63 P. 383 | Idaho | 1900
Lead Opinion
This is a submission of a controversy without action. It is unnecessary to set forth the entire stipulation of facts, as shown by the transcript. The question submitted to the court upon this agreed case is as follows: “Were mining claims, for which United States patents had been issued, exempt from taxation in 1898 when the mining claims hereinbefore mentioned were assessed?” This submission involves simply the construction of subdivision 7, section 1401, of the Revised Statutes. Said section provides that “the following property is exempt from taxation: .... Seventh. Mining claims, but machinery, property and improvements upon or appurtenant to mining claims shall not be so exempt.” The tenth subdivision of said section includes “possessory rights to public lands.” It is not, as we consider it, necessary to enter into a philological discussion of the origin or general meaning of the term “mining claim.” What does the term mean as used in the statute under consideration? The organic act of the territory of Idaho contains a provision similar, if not exact, with that of most of the territories. Section 1851 of the Revised Statutes of United States, provides: “The legislative power of every territory shall extend to all rightful subjects of legislation, not inconsistent with the constitution and laws of the United States. But no law shall be passed interfer
Section 1400 of the Revised Statutes, which is the existing law in this state, provides that “all property in this territory
The constitution of Nevada (article 10) prescribes the taxation of “all property, real, personal, and possessory, excepting mines and mining claims, the proceeds of which alone shall be taxed.” It is evident that the makers of the consti
It will not do, in the consideration of this case, to place too-much reliance upon the decisions in California and Nevada. The conditions are so very different. We have no law in this-state subjecting the product of mines to taxation, and, if the-
It is objected that many patented mines are nonproductive. So, also, is much other property in the state. But the law provides (Laws 1899, sec. 1, p. 215) : “All taxable property must be assessed at its full cash value.” If A owns one hundred and sixty acres of land, all of which is under improvement, and from which he is receiving a large yearly revenue, it is not presumable that B, who owns one hundred and sixty-acres of sagebrush land adjoining him, none or but a very small part of which is under improvement, and from which B is receiving no revenue whatever, will “be assessed at the same value as that of A. And it is presumable that the like rule will obtain in regard to mines, certainly if regard is had to the law. That the legislature has the absolute authority to exempt all mines and mining property from taxation is unquestioned, but such intention should be expressed in direct, and unequivocal terms. Questions of such importance, involving such vital consequences to the state and to the people, ought not to be left to the fallibility of construction. The judgment of the district court is reversed, and cause remanded, with instructions to enter judgment in favor of the defendant dismissing the action, with costs of appeal to appellant.
Concurrence Opinion
I concur in the views so ably expressed by Mr. Chief Justice Huston. The theory of the lower court and that urged here by counsel for respondent, in my opinion, overlooks well-established rules of construction in construing our revenue statutes. As suggested in the opinion formulated by Mr., Chief Justice Huston, the only question to be determined here is, What did the legislature intend to be understood by the use of the term “mining claims” in our revenue statutes? Title 10 of the Revised Statutes is entitled “Revenue.” The
Without specifying or enumerating the well-known rules of statutory construction which must be followed in deciding the question before us, I will make some general observations relative to the question here. Title 10, supra, is strictly speaking, a revenue statute. Its object and purpose is to raise revenue. Within the meaning of the various sections found in that title, the word “real estate” includes possessory claims to the public lands of the United States, whether those lands are mineral or nonmineral. It is so expressly declared. “All mines, minerals and quarries in and under the land” are real estate, in the language of the statute, and the same is “property,” and so declared to be. What property is taxable? The statute says: “All property in this territory [state] not exempt under the laws of the United States, except as enumerated in the next section, is subject to taxation.” Careful reading of the whole of title 10, and all amendatory acts relating thereto, shows, to my mind, that it was the intention of the legislature to tax all property in this state, except such as is used for public schools, and public property belonging to the
The act of Congress quoted in the opinion of Mr. Chief Justice Huston prohibits the taxation of property belonging to the United States. The location of a mining claim under the laws of the United States, if properly made, makes the locator the owner of such mining claim as against all the world except the United States. To become the owner of such mining claim as against the United States, the locator must comply with the conditions required of him by the act of Congress by making $500 worth of improvements upon the mining claim, etc., and then apply for patent, and comply with all the regulations prescribed by law. When the locator does this, he is then entitled to, and receives, a patent for his mining claim, and becomes the private owner thereof against the government and all the world.
Keeping in mind the object and purpose of the statute under consideration — the raising of revenue — and keeping in
We are cited by counsel for respondent to a number of sections in the Revised Statutes where the term “mining claims” is used as illustrating the meaning of the term as used in the revenue statute. We are cited to section-4542 of the Ee-vised Statutes, in this connection. That section authorizes the court or judge thereof to order a survey of “any real property or mining claim, including ledges thereof,” which the claimant believes to be in the possession of another either by surface or underground holdings or workings, etc. To my mind, the term “mining claim,” as used in that section, was not intended to include mining property the title to which was in the claimant; for, if the Use of this term “mining claim” had been omitted entirely from said section, the language therein used would have authorized such survey upon a mining claim held subject to the paramount title of the United States.
We are referred by counsel for respondent to section 5125 of the Revised Statutes, relating to laborer's’ liens, where the expression, “who performs labor in any mining claim,” is used as illustrative of the intent with which the term “mining claim” is used in our revenue law. But this section of the Revised Statutes was expressly repealed by the legislature in 1893, and a new statute upon this subject enacted, wherein this language is used by the legislature, “or performs labor in any mine or mining claim”; and by this new statute, even in our mechanic’s lien law, it appears that the legislature had in view a distinction between mining property held by the private owner under title in himself and the mere location of mining property held subject to the paramount title of the United States government.
The rule is well established that in construing revenue statutes the exceptions thereto exempting property must be strictly construed. This rule does not conflict with, but carries out the intention of, section 4 of the Eevised Statutes, cited supra, establishing the rule of liberal construction in this state. But the rule of construction contended for by the respondent violates these rules of construction, as it tends to defeat, to some extent, the raising of revenue, and, instead of promoting justice, promotes injustice. There is no justice nor reason in exempting mines owned by private individuals, and held or worked for their especial benefit, from taxation. I do not believe that the legislature intended so to do, and I am unwilling that this court shall, by construction, exempt a large proportion of the property in this state which is owned by private individuals, and held and operated for the benefit of such private owners, from taxation.
Dissenting Opinion
I cannot concur in the conclusion reached by my associates. In the question submitted for decision herein the expression "mining claims” is used twice, and applied to patented mining land. The question is as follows: “Were mining claims for which United States patents had been issued exempt from taxation in 1898, when the mining claims herein-before mentioned were assessed ?” The decision must turn upon the meaning of the term “mining claims” as used in section 1401 of the Revised Statutes. Counsel who prepared and submitted to this court the above-quoted question uses therein that term twice, and each time applies it to patented mining land. It is but proper to state here that Mr. Borah, who presented this case on the part of the respondent in this court, did not appear for him in the court below, and signed the stipulated facts on which appears the foregoing question. I am of the opinion that the legislature that enacted said section 1401 and other sections of our Revised Statutes, and the several legislatures that have amended and re-enacted said section, intended to and did apply said term to patented as well as unpatented mining claims. It is suggested in the opinion of Chief Justice Huston that it was
My associates hold that provisions concerning exemptions from taxation must be strictly construed, thus holding that, where said section .declares that the provisions of the Revised Statutes must be liberally construed, the expression “their provisions” only means a part of the provisions of the Revised Statutes, and not all of them. The object of said section 1401 was to exempt property from taxation, and that was to promote justice. It is stated that, if patented mining claims are exempted from taxation, great injustice would be done. Whether that be true or not, it is not the duty of this court to run a race of opinions with the legislative branch as to whether certain laws are just or unjust. The legislature is the sole judge of that question. It is proper to suppose that the legislature intended to and did promote justice by exempting certain property from taxation. Said section 1401 ought to be so interpreted as to include all property clearly intended by the law-making power to be exempted from taxation and no more.
Much has been said by counsel as to the meaning of the term “mining claims.” Under the revenue laws of Arizona it is held that that term does not include patented mining ground; that a mining claim, after the patent of the United States is issued conveying it, then, under the laws of that territory, becomes '“lands” or “real estate.” (See Waller v. Hughes (Ariz.), 11 Pac. 122.) The statute of Arizona defining the words “land” and “real estate” is different from ours, and if it were not, that case would not be decisive of the one at bar. The supreme court of the United States in Smelting Co. v. Kemp, 104 U. S. 649, 26 L. ed. 875, defines a “mining claim” as a parcel of land eon-