148 P. 1104 | Utah | 1915
Salt Lake City, hereafter called appellant, commenced this action in the City Court of Salt Lake City against the defendant to recover a road poll tax amounting to two dollars. The The action was based upon a city ordinance, which was approved June 15,1909. The ordinance in question was adopted pursuant to Chapter 118, Laws Utah 1909, which was approved March- 23, 1909, and went into effect May 12th of that year. The ordinance is fully set forth in the complaint, together with the notice that was served on the defendant by the ‘' street supervisor ’ ’ of Salt Lake City! The defendant demurred to the complaint upon the ground “that it did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.” He assailed both the ordinance and said Chapter 118 as being unconstitutional and therefore void. Defendant supplemented his general demurrer by specifically enumerating the grounds which he contended vitiated Chapter 118 and the ordinance aforesaid. The City Court duly certified the action to the District Court of Salt Lake County where, after a hearing upon the demurrer, it was sustained. The appellant elected to stand upon its complaint, whereupon the District Court entered judgment dismissing the action, and hence this appeal.
In view that the title of the act in question is also assailed upon the ground of duplicity, we quote it in full:
“An act defining powers of county commissioners as to roads; appointing county road commissioner, defining his duties, providing an annual road poll tax; specifying who shall be liable and manner of collecting and expending the same, repealing Chapter 2, Title 30, and also Title 64, complied Laws of Utah, 1907. ’ ’
Section 1 of the act is divided into six separate divisions. In the first the county commissioners of the several counties of this state are required to appoint biennially a county road commissioner, to fix his compensation and to remove him for cause, iii the divisions following are defined the powers and duties of the county commissioners respecting the platting, abolishing, maintaining, and improving the public roads of the several counties. Section 2 provides that a record be kept
‘‘ Two dollars lawful money is an annual road poll tax upon every man over twenty-one and under fifty years of age, not physically incapacitated to work and not exempted by law. Within incorporated cities or towns, said road poll tax may be collected and expended under such regulations as may be by the city ordinance prescribed in road improvements.”
Section 7 provides for the collection of the road poll tax in the county at large by the county road commissioner. Section 8 prescribes a penalty for failure to pay the road .poll tax. Section 9 requires the county road commissioner to prepare a list of the names and addresses of all persons subject, to pay the road poll tax outside of cities and towns. Sections 10 and 11 provide who shall be exempt and how the fact of exemption , shall be ascertained and certified. The exemptions are such as are usual in such laws, namely, volunteer firemen and officers, mpsieians and members of the National Guard, etc.
The constitutionality of the act is assailed on the following grounds: (1) That it offends against Article 1, Section 24, of our Constitution, which reads as follows: " All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation.” (2) That it also violates Article 4, Section 1 of that instrument, which provides: ’
“The rights of citizens of the State of Utah to vote and hold office shall not be denied or abridged on account of sex. Both male and female citizens of this state shall enjoy equally all civil, political and religious rights and privileges.”
(3) That it is contrary to Article 13, Section 3, which in substance, provides that the Legislature shall provide for a uniform and equal rate of assessment and taxation, and shall,
“Except general appropriation bills, a,nd bills for the codification and general revision of laws, no bill shall be passed containing more than one subject, which shall be clearly expressed in its title.’'
There are other constitutional provisions referred to in connection with the foregoing, but they have no special application here.
In order to obtain a more comprehensive view of the legal questions involved we shall give a brief history of the so-called road poll tax law as the same has been in force in the Territory and State of Utah for many years.
“Within incorporated towns or cities said poll tax may be collected under such regulatibns as may be by the ordinance provided and be used by said towns or cities for improving” the streets.
Sections similar to 1744-1751 are found in Comp. Laws Utah 1876, p. 165. It is there made to appear that the first poll tax law in force in the Tei'ritory of Utah was approved on the 16th day of January, 1862, and by referring to the
"At the outset it should be remembered that we are not dealing with a statute relative to a highway assessment payable in labor, but we are dealing with a statute requiring the payment of money only, a state capitation or poll tax.”
It is as manifest from the law itself as it could well be made that the present road poll tax is precisely what it always has been in this state, namely, an imposition in the nature of a police regulation, not a tax in the sense that taxes are spoken of in our Constitution and statutes when the subject of general taxation is under consideration. The only case that we have been able to find (Hassett v. Walls, 9 Nev. 387) which supports defendant’s theory that the road poll tax is
“The power to impose labor for tbe repair of public highways and streets has been exercised from time immemorial, and comes within the police regulation of the state or city. A commutation of such labor in money in lieu of work, while in the nature of a tax, is not in common speech or in customary revenue legislation, understood as embraced’ in the term tax. The power to impose this labor is exercised for public purposes, and the general good and convenience of the community. (Citing cases.) There are certain services which may be commanded of every citizen by his government, and obedience enforced thereto; among these services are labor on the streets or highways, and training in the militia.”
It accordingly is held by practically all authorities that such a road poll tax does not come within the uniformity clause of the Constitution relating to general taxation, and that it is not a property tax nor a poll or capitation tax as that term is generally understood and applied by the courts. Upon this question see Tekoa v. Reilly, 47 Wash. 202, 91 Pac. 769, 13 L. R. A. (N. S.) 901, and note; Shane v. City of Hutchinson, 88 Kan. 188, 127 Pac. 606; City of Faribault v. Misener, 20 Minn. 396 (Gil. 347); Sawyer v. City of Alton, 4 Ill. (3 Scam.) 127; Pleasant v. Host, 29 Ill. 490; Fox v. Rockford, 38 Ill. 451; Macomb v. Twaddle (Bradwell), 4 Ill.
Defendant’s contention that if the state can require the payment of two dollars it may compel the payment of any number of dollars is also fully considered by the Supreme Court of Kansas in Re Dassler, supra. It is there stated that it is not necessary to determine that question until the state attempts to impose unreasonable burdens in.
.The defendant, however, further contends that our Constitution is broader with respect to the rights and privileges that are enjoyed by the sexes than are the provisions of the Constitutions of the several states whose decisions
“The rights of citizens of the State of Utah to vote and to hold office shall not be denied or abridged on account of sex. Both male and female citizens of this state shall enjoy equally all civil, political and religious rights and privileges.”
We confess our inability to see anything in the foregoing quotation which prevents a reasonable classification of the* citizens of the state with regard to the performance of certain duties which may be required by the state under its police power. Why should not women be exempt from the performance of some duties which are imposed on men? Surely one need not at this day and age point out the physical differences that exist between the sexes, nor dwell upon the reasons why females, in the nature of things, cannot respond to all the demands of the state. To perform labor on the public roads or streets, or to pay the sum of two dollars for the purpose of improving them, is neither a political, religious, or other civil right or privilege. Nor does it fall within the right or privilege of exercising the franchise or of holding an office. It is not likely that females will ever compete with the males for the office of county road commissioner or for any office relating to the public roads. But in practice the imposition and payment of a road poll tax by women would, in the long fun, and in a large measure at least, merely add an additional burden on a large number of men, and thus, instead of bringing about uniformity of burdens, would tend to the opposite result. It is a matter of general knowledge that man, during his active career, is the breadwinner for the family, and that upon him must fall tl^direct burden of discharging the public duties, and especially so when physical exertion and
Entirely apart from the legal phase of the question, however, how does it benefit the married man to require his wife or his daughters to pay a road poll tax? It would only tend to place an additional burden on him without benefiting any one. Even if counsel’s contentions were conceded therefore, he would not gain anything in a practical sense. Of course, such consequences would not control the principle he contends for if it were true that under the constitutional provision which he invokes women may not be put in a class by themselves. Such a classification has, however, always been made and enforced from time immemorial, and unless prohibited in express terms in the Constitution, it is a natural and proper one to make. We can discover nothing in the constitutional provision now under consideration which prohibits such a classification, and hence the contention cannot prevail. In passing this phase of the case we desire to state that after an extended search we have been able to find but one case wherein it is squarely held that a road poll tax like the one in question here is unconstitutional. There may be and perhaps are others. The case is the one before referred to, namely, Hassett v. Walls. No authority is cited in that case, nor is there any satisfactory reason given in support of the conclusion. All that can be said is that the Nevada Supreme Court, as then constituted, refused to be bound by the decisions of other courts upon the subject. It is but fair to state that another case is sometimes referred to as sustaining the Nevada decision, namely, Proffit v. Anderson (Va.), 20 S. E. 887. A mere cursory examination of that case, however, will disclose that the decision is based upon an entirely different ground. The Constitution of Virginia contained a provision that “counties and corporations shall have the power to impose a capitation tax not exceeding fifty cents per annum for all purposes.” Louisa County, in that state, sought to impose an additional road poll tax, and the
The defendant, however, also contends that Chapter 118 is void because the act contains more than one subject. A careful examination of Chapter 118 will disclose that no new legislation was attempted. The principal
‘ ‘ Title 64 of the Laws of 1907 was one subject, namely, poll tax. The powers and duties of county commissioners was Chapter 2 of Title 30 of the Laws of 1907, relating to highways. The subject of cities and powers of city councils was another title, to wit, Title 13 of the Laws of 1907. ’ ’
It is contended, therefore, that there are three distinct subjects contained in Chapter 118. Let us pause for a moment and examine this contention. It is now settled doctrine that anything could have been incorporated into the sections as amended which would have been germane or directly related to the subject-matter of the original sections, or which could properly have been included therein originally. Upon that point we desire to call special attention to what was said in Marioneaux v. Cutler, 32 Utah, 486, 91 Pac. 355. Reference to that case will show, we think, that the matters contained in Chapter 2 of Title 30 and Title 64, supra, were not so incongruous or foreign to each other as not to permit them to be incorporated into one act. What is there in the first five sections of Chapter 118 that could not have been properly included within any amendment of Sections 1134 to 1138? The powers of the county commissioners referred to in the first five sections of Chapter 118 are not as sweeping as defendant’s statements would imply. They are strictly limited to matters relating to public roads and a road poll tax and the manner of its collection and disbursement. These matters are all connected with or related to each other. Are not the maintenance or improvement of public roads and the collection and disbursement of a road poll tax sufficiently related to each other to be properly included in one act? We certainly have found nothing in the decisions,or laws indicating that such may not be done. After carefully considering and reflecting on the rules laid down by us in Edler v. Edwards and Marioneaux v. Cutler, supra, we cannot see how anything that is said in the first five sections of Chapter 118 conflicts with the rules there laid down.
It is, however, further contended that Title 64, comprising
If we are correct in holding that the provision respecting the imposition and collection of a road poll tax is not foreign to legislation concerning public roads and highways, then again there is nothing in the last six sections of the act which offends against the constitutional provision in question The objection is therefore limited to the fact that the Legislature consolidated Chapter 2 of Title 30 and Title 64 as aforesaid. We have already attempted to show that there is nothing contained in the first five sections of Chapter 118 which could not properly have been included in one amendatory act. Now, what is there in the last six sections of that chapter that could not have been properly included in the same amendatory act? Surely there is nothing,• except it be the provision that permits cities and towns to collect and expend the poll tax on “road improvements.” If in amending or in consolidating acts of the Legislature a rule as strict as the defendant contends for shall be enforced, then the subjects of legislation will be indefinitely increased. If the matter objected to had not before been treated in different chapters of the Compiled Laws, we do not think that any one would seriously contend that Chapter 118 contained more than one subject under the liberal rule of construction applied by the courts. The mere fact, therefore, that the subject-matter of Chapter 118 was treated in different chapters or different titles is, under the circumstances, not even persuasive that there is more than one legislative subject contained in the act. It often happens that two, and even more, independent acts are passed the whole subject-matter of which could properly have been embraced within one act. Consolidation of acts, therefore, standing alone, is of'little, if any, importance upon the question of plurality of subjects. As we pointed out in Edler v. Edwards, supra, that while the constitutional provision now under consideration is mandatory and binding alike upon the courts and the Legislature, yet it should be liberally construed in favor of upholding a law, and should be so applied as to effectuate its purpose in preventing the combi
Much is said in defendant’s brief concerning the injustice of a road poll tax. If we were in entire accord with counsel’s contentions in that regard, it still would be of no consequence here. To cure defects in or to repeal bad
The judgment is therefore reversed and the cause is remanded to the District Court of Salt Lake County, with directions to overrule the demurrer and to proceed with the case in the usual course.