It was not until March of 2011 that Plaintiff was disciplined for her lateness and absences. (Sampson Dep. 184.)
On May 5, 2011, Landis sent a letter to Plaintiff alleging that on May 3 and May 4, 2011, Plaintiff arrived late to work without contacting Landis, which was contrary to the guidance provided to Plaintiff in person on February 8, 2011 and March 7,
On May 31, 2011, Landis instructed Plaintiff that she was not to enter the school complex through the west wing, check in with Landis, and then drive out of the complex and reenter through the east wing. (Landis Dep. 279-81; June 15, 2011 E-mails, Defs.’ Mot. Ex. 36.) Landis wanted Plaintiff to be on duty at 7:00 a.m. rather than stopping in and returning to her car to drive around the complex. (Landis Dep. 280.) Landis felt that she and Plaintiff “had a very difficult time communicating to one another....” (Lan-dis Dep. 227-29.)
On June 16, 2011, Plaintiff was suspended for five days without pay. (Sampson Dep. 194-96; June 16, 2011 Letter, Defs.’ Mot. Ex. 37.) The letter informing Plaintiff of this suspension cited her continuing lateness, her failure to follow instructions regarding entrance into the school complex, and other deficiencies in Plaintiffs performance. (June 16, 2011 Letter.) Specifically, Quinn indicated that Plaintiff was late on June 9, June 14, and June 15, 2011. {Id.) Landis’s log indicated that Plaintiff was five minutes late on June 9, 2011 and June 14, 2011, and was seven minutes late on June 15, 2011. (Landis Log.) Quinn informed Plaintiff that “[t]his letter represents a last chance for you to correct your behavior.” (June 16, 2011 Letter.)
On June 27, 2011, Landis informed Plaintiff that she was to arrive at the administrative retreat scheduled for June 29, 2011 at 8:00 a.m. (Landis Dep. 290-91.) On June 29, 2011, Plaintiff went to the high school first, thinking that the administrative employees would meet there and car pool to the retreat together. (Sampson Dep. 197-98.) She then got lost on her way to the retreat, called Methacton’s communications director, Angela Linch, at 7:15 a.m., and Landis when she was near the retreat. She finally arrived at the administrative retreat at 8:30 a.m. (Sampson Dep. 196-98; June 29, 2011 Letter, Defs.’ Mot. 38.)
6. Termination of Plaintiff''s Employment
At her July 7, 2011 evaluation, Plaintiff was presented with the option of resigning. (July 7, 2011 Meeting Notes, Defs.’ Mot. Ex. 39.) That same day, Plaintiff received
On August 23, 2011, the Methacton School Board voted to dismiss Plaintiff from her employment with Methacton. (Sampson Dep. 207-09; August 24, 2011 Letter, PL’s Resp. Ex. O.) Over the course of the 2010-2011- school year, Landis logged twenty-three occasions on which' Plaintiff was late for work. (Landis Log.) Plaintiff contends she was only late on five occasions. (Sampson Dep. 161.) Plaintiff did not maintain records or documentation with regard to her arrival time at work. (Id.)
II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
Defendants request that the Court enter summary judgment on all of Plaintiffs claims. A party is entitled to summary judgment “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
III. DISCUSSION
A. Violation of the ADA (Count I)
In assessing claims of discrimination on the basis of a disability, courts apply the burden-shifting analysis set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,
1. Prima Facie Case of Discrimination
To establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the ADA, Plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) that she is a disabled person within the meaning of the ADA; (2) that she is otherwise qualified to perform the essential functions of her job with or without reasonable accommodation; and (3) that she has suffered an adverse employment action that was the result of discrimination. Taylor v. Phoenixville School Dist.,
i. Disabled Person Under the ADA
A “disability” is defined as: “(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of [an] individual; (B) a record of such impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1). The ADA provides a list of what constitutes a “major life activity,” which includes, but is not limited to: “caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, seeing, hearing, eating, sleeping, walking, standing, lifting, bending, speaking, breathing, learning, reading, concentrating, thinking, communicating, and working.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2). According to the EEOC:
[t]he primary object of attention in cases brought under the ADA should be whether covered entities have complied with their obligations and whether discrimination has occurred, not whether an individual’s impairment substantially limits a major life activity. Accordingly, the threshold issue of whether an impairment “substantially limits” a major life activity should not demand extensive analysis.
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(l)(iii). An impairment “substantially limits” an individual if they are unable “to perform a major life activity as compared to most people in the general population. An impairment need not present, or significantly or severely restrict, the individual from performing a' major life activity in order to be considered substantially limiting.” 29 'C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(l)(ii). “The determination of whether an individual is substantially limited in a major life activity must be made on a case by case basis.” Albertson’s, Inc. v. Kirkingburg,
Methacton contends that Plaintiffs condition was a temporary, non-chronic impairment, which is not a disability under the ADA. “[A] temporary, non-chronic impairment of short duration is not a disability covered by the ADA.” Rinehimer v. Cemcolift, Inc.,
As discussed above, “not every impairment will constitute a ‘disability.’ ” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(l)(ii). As the Fourth Circuit observed:
Applying the protections of the ADA to temporary impairments ... would work a significant expansion of the Act. The ADA simply was not designed to protect the public from all adverse effects of ill-health and misfortune. Rather, the ADA was designed to assure [] that truly disabled, but genuinely capable, individuals will not face discrimination in employment because of stereotypes about the insurmountability of their handicaps. Extending the statutory protections available under the ADA to individuals with broken bones, sprained joints, sore muscles, infectious diseases, or other ailments that temporarily limit an individual’s ability to work would trivialize this lofty objective.
Halperin v. Abacus Tech. Corp.,
Methacton cites the ease of Smyth v. Wawa, Inc., No. 06-4474,
Plaintiff relies on the case of Tish v. Magee-Women’s Hospital of University of Pittsburgh Medical Center, No. 06-820,
Viewing the evidence in this case in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, we are compelled to conclude that Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that the injury to her knee was a permanent, long term condition that substantially impaired a major life activity. In August of 2009, Plaintiff injured her knee. She experienced swelling and discomfort when walking. By November of 2009, Plaintiff was having difficulty walking around the building and fulfilling her duties as Acting Principal at Areola. Between August of 2009 and February of 2010, Plaintiff performed her job duties as Acting Principal at Areola to the best of her ability. On March 8, 2010, Plaintiff had surgery performed on her knee. As a result of the surgery and the development of scar tissue, Plaintiff missed the remainder of the school year. Following her time off and physical therapy, Plaintiff occasionally used a knee brace, and had difficulty standing, walking, and sitting for long periods of time without feeling discomfort. In Plaintiffs own words, “[a]t times I wear a brace still, but I can essentially do everything that I used to do before I was injured.” (Sampson Dep. 94.) Moderate difficulties in walking or climbing stairs do not bring an individual within the class of persons protected by the ADA. See Kelly v. Drexel Univ.,
Nor has Plaintiff established a record of impairment. “Record-of-impairment claims protect individuals who suffer discriminatory action based upon a documented history of a disability, and a plaintiff relying upon a record of impairment must establish a history of a condition that substantially limits a major life activity.” Adams v. Pennsylvania, No. 06-2154,
As discussed above, Plaintiffs injury was limited in duration and impact. Plaintiff experienced pain and swelling for approximately six months. She then missed four or five months due to surgery and recuperation. The collateral effects of Plaintiffs knee injury, including occasional use of a knee brace, difficulty standing, walking, and sitting for long periods of time without feeling discomfort, do not rise to the level of substantial limitations or major life, activities. See Dawley v. Erie Indem. Co.,
Plaintiff has also failed to establish that Methacton regarded her as disabled' under the ADA. To do so, a plaintiff must establish that an employer “misinterpret[ed] information about an employee’s limitations to conclude that the employee [was] incapable of performing a wide range of jobs.” Taylor,
Plaintiff contends that she was initially demoted from her position as Acting Principal at Areola to Assistant Principal at Areola while on medical leave because of her disability. Plaintiff highlights the May 21, 2010 letter drafted by Harney, which reads .that because of her “disability status,” she would be demoted. Plaintiff contends that a reasonable trier of fact could conclude that the use of the term “disability status” could refer to Plaintiffs physical condition, rather than how she was being compensated. (Pl.’s Resp. 14.) Other than this one reference to Plaintiffs “disability status,” -Plaintiff does not point to any other evidence to establish that Defendants considered her to be disabled as defined by the ADA. Rather, the record reflects that Defendants’ interaction with Plaintiff regarding her knee were few and far between and were supportive in nature. Plaintiff acknowledged that during her interview for the role of Principal at Areola, the subject of her knee never came up. The undisputed record also reflects that
Even if Methacton regarded Plaintiff as disabled, which does not appear to be the case, we conclude that Plaintiff has not created a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Methacton made its employment decisions on that basis.. Plaintiff repeatedly alleges that Quinn saw her limping during their weekly meeting in September of 2009, and that other unidentified employees had inquired about her injury until she took leave in March of 2010. Plaintiff alleges that her demotion from the role of Acting Principal at Areola to Assistant Principal was the result of her disability status. (Pl.’s Resp. 14.) She in no way, however, connects this action, or any other, to Methacton’s knowledge of her injury outside of unfounded speculation.
Accordingly, Plaintiff has not met her burden to establish that she was disabled under the ADA.
ii. Otherwise Qualified
Methacton does not contest that Plaintiff is otherwise qualified to perform the essential functions of her job with or without reasonable accommodation. We assume Plaintiff has satisfied this prong of establishing a prima facie case of ADA discrimination.
iii. Adverse Employment Action Resulting From Discrimination
Even if one were to conclude that Plaintiff had a disability and is otherwise qualified to perform the essential functions of her job, we conclude that a reasonable juror could not find that she suffered an adverse employment action resulting from discrimination. To meet this standard, Plaintiff “must show that [her] perceived disability was a ‘determinative factor’ ” in Methacton’s decisions to take adverse employment actions. Decker v. Alliant Technologies, LLC,
Plaintiff highlights several adverse employment actions that she believes were evidence of discrimination: (1) the November 4, 2009 letter written by Quinn; (2) Plaintiffs demotion from her role as Acting Principal to Assistant Principal at Ar-eola while on leave; (3) Plaintiff not being named Principal at Areola; (4) Plaintiff being transferred from Areola to Methac-ton High School; and (5) harassing e-mails and communications when Plaintiff was on medical leave. (Pl.’s Resp. 14.)
Methacton acknowledges that the decision to not hire Plaintiff as Principal at Areola and the suspensions and termination of Plaintiffs employment were adverse employment actions. Methacton argues that moving Plaintiff from the role of Acting Principal to Assistant Principal at Areola when she acknowledged that she could not fulfill the responsibilities of Acting Principal was not an adverse employment action. We agree. Even though as part of the position change, Plaintiffs status as an employee was altered and her compensation was reduced by approximately $1,050 per month, the change was temporary and it was with Plaintiffs agreement. As for Plaintiff being transferred from Areola to Methacton High School for the 2010-2011 school year, we agree with Methacton that this was not an adverse employment action. “It is well settled that a change in buildings or office conditions is not considered an adverse employment action, nor are a lateral transfer, or changes in title or reporting rela
Plaintiff asserts that the adverse employment actions were the result of her physical impairment. (Pl.’s Resp. 14.) The record does not support this assertion. The only connection Plaintiff alleges is temporal. (See Sampson Dep. 82 (“What I believe is that, once again, when Dr. Quinn had knowledge that I had surgery, that I had an injury, that he started treating me differently.”).) As discussed above, Plaintiffs allegations are pure speculation. The record contains no evidence that Methac-ton imposed adverse employment actions on Plaintiff because she had a torn meniscus, let alone that Plaintiffs injury was the “determinative factor” in the decisions to impose such employment actions. In fact, the evidence is to the contrary. Correspondence between Quinn and Plaintiff after her injury reflect concern and support for Plaintiff. (See March 4, 5 2010 E-mails; March 10, 2010 E-mails.) Harney similarly expressed support for Plaintiff in her recovery. (See March 14, 15 2010 Emails.) Moreover, it is undisputed that outside of requests for leave initiated by Plaintiff, Defendants did not address Plaintiffs knee injury apart from one brief interaction between Quinn and Plaintiff in September of 2009.
Plaintiff implicitly argues that Methac-ton treated its employees disparately, which would evidence pretextual discrimination against her. The record reflects unsubstantiated allegations regarding attendance and tardiness related to Assistant Principals Paul Spiewak and Karey Kochenour, and Spiewak’s secretary, Helen Leach. (Landis Dep. 75-76, 79.) The record also reflects that Diana Kernop, the Union President for Methacton teachers, witnessed a number of individuals regularly arrive late to work. (Kernop Dep. 6, 22, 23, 27, Pl.’s Resp. Ex. Q.) Moreover, Ker-nop did not recall anyone being disciplined for lateness. (Id. at 20.) However, Plaintiff acknowledged that she was unaware of how Methacton handled issues with other employees’ timeliness. (Sampson Dep. 186.) Methacton disputes Plaintiffs assertions that these employees were treated differently. Landis specifically recalls speaking to these individuals about their infrequent lateness, the situations being remedied, and being contacted when these individuals were to arrive late. (Landis Dep. 74-78.) Plaintiff has not established that Methacton treated other similarly situated employees differently, and has not established that the District’s legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for the adverse employment actions were more likely than not motivated by discrimination.
Accordingly, we are compelled to conclude that Plaintiff has failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination by Met-hacton on the basis of a disability. Notwithstanding Plaintiffs failure to establish a prima facie case we will assume for the purpose of argument that she did and will consider her claims under the remainder of the McDonnell Douglas framework.
2. Legitimate Non-Discriminatory Reason for Adverse Employment Action
An employer may rebut a plaintiffs prima facie case of discrimination under the ADA by producing evidence that adverse employment actions were taken
Methacton provides legitimate, nondiseriminatory reasons for each of the adverse employment actions taken in this case. Methacton contends: (1) that Plaintiff was changed from Acting Principal to Assistant Principal at Areola because she could no longer perform the essential functions of the job for the remainder of the school year; (2) that Plaintiff was not offered the position of Principal at Areola because she was not the most qualified candidate for the job; and (3) that Plaintiff was suspended on several occasions and her employment was ultimately terminated because she was persistently late for work and failed to adhere to the directives of her supervisors. (Defs.’ Mot. 19-20.)
Methacton has carried its burden in establishing that it had a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for each of the adverse employment actions Plaintiff experienced in this ease. See Stouch v. Tp. of Irvington,
3. Pretextual Justification for Adverse Employment Action
Plaintiff contends that Methacton’s proffered legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its decision to demote Plaintiff from Acting Principal to Assistant Principal at Areola was a pretext for discrimination. This is the adverse employment action that Plaintiff claims is applicable to her ADA disability discrimination claim.
In order to prove the employer’s explanation is pretextual, the plaintiff must cast [ ] sufficient doubt upon each of the legitimate reasons proffered by the defendant so that a factfinder could reasonably conclude that each reason was a fabrication ... or ... allow[ ] the fact-finder to infer that discrimination was more likely than not a motivating or determinative cause of the adverse employment action. A plaintiff who has made out a prima facie case may defeat a motion for summary judgment by either (i) discrediting the employer’s proffered reasons, either circumstantially or directly, or (ii) adducing evidence, whether circumstantial or direct, that discrimination was more likely than not a motivating or determinative cause of the adverse employment action.
Wishkin v. Potter,
Plaintiff has failed to direct us to any evidence that could reasonably support an inference of pretext. Instead, Plaintiff merely asserts that a reasonable trier of fact could find that Plaintiff was demoted because of her disability. (Pl.’s Resp. 15.) However “[a] plaintiffs personal belief that the real reason for the job action was discriminatory animus does not create a genuine issue of material fact.” Dellapenna v. Tredyffrin/Easttown Sch. Dist., No. 09-6110,
Plaintiff has failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that Defendants’ offered non-discriminatory reason for her demotion was pretextual and a justification for discrimination against Plaintiff. See Majewski v. Fischi,
B. FMLA (Count II)
Plaintiff alleges that Methacton unfairly demoted her, denied her promotions, suspended her, and forced her to resign for exercising her rights under the FMLA. Plaintiff does not assert an interference claim. See Conoshenti v. Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co.,
Methacton argues that Plaintiff should be foreclosed from seeking relief under the FMLA because she did not take leave pursuant to the Act. (Defs.’ Mot. 29.) Plaintiff responds that she was not required to expressly invoke the FMLA when taking leave for her surgery. (Pl.’s Resp. 18.) “When an eligible employee needs to take FMLA leave that was not foreseeable, ‘[t]he employee need not expressly assert rights under the FMLA or even mention the FMLA’; rather the employee need only notify the employer that leave is needed.” Conoshenti,
“To prove FMLA retaliation, an employee must show that his [or her] employer intentionally discriminated against him [or her] for exercising an FMLA right.” Martin v. Brevard Cnty. Sch.,
Since FMLA retaliation claims are subject to the same burden-shifting analysis as ADA claims, Mascioli v. Arby’s Restaurant Grp., Inc.,
Accordingly, there is no genuine issue of material fact with regard to Plaintiffs FMLA retaliation claim.
C. Retaliation (Count III)
Plaintiff maintains that Methacton retaliated against her for filing a complaint with the EEOC. “To establish a prima facie case of retaliation under the ADA, a plaintiff must show: (1) protected employee activity; (2) adverse action by the employer either after or contemporaneous with the employee’s protected activity; and (3) a causal connection between the employee’s protected activity and the employer’s adverse action.” Krouse,
Plaintiff does not argue and has failed to establish that there is a genuine issue of material fact with regard to whether Methacton retaliated against her for filing her EEOC complaint. As with Plaintiffs other claims, she has failed to make a prima facie case and Methacton has provided legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for the adverse employment actions Plaintiff suffered.
With regard to Plaintiff not being hired for the role of Principal at Areola, the record reflects that Plaintiff was given an interview for the position. Her interview lasted approximately thirty-five minutes, during which time she was asked the same questions asked of every interviewee. She was not asked about her knee or her EEOC complaint. There is no evidence that Plaintiffs EEOC complaint was a factor in the interview process. The evidence does reflect that seventeen candidates were interviewed for the position of Principal at Areola on May 4, 2010 and May 11, 2010, that they were ranked, and that Plaintiff had a cumulative score of 59.64%, which was approximately 34% lower than the top-rated interviewee and the worst score by a wide margin. Only four interviewees from the first-round were selected for second round interviews. Methacton’s reason for not appointing Plaintiff to the position of Principal at Areola was legitimate and non-discriminatory. Plaintiff asserts otherwise, but cannot point to anything in the record to support that assertion.
Methacton’s decision to suspend Plaintiff and later terminate her employment is also legitimized by the record. The record reflects evidence of numerous warnings to Plaintiff regarding her perpetual inability to arrive to work on time. Officials at Methacton first reminded Plaintiff that she needed to arrive on time at 7:00 a.m. on September 20, 2010. They then provided guidance to Plaintiff in person regarding her lateness on February 8, 2011 and March 7, 2011 and again by letters on February 10, 2011, March 15, 2011, May 5, 2011, May 13, 2011, and June 16, 2011. Over the course of the 2010-2011 school
Plaintiff has failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Methacton’s proffered justifications were pretextual. Accordingly, there is no genuine issue of material fact with regard to Plaintiffs ADA retaliation claim.
D. Hostile Work Environment (Count IV)
Plaintiff also contends that Methacton created a hostile work environment in retaliation for filing a complaint with the EEOC, in violation of the ADA. To establish a hostile work environment under the ADA, a plaintiff must show that
(1) [she] is a qualified individual with a disability under the ADA; (2)[she] was subject to unwelcome harassment; (3) the harassment was based on his disability or a request for an accommodation; (4) the harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of [her] employment and to create an abusive working environment; and (5) [her employer] knew or should have known of the harassment and failed to take prompt effective remedial action.
Hamera v. Cnty. of Berks,
Plaintiff argues that less than a month after she returned to work, “Landis colluded with Harney and Quinn to write down every time she heard from someone that Plaintiff arrived late to work.” (Pl.’s Resp. 16.) Plaintiff cites her reprimands, suspensions, and the eventual termination of her employment as evidence of the hostile work environment that she endured. (Id.) Plaintiff has not raised a genuine issue of material fact regarding a hostile work environment based on her physical impairment. At most, the record reflects that Methacton school officials vigorously policed Plaintiffs arrival time in the 2010-2011 school year. If a hostile environment
In addition, two days after Plaintiff sent Harney a letter reflecting her view that she was enduring a hostile work environment, Harney wrote a letter to Plaintiff and requested that she provide him with the names, dates, and events that formed the basis of her belief that she was dealing with retaliation and a hostile work environment. Plaintiff did not provide Harney with written information so that he could investigate her claim of a hostile working environment. Despite Plaintiffs expectations that Harney would follow-up on her claim, the record reflects that upon Har-ney requesting information, it was Plaintiff who failed to respond.
Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact regarding her claim that Methacton created a hostile work environment in violation of the ADA.
E. Aiding and Abetting (Count V)
Plaintiff also asserts that Defendants Timothy Quinn, Robert Harney, and Judith Landis aided and abetted Methacton’s discrimination and retaliation in violation of the ADA, FMLA, and the PHRA. As discussed above, there were no primary violations of the ADA or FMLA. Moreover, neither statute provides for aiding and abetting liability for individual employees. See Bernhard v. Brown & Brown of Lehigh Valley, Inc.,
Under the PHRA, it is unlawful for any person to compel, coerce, incite, aid, or abet a violation of the Act. 43 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 955(e). Section 955(e) permits a plaintiff to recover from individual employees who aid and abet violations of the PHRA. Id.; Dici v. Com. of Pennsylvania,
Accordingly, Plaintiffs claim against the individual Defendants must be dismissed.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants Methacton School District, Timothy Quinn, Robert Harney, and Judith Landis’s Motion for Summary Judgment Motion will be granted.
An appropriate Order follows.
ORDER
AND NOW, this 12th day of February, 2015, upon consideration of Defendants Methacton School District, Timothy Quinn, Robert Harney, and Judith Landis’s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 20), and all papers submitted in support thereof and in opposition thereto, it is ORDERED that the Motion is GRANTED, and Judgement is entered in favor of Defendants and against Plaintiff Lana Sampson.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Notes
. We view of all of the facts and draw all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the non-moving party. P.N. v. Clementon Bd. of Educ.,
. According to the June 29, 2011 letter, Angela Linch’s phone records indicate that Plaintiff did not actually call Linch until 7:45 a.m. (June 29, 2011 Letter.) These phone records are not a part of the record in this case.
. The disability determination standards are the same for the analyses of the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA. See Tish,
. Methacton points out that the individuals cited by Plaintiff had different roles and responsibilities and were not truly similarly situated. (Defs.’ Reply, 3.) In addition, the uncontested record does not reflect that these individuals ignored specific directives from supervisors as was the case with Plaintiff. (Id. at 3-4.)
. Methacton’s defense of its decision to transfer Plaintiff to Methacton High School is unnecessary because we have determined that it was not an adverse employment action.
. Plaintiff frames the remainder of the adverse employment actions as being appropriate to her ADA retaliation claim. Accordingly, we address them infra.
. Methacton observes that Plaintiff took disability leave pursuant to the Act 93 Agreement, which applies to administrators employed by Methacton. (Defs.’ Mot. 5.) According to Methacton, leave pursuant to this policy was more favorable to Plaintiff than leave pursuant to the FMLA, as Plain
. We note, however, that in Tish, the main case on which Plaintiff relies, the plaintiff had formally applied for FMLA leave. Tish,