It is apparent from this record that the judgment of nonsuit was bottomed on the conclusion that there was no sufficient evidence offered tending to show that Pearce at the time of the accident was about his master’s business, so as to chargе the insurance company with liability under the doctrine of respondeat superior. In this conclusion we concur.
The evidence tends tо show negligence and general employment, and nothing more. There is no evidеnce that Pearce was, at the time and in respect to the transactiоn out of which the injury and death arose, engaged in discharging any duty of his employment.
Proof of general employment alone is not sufficient to impose liability. It'must be made to appear that the particular act in which the employeе was at the time engaged was within the scope of his employment and was being performed in the furtherance of his master’s business.
Tribble v. Swinson,
Presence of the premium cоllection book on the car owned by Pearce and used by him in discharging his duties doеs not supply the missing link.
Van Landingham v. Sewing Machine Co., supra; Tribble v. Swinson, supra; Creech v. Linen Service Corp.,
Barrow v. Keel,
Was there, then, error in the exclusion of the evidence rеlating to statements made by Pearce shortly after the accident?
Agency hаving been established either by proof or by admission, the declarations of the аgent made in the course of his employment and within the scope of his agenсy and while he is engaged in the business
(dum fervet opus')
are competent as, in that case, they are,' as it were, the declarations of the principal.
Brittain v. Westall,
*590
To be competent tbe statement must be made while the agent is engaged in transacting some authorized business and must be so connected with it as to constitute a part of the
res gestee.
It must be а part of the business on hand or the pending transaction, as regards which for cеrtain purposes the law identifies the principal and the agent,
Queen v. Ins. Co.,
Statements of an agent that are nothing more than a narrative of a past occurrence,
Northwestern Union Packet Co. v. Clough,
A driver’s statement to a policeman, made before the person injured by his truck was taken away, that he was working for the defendant,
Renfro v. Central Coal and Coke Co.,
19 S.
W.
(2d), 766, or a chauffeur’s declaration that he was on a mission for his employer, is incompetent for “the act done cannot be qualified or explained by the servаnt’s declaration, which amounts to no more than a mere narrative of a past occurrence.”
Frank v. Wright,
That such declarations are hearsay and inadmissible in evidence is sustained not only by the text writers and decisions of other courts but by many decisions of this Court in additiоn to those heretofore cited.
Cole v. Funeral Home,
It follows tbat tbe testimony as to declarаtions made by tbe defendant Pearce was incompetent and inadmissible as аgainst tbe defendant Insurance Company. These declarations were made some time after tbe occurrence, after Pearce bad left tbe sсene of tbe accident and returned, after police bad arrived at tbe scene, and after tbe deceased bad been placed on an ambulance. They clearly come under tbe hearsay rule.
Even if admitted, tbe statеment made tends to show tbat Pearce bad completed bis work and was at tbe time on bis way borne. Creech v. Linen Corp., supra; McLamb v. Beasley, supra.
Tbe judgment below is
Affirmed.