VALERIE SAMPSON and DAVID RAYMOND, on their own behalf and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. KNIGHT TRANSPORTATION, INC., an Arizona corporation, KNIGHT REFRIGERATED, LLC, an Arizona limited liability company, and KNIGHT PORT SERVICES, LLC, an Arizona limited liability company, Defendants.
No. 96264-2
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
SEP 05 2019
CERTIFICATION FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON IN; EN BANC
The answer is no. All workers must be compensated for all hours worked in a workweek in accordance with the
FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiffs Valerie Sampson and David Raymond (collectively Sampson) are Washington residents who worked as commercial truck drivers for defendants Knight Transportation Inc., Knight Refrigerated LLC, and Knight Port Services LLC (collectively Knight). Plaintiffs brought this putative class action on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated for several alleged violations of Washington wage and hour laws. At issue here is Sampson‘s claim that piece-rate drivers must receive separate hourly compensation for all time spent “on-duty not-driving.”1
Knight uses two methods to compensate its drivers. Long-haul drivers—those that deliver loads across the United States and Canada—are paid a mileage-based piece rate, based on estimated miles rather than actual miles driven (mileage rate). The per-mile rate varies depending on the length of the trip and is intended to compensate the driver for time spent driving as well as for routine nondriving tasks associated with the trip, including weighing loads, filling out paper work, conducting vehicle inspections, securing
Short-haul drivers—those that pick up loads from major ports in Washington and deliver them across the Pacific Northwest—are paid a flat rate for each round trip (load rate). The load rate is determined by several factors, including the trip length and type of load. Like the mileage rate for long-haul drivers, the load rate is intended to cover all routine nondriving tasks. And like long-haul drivers, short-haul drivers receive extra pay for additional activities, such as long wait times and assisting with loading and unloading. The district court determined that both the mileage rate and load rate qualify as “piece rates” pursuant to Washington law because drivers are paid for tasks completed and not the amount of time worked. Id. at 13 (citing Erickson v. Dep‘t of Labor & Indus., 185 Wash. 618, 620, 56 P.2d 713 (1936)).
Sampson argues that both compensation schemes violate the
ISSUE
Does the
ANALYSIS
The
With limited exceptions,
Knight contends that
This is the fourth certified question we have received in the last several years from federal courts relating to piecework compensation and the
A. We answer the certified question as framed by the district court As a preliminary matter, we must decide whether to answer the certified question as presented by the district court or exercise our discretion to reformulate the question. See, e.g., Allen v. Dameron, 187 Wn.2d 692, 701, 389 P.3d 487 (2017); Order at 17. Knight argues that the question as presented implicitly accepts Sampson‘s premise that the nondriving tasks at issue are outside the scope of the piece-rate compensation. Knight asks us to reframe the question to read, “Does the
We answer certified questions de novo and in light of the certified record from the federal court. Carlsen v. Glob. Client Sols., LLC, 171 Wn.2d 486, 493, 256 P.3d 321 (2011); see also
B. The plain language of
The Department of Labor and Industries (Department) has long understood
This court interprets regulations according to the same rules that are used to interpret statutes. Lopez Demetrio, 183 Wn.2d at 655. First, the court “examine[s] the plain language of the regulation; if that language is unambiguous, it controls.” Id. A regulation “‘is not ambiguous merely because different interpretations are conceivable.‘” Cerrillo v. Esparza, 158 Wn.2d 194, 201, 142 P.3d 155 (2006) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Agrilink Foods, Inc. v. Dep‘t of Revenue, 153 Wn.2d 392, 396, 103 P.3d 1226 (2005)). Instead, more than one interpretation must be reasonable. Id.
The parties disagree on whether or not the regulation is ambiguous. The full text of the regulation states:
Where employees are paid on a commission or piecework basis, wholly or partially,
(1) The amount earned on such basis in each work-week period may be credited as a part of the total wage for that period; and
(2) The total wages paid for such period shall be computed on the hours worked in that period resulting in no less than the applicable minimum wage rate.
Sampson argues that the regulation is ambiguous and that the Department‘s interpretation is only one of two reasonable interpretations. Sampson asks us to interpret the regulation to “require[] employers to satisfy their obligation to pay for all hours worked before applying workweek averaging.” Pls.’ Opening Br. on Certified Question at 26. To support their position, Sampson argues that the Department‘s interpretation renders subsection (1) of the regulation superfluous because “Subsection (1) provides: ’The amount earned on [a piece-rate] basis . . . may be credited as a part of the total wage for that period.’
Sampson is correct that Washington courts interpret regulations in a manner that gives effect to all the language without rendering any part superfluous. Hayes v. Yount, 87 Wn.2d 280, 290, 552 P.2d 1038 (1976). However, the Department‘s interpretation of
The Department‘s interpretation comports with the plain language of the regulation and does not render any part superfluous. Therefore, we agree with the Department‘s interpretation and move to the central issue in this case—whether the regulation so interpreted violates the
C.
The central issue in this case is whether workweek averaging, as authorized by
To overcome this presumption of validity, Sampson argues that our decision in Carranza requires all employers to compensate piece-rate workers on a separate hourly basis for work performed outside the piecework, so
In Carranza, we were asked whether “‘Washington law require[s] agricultural employers to pay their pieceworkers for time spent performing activities outside of piece-rate picking work.‘” 190 Wn.2d at 618. The plaintiffs in the case were seasonal and migrant agricultural workers who were paid on a piece-rate basis—a set amount for every bin of apples or pears or each lug of cherries picked. Id. at 616. They were also required to spend time performing other tasks not related to picking, such as traveling between orchards, transporting ladders, and attending mandatory meetings. Id. at 617. We determined that “[t]he plain language of the
The fact that workweek averaging may not be applied to agricultural workers, who are explicitly exempt from
The exemption of agricultural workers from
Paying agricultural workers for every bin of fruit they pick incentivizes them to work harder, faster, and more efficiently while doing that work. The more fruit they pick in an hour, the more they get paid. Requiring this class of historically vulnerable workers to then spend time on activities where they are not earning additional compensation would frustrate the purpose of the
Piecework compensation in the trucking industry also promotes productivity but in a very different way. Unlike agricultural workers, truckers are not closely supervised during the day. They are frequently away from the employer‘s office or terminals for weeks at a time with little oversight. Br. of Am. Trucking Ass‘ns Inc. & Wash. Trucking Ass‘ns as Amici Curiae at 4. Truck drivers are not paid a per-mile rate so that they will drive faster and produce more miles in an hour. Rather, piecework compensation incentivizes them to make productive use of their day.
For the past 45 years, the regulation has reflected the Department‘s reasonable determination that workweek averaging is a valid measure of compliance with the
D.
Finally, we turn to Sampson‘s argument that
Determining the extent of an administrative agency‘s rule-making authority is a question of law, which we review de novo. Wash. Pub. Ports Ass‘n, 148 Wn.2d at 645. An administrative agency “possesses only those powers either expressly granted or necessarily implied from statutory grants of authority.” Id. at 646. Agency regulations “may be used to ‘fill in the gaps’ in legislation if such [regulations] are ‘necessary to the effectuation of a general statutory scheme.‘” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Green River Community Coll. v. Higher Educ. Pers. Bd., 95 Wn.2d 108, 112, 622 P.2d 826 (1980)).
The director of the Department is charged by statute with “the administration and enforcement of all laws respecting the employment and relating to the health, sanitary conditions, surroundings, hours of labor, and wages of employees employed in business and industry in accordance with the provisions of [the
The
The Department is tasked with the enforcement of the
CONCLUSION
Yu, J.
WE CONCUR:
Fairhurst, C.J.
Stephens, J.
Madsen, J.
González, J.
VALERIE SAMPSON and DAVID RAYMOND, on their own behalf and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. KNIGHT TRANSPORTATION, INC., an Arizona corporation, KNIGHT REFRIGERATED, LLC, an Arizona limited liability company, and KNIGHT PORT SERVICES, LLC, an Arizona limited liability company, Defendants.
No. 96264-2
OWENS, J. (dissenting) — We are asked to decide whether the
Plaintiffs Valerie Sampson and David Raymond (collectively Sampson) argue that the
Where employees are paid on a commission or piecework basis, wholly or partially,
(1) The amount earned on such basis in each work-week period may be credited as a part of the total wage for that period; and
(2) The total wages paid for such period shall be computed on the hours worked in that period resulting in no less than the applicable minimum wage rate.
Under
To assess the validity of
Carranza involved facts strikingly similar to the case before us. A fruit company paid its agricultural employees on a piece-rate basis. Id. at 616. The agricultural employees brought a lawsuit, alleging that the fruit company failed to comply with Washington law because the
The majority attempts to distinguish Carranza, contending that because agricultural employees are expressly excluded from
Because Carranza supplied the plain meaning of the
I believe this court‘s recent decision in Carranza requires this court to hold that
Owens, J.
Wiggins, J.
