delivered the opinion of the court.
Miсhael Theodore Salina (Salina) was found guilty by a jury of two counts of grand larceny by cheсk. His punishment was fixed at imprisonment for eight years on each count. We granted a writ of error to the trial court’s order sentencing Salina on these verdicts. The only issue here is Salina’s claim that the trial court erred in failing to sustain his challenge for cause to four members of the venire.
Salina was charged with larceny by check from two Winchester banks. Voir dire examination disсlosed that four of the members of the venire owned stock in one or both of the banks. Each indicated that his stock ownership was not “substantial”. When asked whether *93 their stock ownership would in any way affect their “judgment in the case involving theft from that bank”, two of the veniremen unequivoсally answered “no”; Venireman Johnson responded: “I don’t think so”; and Venireman Belchic answered: “Yes. No. I doubt that it would affect my judgment.”
Salina’s attorney moved that these four veniremen be stricken for cause in view of their stock ownership. This motion was denied by the trial court and thrеe of the veniremen, including Johnson and Belchic, served on the jury at trial.
In any criminal prosecution, the accused is entitled to a trial by an impartial jury. U.S. Const, amend. VI; Va. Const, art. I, § 8.
If, upon
voir dire
examination or upon othеr competent evidence, it appears that a juror does not stand indifferent in the cause, another shall be drawn or called and placed in his stead for the trial of that case. Code § 8-208.28; Rules of Court 3A:20(b). It is the duty of the trial court, through the legal machinery provided for thаt purpose, to procure an impartial jury to try every case.
Slade
v.
Commonwealth,
While the Attorney Genеral appears to concede that the stockholder of a corporation is disqualified to serve as a juror in civil litigation in which that corporation is a party or hаs a pecuniary interest, he argues that the same rule does not apply to a criminal prosecution where the corporation is the victim of the crime. He says this is so because the criminal offense is one against the state for a “public wrong”. In support of this position, he cites no direct authority but relies on general statements from various opiniоns which are made inapposite by the facts of those cases.
That a stockholder in a company which is a party to a lawsuit is incompetent to sit as a juror is well settled.
Chesnut
v.
Ford Motor Co.,
Some courts have gone so far as tо disqualify, as a principal challenge, relatives within the prohibited degree of relationship to a stockholder in a cause where the corporation is a party or hаs a pecuniary interest. Armor. 86 A.L.R. 120. Thus in Miller v. United States, 38 App. D.C. 361, 40 L.R.A. (N.S.) 973 (1912), the son of a stock *94 holder was held subject to “common-law disqualification” in a criminal prosecution for embezzlement from the corporation.
A member of a cooperative association has been held to be disqualifiеd on the trial of a defendant for a burglary of the association’s property,
State
v.
Thomlinson,
78 S. D. 235,
In
Jaques
v.
Commonwealth,
The reasons underpinning the disqualification of prospective jurors within the prоhibited degree of consanguinity or affinity to the victim set forth in Jaques, i.e., “that the feelings of the party injured and of his relations, are generally more excited by a personal wrong or an injury to рroperty resulting in prosecution for felony, than in ordinary controversies involving mere questiоns of property,” apply with even greater force where, as here, the criminal act suffered by the corporation has the direct effect of diminishing the assets of the corporation held for the benefit of its stockholders. We cannot see how, in such circumstances, a stockholder, regardless of the size of his holdings, could be said to stand indifferent in the cause.
This judgment is reversed and remanded for a> new trial.
Reversed and remanded.