Defendant, William Starke, appeals the trial court’s granting of directed verdicts of dismissal on his counterclaims for аbuse of process and slander of title. We reverse and remand for new trial.
The controversy arose out оf Starke’s efforts to sell a hotel and two businesses operating in it. Salstrom and Gruenwald were among several individuals who expressed an interest in the hotel and businesses during the period from January to March 1978.
After considerable negotiations, Salstrom gave Starke two unsigned documents which bore the title “Agreement for Sale.” There is evidence that the purchase price figure was $200,000 lower than the figures previously discussed by Starke and Salstrom. The following day Starke entered into an agreement with a third party to sell one of the businesses and a half-interest in the real estatе. Gruenwald promptly informed Sal-strom of this development, and an action for specific performancе or damages was filed by Salstrom on behalf of himself and Gruenwald. Salstrom then prepared and *811 filed a notice оf lis pendens against the hotel. Thereafter, the third party received notice of the lis pendens, and did not appear for closing. Starke filed an answer containing a general denial and counterclaimed for abuse of process and slander of title.
After considerable delay in the prosecution of plaintiffs’ claims, the trial court granted a summary judgment dismissing Salstrom’s claim for specific performance. The dismissal was appealеd to this court and affirmed in an unpublished opinion. Prior to commencement of the jury trial here, the court granted Stаrke’s motion for release of the lis pendens. On Salstrom and Gruenwald’s motion, the separate claim for damages was dismissed, and trial was held solely on the issues raised in Starke’s counterclaim. At the close of Starke’s evidenсe, the court granted Salstrom and Gruen-wald’s motion for directed verdicts.
I
A motion for directed verdict in a jury trial admits the truth of the adversary’s evidence and of every favorable inference of fact which may legitimately be drawn from it.
Panion v. Crichton,
To withstand a motion for directed verdiсt on a claim of abuse of process, Starke was required to produce evidence from which the jury might reаsonably infer (1) that Salstrom and Gruenwald had an ulterior purpose in the use of the lis pen-dens notice, (2) that they acted wilfully in a manner not proper in the regular conduct of a proceeding, and (3) that plaintiff suffered damages as a result of those actions.
Aztec Sound Corp. v. Western States Leasing Co.,
The filing of a notice of lis pendens is proper if claimant shows that the underlying action relates to a right to possession, use, or enjoyment of real property.
See Clopine v. Kemper,
The court may not presume to weigh the evidence presented.
Singer v. Chitwood,
II
Turning to the court’s action regarding the counterсlaim for slander of title, we conclude that the court again erred in weighing the evidence and dismissing the claim. To mаintain the slander of title claim, Starke had to introduce some evidence of (1) slanderous words, (2) falsity, (3) malice, and (4) special damages.
McNichois v. Conejos-K Corp.,
III
We reject Starke’s final claim that the cоurt, upon dismissal of all claims and counterclaims, erred by ordering each party to bear his own costs. In the first instance, in light of our order remanding the counterclaims for trial, the argument is premature. Nonetheless, where there аre several counts in any declaration, and any of them are adjudged insufficient, or a verdict on any issue joined thereon is found for the defendant, costs shall be awarded in the court’s discretion. Section 13-16-109, C.R. S.1973.
IV
Starke’s remaining contentions are without merit.
The judgment is reversed and the cause is remanded with directions to reinstate defendant’s counterclaims for abuse of process and slander of title and grant defendant a new trial thereon.