Opinion
This appeal arises out of a tragic incident. Four teenagers attended an all-night party and then attempted to drive home. Unfortunately, the driver of the vehicle crashed into a tree, killing herself and one passenger and severely injuring the two other passengers. The two injured parties (Shion Sakiyama (Sakiyama) and Julie Kuo (Kuo)) and the parents of the two deceased teenagers (Lynn Chen (Chen) and Suel Lee (Lee))
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brought the instant lawsuit against numerous persons, including AMF Bowling Centers, Inc. (AMF), the owner of the facility where the party was held. Appellants theorize that AMF is liable under traditional
Moreover, the trial court properly denied appellants’ motion for reconsideration. The motion failed to include new facts and/or new law, and even if some of the facts could be constmed as “new,” they do not alter the conclusion that AMF did not owe a duty to appellants.
FACTUAL 2 AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On March 13-14, 1999, a “rave” party 3 was held at AMF’s roller skating rink, World on Wheels. Chen, Lee, Sakiyama, and Kuo, all teenagers, arrived at the event between 10:00 p.m. and 10:30 p.m.
Drug Use
According to appellants, drugs were being used and sold at the event. In fact, Kuo purchased “ecstasy” about 30 minutes after arriving at World on Wheels. She purchased two tabs of the drug, which she divided into halves. Both she and Lee each took half a tab of ecstasy approximately 45 minutes after arriving at the skating rink. Although Kuo did not see Sakiyama take any ecstasy, Sakiyama later told her that she had taken her share of the drugs. Neither Kuo nor Sakiyama know whether Chen ingested any ecstasy while at the party.
Various items (which appellants characterize as drug paraphernalia), including pacifiers, whistles, masks, and glow sticks, were sold at the party. However, AMF and its security personnel took numerous steps to confiscate and remove both drugs and drug paraphernalia from the facility. Specifically, prior to the party, AMF employees were told that because attendees would try to sneak into the event with drugs, they were required to identify any such persons and confiscate the drugs. Before attendees could enter the party, they were searched twice—once outside the facility and once inside the roller skating rink—and any known drug paraphernalia (surgical masks, dust spray, balloons, and Vick’s Vapor Rub bottles) was confiscated. During the party, AMF employees confiscated drugs and drug paraphernalia. Moreover, drug dealers were identified and ejected from the premises.
There is no evidence that AMF furnished appellants, or anyone else, with drugs.
Car Accident
The four girls left the rave party while it was still dark out. After exiting the arena, all four girls sat down for about 30 minutes because they were tired. A security guard then approached them and told them that it was time to leave.
Once in the car, Kuo and Lee fell asleep almost immediately. Chen and Sakiyama discussed whether Chen felt able to drive. Chen told Sakiyama that she “could drive.”
According to Sakiyama, they got lost after leaving World on Wheels. It took them between 45 minutes and one hour to find the freeway. They were so tired that they rolled down the car windows and turned the volume on the radio up loud.
Sakiyama fell asleep approximately a half-hour after entering the freeway. Before she fell asleep, Chen seemed to be driving fine.
Over an hour after they left the party and about 30 miles from the roller skating
Procedural History
In March 2000, Sakiyama, Kuo, and the successors in interest of Lee, filed their first amended complaint for personal injuries and wrongful death. In September 2000, Hsin Hwa Chen and Chin Chih Ting, individually and as successors in interest of Chen, filed their complaint for wrongful death. The two separate lawsuits were thereafter consolidated and transferred to one court.
On April 13, 2001, AMF filed its motion for summary judgment, arguing, inter alia, that it did not owe a duty of care to appellants. Appellants opposed the motion, asserting that AMF owed them (and the general public) a duty not to participate in the creation of a rave, which they define as a dangerous event. On May 21, 2001, the trial court granted AMF’s motion for summary judgment, adopting AMF’s argument that it did not owe a duty to appellants.
Thereafter, appellants filed a motion for reconsideration of the trial court’s order. Appellants asserted that they possessed both new facts and new law which warranted reconsideration. AMF filed an opposition, and on June 27, 2001, the trial court denied the motion for reconsideration, reasoning that “there is no new evidence to suggest AMF had a duty to prevent Plaintiff’s [sic] from acquiring and ingesting the drug Ecstasy and then thereafter not driving a car.” After a signed judgment could not be located in the trial court file, judgment was entered nunc pro tunc with a retroactive date of June 12, 2001, in favor of AMF and against appellants.
This timely appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
I. Motion for Summary Judgment
A. Standard of Review
“A trial court properly grants summary judgment where no triable issue of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).) We review the trial court’s decision de novo.”
(Merrill v. Navegar, Inc.
(2001)
Exercising our independent judgment as to the legal effect of the undisputed facts
(Spitler v. Children’s Institute International
(1992)
B. AMF Did Not Owe Appellants a Duty of Care
“Actionable negligence is traditionally regarded as involving the following: (a) a
legal duty
to use due care; (b) a
breach
of
In
Rowland v. Christian
(1968)
1. Foreseeability
“[F]oreseeability of the risk is a primary consideration in establishing the element of duty. [Citation.]”
(Weirum, supra,
To support a duty of care, the foreseeability must be reasonable.
(Juarez
v.
Boy Scouts of America, Inc.
(2000)
That being said “foreseeability alone is not sufficient to create an independent tort duty. ‘ “Whether a defendant owes a duty of care is a question of law. Its existence depends upon the foreseeability of the risk and a weighing of policy considerations for and against imposition of liability.” [Citation.]’
(Burgess v. Superior Court
(1992)
Appellants contend that AMF’s conduct in promoting and producing the “all night drug infested rave to teenagers” satisfies the foreseeability requirement because the party was “sufficiently likely to result in auto accidents” which would injure both rave attendees and members of the general public. We agree with appellants that “the low threshold for foreseeability is met here.”
(Adams
v.
City of Fremont
(1998)
However, as established by legal authority and demonstrated by the facts in the instant case, “almost any result was foreseeable with the benefit of hindsight.”
(Adams, supra,
Before we discuss the other
Rowland
factors, however, we must dispose of appellants’ heavy reliance upon
Weirum, supra,
Upon learning that the disc jockey was nearby, two teenage drivers were racing to follow him and win a prize. In attempting to follow the disc jockey’s vehicle, one of the two drivers forced a third party’s car onto the center divider of the freeway, where it overturned. The driver was killed, and his family brought an action for wrongful death against the radio station.
The California Supreme Court considered “whether defendant owed a duty to decedent arising out of its broadcast of the giveaway contest” (Weirum, supra, 15 Cal.3d at pp. 45—46), and concluded that it did. “It was foreseeable that defendant’s youthful listeners, finding the prize had eluded them at one location, would race to arrive first at the next site and in their haste would disregard the demands of highway safety.” (Id. at p. 47.) Moreover, the court’s opinion rested largely upon the facts presented in that case. “The giveaway contest was no commonplace invitation to an attraction available on a limited basis. It was a competitive scramble in which the thrill of the chase to be the one and only victor was intensified by the live broadcasts which accompanied the pursuit.... In [other] situations there is no attempt, as here, to generate a competitive pursuit on public streets, accelerated by repeated importuning by radio to be the very first to arrive at a particular destination. Manifestly the [contest] bears little resemblance to daily commercial activities.” (Id. at p. 48.)
The all-night rave party is decidedly distinguishable from the contest at issue in Weirum. Unlike the radio contest, in which hazardous driving by teenagers was a necessary component of the game, the rave party was simply a party attended by teenagers. While drugs may have been anticipated, the teenagers did not need to use drugs to attend the party. AMF did not promote drug use; in fact, it took numerous steps to discourage and prevent drug use. And, although the party lasted all night, the attendees were not required to stay until they were too tired to drive home.
These distinctions between the instant case and Weirum are critical. While the radio station in Weirum had ongoing direct involvement in the act that caused the accident and injuries, AMF had no such direct link to the unfortunate accident in this case. Under these circumstances, applying the facts and holding of Weirum to this case would not only unduly broaden the scope of the legal duty of care, but it would also contradict the rationale of the social host liability cases discussed in section I.B.5, post, a leap in legal analysis we decline to take.
2. Degree of Certainty that Appellants Suffered Injury and Closeness of the Causal Connection
Although appellants undeniably were injured, their injuries were not closely connected to AMF’s conduct in renting its facility for a rave party. As set forth above, hosting a rave party does not equate with an unreasonable risk of harm. While the sale and consumption of drugs may have occurred at the party, there is no evidence that AMF encouraged or participated in drug use
4
or required the attendees to stay at the party. In fact, the evidence demonstrates just the opposite—AMF took numerous steps to prevent drug use at its facility. Contrariwise, there is a close connection between Chen’s decision to drive, the others’ decision to go in her car, and the regrettable accident. (See, e.g.,
Andre
v.
Ingram
(1985)
3. Moral Blame
“Moral blame has been applied to describe a defendant’s culpability in terms of the defendant’s state of mind and the inherently harmful nature of the defendant’s acts.... [Cjourts have required a higher
Here, there is nothing morally blameworthy about AMF’s decision to rent its roller skating rink for a rave party, particularly under the facts presented in this case. There is no evidence that AMF intended or planned for teenagers to drive while impaired, had actual or constructive knowledge that the rave would result in the subject vehicle collision, or acted with bad faith or a reckless indifference to the consequences of allowing its roller skating rink to be used for a rave. To the contrary, not only did AMF not provide drugs to the attendees, it took numerous steps to prevent drug use at its facility, including searching the attendees, confiscating drugs and drug paraphernalia, and evicting any drug dealers.
4. Policy of Preventing Future Harm, Extent of Burden to AMF, and Consequences to the Community
Appellants additionally argue that imposing liability upon AMF will advance the policy of preventing future harm to both partygoers and the general public. Although we agree that preventing vehicle accidents which result from drug use and/or fatigue is an important goal, we question whether the public policy of preventing future harm will be furthered by the imposition of liability.
Baldwin, supra,
The same analysis rings true in the instant case. There is no evidence that AMF collaborated with anyone to encourage partygoers to use ecstasy or other intoxicants. Absent such evidence, and coupled with evidence that AMF engaged in numerous measures to prevent drug use on its premises, the policy of preventing future harm is not strong in the instant case.
As such, other than speculation, there is no evidence that the type of harm appellants seek to prevent will follow a ruling which outlaws rave parties. As appellants concede, teenagers are highly susceptible to peer pressure. If they feel pressure to experiment with drugs or stay out all night, they might yield to that pressure, regardless of whether rave parties exist. (See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 1521 [acknowledging that the sale and use of ecstasy and other drugs is not limited to rave parties]; Note,
supra,
88 Va. L.Rev. at pp. 1622-1623 [commenting that “targeting all raves will not stop ecstasy use because the drug
Appellants insist that AMF had a duty to take steps in order to make the rave party a safe haven, including by shortening the time periods of the raves, providing transportation, offering resting accommodations to the attendees, and enacting “serious measures to curtail the use of drugs.” Imposing such requirements upon AMF would be unduly burdensome.
First, it is virtually impossible for a party organizer to rid all drugs from its facility. Ecstasy is small, described in this case by Sakiyama as similar to “a white Advil pill.” A party attendee easily could conceal such a small pill in order to bring it into the rave. And, AMF took more than reasonable steps to minimize the presence of drugs at the party, including by ejecting known drug dealers and requiring attendees to pass through two security check points.
Likewise, it would be impossible for a party host to accommodate “tired” party attendees. The expense of offering transportation and resting facilities would be enormous, not to mention raising additional safety concerns. Who would drive the patrons from the party? Where would they go? Who would supervise the resting rooms? And, who would bear the costs and risks of such measures?
Moreover, the party attendees were free to leave the party at any time if they were tired. AMF had no duty to prevent them from driving whenever they chose to leave, even if they were too fatigued or impaired to do so safely. (Knighten, supra, 206 Cal.App.3d at pp. 73-74.) Such a rule makes sense. How could AMF employees assess whether an attendee was capable of driving?
The alternative proposed by appellants—to ban all raves—would be onerous to our community. Appellants seek to prohibit rave parties because they provide a venue for attendees to stay up all night, potentially use drugs, and then drive when they are either under the influence or too fatigued to do so. Unfortunately, there is no evidence that the rave scene will cease if we hold business owners liable to persons injured after they leave a rave party. Rather, it is just as likely that rave parties in traditional commercial settings (such as AMF’s roller skating rink) will be replaced by raves in far more dangerous places, such as abandoned warehouses. (Note, supra, 88 Va. L.Rev. at p. 1604.)
Furthermore, if we were to accept appellants’ premise, then banning raves is not the only answer; rather, appellants are asking us to prohibit or impose liability upon other businesses or noncommercial events which also involve late night activities and possible drug and/or alcohol use. As set forth above, many business, including bars, casinos, movie theaters, restaurants, and sporting events would suffer drastic economic losses were we to adopt appellants’ argument. Accordingly, we decline to do so.
5. Social Host Liability
Our conclusion is consistent with social host liability decisions which have held that defendants who simply provide venues for drinking alcohol do not owe a duty of care to plaintiffs injured by guests who drive from the facilities while intoxicated. For example, in
Coulter, supra,
21 Cal.3d at pages 152-153, our Supreme Court held “that the service of alcoholic beverages to an obviously intoxicated person by one who knows that such intoxicated person intends to drive a motor vehicle creates a
reasonably foreseeable
risk of injury to those on
Following Coulter, the Court of Appeal in Leong, supra, 235 Cal.App.3d at pages 829-830, affirmed the dismissal of a wrongful death complaint. The plaintiffs’ son was killed by a drunk driver who had attended and became intoxicated at a San Francisco Giants baseball game. The plaintiffs brought a negligence claim against SF Parking, Inc., and the Giants, alleging that the defendants were liable because they knew or should have known that patrons would consume alcohol on their premises and, despite having this knowledge, failed to take reasonable steps to prevent or prohibit such conduct. (Id. at p. 830.) The trial court sustained the defendants’ demurrer, and the Court of Appeal affirmed, reasoning that the plaintiffs’ claim that the defendants “failed to prevent or to prohibit patrons from drinking and actually encouraging the use of the parking lot premises for drinking” could not proceed because the plaintiffs neglected to allege that the defendants actually furnished the patrons with alcohol. (Id. at p. 832.) The defendants could not be held liable, as a matter of law, “for simply permitting [patrons] to consume alcoholic beverages on [their] premises.” (Ibid.)
Other state courts have reached similar conclusions in the context of rave parties. For example, in
Looby v. Local 13 Productions
(Pa. 2000)
Similarly, in the instant case, appellants direct us to no evidence that AMF furnished drugs to the party attendees.
7
Thus, appellants are left with the sole claim that AMF had a duty not to host a rave party because it was foreseeable that drugs would be used, that Chen would ingest drugs, and that she would
thereafter drive either under the influence of ecstasy or while extremely fatigued. Although we agree that these activities were foreseeable, we cannot find, as a matter of law, that they equate with a duty of care. After all, AMF could not have prevented the rave attendees from
Our holding also comports with the rule that business owners do not have a duty to prevent persons either under the influence of alcohol or otherwise incompetent to drive from driving while impaired.
(Knighten, supra,
206 Cal.App.3d at pp. 73-74; see also
Nipper v. California Auto. Assigned Risk Plan
(1977)
C, D. *
II. Motion for Reconsideration *
CONCLUSION
We are sympathetic to the injured teenagers and the families of the deceased, and our opinion should not be construed as condoning what transpired on March 13-14, 1999. Nevertheless, we do not believe that we can or should ban rave parties, or allow providers of venues for such parties to face liability for the innumerable consequences which can follow a late night party often entailing drugs and/or alcohol. Rather, we reserve this issue for the Legislature, to the extent it finds that restrictions and/or regulations are necessary to remedy the perceived risks of rave parties. (See, e.g., Assembly Bill No. 1941 (2001-2002 Reg. Sess.) as amended May 15, 2002; Ill. House Bill No. 5952 (2001-2002 Gen. Assem.) as introduced Feb. 11, 2002.)
The judgment and orders of the trial court are affirmed. AMF is entitled to its costs on appeal.
Boren, R J., and Doi Todd, J., concurred.
A petition for a rehearing was denied August 6, 2003, and the petition of appellants Shion Sakiyama et al., for review by the Supreme Court was denied September 24, 2003.
Notes
Hisin Hwa Chen and Chin Chih Ting filed their lawsuit on behalf of Chen; Jong Hee Lee and Sun Hee Kwon filed their lawsuit on behalf of Lee. For the ease of the reader, we refer to Chen, Lee, Sakiyama, and Kuo collectively as appellants. We recognize that it is the parents of Chen and Lee who are the actual parties to the lawsuits.
Because we review a motion for summary judgment de novo, our factual summary is based only upon facts, supported by evidence, contained in AMF’s motion for summary judgment and appellants’ opposition to said motion. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c);
Artiglio v. Corning Inc.
(1998)
The parties dispute the nature of the party. AMF characterizes the party as a late-night musical event. On the other hand, appellants describe the party as an all-night dance party, at which drugs are openly sold and used by teenagers.
As discussed in unpublished section II.B.1, post, the declaration of Reginald Gibson filed in support of appellants’ motion for reconsideration does not offer any competent evidence that AMF employees sold drugs to the rave party attendees.
Similarly, one article suggests that federal efforts to prosecute and convict club owners who have hosted rave parties, but “who have not actively taken part in the alleged drug activity, is doomed to failure.” (Note, Targeting Ecstasy Use at Raves (2002) 88 Va. L.Rev. 1583, 1622 (hereafter Note).) The necessary causal connection between hosting the rave party (without supplying drugs) and injuries suffered either by attendees or third parties after partygoers have left the rave is absent. For this reason, that author opines that while drug activity should be eliminated from raves, rave parties should continue without drugs. (Ibid.)
Business and Professions Code “[s]ection 25602, subdivision (c), and Civil Code section 1714, subdivision (b), expressly abrogate this part of
Coulter
in favor of prior judicial interpretation finding the consumption rather than the serving of alcoholic beverages as the proximate cause of injuries inflicted upon another by an intoxicated person.”
(Leong v. San
Francisco Parking, Inc.
(1991)
See footnote 4, ante.
See footnote, ante, page 398.