81 Iowa 23 | Iowa | 1890
Lead Opinion
The plaintiffs alleged, as part of the consideration for the promise to convey to them the lots in question, the conveyance by them of their interest in the homestead of EL W. Sample, deceased, without consideration. There is not only an entire absence of testimony to show such an agreement, but the written contract, in pursuance of which the homestead was conveyed, shows that it was upon consideration “of the just rights of dower of the said Sarah M. Sample in the estate of H. W. Sample, and that she does not oppose the probating of said will as written.” It appears in testimony that on many occasions, when speaking about the plaintiffs and the property in question, Mrs. Sample, deceased, said that she intended it as a home for the plaintiffs when she was gone. Mr. Collier testifies: “Mrs. Sample told me that she had bought that property; that she felt that if she did not buy a home for Will he would not have one. * * * She wanted a place for a home for William. He had been good to her. She wanted to buy it for a home for him.” H. W. Sample, son of plaintiffs, testified that one day his father was talking to his grandmother about building a house, and “she said: ‘Never mmd about that. Don’t worry about that.’ She did not expect to occupy the place long, and father should have it after she was through with it.” To Mrs. Malcolm she said she wanted to buy the house so she could leave it to her son William for a home, that it was for a home for herself while she should live. Louise Hampton testifies that deceased said she thought she would get a home, and leave it to Mr. Sample’s folks when she was through with it. Mrs. Hale testifies that Mrs. Sample frequently informed her of her intention to purchase a house for her own use during her life, and to leave it at her death to William, and gave as a reason that otherwise he would not have one; that her object in buying the house was to provide a home for William and his family after her death.
III. We think defendant’s counterclaim is sufficiently answered in the testimony, and certainly conclusively answered by the clause in Mrs. Sample’s will, wherein she directs her executor to give to Samuel and W. S. Sample “acquittances and releases and receipts in full of all indebtedness and obligations to me, whether due or to become due, and the same shall be released and canceled.”
Our conclusion is that the decree of the district court be reversed, and decree be entered dismissing the plaintiffs’ petition, and with judgment that plaintiffs pay the costs. Reversed.
Dissenting Opinion
(dissenting) — I. I cannot concur in the foregoing opinion of the majority of the court. I am clear in my conviction that the judgment of the district court ought to be affirmed. The evidence, in my opinion, clearly establishes facts authorizing the legal inference of an agreement between defendant’s intestate and plaintiffs to the effect that she would secure to plaintiffs, by conveyance or by other assurance, the homestead occupied by her, to be possessed and enjoyed by plaintiffs after her death. The consideration of this contract moving from plaintiffs was their undertaking not to remove from Keokuk, and to give intestate such care and service as her condition of health and advancing age required, and to devote to her business such attention as it demanded. The evidence clearly shows that plaintiffs did perform these undertakings, and that intestate received the full measure of the consideration
This court holds that there is no evidence supporting the contract. In my opinion there is the clearest evidence, which is sufficient to convince the judicial mind to the degree of the most complete satisfaction that the agreement alleged in the petition was entered into between the parties, and fully performed by plaintiffs. That evidence is the clear, distinct and often-repeated statements and admissions of intestate. She, over and over again, declares her intention that the plaintiffs shall have the homestead she occupied, that they had remained in Keokuk to enable them to devote care and attention to her, and that they had served her, etc., etc., showing distinct admissions of obligation to secure the property to plaintiffs in consideration of
II. The opinion plainly says that the evidence shows but limited attention and services of plaintiff to intestate which, inferentially, as I understand the opinion, is not sufficient to support a promise by intestate. Yet the opinion quotes evidence reciting the declarations of the intestate to the effect that she was dependent upon plaintiffs for care and attention, which they gave her; that Mr. Sample, on her account, remained in Keokuk; and “that he had been everything to her, and done everything for her that was possible for him to do.” And yet the opinion puts depreciatory estimates upon plaintiffs’ services and care of deceased. In my opinion, the evidence showing her declarations is the fullest possible proof- of the great extent of plaintiff’s services. She declares that they remained in K.eokuk on her account, to render services to her, and, having remained, William, the plaintiff, “had been everything to her, and done everything for her that it was possible for him to do.” Surely none knew better than she herself what services plaintiff had rendered to her. It surely was not the legal, moral or filial duty of plaintiffs to forbear to change their home, and to remove to another state or city in order to better their condition, and to remain in Keokuk presumptively to their financial disadvantage. There is clear evidence of services rendered by plaintiffs which constitute the consideration of the contract between the parties. The evidence shows that the relations between the decedent and Mr. Sample, plaintiff, were of the most tender and affectionate character. While she was a stepmother, neither could have been more affectionate and confiding as to the other had she been his natural mother. Doubtless she assumed the relation of stepmother when he was of such tender years that he
III. Let it be supposed that the case presents these facts: Mr. Sample, through a course of years, supplied his stepmother, at her request, with money, amounting in the aggregate to many thousands of dollars, which was used by her to secure services and other things necessary for her comfort. These large advances were often acknowledged by her; accompanied by expressions of gratitude therefor, with frequent declarations that in return for them, and in discharge of the obligation imposed upon her for these advances, she intended to secure to him the homestead occupied by her. Such expressions were made to him, and to his family, and often to others. Under such a state of facts, can any one doubt that the law would infer a contract binding her to secure to him the homestead in the absence of equities therein held by others? Indeed, the consideration for the contract having been shown beyond question, and the frequent admission of the obligation arising from the receipt thereof being established by clear proof, the law will infer a contract entered into between the parties binding the intestate to secure to plaintiff the homestead. See Wence v. Wykoff, 52 Iowa, 614; Van Sandt v. Cramer, Adm'r, 60 Iowa, 424. We think no one would contend, where the consideration of the alleged contract was money paid, instead of services rendered, that the law would not infer a contract between the parties. But in this case plaintiffs, instead of advancing to intestate a few thousands of dollars, gave her care, attention and services for years, which, under the law, they were not bound to render, and which these relations did not impose upon them as a filial, moral or honorable obligation. These services and care were more valuable to intestate than money. They required greater sacrifice on the part of plaintiffs than the payment of thousands; for the performance of these services kept plaintiffs and their family in Keokuk, depriving them all of opportunities of seeking employment and fortune elsewhere, which is usually attained
IY. In my opinion there can arise no reasonable-doubt that deceased intended that plaintiffs should have the property. Such an intention is established by the-plainest evidence. The law, on the facts and principles heretofore stated, will infer that there was an agreement between the parties, and the intention was-pursuant thereto. But under the principles of equity which require courts to effectuate intentions, the law, in order to do so, will infer the existence of a contract when there are no conflicting equities. This will be done in the exercise of the power of equity to enforce rights based upon unexecuted intentions. If such intentions be purely voluntary, chancery can give no aid to compel the enforcement of such rights. But the existence of the intention being clearly shown, equity will, with acute and vigilant intelligence, seek for grounds on which the intention may be effectuated. It will And, in this case, evidence establishing inferentially the existence of an agreement. Justice demands that the contract be enforced, and thereby the intentions of intestate be effectuated. The duty of courts in such cases is forcibly expressed by Lord Holt in Fisher v. Wiggins, 12 Mod. 297. In support of the doctrine he announces, he cites a rule announced seventy years before by Sir Hewby Hobabt, chief justice of the court of common pleas, in Earl of Clanrickard's Case, Hob. 273. Lord Holt uses this language: “Judges ought to be curious and astute to find a means to support the intent of parties, which often makes judges in constructions transpose clauses in deeds, and split an instant into priority and posteriority, and never adjudge without reluctancy against intent of parties, especially in intended provisions for children.” Sir Henby Hobabt, in the case cited by Lord Holt, makes this declaration: “I do