165 F.2d 605 | 10th Cir. | 1947
Lead Opinion
Ben Samett instituted in the United States Court for Colorado this class action •against Reconstruction Finance Corporation. It was alleged in the complaint that plaintiff was engaged in the business of slaughtering livestock; that he was a resident of Denver, Colorado, and that his place •of business was in that city; that there was due him a balance of $22,660 on accrued and vested subsidies; that in like manner large balances on accrued and vested subsidies were due other slaughterers of livestock throughout the country; that acting under the pretended authority of Economic Stabilization Directive No. 41, as amended, and certain regulations promulgated by the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, payment of the respective amounts •due had been refused; and that such directive and such regulations in their application to the business of plaintiff and to the businesses of others similarly situated undertook to lay forfeitures and penalties and were unlawful, illegal, and void. A declaratory judgment was sought determining and adjudicating that the directive and regulations referred to were illegal, null, and void; awarding plaintiff judgment against the defendant Reconstruction Finance Corporation in the sum of $22,660, with damages for the wrongful withholding of such sum; awarding like recovery in the respective amounts due others similarly situated who should elect to join plaintiff and participate in the prosecution of the action; and declaring the several judgments to be a lien upon all subsidy moneys appropriated by Congress and placed under the control of the defendant Reconstruction Finance Corporation. The court dismissed the action for lack of jurisdiction, and plaintiff appealed.
Section 204(a) of the Emergency Price Control Act, 56 Stat. 23, 50 U.S1C.A. Appendix, § 901 et seq., provided in effect that the Emergency Court of Appeals should hf.ve exclusive jurisdiction to set aside a regulation, order, or price schedule promulgated by the Administrator; and section 204(d) provided that judgments and orders of the Emergency Court of Appeals should be subject to review by the Supreme Court, and that, except as provided in the section, no court should have jurisdiction or power to consider the validity of any regulation, order, or price schedule. These provisions were valid; and under them, only the Emergency Court of Appeals in the first instance, and the Supreme Court on certiorari to the Emergency Circuit Court of Appeals, had jurisdiction of an action attacking the validity of a regulation promulgated by the Administrator, Office of Price Administration, or by -the Director, Office of Economic Stabilization, on the ground that it was illegal and void. Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 64 S.Ct. 660, 88 L.Ed. 834; Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S. 503, 64 S.Ct. 641, 88 L.Ed. 892; Bowles v. Capitol Packing Co., 10 Cir., 143 F.2d 87; Bowles v. Nu Way Laundry Co., 10 Cir., 144 F.2d 741, certiorari denied, 323 U.S. 791, 65 S.Ct. 431, 89 L.Ed. 631; Bowles v. Jones, 10 Cir., 151 F.2d 232.
The crux of this case was primarily an attack upon the validity of a directive promulgated under the authority of the Emergency Price Control Act. The directive itself was attacked on the ground of being illegal, null, and void. It was not a case where administrative action or non-action under a valid regulation was challenged. The action was within the scope and meaning of section 204(a) and (d); and under the law existing at the time of the institution of the action and at the time of its dismissal only the Emergency Court of Appeals had original jurisdiction to entertain it. Illinois Packing Go. v. Defense Supplies Corp., supra.
The judgment is affirmed.
Dissenting Opinion
(dissenting).
Samett brought this action against the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, under § 2(m) of the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, as amended, 58 Stat. 636. In addition to other relief, he sought an adjudication that certain portions of Directive 41, as amended, issued by the office of Economic Stabilization, and certain revised regulations of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation were invalid and, therefore, did not authorize the imposition of penalties with respect to subsidy payments for the slaughtering of livestock. The trial court held it was without jurisdiction to pass on the validity of such Directive and regulations and on July 23, 1947, entered its order dismissing the action.
Section 204(d) of the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942 vested exclusive jurisdiction in the Emergency Court of Appeals, and in the Supreme' Court, upon review of judgments of the Emergency Court of Appeals, to determine the validity of any regulation or order issued under § 2 of such Act. For the reasons indicated in Illinois Packing Co. v. Bowles, Em.App. 147 F.2d 554, I am of the opinion that Directive 41 was issued under § 2 of the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942. See, also, Illinois Packing Co. v. Snyder, Em.App., 151 F.2d 337.
The question then presented is whether Congress, by § 2(m), supra, intended to. amend § 204(d), supra, so as to give to the district courts jurisdiction to pass on the validity of regulations undertaking to.
Obviously, Congress believed that conditions or penalties were being imposed with respect to payments authorized under the Price Control Act relating to the production or sale of agricultural commodities not authorized by law or by lawful regulations and that provision should be made for aggrieved persons to obtain relief in the district court of the district in which they reside or have their place of business.
Thus, it will be observed that § 2(m), supra, prohibits the imposition of any condition or penalty not authorized by a lawful regulation and authorizes any person aggrieved by any action contrary to the provisions of § 2(m), supra, to petition the district court of the district in which he resides or has his place of business for a declaratory judgment to determine whether such action is in conformity with the provisions of such Act and otherwise lawful, and gives the district court jurisdiction to grant appropriate relief. The power to determine whether such action is in conformity with the provisions of § 2(m), supra, or otherwise lawful, clearly implies the power to determine that such action is not in conformity with the provisions of § 2(m), supra, or is otherwise unlawful. The imposition of a condition or penalty not authorized by a lawful regulation would not be in conformity with the provisions of § 2(m), supra. Therefore, it seems to me that § 2(m), supra, expressly grants to the district courts jurisdiction to determine whether a regulation under which such a condition or penalty is sought to be imposed is lawful or unlawful for the purpose of determining the rights of the plaintiff to any such payment authorized by an act of Congress.
Section 2(m), supra, does not apply to price regulations per se,
Moreover, the Emergency Price Control Act terminated on June 30, 1947, and the jurisdiction of the Emergency Court of Appeals, if any, on July 23, 1947, to pass on the validity of a regulation,
For the reasons indicated, I respectfully dissent.
See Bowles v. Crew, D.C.Cal., 59 F.Supp. 809, 811.
See Standard Kosher Poultry, Inc. v. Clark, Em.App., 163 F.2d 430.