29 Iowa 557 | Iowa | 1870
As both of these cases grow out of one and the same transaction, and were tried in the court below and de novo in this court upon the same evidence, they are considered and disposed of in one opinion.
The plaintiffs ask to have these conveyances set aside on the grounds:
1. That the conveyances were without any valuable consideration.
2. They were obtained by the defendants by fraud and undue influence.
3. The grantor was not of sufficiently sound mind at the time of making the conveyances.
4. Opium or some other drug was administered to him by the defendants, or one of them; and while under its influence he was induced to make the conveyances, and they were not his voluntary acts and deeds.
5. That the deeds were never delivered.
That the deeds were not properly stamped as required by the revenue laws of the federal government.
It is an elementary principle that the consideration of blood, or natural love and affection, is a good consideration, and that an executed contract or conveyance made upon such consideration is binding between the parties and all others, except subsequent purchasers without notice and creditors. 1 Parsons on Con. 5th ed. 431, 432; Noble v. Smith, 2 Johns. 32; Grangiac v. Arden, 10 id. 293; Pitts v. Mungum, 2 Bailey, 588; Pearson v. Pearon, 7 Johns. 26; Carpenter v. Dodge, 20 Vt. 595.
The deeds made by Henry Mercer, Sr., in his lifetime to the defendants, his sons, will not be held invalid on the ground that no pecuniary consideration passed from the grantees to the grantor. They are founded upon meritorious considerations, and are not assailable in this contest.
II. On a careful examination of the testimony, which is quite volumiñous, no sufficient evidence of fraud, undue influence or want of capacity in the grantor, is found to support those allegations. There is some slight evidence that a short time before the execution of the deeds opium had been taken by the grantor, who was then in feeble health, but that, either at the time of the execution of the deeds or at any other time shortly before, he was perceptibly under its influence, there is no satisfactory proof. On the other hand, all the disinterested witnesses agree, that during the whole of the last illness of the grantor including the time of the. making of the conveyance, he was, to all appearance, as sound of
It is true that at the time of the execution of the deeds the grantor was in feeble health, but the evidence clearly shows that he was of sound mind and capable of knowing, and that he did know, what he was doing.
It has already been seen that there was no valuable consideration for the making of these conveyances. They were made by a father to his two sons as gifts from him of their respective shares of his estate. By the act of congress of March 3, 1868, section 132 — in force when these deeds were made — it is provided “ that if any person shall, by deed of gift or assurance of title, made without valuable and adequate consideration, and purporting to vest the estate either immediately or in the
It will be seen, by reference to section 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 180, 131, and 133, of the same act, that grantees in such cases are chargeable with a “succession” tax on the value of the estate thus granted, which tax is much larger than the stamp tax.
It has therefore been held by the secretary of the treasury, that “ a conveyance without consideration requires no stamp. Emerson’s Int. Eev. Guide, 148-, decision 16 ; Edwards on Stamp Act, 10, of Adds, and note 13 ; Schedule B., Stamp Act, title “ Conveyance.” That a deed of gift needs no stamp is also the view taken by Mr. Parsons. 3 Par. on Cont. 826, 5th ed. He says: “It is obvious, from the very clear language of the statute, that the ad valorem stamp duty upon conveyances applies only to estates that are bought and sold ; for the word ‘ sold ’ expressly qualifies the nature of the transaction, and the terms 1 purchaser and ‘purchasers’ are used in their ordinary senses as designating the person effecting a bargain, and not in their technical legal sense, as indicating one who acquires laud in any manner other than by descent or the mere act of law. See Act of July 1, 1862, sched. B. ; Act of March 3, 1853, s. 6.
Reversed.