179 P. 257 | Or. | 1919
The defendant requested the court to instruct the jury as follows, which instruction was refused and there was an exception:
“II. It is shown by the evidence that after the fire occurred, the plaintiff and the defendant agreed that the entire loss suffered by the plaintiff through the fire in question amounted to $911.70, and said agreement was reduced to writing and signed by the plaintiff Samchuck. Under the pleadings in this case the plaintiff is bound and concluded by that agreement, and the sum of $911.70 specified in said agreement must be taken by you as fixing the amount of the actual loss suffered by the plaintiff. It follows that in no event can you find for the plaintiff in a sum exceeding ten-eighteenths of $911.70, and if under the other instructions of the Court you find that the plaintiff is entitled to recover in this case, your verdict should be for the amount of $506.50.”
The fourth assignment of error is based upon an instruction asked for by the defendant, which, being long, we will not quote in full. Most of it embodies correct principles of law which would, no doubt, have assisted the jury in arriving at a conclusion in the ease, however, it contained the following:
“If you find that at the time the plaintiff signed this proof, he knew it contained the statements above mentioned, then said statements were both false and fraudulent, and under the terms of the policy, such false and fraudulent statements would deprive the plaintiff of the right to recover any sum whatsoever from the defendant.”
The fifth and sixth assignments of error are based upon the following instruction:
“ (31). If you find from a preponderance of the evidence, as above outlined, that the statements so alleged to have been made by the plaintiff are material and untrue, and you further find that the statements were willfully and knowingly and intentionally made by Samchuck, with knowledge of their falsity, the intention to deceive the defendant insurer would necessarily be implied, and need not be proved by positive evidence, for the law presumes every man to intend the natural consequences of his act; and, as stated, if you find these facts last alleged, by a preponderance of the evidence, then in that event the plaintiff cannot recover in this action against the defendant, as such facts so established would invalidate and avoid the contract upon which plaintiff brings his action.”
The instruction in question is somewhat involved, and except for this one fault, is quite favorable to the defendant. It may have been the intention of the court to qualify the first clause, submitting to the jury the materiality of the false statements, and to convey to the jury an unqualified direction to find for the defendant, if the statements were willfully and knowingly made with knowledge of their falsity and with intention to deceive the defendant. It is possible the instruction did not actually mislead the jury. Still we
Exceptions were also made to the following instructions :
“ (34). If, on the other hand, you find from the evidence that no such condition of affairs exists, and that the total loss has not been fully defined and described in the proof of loss, then yon would have a right to resort to the other evidence in the case. But, as I stated to you before, if the parties have committed their findings and their estimates to writing in this document known as the proof of loss, then the plaintiff would be concluded by. the statement's therein.
“(35). So that, geptlemen of the jury, the question narrows down to the consideration, first, whether or not the plaintiff falsely, knowingly and willfully, made a statement in contravention of this contract of insurance, .the provisions and conditions of which are fully set forth in these pleadings. If he did so, you need not give the case further consideration and yon should return a verdict for the defendant. If, on the other hand, you do not so find, then you would be entitled to bring in a verdict for the plaintiff, which should be five-ninths of the amount of the loss, as shown by the evidence, together with interest thereon from the twenty-seventh day of March, 1914, the date of the fire. ’ ’
We think these instructions are quite fair and, if anything, rather favorable to the defendant. Indeed, it seems to us that, with the one exception herein-before referred to, the case was submitted to the jury by the court below with a great deal of care.
Reversed and remanded to the court below for a new trial.
Reversed and Remanded. Rehearing Denied.