Brandon SAMPLE, Appellant v. BUREAU OF PRISONS, Appellee.
No. 05-5038.
Unitеd States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit.
Argued: Oct. 10, 2006. Decided: Nov. 3, 2006.
466 F.3d 1086
both in the standards governing entries into the home and in the remedy for violations of those standards. There is now one uniform knock-and-announce rule. We are thus faced with a conflict between Supreme Court decisions, a circumstance outside the Rodriguez decision requiring lower courts to follow a Supreme Court precedent directly on point even if later decisions have underсut its rationale. See Mozee v. Am. Commercial Marine Serv. Co., 963 F.2d 929, 935 (7th Cir.1992). As to which line should be followed, we think it plain that Hudson, not Miller and Sabbath, now must control. Not only is Hudson the Court‘s most recent pronouncement about whether evidence should be excluded as a remedy for knock-and-announce violations, but it is аlso the Supreme Court‘s only thorough analysis of the issue. From all that appears, Miller and Sabbath merely assumed that suppression followed a violation. See also Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 482-83, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963). We therefore hold that even if the entry here violated
Affirmed.
Craig E. Estes, appointed by the court, argued the cause as amicus curiae for appellant. With him on the briefs were William M. Hohengarten and David W. DeBruin, aрpointed by the court.
Brandon Sample, pro se, filed briefs for appellant.
Megan L. Rose, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the cause for appellee. With her on the brief were Kenneth L. Wainstein, U.S. Attorney at the time the brief was filed, and R. Craig Lawrence, Assistant U.S. Attorney. Michael J. Ryan, Assistant
Before: SENTELLE, Circuit Judge, and EDWARDS and WILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judges.
Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge SENTELLE.
SENTELLE, Circuit Judge:
Brandon Sample, an inmate at a federal correctional facility, appeals the entry of summary judgment in favor of the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP“) on his claim under the Freedom оf Information Act,
I.
Sample is incarcerated in a federal prison. He requested, under FOIA, a number of records from BOP‘s files, specifying that the records were to be in an electronic format. Receiving no resрonse, he filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. BOP claimed it had never received the request and promptly provided paper copies of all the records. Sample was dissatisfied, however, and continued to press his claim for the same records in electronic format. On BOP‘s motion, the district court granted summary judgment. The court concluded that providing the records in electronic formаt would violate BOP security policies. Those policies limit inmates’ access to computer disks, CD-ROMs and computer terminals in an effort to prevent unsupervised communication with persons outside the facility, and to protect the integrity of BOP‘s computer systems. Similarly, given that BOP cannot continually supervise inmates’ possession of material items, the policies prohibit their personal possession of removable media. Sinсe those policies would be violated if BOP were ordered to provide Sample‘s records in electronic format, the district court held that BOP satisfied its FOIA obligation by providing the documents in paper format. Sample‘s cross-motion for summary judgment was denied. Sample timely appealed the district court‘s decision, and this Court appointed amicus curiae in support of Sample.
II.
This Court reviews de novo the district court‘s grant of summary judgment in favor of аn agency in a FOIA case. We must determine whether the facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the requester, present any genuine issue of material fact. Steinberg v. U.S. Dep‘t of Justice, 23 F.3d 548, 551 (D.C.Cir.1994).
A.
FOIA requires federal agencies to release certаin documents in response to requests from the public. It states that “each agency, upon any request for records which (i) reasonably describes such records and (ii) is made in accordance with published rules stating thе time, place, fees (if any), and procedures to be followed, shall make the records promptly available to any person.”
BOP argues that providing the documents in paper format satisfied its obligations under FOIA because Sample, pursuant to BOP security regulations, could not receive the records in electronic format. As а result, with respect to Sample, the records were not “readily reproducible” in that format. BOP‘s determination as to reproducibility, moreover, must be accorded “substantial weight” by the reviewing court.
Under any reading of the statute, howеver, “readily reproducible” simply refers to an agency‘s technical capability to create the records in a particular format. No case construing the language focuses on the charaсteristics of the requester. See, e.g., TPS, Inc. v. U.S. Dep‘t of Defense, 330 F.3d 1191, 1195 (9th Cir.2003) (interpreting “readily reproducible” as referring to technical capability); see also, e.g., Carlson v. U.S. Postal Serv., 2005 WL 756573, at *7 (N.D.Cal.2005) (holding that “readily reproducible” in a requested format means “readily accessible” by the agency in that format); Landmark Legal Found. v. EPA, 272 F.Supp.2d 59, 63 (D.D.C.2003) (construing “readily reproducible” as the ability to duplicate).
Under the only plausible reading of “readily reproducible,” there is no dispute as to BOP‘s ability to reproduce the records electronically. BOP has conceded as much by offering to provide the records in electronic format to Sample‘s non-inmate designee. Thus BOP‘s reliance on the “readily reproducible” language is misрlaced. There is a clear statutory obligation to produce the records in electronic format when that format is requested.
It is true that case law construing the statute before the 1996 amendments supports BOP‘s рosition that format requests need not be honored. Several circuits, including this one, held that an agency satisfied its obligations under FOIA by providing records in any format. In Oglesby v. U.S. Dep‘t of the Army, 920 F.2d 57, 70 (D.C.Cir.1990), this Court held that FOIA was satisfied when an agency, rather than provide the individual records directly to the requester, made all of the potentially responsive records available in a public reading room for the requester to search himself. Oglesby relied on Tax Analysts v. U.S. Dep‘t of Justice, 845 F.2d 1060, 1065 (D.C.Cir.1988), in which we noted that “an agency need not respond to a FOIA request for copies of documents where the agency itself has provided an alternative form of access.” These cases established that providing some form of access—even if not the exact one sought by the requester—was sufficient to discharge an agency‘s obligations under FOIA. Id.
BOP argues that this principle was recently reaffirmed, notwithstanding the 1996 amendments, in Martinez v. Bureau of Prisons, 444 F.3d 620 (D.C.Cir.2006) (per curiam). In that case, an inmate sued under FOIA to obtain paper copies of his presentence investigation reports (“PSRs“) that he could keep in his cell. Id. at 621.
BOP relies on Martinez for the proposition that FOIA, even after the 1996 amendments, does not require it to provide Sample‘s documents in electronic format because he was given the same records in paper copy. This reading of the case, however, is too broad. Martinez did not construe the “form or format” requirement at all because format—in the sense of paper documents or electronic data—was not at issue. Rather, our holding in Martinez was limited to whether FOIA required BOP to permit an inmate to possess records in his cell, an issue that was unaffected by the 1996 amendments. Therefore, Martinez is not applicable here.
B.
We note, however, that Sample‘s reading of BOP‘s obligations under FOIA is also too broad. Sample argues that BOP not only must provide the records in electronic format, but also must facilitate Sample‘s ability to access them in the requested format. That is, Sample argues that FOIA entitles him to view the records on a computеr, notwithstanding BOP‘s asserted policy prohibiting or restricting inmates’ access.
Policies enacted pursuant to BOP‘s statutory mandate to administer the nation‘s prisons are entitled to great deference. See Martinez, 444 F.3d at 625 (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 531, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979); Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 405, 94 S.Ct. 1800, 40 L.Ed.2d 224 (1974)) (noting that “a court would be loath to second-guess” policies that “reflect[] a judgment regarding prison administration“). Whether the policy asserted here trumps BOP‘s obligations under FOIA, however, is not before us. In this case, BOP performs two roles with respect to Sample: FOIA respondent and custodian of inmates. We have already concluded that BOP, as FOIA respondent, must provide the records in the form or format requested. The FOIA case is resolved. BOP‘s rоle as custodian in receipt of electronic records intended for an inmate, by contrast, only comes into play after the FOIA request has been completed. Since we cannot pass on conduсt that may or may not occur after BOP provides these records, questions of access or possession are not before this Court. Once BOP, in its role as FOIA respondent, has provided the records in electroniс format, its FOIA obligation is complete. If BOP—in its role as Sample‘s custodian—then decides to limit or prohibit access to the material, any question raised by that decision is not before us.
III.
Since the records sought by Sample are “readily reproducible” under the statute, BOP must produce them in electronic format. The district court‘s grant of summary judgment in favor of BOP is reversed, and the case is remanded to the district court with instructions to enter judgment in favor of Sample.
So ordered.
SENTELLE
CIRCUIT JUDGE