Salt Co. v. East SaginawSalt Co. v. East Saginaw
delivered the opinion of the court.
It is unnecessary at this time to discuss the question of power on the part of a State legislature to make a contraсt exempting certain property from taxation. Such a' power has been frequently asserted and sustained by the decisions of this court. *
The question in this case is, whether any contract was ¡mulo at all; and, if there -was, whether it was a coutraсt determinable at will, or of perpetual obligation ?
Had the plaintiff' in error been incorporated by a special charter, and had that charter contained the provision, that all its lands and property used in the manufacture оf salt
If it be objected that such a view of the case exposes pai-ties to hardship and injustice, the answer is ready at hand, and is this: It will not be presumed that the legislature of
The case differs entirely from those laws and charters which have been adjudged to be irrevocable contracts.
Charters grantеd to private corporations are held to be contracts. Powers and privileges are conferred by the State, and corresponding duties and obligations are assumed by the corporation. And if no right to alter or repeal is rеserved, stipulations as to taxation, or as to any other matter within the power of the legislature, are binding on both parties; and, so corporations formed under general laws in place of special charters, like the Ohio banks under the general banking law of that State, are entitled to the benefit of specific provisions and exemptions cоntained in those laws, which are regarded in the same light as if inserted in special charters.' “ The act is as special to each bank,” says Justice McLean, delivering the opinion of this court, “as if no other institution were incorporated undеr it.” * In such cases the scope of the act takes in the whole period for which the corporation is formed. Thе language means that, during the existence of any corporation formed under, the act, the stipulation or exemption specified in it is to operate.
The act under consideration cannot be interpreted on this, principle. It applies to individuals as well as corporations, and to all corporations having power to manufacture salt. Now, in the case of individuals, must it be construed to mean that, as long as the individual lives and manufactures salt, the State will pаy him the bounty of ten cents on the bushel, and exempt his property from taxation ? Can the law never be repealed as to those who have once commenced the manufacture? Such a construction could never have beеn intended. In its nature it is a general law, regulative of the internal economy of the State, and as much subject to repeal and alteration as a law forbidding the killing of game in certain seasons of the year. Its continuance is ar matter of public policy only; aud those who rely on it must
In short, the law does not, in our judgment, belong to that class of laws which can be denominated contracts, except so far as they have been actually executed and complied with. There is no stipulation, express or implied, that it shall not be repealed. General encouragements, held out to all persons indiscriminately, to engage in a particular trade or manufacture, whether such encouragement be in the shape of bounties or drawbacks, or other advantage, are always under the legislative control, and may be discontinued at any time.
Judgment aeeirmed.
Notes
New Jersey
v.
Wilson,
Piqua Bank
v.
Knoop,