Michelle SALZER, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. William BARFF, Defendant and Appellee.
No. 25657.
Supreme Court of South Dakota.
Decided Dec. 15, 2010.
Rehearing Denied Feb. 1, 2011.
2010 S.D. 96
Considered on Briefs Nov. 15, 2010.
Thomas E. Brady of Brady & Pluimer, PC, Spearfish, SD, Attorneys for defendant and appellee.
KONENKAMP, Justice.
[¶ 1.] In responding to an emergency call, a police officer ran a red light and struck plaintiff‘s vehicle. Plaintiff brought suit against the officer for negligence. Granting summary judgment for the officer, the circuit court ruled that the limitation period expired under
Background
[¶ 2.] This case was decided on summary judgment, and therefore, we view the facts in a light most favorable to Plaintiff Michelle Salzer, the non-moving party. On July 30, 2006, Salzer was traveling west on Lazelle Street in Sturgis, South Dakota. William Barff, a Sturgis police officer, was driving his police vehicle, responding to an emergency grass fire call. His siren was not activated. Barff drove through a red light and struck Salzer‘s vehicle. She was injured as a result.
[¶ 3.] Almost three years later, on July 28, 2009, Salzer brought suit against the City of Sturgis and Barff. The city was later dismissed by stipulation. Barff moved for summary judgment arguing that Salzer‘s suit against him was untimely under
Analysis and Decision
[¶ 4.] Relying on our rules of statutory construction, Salzer maintains that
[¶ 5.] When the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, our interpretation is confined to declaring the meaning as plainly expressed. Perdue, 2010 S.D. 38, ¶ 7 n. 2, 782 N.W.2d at 377 n. 2 (citations omitted). “The legislative intent is determined from what the [L]egislature said, rather than from what we or others think it should have said.” Petition of Famous Brands, Inc., 347 N.W.2d 882, 885 (S.D. 1984) (citation omitted). We have no cause to invoke the canons of construction where the language of a statute is clear. Id.
[¶ 6.] Here,
Any action for recovery of damages for personal injury or death caused by the negligence of a municipality must be commenced within two years from the occurrence of the accident causing the injury or death.
(Emphasis added.) The Legislature defines “municipality” as “all cities and towns organized under the laws of this state[.]”
[¶ 7.] In 1986, the Legislature repealed four of the six statutes in SDCL Chapter 9-24. See 1986 S.D. Sess. Laws ch. 4, § 8. The repealed statutes dealt with certain notice requirements for actions against municipalities. In the same legislative session, SDCL Chapter 3-21 was enacted. See 1986 S.D. Sess. Laws ch. 4, § 2. That chapter relates to the same notice requirements of
[¶ 8.] Considering this legislative history, especially the inclusion of employees with public entities in SDCL Chapter 3-21, and the omission of employees with municipalities in SDCL Chapter 9-24, interpreting “municipality” in
[¶ 9.] Before 1986, Illinois applied, among other things, a general statute of limitations to claims against government employees in their individual capacities because the Illinois Tort Immunity Act limited actions only “against a local entity[.]” See Racich v. Anderson, 241 Ill. App. 3d 336, 181 Ill. Dec. 721, 608 N.E.2d 972, 974 (1993). Section 8-101, however, was amended in 1986, adding “or any of its employees” and changing the statute of limitations from two years to one year. Id. After its amendment, the statute was interpreted to preclude actions against government employees in their individual capacities unless brought within the one-year statute of limitations. Id.; Herriott v. Powers, 236 Ill. App. 3d 151, 177 Ill. Dec. 584, 603 N.E.2d 654, 657 (1992); see also Sperandeo v. Zavitz, 365 Ill. App. 3d 691, 302 Ill. Dec. 957, 850 N.E.2d 394 (2006).
[¶ 10.] In Washington, former Washington Revised Code section 4.96.020 did not specifically include employees, and therefore, the Washington Supreme Court ruled that the statute did not apply to claims against individual government employees. See Wright v. Terrell, 162 Wash. 2d 192, 170 P.3d 570, 571 (2007); Bosteder v. City of Renton, 155 Wash. 2d 18, 117 P.3d 316, 335-36 (2005) (Sanders, J., writing for the majority). Afterwards, however, Washington amended RCWA 4.96.020 “to apply to claims for damages against all local governmental entities and their officers, employees, or volunteers, acting in such capacity[.]” See RCWA 4.96.020(1) (2006).
[¶ 11.] A review of other cases addressing claims against employees in their individual capacities reveals that many jurisdictions, if not the majority, specifically include government employees in the limitations periods applicable to government entities. See
[¶ 12.] Our task is limited to deciding whether Salzer‘s suit against Barff is controlled by
[¶ 13.] Reversed and remanded.
[¶ 14.] GILBERTSON, Chief Justice, and ZINTER, MEIERHENRY and SEVERSON, Justices, concur.
Notes
*
No action for the recovery of damages for personal injury, property damage, error, or omission or death caused by a public entity or its employees may be maintained against the public entity or its employees unless written notice of the time, place, and cause of the injury is given to the public entity as provided by this chapter within one hundred eighty days after the injury. Nothing in this chapter tolls or extends any applicable limitation on the time for commencing an action.
(Emphasis added.)