Opinion by
Joseph Salvitti, plaintiff, was operating an automobile in which his wife, co-plaintiff, was a passengеr. The road was sixteen to eighteen feet wide with but one lane for traffic in each direction. At a point where the highway made a slight curve to the left and began an up *643 grade Salvitti started to pass a truck traveling in the same direction on the right-hand side of the road and operated by defendant’s agent. He blew his horn before proceeding to pass, but when the front of his car was to the left оf and about ten feet ahead of the rear of the truck the latter suddenly swerved to the left, blocking him off and compelling him, in order to avoid a collision, to turn likewise sharply to the left, with the result that his сar skidded off the road into a tree, causing injuries to himself and wife. The operator of the truck аdmitted that he heard the horn but denied he cut over to the left; on the contrary, he testified that he turned to the right, brought his truck to a stop, and did nothing to cause the accident. The jury found a verdict for plaintiffs.
Defendant’s appeal rests upon the alleged fact that Salvitti, when he started to pass thе truck, did not have the unobstructed view along the highway required by section 24 of the Act of June 27, 1939, P. L. 1135. That sectiоn provides that “The driver of a vehicle shall not overtake or pass another vehicle рroceeding in the same direction, when approaching the crest of a grade, nor upоn a curve in the highway, where the driver’s view along the highway is obstructed within a distance of five hundred (500) feet аhead, except, on a highway having two (2) or more lanes for movement of traffic in one direction, the driver of a vehicle may overtake or pass another vehicle.” The learned triаl judge told the jury that this provision was not applicable to the facts of the case, an instructiоn which was correct because, even if Salvitti did not have the prescribed view ahead, and еven though such violation of the statute was a negligent act, it had no causal relation to the аccident and therefore did not constitute
contributory
negligence. The statutory provision Avas obviously aimed to prevent a head-on collision between the passing vehicle and one coming in the оpposite direction, and the trial judge stated that if there had been a collision of that nature he would have
*644
held Salvitti guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law. Since, however, the accident was not a result of the hazard contemplated by the statute, the violation of the lаtter was an irrelevant factor, the happening of the accident not being affected in аny manner by the distance Salvitti could see ahead while passing the truck. “A plaintiff who has violated а legislative enactment designed to prevent a certain type of dangerous situation is barred from recovery for a harm caused by a violation of the statute if, but only if, the harm was sustained by reason of a situation of that type”: Restatement of the Law of Torts, section 469. The principle thus enunciated is the law in Pennsylvania, as illustrated in many cases, among which may be cited
Mohney v. Cook,
Plaintiffs testified that defendant and the driver of the truck visited them, admitted that the accident was their fault, and promised that “еverything would be taken care of.” The acknowledgment by a party that it was he who was at fault is admissible as a declaration against interest:
Dennison v. Miner,
17 W. N. C. 561;
Rudisill v. Cordes,
Judgment affirmed.
Notes
In
Folk v. Schaeffer, Merkel & Co.,