Case Information
*1
MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT
Rеporter of Decisions
Decision:
Docket: Aro-15-211
Submitted
On Briefs: December 17, 2015
Decided: January 12, 2016
Panel: SAUFLEY, C.J., and MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, and HJELM, JJ.
SAMANTHA RAMELLI
v.
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE COMMISSION
HJELM, J.
[¶1] Samantha Ramelli appeals from a judgment entered in the Superior Court (Aroostook County, Hunter, J. ) on her petition for review of finаl agency action, see M.R. Civ. P. 80C, affirming a decision issued by the Unemployment Insurance Commission. In that decision, the Commission concluded that Ramelli had not filed a timely appeal from an eаrlier administrative order determining that she had been overpaid $13,157 in unemployment insurance benefits. We affirm the judgment.
[¶2] Because the Superior Court reviewed the Commission’s decision as аn
intermediate appellate court, we review the Commission’s decision directly.
Sinclair Builders, Inc. v. Unemployment Ins. Comm’n
, 2013 ME 76, ¶ 9,
[¶3] In a decision dated and mailed on March 30, 2011, a Deputy of the
Department of Labor, Bureau of Unemployment Compensation determined that
Ramelli was required to reimburse the Bureau for unemployment insurance
benefits she had received between April 2010 and March 2011 totaling $13,157.
See
26 M.R.S. § 1194(2), (10), (11)(C) (2015). The Deputy found that during this
period the Bureau had mailed Ramelli multiple requests for work search logs, that
Ramelli had failed to respond to those requests, and that she was therefore not
eligible for the benefits she hаd received.
See
26 M.R.S. § 1192(3) (2015)
(providing that to be eligible for unemployment insurance benefits a claimant must
be “actively seeking work in accordance with the regulations of the commission”);
see also
[¶4] On April 11, 2012—nearly one year after the expiration of the appeal period—Ramelli filed an appeal from the Deputy’s March 2011 decision with the Department of Labor, Division of Administrative Hearings. In May 2012, the Division dismissed the appeal as untimely. Ramelli then appealed the order of dismissal to the Commission. Although notice of an appeal hearing was sent to Ramelli, she did not appear, and the Commission accordingly dismissed her appeal by order issued in September 2012, and subsequently denied Ramelli’s request for reconsideration.
[¶5] Ramelli then filed an аppeal from the Commission’s order of dismissal with the Superior Court (York County) [3] pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 80C. On the Commission’s own motion, the court ( Fritzsche, J. ) remanded the matter to the Commission for further proceedings. After а hearing where Ramelli testified, the Commission concluded that the default and resulting dismissal of her appeal to the Commission should be set aside for good cause. See 5 C.M.R. 12 172 005-2 § 1(B) (2002). The Commission then remanded the matter to the Division to develop an evidentiary record on both the timeliness of Ramelli’s initial appeal of the March 2011 order and the merits of the work search log issue.
[¶6] On that further remand, the Division took testimony from Ramelli and submitted a record of the hearing to the Commission for decision. The Commission then held an additional hearing where Ramelli again testified, as did the Deputy who issued the March 2011 decision, and a claims specialist who had worked with Ramelli. Based on the evidence in the record, the Commission determined that the Deputy’s Marсh 2011 decision was mailed—as the statute required—to Ramelli’s “last known address,” 26 M.R.S. § 1194(2), which was an apartment located in Arundel. In her testimony, Ramelli acknowledged that although her address of reсord was for the apartment building in Arundel, she was actually living in New Hampshire at that time and that therefore she may not have received the decision. Finding that the Bureau complied with the stаtutory mailing requirements even though Ramelli was not living at the address of record she had provided, the Commission concluded that Ramelli’s April 2012 appeal to the Division of the March 2011 ordеr was untimely, and that therefore neither the Division nor the Commission had jurisdiction to entertain the merits of the appeal. Ramelli appealed the Commission’s decision to the Superior Court (Aroostook County) pursuant 26 M.R.S. § 1194(8) (2015), 5 M.R.S. § 11002 (2015), and M.R. Civ. P. 80C, and the court ( Hunter, J. ) affirmed the Commission’s determination.
[¶7] On this appeal from the Superior Court judgment, Ramelli argues that the Commission erred by concluding both that her 2012 appeal to the Division of Administrative Hearings of the March 2011 order was untimely, and that she was ineligible to receive unemployment insurance benefits and was obligated to disgorge benefits received during the period of her ineligibility. We conclude that the Commission correctly determined that Ramelli’s appeal was time-barred and do not reach the merits of her challenge to the overpayment determination.
[¶8] Based on competent evidence,
see Sinclair Builders, Inc.
,
[¶9] Pursuant to 26 M.R.S. § 1194(2), a benefit determination is final unless the claimant files an appeal “within 15 calendar days after that notification was mailed to the claimant’s last known address .” (Emphasis added.) Therefore, the fifteen-day appeal period began to run on March 30, 2011, which was the date the decision was mailed to Ramelli’s address of record. As the Commission found and as the decision itself correctly specified, the deadline for any appeal was April 14, 2011, subject only to a fifteen-day enlargement for good cause shown. See id. Ramelli filed an appeal from the Deputy’s March 2011 decision, but she did not do so until April —nearly one year late. The Commission correctly concluded that Ramelli’s appeal was filed well beyond any deadline allowed by statute.
[¶10] We have held that although Maine’s Employment Security Law is
“remedial legislation mandating a liberal construction in favor of the claimаnt,” the
statutory appeal periods within “the chain of administrative review are
jurisdictional and mandatory.”
McKenzie v. Me. Emp’t Sec. Comm’n
,
The entry is:
Judgment affirmed. On the briefs:
Samantha Ramelli, appellant pro se
Janet T. Mills, Attorney General, and Nancy Macirowski, Asst.
Atty. Gen., Office of the Attorney General, Augusta, fоr the Unemployment Insurance Commission
Aroostook County Superior Court docket number AP-2014-5
F OR C LERK R EFERENCE O NLY
Notes
[1] Although the Commission did not make a specific finding on the issue, the record contains evidence that on March 17, 2011, nearly two weeks before the Deputy issued her decision, the Bureau mailed a notice to Ramelli’s address of record to schedule a telephone fact-finding interview for the following week. On the scheduled datе, the Deputy attempted to contact Ramelli at a telephone number maintained in the Bureau’s records, but the person who answered informed the Deputy that nobody with that namе was staying there. Because Ramelli’s contact information was not effective, she did not participate in the administrative process that led to the Deputy’s decision.
[2] 26 M.R.S. § 1194(2) (2015) prоvides in pertinent part: The deputy shall promptly notify the claimant and any other interested party of the determinations and reasons for the determinations. Subject to subsection 11, unless the claimant or any such interested party, within 15 calendar days after that notification was mailed to the claimant’s last known address, files an appeal from that determination, thаt determination is final, except that the period within which an appeal may be filed may be extended, for a period not to exceed an additional 15 calendar days, fоr good cause shown.
[3] Ramelli was living in York County when she filed this first appeal to the Superior Court. She later moved to Aroostook County, which is the venue in this action. See infra ¶ 6.
[4] The Commission determined alternatively that even if Ramelli’s appeal were timely, she would not have prevailed. Ramelli does not dispute the Deputy’s finding that she did not submit work search logs but instead she argues that shе was not required to do so. The Commission rejected this contention based on the requirements established in 26 M.R.S. § 1192(2) (2015), which is different in some respects from the version of section 1192(2) that was in effeсt when the Deputy made the overpayment determination in March 2011. See 26 M.R.S. § 1192(2) (2010); P.L. 2011, ch. 645, § 2 (effective Aug. 30, 2012) (codified at 26 M.R.S. § 1192(2) (2015)). Because we do not reach the merits of Ramelli’s argument and because, in any event, the issue was not raised by the parties in this appeal, we do not consider whether the Commission applied the correct version of 26 M.R.S. § 1192.