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Sales v. Grant
224 F.3d 293
4th Cir.
2000
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*2 which each defendant listed qualified im- LUTTIG, Circuit Judge: munity, but not sovereign immunity, Alphonso Defendants John among their affirmative defenses. Mason Grant, members the Electoral Board of and Grant next moved for judg- Lynchburg, Virginia, *3 ment, in which they motion failed to assert the quashing from district court’s of their qualified either or sovereign immunity. motions for summary judgment. In those The district did not rule on court the mo- motions, the qualified defendants asserted tion, a ensued, and four-day trial during and sovereign from al- suit for which Mason and Grant never once assert- legedly causing plaintiffs Inez Sales and ed either claim of immunity. After both Miller, Lynchburg Debra former Assistant plaintiffs the and the defendants pre- had Registrars, reappointed. to be Sales evidence, sented their Mason and Grant and Miller have to moved dismiss this moved for dismissal under Federal Rule of appeal, arguing appellants that the have Civil Procedure on grounds unrelated right waived their to assert either immuni- qualified to or sovereign immunity, and the ty. follow, Fоr the reasons grant that district court granted that motion. the motion part, to dismiss in deny that part, motion in part, affirm in and remand This court and reversed remanded for a proceedings. further Grant, new trial Sales v. 158 F.3d 768 (4th Cir.1998) (“Sales /”). During the I, course of Sales Mason and Grant never they After were not reappointed as As- asserted qualified either or sovereign im- Registrars sistant Lynch- munity. remand, On Mason and Grant action, burg, Sales and Miller filed moved for summary judgment, asserting § under alleging U.S.C. that they were immune from suit under Electoral Board members Mason and qualified doctrines of and sovereign Grant violated their rights constitutional immunity. The district quashed by causing them not to be reappointed motions, these explaining that this court of their political because Al- affiliations.1 trial, had remanded the for a case new and though the General Registrar, rather that it “inappropriate for the defen- members, than the Electoral Board or its dants to raise the qualified defenses оf possesses power to hire Assistant immunity and Eleventh Amendment im- law, Registrars Virginia see Va. munity at this late date.” J.A. 311. 24.2-112, Code Sales and Miller claim improperly Grant used appeal Mason and Grant now from the their influence over Regis- the General quashing of their motions trar to control her appointment decision. judgment. Sales and Miller have moved

Mason and Grant to this responded appeal, arguing to the com- dismiss that Mason plaint by filing a motion to and have right which Grant wаived their to as- did not qualified mention sert sovereign qualified im- both and immuni- munity, and which was They ty- denied. then appellees filed Registrar, suit Mason and General Electoral and the Board capacities in both However, Grant their individual and itself as defendants. Mason and capacities in their official as members parties Grant only were the to file the sum- Electoral Board. Grant remains defendant mary judgment subject motions are the but, in both court, by order of the district appeal or to file a notice of from Mason is now defendant in motions, quashing and those are thus capacity, longer because he is no only defendants-appellants now before member of the Electoral Board. this court. complaint The section 1983 also named a Board, member third Electoral circumstances, we have no Under these

II. concluding that the defendants trouble claim that first Mason seriously their press waived their to they are entitled immunity for thе claim Miller. brought by Sales suit from the remand. time after in their motion to argue and Miller Sales addressed this court has not Although and Grant have dismiss claim of whether a this affirma right to assert their waived under the exact factual immunity is waived by failing pursue tive defense here, our conclusion present circumstances agree, I. We after Sales remand in this court’s decision finds dismiss grant therefore McGraw, 125 Corp. Industries v. assertion Suarez and Grant’s respect to Mason *4 (4th Cir.1997), in which we held immunity. qualified immunity can be qualified of that a claim qualified that im It is well-settled squarely presented to the waived if not defense, and that munity is an affirmative immunity court, qualified and district that it rests with the pleading of “the burden time the first on cannot be asserted for Britton, 523 defendant.” Crawford-El Suarez, in appeal. Id. at As 1584, 586-87, their claim pressed here defendants never (1998) (quoting Gomez v. To L.Ed.2d 759 and immunity prior appeal, to qualified of 639-641, ledo, in Suarez no doubt that the result we have (1980)). Although Mason L.Ed.2d 572 same had the defen- wоuld have been the qualified their technically pled and Grant qualified cursorily mentioned dants there to the defense in their answers immunity It is immunity in their initial answer. thus they explained never complaint, initial Suarez, that, and Mason Grant clear claim of for their legal or factual basis quali- have asserted permissibly could not remand after immunity to qualified prior I. To immunity on Sales fied Indeed, qualified of their mention Sales seriously pursue to allow Mason and Grant answers consisted immunity their for the immunity claim qualified their the mat single, cursory sentence on only a I would be to time on remand after Sales ter, affir listing in a of several contained on the their waiver of that defense forgive individual defen “The mative defenses: that court chose to fortuity mere this re- immunity by qualified protected dants are appeal. the first This ‍​​‌​‌‌​‌​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​​‌‌​‌‌‌​​‌‌‌​​​‌​‌‌​‌‌​‌​‌‌​​‍mand' the case after Grant from suit.” Answer of Defendant decline to do. And, 4; at 4. Mason Answer of Defendant that above, concluding Mason although the defen as recounted right to assert have waived their opportunities other Grant had numerous dants not hold qualified we do cate their claim to remand to assert that a section 1983 defendant gorically do so. immunity, they failed to qualified qualified im any pursue must defense omitted Specifically, and Grant munity every possible occasion order immunity from their mention raise that defense preserve his and for sum motions to dismiss pre-trial Rather, we proceedings. hold later mary presentation judgment, from where, here, only a defendant trial, only that four-day and from during case their immunity cursorily As references for dismissal. post-trial their complaint, I, such, his answer to section after Sales prior to remand mention, let alone might play and thereafter fails notion that seriously his assertion of affir press, Grant’s defense a role Mason and defense, once, despite filing several dis- mative only to the court mentioned district occasion, in thе district and, positive motions the defendants even on in a trial on the mer despite participating to how any explanation as provide failed to claim, that defen- the section 1983 immunity might apply. its of why qualified actively pursue dant claim of Mason and argument Grant’s amounts to an qualified immunity for the first time on assertion that a state may convert suits, or all individual capacity remand after protections

which the of sovereign immuni ty would inapplicable, otherwisе be into III. suits, capacity official with all the attend protections ant of the Eleventh Amend Mason and next argue Grant ment, (via by announcing statute or other they are entitled to Eleventh Amendment wise) that it will indemnify governmental monetary from the suit for dam officers sued their individual capacities ages brought Sales and Be Miller. by creating an plan insurance to fi cause Sales and Miller seek award of nance that indemnification. As Sales and damages against Mason and Grant in out, point Miller and Mason and Grant their we conclude recognize, themselves Appellants’ see Re are not entitled to ply Br. at the courts of appeal have protection from suit under the Eleventh decisively rejected See, argument. Amendment.2 e.g., v. Georgia Jackson Dep’t Transp., In asserting sovereign immunity from 1573, 1577-78 Cir.1994) (“We *5 imposition monetary liability against conclude that the voluntarily existence of a capacities, them their individual Mason liаbility established trust fund does not challenge and Grant do not the well-estab- make party the state the real in interest in rule that lished the Eleventh Amendment this action and that the trust fund does not generally damages does not bar suits for extend the state’s Eleventh Amendment officers, against state long so as those immunity to its employees sued in their officers are sued in capaci- their individual capacity.”); individual Benning v. Board of See, Graham, e.g., ties. v. Kentucky 473 Univs., Regents 775, Regency 928 F.2d 159, 165-66, 3099, 105 S.Ct. 87 (7th Cir.1991) (“[T]he 778-79 statе cannot (1985). Rather, L.Ed.2d 114 Mason and manufacture immunity employees for its because, Grant contend that Virgi- under' simply by volunteering indemnify law, any monetary nia judgment against them.... state’s [A] decision to indemni paid them would be out of a state-funded fy employees its does not transform suit 2.1-526.8, plan, insurance see Va.Code against individual defendants into a suit by a check drawn on the general state’s against sovereign.”); Griess v. Colora treasury, do, (10th Cir.1988) by 1042, suit is barred the Elev- 1046 (“[T]he enth disagree. Amendment. We position state’s an boils down to above, 2. As noted presently only sought while Mason is by The relief Sales and Miller only defendant in this action in (and his individual against point, Mason at this capacity. Grant remains a defendant in both Grant) only capacities in their official is that capacities. and official We un- they (along with the other current members of Mason) (along derstand Grant with to have Board) by the Electoral be ordered the district immunity only asserted Eleventh Amendment Registrar court to direct General Read to fill monetary sought against as to the relief him Registrar positions. the two Assistant See id. capacity. in his individual reference Although apparent why there is no reason capacity portion to the official of the lawsuit sovereign immunity request pro- from this portions of Mason and Grant's briefs spective injunctive relief would be available to sovereign that immunity prin- discuss is to the Grant, see, Jordan, e.g., Edelman v. that, officers, ciple thеy as state cannot be 651, 667-68, 1347, 415 U.S. personally obligated pay monetary judg- (1974), L.Ed.2d 662 because we under- do not against ments entered them in their official stand them to have such asserted capacities. Appellants' See Br. at 28. Sales any we leave it to the district court to address point, and Miller do not contest this and in- might such assertion of that be only sought monetary deed have relief made remand. capaci- Mason and Grant in their individual (complaint). ties. See J.A. 24 Rеgents decision in preme Court’s its unilaterally'to extend attempt Doe, v. University employees by the all of its immunity to California (1997), 900, 137 L.Ed.2d S.Ct. obligation for illusory of an assumption held that the a unanimous Court in which constitu- The state’s indemnification- would government the federal fact that artificially ma- immunity cannot be tional university litigation indemnify a state fashion.”); Spruytte v. in this nipulated judgment did and for adverse costs (6th Walters, n. 6 F.2d 512 & immu- Amendment not alter the Eleventh Cir.1985) (“A may not manu- government university. Id. at enjoyed by the nity employees for its facture holding, In so the Court 117 S.Ct. 900. them.”); v. Demery indemnify agreeing that rejected the notion (9th 1146-49 Kupperman, by the entity protected whether Cir.1984).3 Amendment should be converted Eleventh Webb, Beardsley 30 F.3d 524 fi- question of ultimate “into a formalistic Cir.1994), that a state’s agreed that liability,” and made clear nancial cannot invest of indemnification promise reasoning precedents in its none of the officers, sued their indi- governmental pres- to the notion that “lends sovereign immunity viduаl party’s under- of a third ence or absence enjoy. See they would not otherwise indemnify agency should de- taking to Although we noted id. Beards- entity kind it is the termine whether had not estab- that the defendant there ley treated as an arm that should be plan that the insurance would lished 430-31, 117 900. The Id. at State.” state-funded, see id. at indemnify him was that “it is the enti- thus concluded Court 531-32, that the fact we do not believe than liability, rather ty’s potential legal here warrants has been established such pаrty a third ability inability require from that reached different conclusion *6 it, discharge liability the or to to reimburse To rule otherwise would be Beardsley. instance, that is relevant” completely the a state to eviscerate permit inquiry. We are the Eleventh Amendment are not governmental rule that officers that, confronted confident were the Court monetary liability when sued immune from us, case, now such as the one before with capacities. And this in their individual in their sued individu- in which defеndants at no to the would come cost evisceration capacities al asserted for, by states, proposed the rule of indemnifica- promise on ‍​​‌​‌‌​‌​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​​‌‌​‌‌‌​​‌‌‌​​​‌​‌‌​‌‌​‌​‌‌​​‍a state’s based Grant, promised to once a state Mason and tion, to allow that the Court would decline sued in their individual indemnify officers im- with to invest the defendants promise the “insurance fund” estab- capacities, en- they would not otherwise munity that promised to finance the indemnifica- lished just it declined to allow the mecha- joy, to contain funds tion would not have entity divest an of indemnification to nism all, all in federal court given that suits enjoyed it otherwise prohibited officers would be against state Regents. by consent the state.

absent therefore conclude We by indemni- the Eleventh concluding promise protected In that a are Grant monetary non-immune sta- from the suit does not alter the Amendment fication have filed damages in their individual Sales officers sued tus state capacities.4 them in their individual from the Su- we derive 1045; 4; Griess, 841 F.2d at Dem 1576 & n. present dispute, in at least three of 3. As in the ery, 5. above, 735 F.2d at 1146-47 & n. by the state assumed the cases cited indemnify employ obligation statute rejecting and Grant’s claim of In against them in their ees for awards entered merits, immunity on the Amendment Eleventh See Jackson, capacities. 16 F.3d at necessarily deny Sales and Miller's we order, CONCLUSION case.” And indeed, it went on to reason that agreed with plain- the herein, For grаnt the reasons stated tiffs “that these defendants raise appellees’ the motion to dismiss these motions [Eleventh Amendment and respect appellants’ with to the assertion of qualified immunity] with the court post- qualified immunity, deny the motion to trial” because approach “this pro- would respect dismiss with to the appellants’ judicial mote efficiency and economy.” claim of sovereign immunity, and affirm of the district court The reasons for the treatment of the resрect to appellants’ by indirection, assertion of sov- issue both the district ereign immunity. We also remand the court and the majority, yet are to be ex- and, case for further proceedings plained events, consistent in all neither rec- has opinion with this opinion ognized and the of this Supreme decisions court in I. Sales Court and our court that Eleventh Amend- ment immunity may time, be raised at any

It is so ordered appeal. Jordan, even on Edelman v. 651, 677-78, 94 S.Ct. 39 L.Ed.2d WIDENER, Judge, concurring Circuit (1974); Ford Mоtor Co. v. Department dissenting: the Treasury, 459, 467, (1945); Collins, 89 L.Ed. 389 Re (4th Cir.1999). majori concur the result ty decision as to Eleventh Amendment imm III. unity.*

As to the II. I respectfully dissent.

For some reason not stated in opin- majority depends Corp. on Suarez ion, the majority expresses McGraw, “no opinion on Industries argument, Cir.1997), included the motion to proposition that a claim that Mason and Grant waived of qualified ‍​​‌​‌‌​‌​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​​‌‌​‌‌‌​​‌‌‌​​​‌​‌‌​‌‌​‌​‌‌​​‍immunity can be waived “if not their right to assert sovereign immunity squarely presented” to the district court by failing to make that assertion and that immunity cannot be as remand I.” Slip after Sales n. 4. p. serted first time on Sua *7 court, While the district in opinion its rez did hold that where a claim of qualified 17, 1999, May similarly ques- avoided the immunity had nowhere been mentioned in waiver, tion of announcing that it “declined until appeal, the case it could not be men to entertain summary judgment new mo- tioned for the appeal, first time on it but by defendants,” tions in its order of did not hold that the rea-son was that the 25, 1999, May certifying the appeal as matter not “squarely presented to the frivolous, (italics added). considering even Eleventh district court” It used immunity, Amendment it described “the “squarely” the word in deciding that the giving defense rise to the appeal question has been presented. had not been In Sua waived because it should have been raised rez the defense had not been mentioned prior decided to the otherwise, first trial until appeal, squarely or there- respect to dismiss this immunity. with to the Maj. op. Eleventh Amendment However, Eleventh Amendment claim. p. judgment 298. But that refused to consider express opinion argument, no on the included subject. majority The then decides the in the motion to merits, Eleventh Amendment on its right Grant waived their to assert having just affirmed the district court which immunity by failing to make that assertion question. refused decide prior to remand after Sales I. * decision, majority example, The affirms judgment respect of the district court with May order of court’s in of district long-time precedent fоllowed fore we raised could be any 1999 that defense immunity, as qualified permitting after before, I mention which defense, new trial but not raised for to be affirmative other later. the first time on of Suarez is construction That strained such as an affirmative defense While opinion by de- majority

justified in the in a immunity must be asserted qualified only “cursorily as scribing the defense “sufficiently is pleading, responsive majority emphasis of the The mentioned.” by Rule 8 its bare purposes raised cursory treatment it describes as on what v. District Council assertion.” Santos adjec- on that by dependence is shown (2d 963, 967 City, York 619 F.2d New be, adverb, tive, the case or as Cir.1980). Pittsburgh- See also Kulzer opinion. of its paragraphs three successive (2d Cir. Corning Corp., and 296. Maj. op. pp. 295-96 1991) (statute de limitations affirmative However, any rigor of the answers pp. 295-96 “need not be raised fense following is the and bare asser degree specificity” of the defendants both ous prevent is sufficient affirmative dеfense: tion answer waiver). Thus, an Grant’s pro- defendants are 51. The individual swer, defense of pleading the affirmative immunity from suit. by qualified tected entirely satisfied the immunity, qualified here, Cursive, means cursory, as used or 8(c). Rule requirements of or casual manner in an offhand “delivered detail.” Web attention to great without the defendants ef- the fact that Despite Dictio New International ster’s Third immunity as an fectively pleaded the defendants suggest that nary, p. 558.1 defense, majority holds affirmаtive explicit more hardly could have been right to waived their that the defendants adjective used defense, and that the their immunity on remand assert the defense is by majority denigrate they did not mention retrial because to the badly place. out of an- than in their other swers, the dis- subsequent motions to IV. during the trial Sales On trict court who majority party concludes that contrary, I that a defendant submit a Rule 50 makes a motion for for, granted, moves and is who ultimate- prevails, law and but a matter of way in no ground, on one judgment based appel- reversed ly has that decision his other affirmative defenses waives trial, for new late court and remanded are and these defenses pleaded, have been to assert a effectively waives the the case is remanded available in the event defense pleaded affirmative previously trial, as here. for a new effect, trial. this hold- during the new Here, not rule on the the trial court did moving fоr a ing requires that a defendant *8 motion, summary judgment defendant’s possible all de- judgment Rule 50 assert motion, disposing of the case any remain- and took no action in or her fenses was defendant’s Rule 50 motion Even until the deemed waived. ing defenses will be the at trial. receiving made evidence majority decision after place, more out trial dispute that had the beyond It is pass on all the requires a district court early summary initially denied an if it one court even considеrs theories asserted qualified immu- motion claim of judgment them as here. Because dispositive, would have been able nity, defendants explicitly pleaded in defendants this case immunity in a sub- answer, either assert immunity in their quali- motion or at trial sequent have not because that defendants would hold immunity raised at various may be to assert this defense on fied waived their See stages dispute. of a and successive true in view particularly remand. This is 301 Pelletier, 299, 306-07, Behrens v. 516 (cita- U.S. 472 526, U.S. at 105 S.Ct. 2806 834, (1996). 116 133 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 773 A omitted). tion may defendant a qualified raise im Thus, clearly Mitchell establishes that an munity pleadings defense at the stage rejecting order defense of motion to plain “unless the immunity at either stage the dismissal allegations tiffs state claim of violation the summary judgment stage is a “final” law, clearly established a defendant judgment subject appeal. to immediate pleading qualified immunity is entitled to Since an unsuccessful appeal from a dismissal before denial the commеncement of dis of dismissal covery.” cannot Forsyth, possibly Mitchell v. render 511, 526, later 86 L.Ed.2d denial of a summary motion for judg- (1985). Next, a defendant move for ment any “final,” less it that peti- follows sum-mary judgment is entitled to such appeal tioner’s falls within 1291 and dis- “if discovery fails to uncover evidence suf missal improper. genuine ficient to create a issue as to Behrens, 299, 306-07, whether the defendant fact committed (1996) (italics 133 L.Ed.2d 773 in orig- Mitchell, acts.” those 472 U.S. at inal). Finally, S.Ct. 2806. “Mitchell makes it clear that ... with respect decisions A case on facts indistinguishable, for all dismissal or judgment, if ad practical purposes, from those here is verse, preclude do not interposition Daingerfield Island Protective Society v. the defense of as a defense to Babbitt, (D.C.Cir.1994). 40 F.3d 442 liability on the merits.” v. Kennedy Babbitt, granted the court summary judg- Cleveland, 797 F.2d Cir. ment to the grounds defendant on unrelat- 1986). ed to its statute of limitations affirmative problem addressed this case has defense, which pleaded had been аs a de- length been discussed at the decision in Babbitt, fense in defendant’s answer. Kennedy discussion Behrens F.3d at 444. The D.C. Circuit reversed Pelletier, ‍​​‌​‌‌​‌​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​​‌‌​‌‌‌​​‌‌‌​​​‌​‌‌​‌‌​‌​‌‌​​‍as follows: grant the initial of summary judgment and say While Mitchell did not that a defen remanded the case to the district court. dant could quali from denial of a remand, On again the defendant moved for fied-immunity defense more than summary judgment arguing that the action once,[*] clearly it contemplated that he was barred the statute of limitations. raisе could at defense successive Babbitt, 40 F.3d at 444. This motion was stages: granted, plaintiff again and the appealed, plaintiffs “Unless the allegations state asserting that the defendant had waived a claim of of clearly violation estab- Babbitt, its statute of limitations defense. law, lished pleading quali- defendant 40 F.3d at 444. The D.C. Circuit held that fied is entitled to dismissal merely pleading the affirmative defense in before the commencement of discov- 8(c) the answer satisfied Rule and that the ery. if Even the plaintiffs complaint defendant did not waive its statute of limi-

adequately alleges the commission of by failing tations defense assert be- acts that clearly violated established Babbitt, fore the first law, the defendant is entitled to sum- stated, 444-45. As mary discovery govern- if “the fails to uncover ment adequately evidence sufficient to create a raised limitations de- *9 genuine issue as to whether fense in the defen- its answer—it not required dant fact committed those acts.” reassert the defense in subsequent suc- * however, [Footnote 2] Interestingly, Appeals assigned Mitchell Court of this Court nor itself dealt with the of two second interlocu- significance aspect to the successive tory appeals claims. See 472 second 515-19, U.S. at 105 S.Ct. 2806. Neither the motion.” Bab

cessful that the

bitt, suggest F.3d at 445. issue correctly decided the Circuit

D.C. majority’s decision correct.

contrary is not

V. judgment of sum, affirming ‍​​‌​‌‌​‌​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​​‌‌​‌‌‌​​‌‌‌​​​‌​‌‌​‌‌​‌​‌‌​​‍court, only goes majority not

district Court, Supreme of the advice immu questions

which is early rather than decided

nity are better Mitchell,

late, see authority against all it holds defense should not of that the merits at all. Even the district

be considered and would have relented apparently as indi post-trial, the defense

considered 25, 1999. May its order

cated judgment of the vacate

I would the case with court and remand

district consider the defense

instructions Behrens and

Kennedy v. Cleveland. America,

UNITED STATES

Plaintiff-Appellee, BOWENS, Scooter,

Spencer a/k/a a/k/a McCurdy,

Clyde, Melvin a/k/a a/k/a Johnson, Defendant-Appellant.

Doc

No. 99-4060. Appeals, Court

United States

Fourth Circuit. 29, 2000

Argued: Feb. 18, 2000

Decided: Aug.

Case Details

Case Name: Sales v. Grant
Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
Date Published: Aug 16, 2000
Citation: 224 F.3d 293
Docket Number: 99-1650
Court Abbreviation: 4th Cir.
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