SCOTT A SAMFORD, JR v. DOUG DRETKE; WARDEN STAPLES; DOCTOR SCARMADO; LISA VATANI, Hеalth Provider; MINNIE CROUCH; UNIT WARDEN OF LAW LIBRARIAN
No. 06-20443
United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit
March 3, 2009
Before KING, STEWART, and SOUTHWICK, Circuit Judges.
Charles R. Fulbruge III, Clerk
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, Houston No. 4:06-CV-497
Scott Samford, Texas prisoner # 835644, appeals the dismissal of his
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Scott Samford (“Samford“) and Cynthia Samford had two sons, Andrew and Benjamin, before divorcing. After the divorce and on or about August 29, 1997, the boys—eleven and fourteen years old at the time—were at Cynthia‘s house when Samford arrived brandishing a handgun and threatening to shoot Cynthia, any police officers that Cynthia might call, and himself. He made good on the final threat and shot himself in the neck. After surviving the gunshot, Samford pleaded nolo contendere to aggravated assault on January 15, 1998. In her victim impact statement regarding the assault, Cynthia stated, “[m]y children and myself are in constant fear for our lives due to Scott Samford‘s behavior and mental condition.” Samford was placed on five years’ probation on the condition that he have no contact with Cynthia, Andrew, or Benjamin. A few months later, Samford violated this probation condition by contacting his sons and ex-wife and, on June 11, 1998, was sentenced to twenty years’ incarceration with the Texas Department of Criminal Justice (“TDCJ“). While in prison, “Cynthia Samford contacted the prison system and attempted to place Andrew and Benjamin Samford on a ‘negative mail list,‘”
Samford challenged the limitations placed on his communication with Andrew and Benjamin in twо separate courts: the District Court for the Northern District of Texas and the District Court for the Southern District of Texas. The related claims were consolidated below.
Samford filed his claim in the District Court for the Northern District of Texas on May 17, 2005. He originally sued Cynthia, arguing that she violated
On June 8, 2005, Samford filed suit in the District Court for the Southern District of Texas. He brought claims under
Samford now appeals the dismissal of his
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
When a district court dismisses a comрlaint both as frivolous and as failing to state a claim under
III. DISCUSSION
Samford appears before this court for a fourth time after stating meritless claims in three prior civil rights suits. See Samford v. Staples, 231 F. App‘x 374 (5th Cir. 2007); Samford v. Staples, 249 F. App‘x 1001 (5th Cir. 2007); Samford v. Bowers, No. 00-10246, 2000 WL 1741640 (5th Cir. Nov. 16, 2000). His current complaint challenges the enforcement of his negative mail list and the removal of his sons from his approved visitors list. As in his previous suits, Samford‘s contentions fail to state a claim.
A. Enforcing Samford‘s Negative Mail List
Samford avers that defendants violated his First Amendment rights by restricting his communication with Andrew and Benjamin. His claims regarding defendants’ intercepting his outgoing non-legal mail to his sons, defendants’ refusing to return the intercepted letters, and defendants’ preventing Samford from receiving photos of his sons all center on defendants’ practices in enforcing Samford‘s negative mail list.3
“[I]n determining the constitutional validity of prison practices that impinge upon a prisoner‘s rights with respect to mail, the appropriate inquiry is whether the practice is reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest.” Brewer v. Wilkinson, 3 F.3d 816, 824 (5th Cir. 1993) (applying the standard articulated in Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987)). Although the Supreme Court has indicated that this standard applies to limitations on prisoners’ incoming mail and that the standard articulated in Procunier v. Martinez4 applies
We must first emphasize that the Supreme Court in Thornburgh made it clear that a distinction still exists between incoming prison mail and outgoing prison mail. But that distinction revolves around the differing penological concerns with respect to outgoing and incoming mail. Specifically, the Court recognized that “[t]he implications of outgoing correspondence for prison security are of categorically lesser magnitude than the implications of incoming materials.”
Id. at 825 (alteration in original) (quoting Thornburgh, 490 U.S. at 413); see also Smith v. Delo, 995 F.2d 827, 830 (8th Cir. 1993) (applying the Turner standard to outgoing mail and stating ”Martinez is limited to outgoing correspondence when deciding the degree of security risk involved; however, . . . it appears that Martinez should not be understood as establishing a special test that applies only when evaluating the constitutionality of regulations governing outgoing mail“).
Under Turner, we evaluate the reasonableness of a practice by considering four factors:
(1) whether there is a “valid, rational connection between the prison regulation and the legitimate governmental interest put fоrward to justify it“; (2) “whether there are alternative means of exercising the right that remain open to prison inmates“; (3) “the impact accommodation . . . will have on guards and other inmates, and on the allocation of prison resources generally“; and (4) whether there are “ready alternatives that could fully accommodate[] the prisoner‘s rights at de minimis cost to valid penological interests.”
Mayfield v. Tex. Dep‘t of Criminal Justice, 529 F.3d 599, 607 (5th Cir. 2008) (quoting Turner, 482 U.S. at 89-91). “[W]e have noted that rationality is the controlling factor, and a court need not weigh each factor equally.” Id. Further, our analysis must give due regard to the decisions of prison officials: “prison administrators . . . , and not the courts, [are] to make the difficult judgments concerning institutional operations.” Turner, 482 U.S. at 89 (omission and alteration in original); see also Freeman v. Tex. Dep‘t of Criminal Justice, 369 F.3d 854, 863 (5th Cir. 2004) (“[T]he Court is equally cognizant of the inherent demands of institutional correction, the deference owed to prison administrators, and the subjugation of individual liberty that lawful incarceration necessarily entails.“). We now turn to the application of these four factors in light of the deference owed to prison administrators.
After reviewing Samford‘s filings, we do not agree that Samford admits the existence of an ongoing state court order; indeed, he has repeatedly denied the existence of such an order. Nonetheless, we agree with the district court‘s alternative reasoning. Prisons have a legitimate interest in protecting crime victims and their families from the unwanted communications of prisoners when a victim requests that the prison prevent such communication.5 See Berdella v. Delo, 972 F.2d 204, 209 (8th Cir. 1992) (“[T]he government‘s interest in protecting the public from harassment by inmates would justify prohibiting an inmate from sending mail to persons who have affirmаtively requested that mail not be received from an inmate.“); see also Jones v. Diamond, 594 F.2d 997, 1014 (5th Cir. 1979) (validating the use of negative mail lists and stating “jail officials may employ a ‘negative mail list’ to eliminate any prisoner correspondence with those on the outside who affirmatively indicate that they do not wish to receive correspondence from a particular prisoner“); Guajardo v. Estelle, 580 F.2d 748, 753 (5th Cir. 1978) (affirming the district court‘s determination that a negative mail list does not violate prisoners’ First Amendment rights and stating that such lists “permit [prison officials] to deny inmates permission to correspond with persons who have objected to further correspondence“). And defendants’ enforcement of Samford‘s negative mail list bears a rational connection to this legitimate interest: Samford‘s pleadings acknowledge that he was placed on probation аfter pleading nolo contendere to aggravated assault when he went to Cynthia‘s home, where Andrew and Benjamin were located, and made various threats before shooting himself just outside the front door. Further, he acknowledges that his probation was conditioned on having no contact with Andrew and Benjamin and that he nonetheless disregarded this condition.
Thus, Turner‘s first, and controlling, factor weighs in favor of the reasоnableness of defendants’ enforcement of Samford‘s negative mail list.
The second factor under Turner asks whether alternative means of exercising the right remain open to the prisoner. This factor further favors defendants’
The third factor considers the impact that accommodating the prisoner‘s right will have on the allocation of prison resources and, hеre, cuts neither for nor against the reasonableness of defendants’ enforcing Samford‘s negative mail list. It is the policy of TDCJ to maintain negative mail lists, and Samford here seeks to remove two individuals from his list. Accommodating Samford in this way would have little, if any, effect on the allocation of the prison‘s resources.
Under the fourth factor, the existence of alternatives to a practice may undermine thе reasonableness of that practice. However, ”Turner does not impose a least-restrictive-alternative test, but asks instead whether the prisoner has pointed to some obvious regulatory alternative that fully accommodates the asserted right while not imposing more than a de minimis cost to the valid penological goal.” Overton, 539 U.S. at 136; see also Victoria W. v. Larpenter, 369 F.3d 475, 484 (5th Cir. 2004) (stating that under Turner‘s fourth factor, “an inmate must present evidence of a ready altеrnative that fully accommodates a prisoner‘s rights at de minimis cost to valid penological interests“). Samford fails to present an alternative to defendants’ enforcement of his negative mail list other than the complete removal of Andrew and Benjamin from the list. Thus, this factor does not undermine the reasonableness of defendants’ practice.
Based on Turner‘s factors, we conclude that defendants’ enforcement of Samford‘s negative mail list is reasonable. Samford avers, however, that defendants’ practice is unreasonable because the defendants have failed to return some of his blocked letters as provided in the Offender Orientation Handbook. He further contends that the same handbook states that a parent outside the prison cannot place an inmate‘s child on the negative mail list. Thеse arguments are unavailing. First, a prison official‘s failure to follow the prison‘s own policies does not, itself, result in a constitutional violation. See Richardson v. Thornton, No. 08-30012, 2008 WL 4933742, at *1 (5th Cir. Nov. 19, 2008) (“The failure of the prison to follow its own policies . . . is not sufficient to make out a civil rights claim.“); Sandoval v. Fox, 135 F. App‘x 691, 691-92 (5th Cir. 2005) (“The mere failure to comply with prison rules and regulations does not, without more, give rise to a constitutional violation.“). Second, the prison‘s handbook also recognizes the interest of protecting victims by stating that minor children of an inmate may be placed on that inmate‘s negative mail list when they are the victim of that inmate. And finally, the reasonableness of preventing Samford
Based on our application of the Turner factors, enforcing Samford‘s negative mаil list is reasonable. Samford has therefore failed to state a claim.
B. Removing Samford‘s Sons From His Visitor List
The district court did not separately address Samford‘s claim that defendants’ removal of his sons from his approved visitors list violated his constitutional rights in reviewing the limitations on Samford‘s communications; however, reviewing de novo, we conclude that Samford has similarly failed to state a claim based on the removal of Andrew and Benjamin from his аpproved visitors list.
“This Court has repeatedly held that for convicted prisoners ‘[v]isitation privileges are a matter subject to the discretion of prison officials.‘” Berry v. Brady, 192 F.3d 504, 508 (5th Cir. 1999) (quoting McCray v. Sullivan, 509 F.2d 1332, 1334 (5th Cir. 1975)). Thus, even where a prisoner was prohibited from visiting with his mother on a single occasion, we stated that “[the prisoner] has no constitutional right to visitation privileges.” Id.; see also Charles v. Nance, 186 F. App‘x 494, 495 (5th Cir. 2006) (“[P]risoners have no absolute constitutional right of visitation.“). We need not go so far as tо say Samford has no right to visitation privileges, but we are satisfied that defendants’ removing Andrew and Benjamin from Samford‘s approved visitors list does not violate Samford‘s constitutional rights for the same reasons that justify defendants’ enforcement of Samford‘s negative mail list. We further note that Samford does not allege that his sons—who have both reached the age of majority according to Samford‘s filings—have ever attempted to visit him or that any such attempt has been prevented.6 Therefore, Samford has failed to state a claim and his complaint was properly dismissed. See Berry, 192 F.3d at 508 (“[T]he magistrate judge properly dismissed [the prisoner‘s] section 1983 claim based on the denial of a visit . . . as both frivolous and for failure to state a claim . . . .“).
IV. CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court. Further, we note that while the current appeal was pending, this court imposed a