History
  • No items yet
midpage
Sailer v. Sailer
764 N.W.2d 445
N.D.
2009
Check Treatment

*1 $3,880.40 in pay costs and he proceedings. disciplinary WALLE, W. GERALD VANDE CROTHERS, C.J., MARY DANIEL J. MARING, CAROL

MUEHLEN KAPSNER, and DALE V.

RONNING

SANDSTROM, JJ., concur. SAILER, L. Plaintiff Appellee SAILER, K. Defendant Appellant.

No. 20080114. North Dakota.

Supreme Court of 30, 2009.

April *4 awarding physical

ment children to parties’ three minor part, part, We affirm reverse Sailer. proceedings. for further remand Curtis Sailer Sandra Sailer [¶2] They signed prenup- met both in 1989. 13, May par- tial 1993. The May ties married on resided Hazen, near North Dakota. Sandra Sailer marriage, had to their prior one child during had children three marriage. In Sandra Sailer October *5 children,

took the minor left Bismarck, home, family and relocated to Curtis Sailer filed for di- North Dakota. 13, 2006, and vorce on November Sandra interim order hear- Sailer answered. An 2006, 29, and on ing held on December was an January the trial court entered awarding Curtis Sailer tem- interim order custody legal physical and porary children. Trial was held parties’ minor 20-21, 2007. The district court December on March 2008. judgment entered prenuptial The district court deemed as matter of law agreement conscionable one- agreement and was so held the unenforceable. district sided as found waive Curtis Sailer express provision prenuptial agree- his family his by supporting ment court awarded Curtis The district income. children and custody physical Sailer children. legal of their both Bismarck, Runge (argued), I. Gregory appeals. Sailer ND, plaintiff appellee. Severin, (argued), Kent M. Morrow II Morrow, Bismarck, ND, for Ringsak & asserts Sandra Sailer [¶4] appellant. defendant enforcing pre- by the trial court erred asserts nuptial agreement. Sandra Sailer KAPSNER, Justice. not be agreement should prenuptial voluntarily did not enforced because: she appeals from a Sailer [¶ 1] Sandra agreement; Curtis agree- prenuptial enter judgment enforcing prenuptial knowingly right waived his to en- so we can reschedule it you so can find prenuptial agreement; And, force mean, enforce- counsel. you if can find ment prenuptial agreement will like- somebody in days two or three to review ly assistance; public cause her to seek back, it and then come we would re- enforced, prenuptial agreement if the its schedule. effect is

substantive unconscionable. Curtis Sailer testified Sandra Sailer “said she signing was fine with is.” A attorney Sailer testified John re- Olson “A premarital be by stating: you acted “Then if going marriage, effective upon comes but several that, do you then review the whole parts Uniform [The Premarital prenup agreement, and so he went Agreement] Act enforceability affect the through step step explained every- premarital Lutz, agreement.” Estate of thing both of us if she had [asked] (internal ¶ 25, 563 N.W.2d 90 any questions.” omitted). citation Section 14-03.1- Sandra Sailer testified the first 06(l)(a), N.D.C.C., provides a premarital prenuptial draft pre- agreement is not enforceable if the sented her about one month before she against whom sought enforcement it, signed and she she indicated had a proves the prenuptial agreement was not chance to read it. if When asked she voluntarily. executed counsel, sought out legal she testified she The trial court did not make did not because she could it. not afford *6 express finding an fact on whether San When asked if either Curtis at- Sailer or voluntarily dra Sailer entered the pre into torney suggested John Olson that she However, nuptial agreement. because the seek should advice of attorney, another she trial court enforced prenuptial agree responded: “I don’t recall.” On direct ment, it can be inferred that the trial court examination, Sandra Sailer testified: concluded both parties voluntarily entered Q. you ... Do recall long you how prenuptial agreement. into the were in Mr. Olson’s office before the argues she did not voluntari agreement signed? was ly prenuptial agreement enter into the A. I say would it was less than a half did not know she could seek advice of hour. counsel. Q. youDo remember what happened trial, At both Curtis Sailer and during that? Sandra Sailer testified as to this matter. in, table, A. Came sat down at a Curtis Sailer testified attorney he hired [attorney John told me Olson] this was John Olson to draft the prenuptial agree- prenuptial agreement standard with var- ment. Curtis Sailer testified on the date things ious in He here. went over prop- signed the prenuptial agree- financial, erty, mostly and focused on ment, May attorney John Olson I parts of, that was aware which was surprised was Sandra Sailer did not have last pages, two Exhibit A. legal representation. Curtis Sailer also testified attorney John Olson:

asked attorney where her or Q. counsel ... Did he through, ever read to represent indicated, her and she said she didn’t Curt each of paragraphs any have and he said that he cannot to make you sure that understood what represent her: am Curt, I representing paragraph that said? Q. page four. Number Turn to No.

A. just please, you can read that out loud or not you ask whether Did he Q. the first sentence? what was about you any questions had and under- parties recognize A. The agreement? prenuptial being exe- stand that this of was All I was made aware A. No. days to their scheduled prior cuted 16 on the assets listed protect this was to 29th, May date 1993. wedding pages. these this Q. Why you sign document? also you that it anyone Did tell Q. A. that would trust me. So he increase any protection included in value than trust? they Q. If increased No reason assets? other those that that years marriage over things These A. That correct. also be included? would great impor- two were of pages the last to him. tance A. No. at all?

Q. you Did read the document A. over the first draft. I looked or was you understand Q. Did also that you by Mr. Olson explained different Q. the first draft Was any giving up also you this were signing this draft? sup- alimony spousal or to claim

right A. can’t I recall. case of a divorce? port property in or Q. you Did contact either Curtis No. A. you any changes Mr. Olson with pre- being Now, you, thought important would be did both Q. agreement? sign nuptial yourself, Curt and same time? A. I did know that would my future changes to make right Yes, both there at we were A. prenuptial agreement. husband’s of each Within moments same time. signed it. Q. again? Say that *7 know I would have the A. Did not cross-examination, Sandra my to hus- right changes make to Sailer testified: prenuptial husband’s band’s—or future Now, agreement, you signed this Q. agreement. you did not? with an attor- Q. You consult didn’t Yes, I A. did. ney? pres- it with Curt Q. you signed And A. No. ent? A. Yes. you go to Q. read —or ... Would Mr. it in front of Q. you signed And 13? and read number page five Olson? acknowledge each parties A. The A. Yes. has that this represent going can’t recall Q. you But free of them by each been executed with Mr. Olson? document through the influence, fraud, undue persuasion, only thing going I recall

A. The economic, duress or emotional physical pages. through the last two whatsoever. any kind you? it in Q. youDo front any claiming that Q. you Are these occurred? Yes, I do. A.

A. Occurred Q. document itself? you And didn’t reschedule the wedding date? No, Q. you occurred forcing sign A. No. it? Q. you And didn’t consult with coun- My

A. economic condition was very sel? present in this. A. I could not afford counsel.

Q. Certainly was. Let’s go to Q. your you But economic condition. had go plenty Let’s time one, though. you Did page paragraph me, go to— one—excuse paragraph three. What that say? does A. I did not have an hour to $200 pay go someone to over I this me.

A. am sorry, where? Well, Q. go did you any of the free one, Q. Page paragraph three. clinics in Bismarck? A. Wife has any accumulated A. I was not any. aware of assets, significant investments or prop- Q. How legal about assistance? erty essentially and her assets consist of personal property. A. I was not made aware either.

Q. So recognized, not, was it Q. you you virtually had Did bringing little call the bar into association? the relationship? A. No. Right.

A. Q. Why not? Q. Again you, A. why you I Didn’t ask know sign you that’s what the document? Nobody needed do. gave me any instruction. again say,

A. And so he would Well, Q. contract, right? this is a trust me. A. It’s a prenuptial agreement. Q. four, Now on page number 12 again? Q. contract, It’s a right? A. marriage Our is a

A. contract. Um-hum. Q. What is this prenuptial agree- Q. you Would read that sentence out ment then? loud? A. piece A paper.

A. acknowledge that Q. It doesn’t mean anything you each has had opportunity sufficient prior then? to executing to consult *8 counsel,

with to reschedule the wedding A. It’s not a vow before God. date if necessary, to proceed not and/or Q. Does this you, mean to anything with marriage, the but each nonetheless this contract? agrees timing that the of the execution A. Not since it stated in here that if of this agreement has no upon effect he died I would have absolutely nothing. their decision to agreement. execute this Q. Does this mean anything you to Q. So I ask you, why you get did or not? married? A. No. A. Because I loved him and I Q. It doesn’t anything? mean As far thought he loved me. you as are concerned— Q. you And signed the agreement? A. The last pages two only are the '

A. That is correct. thing that mean anything.

453 B ques- me ask the Q. stop. Let Just concerned, you far tion. So as of Paragraph seven the [¶ 12] ink on paper? more than nothing this is provides: par prenuptial agreement “The A. That is correct. earnings agree that all the and ties “Lack of This has held: Court resulting from accumulations either prospective spouse to legal to advice services, skills, efforts spouse’s personal significant is a independent counsel obtain work, together all ac property with voluntariness of a weighing the factor therefrom, quired or income derived shall presence but the arrangement, premarital property party separate the prerequi counsel not independent the and income are attrib earnings whom Lutz, enforceability.” Estate site “Through The trial held: utable.” (citing 589 N.W.2d the marriage, the Curtis never waived out ¶¶ 31, 34, Lutz, ND Estate agreement by provisions of the express 90). testified attor Curtis Sailer N.W.2d separate his income to voluntarily using Sailer an ney gave John Sandra Olson provide to the children.” On Sandra legal independent obtain opportunity to argues appeal, Sandra Sailer Curtis Sailer counsel, Sailer was and when Sandra his the knowingly right waived enforce her attorney if John Olson advised asked provisions prenuptial agreement. counsel, responded: “I legal she to obtain essentially arguing that Sandra Sailer is don’t recall.” routinely his because Curtis Sailer used attorney called Neither money support both Sandra Sailer and testify at trial. John Olson daughter, knowing her this was a and vol it “significant contends Sailer Sandra the untary paragraph waiver of seven of Sailer did not call telling” that Curtis prenuptial agreement, and constituted testify to shed an attorney John Olson to enforceability waiver of the entire issue, objective light on the prenuptial agreement. sug- documentation produce explained his attorney John Olson gesting trial, At Sandra Sailer testified party oppos- As role to Sailer. Sandra joint never held bank accounts. parties enforcement, had Sandra Sailer ing took care of She also testified Curtis Sailer prove prenuptial burden to their all associated with house bills voluntarily. was not executed Paragraph life. seven of and married 14-03.1-06(l)(a). testimony Her estab- agreement simply prenuptial states and had an lishes she had document earnings property were to be parties’ its well in opportunity to examine contents separate; it does not indicate kept Sandra Sailer advance of its execution. provide one another. parties could disparity aware of the testified she was Therefore, testimony sug- Sailer’s time execu- resources complied paragraph gests tion, reflects the same. and the document *9 agreement. We prenuptial seven any pressure undue to Nothing establishes or violate Sailer did not waive hold Curtis her desire to sign the document other than prenuptial agree- paragraph seven of marry have “trust” and to Curtis Sailer family. sup- Such by supporting his ment Therefore, we hold the record does her. therefore, port, cannot establish waiver met her bur- not establish Sandra Sailer agree- enforcement of the entire of the voluntarily showing did not den of she agreement. ment. prenuptial enter into 14-07-03, N.D.C.C., pro- mony.” Section Sandra Sailer asserts a mu-

vides: “The husband and wife have because enforcement of the prenuptial tual other duty support likely each out of their agreement would her to cause seek property sup- individual and labor.” By assistance, public she is to spousal entitled porting throughout Sandra Sailer their 14-03.1-06(2), N.D.C.C., support. Section with marriage, complied Curtis Sailer provides: Compliance with 14-07-03. provision a premarital agreement If statutory does mandate not establish modifies or eliminates spousal support provisions waiver of the sev- paragraph and that modification or elimination en prenuptial agreement. party agreement causes one to the to be eligible for support program under a 15] Sandra Sailer contends be [¶ public separa- assistance the time of cause paragraph Curtis Sailer violated sev dissolution, court, tion or marital not- en prenuptial entire agreement, withstanding the the agree- terms of prenuptial agreement is unenforceable. ment, may require the other However, Sandra did not point Sailer provide support to the necessary extent any authority if suggesting one of a clause eligibility. to avoid that prenuptial agreement contract or violat waived, ed pre or the entire contract On November [¶ or signed nuptial agreement Sailer a financial is unenforceable. We statement and affirm finding subsequently the trial affidavit which was court’s that Curtis filed with 8, trial paragraph waive or violate court on December 2006. In affidavit, agreement. seven of prenuptial How Sandra Sailer indicated she ever, if (Temporary even we to hold con received TANF were to the Assistance for Families) Needy (North trary, paragraph prenuptial fifteen of the and WIC Dakota Women, Infants, provides: any provi “Should Program). Children sion of this At the time signed held invalid or Sandra Sailer and filed by any affidavit, unenforceable court of the financial competent statement and she jurisdiction, parties’ all provisions none had the three living shall minor children effect, with her. theless continue full force and The trial court entered an inter- im remaining January extent that order on provisions awarding fair, Therefore, just Curtis Sailer equitable.” minor even if would children. we have determined Curtis Sailer waived paragraph pre seven of the trial, examination, 18] At [¶ redirect nuptial agreement, this would not render Sandra Sailer testified: prenuptial agreement the entire unen Q. During ... you the time that forceable. Curt, separated have been from you any ever sought public assistance? C A. Yes. 16] The trial found: Q. you What did receive? “Sandra has demonstrated that she can be IA. food TANF, received stamps, self-sufficient. prenuptial Under jobs Service, program Job child agreement, if marriage was terminat care I job assistance while seeking. ed, both [Curtis Sailer Sandra Sailer] Q. youDo receive any? still agreed any support not make claims for No, A. nothing. receive alimony. Therefore, neither nor *10 granted spousal support Q. is or ali- Any why? reason

455 14-03.1-06(2), § pre- does not N.D.C.C. qualify. IA. don’t agree- prenuptial clude enforcement you qualify? Q. Why don’t ment. money. I make too much A. you the time that were Q. During D living in the same

married to Curt Sandra Sailer [¶ On 21] qual- household, you attempt did ever is so one- prenuptial asserts public assistance? ify on the prenuptial sided that enforcement of A. No. agreement would be unconscionable. The the mar- Q. you prior had But held, prenuptial agreement, trial court “the riage? 1993, 13, May between the is dated A. Correct. law.” as a Section conscionable matter 14-03.1-06(3), N.D.C.C., “An is provides: recross-examination, Sandra 19] [¶ of a unconscionability premarital sue of Sailer testified: is the court as a for decision not TANF? Q. You are on “Unconscionability of a matter of law.” No, not. I’m A. law, premarital agreement is a matter of not? Q. Why findings factual related to but it turns on I qualify. A. don’t values, the relative property circumstances, you ongoing and their Q. Why qualify? don’t financial ¶5, Binek, 10, 2004 ND need.” Binek v. job I now. A. Lutz, Estate (citing 673 N.W.2d 594 your for Q. actually TANF is And 90). 82, ¶ 44, 563 1997 ND N.W.2d well, is it not? children as of a enforceability premarital substantive parents It for children and A. agreement is a matter of law be decided I jobs program, which is what TANFs Riemers, by the court. Peters-Riemers v. jobs. find helped you was on that ¶72, 20, (citing 2002 ND N.W.2d program through Job Service. Lutz, 1997 ND Estate of 90). N.W.2d any Q. right state aid You are Agree Premarital Uniform now? provides premarital agreements Act ment No, I am not. A. if uncon may be deemed unenforceable you working and Q. Because execution, at at time of scionable qualify? don’t dissolution, separation or marital time correct. A. That is N.D.C.C. or at the time of enforcement. 14-03.1-06(l)(b); § § 14-03.1- N.D.C.C. financial affidavit Sandra Sailer’s 14-03.1-07; 06(2); Estate both indicate she received testimony Lutz, 226, ¶ 25, 620 589. N.W.2d after she and Curtis Sail- public assistance agree prenuptial Sandra Sailer asserts the However, er she testified she separated. ment should be enforced because public for assistance qualify did not at the time of enforce was unconscionable trial, provided any nor she time of has enforce ment. She asserts substantive likely qualify for that she evidence “harshness and ability rests on issues of after has failed such assistance trial. She one-sidedness.” agree- to establish that enforcement Agree- Premarital public The Uniform eligible her to be ment will cause spouses Act record, prospective ment allows we hold assistance. On *11 to, respect among contract parties during with other period of their mar- things: obligations and of each rights “The riage, including replacements existing of any of the of parties property in of items, shall be to considered be owned of either or both them whenever and jointly between them. located!;] (cid:127) (cid:127) (cid:127) acquired wherever or [t]he Paragraph provided: seven parties “The disposition upon ... marital property agree that all of earnings and accu- [; dissolution ... and] modification [t]he mulations resulting spouse’s from either spousal support.” or elimination services, personal skills, work, efforts and (d). 03.1—0S(l)(a),(c), 14— together all property acquired or in- In prenuptial agreement, their therefrom, come derived shall sep- be the parties respect contracted with to then- property arate of the party whom the property. Paragraph provided: two “The earnings and income are attributable.” parties fully concerning are each informed Paragraph ten stated: all property and assets of the other Notwithstanding provision any in this marriage and desire that their shall in contrary, any and all any way change separate the husband’s property acquired assets before and/or legal assets, rights as relates to all of the during by or the marriage party either property presently investments and he has way by gift or inheritance from a and will continue to accumulate. A full list party third shall separate be deemed the assets, prop- husband’s investments and property so acquiring in- erty is Paragraph three stat- attached!.]” cluding, to, but not any limited income ed: signifi- “Wife any has accumulated thereon, increments, accretions, or in- assets, cant or property investments and in creases value of such assets at any essentially

her assets personal consist of time, whether due to market conditions property.” Paragraph provided, four in services, or the skills or efforts of either part: party. own, Husband have full right shall

use, control, dispose encumber and of all parties The respect contracted with exists, of his as it property now as it spousal support against and claims each shall change, increase or from decrease property other’s in paragraph six of the time marriage to time the same as if the prenuptial agreement: relationship did not exist.... The wife parties agree that whether the mar- may sepa- also continue to hold in her riage death by legal terminated or name, acquire rate in the future proceedings, they will make no claim name, separate her properties other except as specifically otherwise provided shall investments which remain her agreement, in this any part separate property. antici- property waive all pate during they their marriage, [sic], rights power curtesy, community will acquire property and investments homestead, property, inheritance, suc- they which agree are to be considered cession, surviving spouse family al- by and, jointly owned them accord- lowance, exempt property, claims for ingly, they expressly agree all such support, alimony, attorney’s fees and property and investments which are reg- of property costs settlement. joint names, shall, istered in their for all purposes, be considered to This Court be owned has held: “Even if a by one-half of them. All premarital agreement each household validly been has goods furnishings acquired voluntarily obtained, its substantive effect

457 court noted: “Plaintiff defendant and thus unen- may unconscionable be are Lutz, 82, pay they all of the debts indi- ND should 1997 Estate forceable.” of responsible ¶ as listed on the 14-03.1-07, vidually for 39, 90. N.W.2d Section 563 Listing.” Rule and Debt Property 8.3 N.D.C.C., provides: Both their assets on the parties valued provisions the Notwithstanding other Listing; Property Rule and Debt how- 8.3 if a court finds chapter, this ever, nothing in the record indicates premarital agreement a enforcement of placed a value on the assets. trial court unconscionable, clearly would be agree- may to enforce the court refuse Although the trial court ment, the remainder of the enforce to be con prenuptial agreement found the the unconscionable agreement without law, as matter it did not scionable a application limit an provisions, findings to come to this necessary make an un- provision avoid unconscionable the trial court conclude conclusion. We result. conscionable findings sufficient to allow provide enacting ch. 14- opportunity properly In N.D.C.C. re [¶ 26] Court the 03.1, § Legislature adopted the Uniform 14- view its decision under N.D.C.C. Ebach, 187, N.D. Act. 1985 ND Agreement Premarital 03.1-07. See Ebach v. 2008 ¶ 190, However, 16, §§ 1-9. a court Laws ch. 34. When trial Sess. 757 N.W.2d findings, § is not of the it errs part required 14-03.1-07 as N.D.C.C. does not make Act; law, necessary rath Agreement Premarital and it is Uniform matter ¶ er, enacted at 14 separate provision findings. for Id. it is remand additional (citation omitted). Legislature. Hearing on S.B. this issue We remand 2171 Before Comm., N.D. Judiciary 49th to value trial with instructions Senate (Jan. 23, 1985); assets, Unif. Premar as Legis. findings Sess. make (2001). Act, resources, 38 Agreement ital 9C U.L.A. their and determine their § 14-03.1- deciding interpreted purposes for We foreseeable needs guidelines forth for trial agreement 07 and have set whether enforcement of the analyzing concluding use this statute. courts to when We are unconscionable. when trial courts discuss was unconscion We have held the prenuptial “clearly law; premarital only we hold the whether able a matter of as specific 14- required under N.D.C.C. to make unconscionable” trial court was 03.1-07, requires complete analysis not. findings, it did property findings factual about the relative Ill and fore and the other resources values Sail- asserting spouse seeable needs failed to make an trial court er asserts the is unconscionable.” premarital agreement ¶ A 45, marital estate. Lutz, 82, equitable ND 563 division 1997 Estate of regarding trial court’s determinations 90. N.W.2d property are treated of marital division Findings of In trial court’s [¶27] may be reversed findings fact Law, and Fact, Order Conclusions clearly errone appeal findings if these noted Sandra the trial court Judgment, ¶71, 12, 2008 ND Lynnes Lynnes, v. ous. monthly income from all net Sailer’s Heinz, (citing 2001 747 Heinz N.W.2d 93 It also indicated sources was $860.05. 443). ¶ 6, 147, N.W.2d ND has demonstrated she can Sandra Sailer prenuptial four of the Paragraph parties filed Rule self-sufficient. agreement provides part: Listing. The trial Property and Debt 8.3 anticipate during idviecky, their N.W.2d marriage, they acquire property 255); Fischer, will see Fischer v. 139 N.W.2d *13 they agree which are to 845, (N.D.1966); investments be 852 Ruff, 78 N.D. Ruff v. jointly by owned 784, (1952). considered to be them 775, 107, 52 N.W.2d 111 and, they accordingly, expressly agree are “[P]arties entitled to a division their property such that all and investments property application under a correct joint in their registered which are by law the trial Jangula Jangu court.” v. names, shall, purposes, ¶ all be for consid- la, 16, ND 2005 706 N.W.2d 85 by ered to be one-half each owned Brandner, (quoting Brandner v. 2005 ND goods All them. household and furnish- ¶ 259). 111, 11, 698 trial N.W.2d court ings acquired by parties during the any findings did not make as to value period marriage, including of their re- estate, of the marital and it did not distrib items, placements existing shall be ute all property. marital We re jointly considered to be owned between verse parties’ and remand the issue of the them. court, property the trial with instruc Thus, tions to parties’ property equitable determine an invest- distribu “registered joint tion of jointly ments their names” property. held goods furnishings their household subject prenuptial to the IV presumed by and are to be owned one-half appeal, [¶ 33] On Sandra Sail- each of them. er contends the trial court erred award judgment The trial court did not ing primary custody of the parties’ minor property registered mention what is in children to Curtis Our Sailer. standard of joint names nor the existence of household review of a trial custody court’s child deci goods which be jointly are to considered sion is clear: parties owned. The record indicates We exercise a limited review of child jointly a own 2004 Chevrolet Suburban. custody awards. A district court’s deci- suggests parties record have custody, including sions on child an ini- goods than appears household what custody, tial award of are treated as prenuptial agreement. A to Exhibit findings fact will not be set aside The trial court failed to equitably divide on appeal clearly unless erroneous. A jointly such property, owned though even finding clearly fact is if erroneous it is such property should have been divided in by an law, induced erroneous view of the agreement. prenuptial accordance with the it, if no support evidence exists to or if court, A trial court reviewing re on the entire evi- quired dence, to determine the total value of the is left with a definite and firm marital an equita estate order make conviction mistake has been made. Hitz, ble division of v. property. Hitz clearly Under the erroneous standard of ¶58, 11, review, 2008 ND 732 (citing 746 N.W.2d we reweigh do not the evidence ¶ White, 133, 13, v. Ulsaker 2006 ND 717 credibility witnesses, reassess the 567). N.W.2d “After a fair retry evaluation of will custody we case or made, the property is the entire marital substitute our judgment for a district equitably estate must then custody divided be initial court’s merely decision tween the under the we might because reached differ- Ruff-Fischer ¶ Ulsaker, guidelines.” 133, 13, 2006 ND ent result. A per- choice between two 717 (citing Neidviecky N.W.2d 567 v. weight Ne missible views of the of the evi-

459 erroneous, opportunity to observe witnesses clearly and our court’s is not dence credibility their should be applica- and determine especially review deferential Hanson, 2005 difficult decision ND given great child deference.” ble ¶82, 11, (citing Hanson v. involving parents. fit 695 N.W.2d 205 two ¶ Hanson, 6, 743 N.W.2d 2003 ND 656 Koble, ND Koble 656). agreed trial The fact that the Peterson, Jelsing v. (quoting N.W.2d analysis custody investigator’s 157). ¶41, 11, N.W.2d clearly is not in itself erro- and conclusions complaining party bears *14 neous. finding that a of demonstrating of burden v. clearly Reeves Che fact erroneous. is trial makes When a court [¶ 36] 63, ¶ 8, 791 591 N.W.2d

pulis, 1999 ND it custody, to child must decision as (citation omitted). the children’s best inter strive to serve Sail- appeal, On Sandra DesLauriers, [¶ 34] v. ests. DesLauriers ¶ improperly trial court ced er the contends 66, 5, (citing ND 642 N.W.2d 892 authority the making 212, ed decision Schmaltz, its v. Schmaltz adopting the anal investigator by 852). custody The trial court must 586 N.W.2d custody investi ysis and conclusions as it forms its consider several factors held: report. Court has gator’s This decision, as in N.D.C.C. custody outlined the “Generally, cannot make re a ‘court 14-09-06.2(1). case, present § Id. In the independent investigator an the port of it all of the court indicated reviewed trial regarding of decision conclusive basis its the interests factors best custody the children. The reason the of 14-09-06.2, it § and concluded best inter usually expressed the for this rule is b, c, h, a, d, j factors and favored ests delegate trial cannot phrase that the court Sailer Curtis Sailer. questions decide anyone power the some of these factors do neces asserts ” Owan, 541 Owan v. custody.’ child party, the sarily favor one over other (N.D.1996) (citations 719, 722 N.W.2d favor San other factors she contends omitted). has also noted is This Court dra Sailer. for a trial judicial practice

not the best A custody investiga adopt court to child rather, love, better for report; it would be tor’s af Factor a “[t]he report the into the trial court to take fection, existing emotional ties its conclu and come to own consideration the and child.” N.D.C.C. parents between Hanson, ND 14-09-06.2(l)(a). sions. Hanson fa The trial ¶ 11, 205. 695 N.W.2d this Sailer on factor. vored Curtis provides: custody investigation report coming regard- In to its decision disagreements some There have been custody, trial court held: ing child the by Sandi to- expressed frustrations all has reviewed ‘best “The Court during exchanges and Curt ward 14-09-06.2, in Section interests’ factors present. [One while children Cent.Code, custody as the well N.D. recently expressed has children] report update [the investigation going to take was concern Sandi analysis and conclu- custody investigator’s] his Dad’s return him to him and not only reviewed The trial court sions!.]” after weekend. custody investigator’s report, but also that are been investigator testify There have weekends custody observed weekend, and she scheduled Sandi’s held: district “[A] at trial. This Court has early them get stronger calls Curt to come and formance when he was lived Sailer, to take them to doctor. compared when he lived trial, custody with Sandra Sailer. At she why When asked favored Curtis Sailer investigator testified Curtis Sailer a, custody investigator on factor testi- “stronger” than Sandra Sailer in the area fied: continuing education the children. guess I base that on the times since explain, When asked to inves- went in—I they back Curt don’t re- tigator testified: they member when that was. When though. year back Just whole [Sandra went context children, Sandy has been with the there has not contact had] with the school.... were a lot times she where called [When oldest child] pick up early. months, had Curt come and them school those two the teacher They missed. I don’t if any were know didn’t have contact with her other times, there but were missed there than picking up, *15 she would see her them early saying were—the times she really but didn’t much I contact. just couldn’t them. And [the handle you think crucial if going that’s are to child], parties’ I got oldest the feel from education, you continue need to have he [him] was that kind felt left out system contact with the education and I he when was with his mom. don’t think she had that. appeal,

[¶ 38] On Sandra Sailer asserts appeal, On [¶ 41] Sandra Sailer asserts equal. factor a argues should be She the this factor should be equal. She contends custody only investigator discussed her re- support the evidence custody does the lationship with the children from Decem- investigator’s factor, finding on and present. ber 2006 to She also con- parents ability provide both have the for custody investigator tends the improperly custody investigator’s their children. The weighed the fact that Curtis Sailer would report testimony and indicate there is evi- their take children the doctor at Sandra supporting dence the conclusion that Cur- request. Sailer’s tis Sailer is favored on factor b. The trial court’s conclusion that factor b favored custody investigator’s report The [¶ 39] clearly was erroneous. indicates evidence supporting existed determination that Curtis Sailer is favored C

on factor a. trial The court reviewed the custody disposi Factor c is investigator’s report, “[t]he listened to testimony, Therefore, her tion of the agreed. parents provide child food, finding clothing, care, trial with court’s that factor a medical or other favored remedial clearly recognized permitted Curtis Sailer was not care erroneous. under the laws this state in lieu of B care, medical and other material needs.” Factor capacity “[t]he b is trial The court favored Curtis Sailer on disposition parents to give factor c. investigator’s report The love, affection, child guidance indicated because Curtis Sailer has the continue often, the education of the provides child.” children more he the ma 09—06.2(l)(b). trial jority The of their needs. also It stated when 14— court favored Curtis Sailer on b. factor the children sick get they when are with custody investigator’s The report Sailer, indicates Sandra she has called Curtis Sailer per- oldest child’s academic get to take them them doctor D, you Q. And factor also consider indicated while report also medicine. two the difference between their resi- splitting to be supposed mean, insurance, dences, I major factor. costs not covered medical all of the children’s the size? pays for Curtis Sailer expenses. medical factor, necessarily. A. Not It’s but major it’s not a factor. asserts Sandra Sailer contends: equal. She this factor should Q. Why was a factor? Curtis on favoring reason for “The sole stability, regardless I A. think time be the amount of

this factor seems to home, stability it’s the rather than which equaled to being children spent location. money spent on the chil- the amount Q. you agree with me that And would However, custody investigator dren.” gain stability over a period children can significant!y finding her was not testified they’re of time if moved? Families has a that Curtis Sailer based fact move all the time. custody investi- income. Both the greater A. Sure. custody investiga- report and the gation Q. Stability is that is something gained factual testimony there tor’s indicate progressively? determining factor c favored Cur- basis Yes, agree. A. holding court’s tis Sailer. trial *16 factor c favored Curtis Sailer was stability, you If move Q. it’s instant clearly erroneous. to some other residence? A. Right. D appeal, Sandra Sailer asserts [¶ 45] On of length Factor d is 44] “[t]he [¶ on this factor. She she should be favored lived in a satisfac

time the child has stable custody investigator equated contends the of desirability and the tory environment parties’ financial and economic situa- court maintaining continuity.” The trial environment. providing tions with a stable d. cus Sailer on factor The favored Curtis trial, also at the cus- argues tody investigator’s report provides: “Sandi greater weight to tody investigator gave end of apartment in her since the has been in a he lived house Sailer because October, It is plans moving. no of has However, ac- apartment. rather than an par apartment, [the so a three bedroom above-quoted testimony, cording to the his own room. gets [The ties’ oldest child] trial, custody investigator indicated room, a two share children] factor, homes is but size a room.” It also states: Sandi has major anot factor. two bath- home is a four bedroom Curt’s d, this discussing In factor mile from Hazen. room home about one den, explained: large game room Court has It includes for the downstairs. Outdoors play area past sta- Essentially, factor d addresses slide, climbing wall swings, children environment, including consid- bility of paved is also a and a sand box. There as physical setting, place eration of or bike, and a driveway for to ride them prior fami- well as a consideration play area is backyard. in the patio lifestyle part its of that ly unit and and protected. in fenced quality of It also setting. addresses environment, the desirabil- past trial, ques- custody investigator was At continuity. Under ity maintaining factor d: tioned about 462 d, prior custody factor

factor is a to be Evidence of In domestic violence. determining when considered custo- awarding custody granting rights or arrangement dial which is best visitation, the shall court consider evi- child. of domestic dence violence. If the court Shaw, 114, ¶ 7, v. 2002 ND Shaw finds credible evidence domestic vi- (quoting Stoppler Stoppler, N.W.2d occurred, has olence and there exists ¶ 142). 633 N.W.2d In one incident domestic violence which d, a trial should applying factor court ana in bodily resulted or in- injury serious lyze physical more than a or a structure dangerous weapon volved the use of a location; however, geographic a trial pattern there exists a vio- domestic court’s concerns allowing about children to lence within a proxi- reasonable time school attend same and live proceeding, mate to the this combination house same are valid considerations under presumption creates rebuttable that a Burns, d. factor Burns v. ND parent perpetrated who has domestic vi- (citations omitted). 737 N.W.2d 243 may joint olence not be awarded sole or case, present In appears the trial custody of a child.... As used may inadequately analyzed fac subdivision, “domestic violence” means d; however, weight tor of the other domestic violence as defined in section best interests factors favor Curtis Sailer. 14-07.1-01. E 09—06.2(l)(j). § Domestic vi- 14— home, Factor h is “[t]he harm, olence “physical bodily includes: in- school, and community record of the jury, activity compelled by sexual physical 14-09-06.2(l)(h). child.” N.D.C.C. force, assault, or the infliction fear trial court favored Curtis Sailer on this harm, physical bodily injury, imminent factor. The investigator’s report *17 activity by force, sexual compelled physical parties’ indicates the oldest child makes assault, or self-defense, in greater committed progress academic when he lives questioned with Curtis on family Sailer. When the complaining or household trial, custody about factor h at the investi 14-07.1-01(2). § members.” N.D.C.C. gator asked considering when she was custody investigator’s The report [¶ 50] parenting performance Sailer’s in alleged indicates both had incidents if past, the she took into the account fact pertaining potential occurred acts of that custody Sandra Sailer had twins. The violence, domestic and it states Sail- investigator replied that she into took con trial, er was favored on factor. this At the sideration the fact twins increase the custody investigator testified none the workload and can be difficult. in incidents she considered her fit report appeal, [¶ 48] Sandra Sailer asserts the definition of domestic violence. The this factor is equal. There is evidence trial court favored Curtis Sailer on this supporting the trial court’s determination factor. On Sandra Sailer asserts Sailer; h that factor favored Curtis there- favoring the of Curtis factor Sailer fore, trial the court’s h finding on factor is “puzzling and disturbing” because the clearly was not erroneous. custody investigator acknowledged none of F the incidents rose to the level of domestic violence, yet custody j pertains investigator [¶ 49] Factor still do violence, provides mestic part: in favored Curtis Sailer on this factor.

463 We remand the issue of agreement. The as set presumption, [¶ 51] is un- 14-09-06.2(1)©, prenuptial agreement is whether the in N.D.C.C. forth the trial court finds conscionable as enforced to trial court only when triggered parties’ violence that domestic with instructions to value as- “credible evidence sets, occurred, their findings and there exists one incident make as to other re- has sources, in resulted seri their foreseeable violence which determine domestic needs, or involved the use of to determine whether the bodily injury ous order pat there weapon exists unconscionable as enforced. dangerous court violence within reason further direct district tern of domestic We joint- proximate proceeding.” equitable make an distribution able time ¶63, 11, ND 591 ly property. held We conclude the trial Chepulis, Reeves v. omitted). (citations If pre physical custody to award N.W.2d 791 court’s decision triggered, trial court is minor to Curtis is not children sumption factual find affirm specific clearly to make is not erroneous. We required however, can part, part, such evidence still reverse in and remand for ings; the trial court as one of further proceedings. considered Gabel, interests factors. Gietzen best WALLE, W. VANDE GERALD [¶ 54] ¶ 153, 9, (citing N.W.2d 552 SANDSTROM, C.J., DALE V. Cox, ND 613 N.W.2d Cox v. JJ., CROTHERS, DANIEL J. concur. 516). custody investigator MARING, Justice, dissenting. testi- The [¶52] to the level fied none of the incidents rose agree parts I IIB and III with violence, and we can infer domestic I majority opinion, respectfully but held: “The because it agreed, trial court IIA, D, C, parts and IV. I dissent from custody has ... inves- Court reviewed reverse the district court’s order. would report update tigation [the agrees [the The investigator]. Court analysis and conclu- custody investigator’s] Voluntariness trial court’s determination sions[J” ¶ 6, Majority, acknowl- level that none of the incidents rose to the trial did not make edged “[t]he violence sufficient to activate of domestic *18 express of whether San- finding an fact on the against custody for presumption the pre- voluntarily entered into the dra Sailer Fur- clearly not erroneous. perpetrator is However, the nuptial agreement. because ther, the trial court’s decision we hold agree- prenuptial trial court enforced the of the incidents consider the evidence ment, inferred the trial court it can be that its one the interests factors and of best parties voluntarily entered both on fac- to favor Curtis Sailer this concluded decision am agreement.” I of prenuptial into the tor, clearly not erroneous. not be opinion the that this Court should whether the district inferring V on legal conclusion this issue reached the volun- We conclude [¶ 53] IIA of dissent from Part respectfully prenuptial agree- into the tarily entered opinion. majority the ment, not or violate Curtis Sailer did waive The does district court’s decision prenuptial agree- paragraph seven Sandra Sail- 14-03.1-06(2), not reflect that it considered ment, § does and N.D.C.C. voluntarily that did not en- prenuptial of er’s claim she not enforcement preclude premarital agreement. premarital agreement ter into and decide issue adequate voluntarily Sandra Sailer received Whether of whether Sailer en- Sandra legal signing premarital advice before premarital agreement. tered into the question of fact that agreement is a is a significant weighing factor when the volun II premarital agreement.

tariness of a See Public Assistance Lutz, Estate not repre 90. Sandra Sailer was N.W.2d dissent from also Part IIC of attorney sented an before or at the majority opinion. On Sandra signing premarital time argues spousal she is entitled to attorney agreement. Curtis Sailer hired support pre- because enforcement of the paid Olson his John for services. San agreement likely marital will cause her to public dra at Sailer was assistance public Majority, seek The assistance. at time and testified she could not afford an ¶ 20, 14-03.1-06(2) § concluded N.D.C.C. attorney. premarital agreement at preclude pre- does not enforcement of the (there paragraph paragraphs) are 23 agreement. 14-03.1-06(2), marital Section parties acknowledge states: “The that N.D.C.C., provides: opportunity each has prior had sufficient If provision premarital agreement to executing to consult with spousal support modifies or eliminates ” explicit counsel.... There waiver is no modification or elimination agreement. counsel Sandra Sailer party causes one to the to be testified she not did see the final version eligible support a program under until the day signed she it. Because the public separa- assistance at time judgment district court does not reflect dissolution, court, tion or marital not- whether considered Sailer’s ar withstanding agree- the terms gument, necessary made the factual find ment, may require ings, voluntarily concluded that she en provide support necessary to the extent premarital tered into agreement, we eligibility. avoid adequately unable to review this issue ¶ 20, Majority, at acknowl- 52(a). on appeal. See N.D.R.Civ.P. With edged public that Sandra Sailer received requisite out the findings, factual we are parties separated, assistance after the but unable to determine whether the factual 14-03.1-06(2) contends N.D.C.C. does findings clearly on voluntariness are erro preclude premarital enforcement of the Furthermore, any neous. without indica agreement because she receive tion the court disagreed considered and public assistance the time of claim, trial. The with Sandra Sailer’s we are unable Majority misinterprets the law. Section to determine whether district court 14-03.1-06(2), N.D.C.C., require correctly does not concluded voluntarily she entered *19 that an eligible individual be to agreement. into the receive Because the district public at court did assistance the time of trial. any not make factual findings, 14-03.1-06(2) Rather, § explain express- nor its N.D.C.C. decision on Sandra Sailer’s claim, ly provides eligible it that a must erred as a matter of law. See Ebach, for support separation Ebach “at the time added.) N.W.2d 34. The marital (Emphasis case should be dissolution.” remanded for the parties separated district court to make After the factual find and at the time ings as to order, whether Sandra Sailer the court received issued its interim Sandra adequate legal signing advice before eligible the Sailer was for public assistance. in the does support record not the district court should have considered The district spousal finding. presented court’s The evidence Sandra Sailer to award whether that, assistance public to avoid establishes even if Sandra Sailer con- support order to requisite findings support jobs, only tinues all three and made the to work she decision. earns a month or approximately its $774.21 $9,290.52 annually, making net her claims Majority Sandra contends likely public that she will need assistance that “provided any has not evidence Sailer paying valid. After a month child $232.00 likely qualify is for such assistance she a support, she has net annual income of ¶20. Majority, Again, at after trial.” $6,506.52. poverty guideline The federal 14-03.1-06(2) § require not does N.D.C.C. $10,400 person one annu- for 2008 for was However, showing. Sandra such January 23, ally. Register Federal public likely will seek as- argued that she (Volume 15). 73, Number Because there brief, trial the trial. In her sistance after is no that the district court con- indication asserted, has sought, “[She] Sandra Sailer sidered whether Sandra Sailer was entitled seek, likely public assistance and will spousal support public to avoid assis- financially is struggling the future. She 14-03.1-06(2) tance under 14-03.1-06(2) may re- this time. Section make district failed to the neces- support to provide Curt to sufficient quire I sary findings, would reverse on this is- eligibili- necessary to avoid that ‘the extent ” sue. brief, ty.’ post-trial argued, In her she agreement, “If the Court enforces the San- nothing and dra will be left with little or Ill likely public

will be forced seek assis- sort.” tance some Unconscionability Furthermore, testimony at trial 61] [¶ agree Majority with the established Sandra Sailer indeed findings the district court’s factual on financially. testified that struggling She unconscionability wholly issue inade- part-time jobs, had three had taken she However, I quate. from Part IID dissent at Job employees tests and met with Ser- majority opinion because the undis- jobs, only quali- but acquire vice better prove puted facts from record jobs. part-time fied for Sandra Sailer also substantively un- premarital agreement is significant testified that she owed as a matter of law because conscionable cards money amount on credit because imposes hardship a severe is one-sided and money her provide Sailer would on Sandra Sailer. during marriage and she unique North in its Dakota job immediately parties sepa- after the unconscionability consideration one of her rated. Sandra Sailer testified Majority $17,000 premarital agreements. As of over credit cards had balance recognizes, adopted Dakota expensive you live when when North because “[i]t Act in Agreement Premarital any money,” and she did not Uniform don’t have job separate provision it also enacted a have a for the first two months after unconscionability. See 1985 N.D. Sess. separated. yet, only And 190, §§ Pre- concerning Laws ch. 1-9. Uniform finding the court made *20 provi- Act includes a Agreement assistance marital public Sailer’s need to be on that, pre- of a precludes has that sion that enforcement was “Sandra demonstrated if: agreement marital she can be self-sufficient.” evidence we bargain was unconscionable call that contract uncon —so and, before execu- 2174, when it executed was Hearing supra scionable.” on S.B. party: agreement, tion that (Jan. 1985) 23, (testimony of John McCabe). (1) legislators questioned a fair Several provided and rea- Was of property disclosure sonable McCabe about the Uniform Premarital of obligations financial the oth- or Act, Agreement including Senator Olson party; er posed hypothetical question who about (2) sign a voluntarily docu- of a premarital Did enforcement one-sided expressly waiving any right

ment 2174, agreement. Hearing supra on S.B. property to disclosure of the (Jan. 1985) 23, (testimony Sen. John obligations of the financial other Olson). asked, Senator Olson “What beyond pro- the disclosure party if happen would a man woman mar vided; and premarital ried and agreement provid (3) proper- Did not have notice ed that gets everything everything he he — obligations ty or financial everything from business. his He earns — party. just responsible child support. 03.1—06(l)(b)- stuck; 14— everything There she is is in his get Uniform Premarital They Hearing [¶ 64] While name. a divorce.” on Agreement precludes (Jan. 1985) Act enforcement of 2174, 23, supra S.B. (testimony an premarital unconscionable if Olson). responded Sen. John McCabe met, the provisions Legislative certain are question that the it an first is “is uncon Assembly clearly that this provi indicated agreement?” Hearing scionable on S.B. McCabe, far John go enough. sion did not (Jan. 2174, 1985) 23, supra (testimony of a representative of the Commit National McCabe). continued, John “I McCabe Laws, tee on appeared Uniform State be it, looking think you’d the terms on Judiciary January fore the Committee probably you a situation where 23, Hearing 1985. on S.B. 2174 Before saying that it is an agree unconscionable Comm., Judiciary Legis. Senate N.D. 49th 2174, (Jan. Hearing supra ment.” on S.B. (Jan. 23, 1985) (testimony Sess. of John 1985) 23, McCabe). (testimony of John He McCabe). presented He the contents of stated, you’d then “Then ask: is there fair Agreement the Uniform Premarital Act property and reasonable disclosure or a urged adopt the committee waiver of the Hearing disclosure.” on 2174, supra uniform act. on Hearing S.B. (Jan. 1985) 2174, 23, S.B. supra (testimony (Jan. 1985) 23, (testimony of John McCabe). explained John McCabe that McCabe). explained McCabe that if disclosure, there if was even it is uncon Uniform Act Agreement Premarital con scionable, probably it would be enforce provision tained would render a 2174, (Jan. Hearing supra able. on S.B. premarital agreement unenforceable if it 1985) 23, McCabe). (testimony of John Hearing on unconscionable. S.B. responded, Senator “I’m Olson a little (Jan. 1985) 2174, 23, supra (testimony of by bothered that because I think there is a McCabe). explained John McCabe lot of accumulation that is not known up unconscionability a “contract between guess front. I’m a little bothered unequal bargaining power, fact that happen.” Hearing that could where one has party created contract so (Jan. 1985) supra S.B. (testimony onerous to the other that we cannot Olson). in clear regard conscience as a fair of Sen. John *21 The for un- Judiciary provision Com additional [¶ 67] the Senate When [¶ 65] of a January conscionability premarital agreement bill on met to discuss the mittee provision further than the for uncon 1985, goes their con 28, legislators expressed scionability under Premarital unconscionability provision the Uniform cerns with Act. It no Agreement places Act. restrictions Agreement Premarital the Uniform (Jan. 28, 2174, required premarital what is to find a supra on Hearing on S.B. 1985). legislative unconscionable. The agreement that “he expressed Senator Olson bill, distinguishable from the Uni and is enactment is about this has reservations Agreement that form Premarital Act limits part the unconscionable bothered about (Jan. 2174, 28, pre the enforcement unconscionable supra it.” on S.B. Hearing Olson). 1985) agreements only require marital if three (testimony of Sen. John § has are met. See 14-03.1- Stenehjem indicated that “he ments N.D.C.C. Senator Deach, 06(l)(b); see also Jana Aune Case also.” problems with unconscionable (Jan. 28, Comment, 2174, Premarital Settlements: Till Hearing supra on S.B. 1985) Do (testimony Wayne Defining Ste Death Us Sen. Enforce Part — Agree ability that Premarital nehjem). Olson later stated Senator Uniform Dakota, unconscionable, but Act in North In re Estate ment “he has trouble Lutz, (N.D.1997), 563 N.W.2d 74 N.D. Hearing has on thinks the bill merit.” (Jan. 1985) (1998) 411, 2174, 28, (testimony (concluding that L.Rev. supra S.B. Olson). seeming states have mitigated Lashkowitz several John Senator Sen. Premar good ly harsh standards of the Uniform that “he thinks this is expressed Act, North Dako Hearing Agreement including ital but it needs work.” mechanism (Jan. 1985) (testi 2174, ta, 28, which amended the statute to address supra on S.B. Lashkowitz). premarital of unconscionable Herschel enforcement mony of Sen. enactment, agreements). Through the Judiciary met Committee provided Legislative Assembly expressly February and moved to again on agreements premarital that should be specifi to add amend the bill a subsection they if re are unconscionable enforced Hearing on unconscionability. cally of whether had fair gardless (Feb. 1985). 6, The sec supra S.B. property reasonable disclosure uncon “Enforcement of tion is entitled obligations financial of the other provisions” provides: scionable entering agreement. into before See Notwithstanding the provisions 190, § ch. 7. 1985 N.D. Sess. Laws if a that chapter, court finds this premarital agreement enforcement of case, In this the district court unconscionable, clearly would be not one-sid- agreement found “[t]he [was] may agree- refuse to enforce to be unenforceable” and concluded ed as ment, enforce remainder premarital was con- agreement without the unconscionable It is as a matter of law. difficult scionable of an application or limit the provisions, imagine premarital agreement more an un- provision to avoid unconscionable This agreement. than one-sided result. conscionable scenario, whereby precisely factual gets everything and the other spouse The committee one 14-03.1-07. expressed nothing, legislators unanimously gets to attach the amend voted ch. 14-03.1 about when N.D.C.C. bill and that the bill concern ment to the moved premarital passed Hearing amended. on S.B. was enacted. (Feb. 6, 1985). only that not all of Curtis Sailer’s provided supra *22 assets, investments, property surviving spouse and would dent’s to an entitled all separate property, liqui- and, remain his but intestate share under N.D.C.C. from 30.1-05-01, dations and re-investments that § right has a of elective share property separate would also remain his in the decedent’s estate. Sandra Sailer property. premarital agreement The also rights any has no to of Curtis Sailer’s any provided earnings that from either premarital the estate under agreement. services, skills, efforts, spouse’s and work When parties pre- [¶ signed separate property be the of the would marital agreement, Sandra had no Sailer party earnings to whom the and income welfare; assets and was on Curtis Sailer Likewise, any inheri- are attributable. $421,703.52 assets, investments, had in and or gift tance would be considered each property. During parties’ marriage, spouse’s separate property. premari- Curtis worked full Sailer time for Dakota that, agreement provided tal in the event Gasification, earning approximately divorce, party neither be entitled would $67,807.00 in 2005. Sandra earned Sailer to insurance retirement benefits from $4,520.04 in 2005. Over the course party. the other parties’ nearly fifteen-year marriage, San- 14-05-24(1), § 69] Under N.D.C.C. dra worked part-time jobs Sailer several granted, divorce is “[w]hen and approximately $66,000, earned which make an equitable shall distribution $5,077.00 to averages year. out At and property parties.” debts of the San- trial, the time of Sandra Sailer was work- gets dra none of Sailer the marital estate ing jobs three and monthly her actual net the premarital agreement under unless income monthly was Out of $774.21. joint placed property Curtis Sailer in ten- income, pay she ordered to Curtis § ancy with her. Under N.D.C.C. 14-05- Sailer a month support, for child $232.00 court, rendering in the decree of leaving her a month $542.21 on which to divorce, may assign the homestead to a live. separated, When Curtis party may require party give either to Sailer he ap- disclosed had accumulated security making any pay- reasonable for $800,000 proximately in net includ- assets ordered in ments the divorce. Sandra ing account, investments, a retirement gave up Sailer all of under rights her fact, In property. Curtis Sailer’s assets premarital in the agreement. law Under had nearly during marriage doubled his 14-05-24.1, § may “the court re- Sandra Sailer. Included in Curtis Sailer’s quire party one pay spousal support assets awas 401k from employment his any for of time.” period that he $648,465.26. admitted was worth any Sailer spousal Sandra does not receive Shortly after Curtis Sailer for di- filed support agreement. under premarital vorce, Sandra Sailer submitted a financial 26.1-36-23.1(2), § every Under N.D.C.C. statement affidavit stating she was health policy pro- insurance must contain a benefits, receiving welfare money had permits vision that no continuation cover- hand, deposits bank, in age in the spouse upon insured’s former $50 entry divorce, of a she and Sailer decree of if the had stocks bonds decree in requires the the amount of provide insured to continued both their names. $200 coverage for that After person up thirty- parties separated, 401k, six gave up months. her invested in a Sandra Sailer however that mon- $959 right support ey to this from her former longer hus- was no in the 401k at trial premarital agreement. band under because Sandra Sailer testified she had to 30.1-04-02, Under N.D.C.C. a dece- use it rent. pay undisputed facts law, show, premarital agreement leaves a matter of ment record *23 real in- property, unconscion- Sailer with no agreement was premarital the vestments, accounts, pov- is in retirement or assets. enforced. Sandra Sailer able as fifteen-year marriage agreement Enforcement of the means she the of a erty at end any spousal support, does receive and three children. in acquired share increases in assets dur- § 14- In to N.D.C.C. addition [¶ 71] ing marriage, the or share in the marital 03.1-07, un- provides that expressly which parties each had home. Binek en- should not be agreements conscionable married, and, they assets al- some when forced, this case law also indicates Court’s though disparity there was a in the value is unconsciona- premarital agreement the assets, parties’ disparity the the was not and, therefore, In Bi- unenforceable. ble significant in this Further- as as case. Binek, explained courts v. we that nek more, request Ruth Binek was allowed pre- of a unconscionability considered the spousal support upon termination of time of agreement at both the marital case, In marriage. this Sandra Sailer has agreement premarital execution the assets, receiving spousal is barred from no ¶ 11, time of at the divorce. at the support, her “circumstances Binek, Court, in 594. This 673 N.W.2d incredibly time of dissolution” were dire. parties that when the married considered skills, has few from employment She which $600,000 worth Theodore Binek’s net was answering record tele- the amount $30,000. net worth and Ruth Binek’s was phones filing. ¶2. divorced, parties the Id. at When Further, approxi- opinion net worth this Court’s Theodore Binek’s was $30,000 $200,000 mately supports and Ruth Binek’s v. the conclusion Weber Weber ¶ depleted. premarital agreement Id. at This Court that this is uncon- had been 3. Weber, agreement was In we conclud- the scionable. Weber premarital concluded that property agreement it executed a settlement not unconscionable when was ed agreement by couple Ruth entered into a who provided divorcing the was because twenty-seven days was premarital could her assets had been married keep Binek grow, them to and Theodore unconscionable and unenforceable. and allow ¶11, 19, support during proper- 358. The obligated Binek was her ND 589 N.W.2d ¶ the hus- ty 12. also awarded the marriage. the Id. at The Court settlement wife had agreement the was residence that he owned before premarital concluded band’s $70,000. at marriage, when enforced which was valued not unconscionable was ¶¶ 2,16. property at concluded the govern parties’ it did not Id. We “because agreement was regarding spousal Id. unconscionable rights support.” settlement one-sided, agreement ad- was explained, “By 12. The Court because husband, allowing great hardship a dressing spousal support placed and, hastily, at the time the separate Binek her formed keep Ruth assets was settlement, Binek’s, signed property cre- parties from Theodore counsel, represented by uncon- was while enough leeway to avoid an wife ated ¶¶ upon Id. at 15-18. result based husband not. scionable time circumstances at the of dissolution.” case, In Sailer was Curtis Id. counsel, while Sandra Sail- represented “Although the provision in this was not. There is no such er agreement may with- approxi- premarital proceed agreement. After premarital counsel, factor is relevant this is a mately years marriage, fifteen enforce- out unconscionability to a under the Crawford finding approximately were married for children, years, fifteen had four and at Agreement [Uniform Premarital Act].” divorce, Law, time of Kenneth Crawford Property Antenup Marital Effect $130,000 (2008 earning was medical doctor 26:9, Agreement, supp.). tial at 8 year. Id. at 834. At time of earlier, Additionally, explained as divorce, Leslie Crawford was earning one-sided, clearly it pro $3,600 Id. year. Without the advice of vides is to receive over *24 counsel, Leslie Crawford entered into a $800,000 assets, in while Sandra Sailer re stipulated agreement divorce with Ken- basically assets, and spousal ceives no no Crawford, neth whereby Kenneth Craw- Furthermore, support. Curtis Sailer has a ford was custody awarded of four chil- job, well-paying where he earns six times dren, home, paid received the earns, what Sandra Sailer and he receives vehicle, fees, attorney’s Leslie Crawford’s health and retirement benefits. insurance paid spousal and her a sup- month $250 premarital agree enforcement port period. for a six-month Id. at 835. places great hardship ment a on Sandra pay Leslie Crawford was to Kenneth Sailer. Crawford a support month in child $15 Weber, Finally, in we [¶ stated it is and rights. received visitation Id. The for a appropriate district court to consider district court entered a judgment based on guidelines when deter- Ruff-Fischer this stipulation. Id. Five months after the mining unconscionability of settlement entered, judgment was Leslie Crawford agreement divorcing parties. attorney retained an and moved for relief ¶11, 17, We 589 N.W.2d 358. acknowl- from the judgment. Id. The district court edged guidelines that the Ruff-Fischer motion, concluding denied her Leslie not the in a standard domestic relations an intelligent person Crawford was and unconscionability case to determine aof fraud, deceit, there was no evidence of however, agreement, settlement we ex- coercion, misrepresentation by Kenneth plained application guidelines that Crawford. Id. On Leslie Crawford may be domestic helpful “because a rela- argued stipulation agreement the divorce agreement tions should scrutinized unjust was so and that it one-sided must in way as a same business contract.” product be deemed the of either Kenneth Id. While the district is not required court Crawford’s overreaching incapacity or her to guidelines consider the Ruff-Fischer to it. agreed understand Id. We with Les- when determining unconscionability lie Crawford and stipulation concluded the this premarital agreement, consideration was “so one-sided and creates such hard- may of the guidelines assist the court in ship that it is unconscionable.” Id. We determining whether the is so acknowledged stipulated agreements that one-sided as to not be enforceable. can provide prompt peaceful and resolu- holding This in Court’s held, tion of disputes, but “when is dis- Crawford supports finding also judgment blatantly closed that a is so one- Crawford premarital agreement is unconsciona rankly sided and so unfair under the un- Crawford, ble. In we considered whether circumstances!,][ covered should ]courts district abused its discretion not enforce it.” Id. at This 836. Court when it denied Leslie Crawford’s motion reversed the district denial court’s divorce judgment. vacate a motion judgment, to vacate the divorce Crawford (N.D. v. Crawford, 524 N.W.2d concluding agreed has “[w]hether 1994). Leslie stipulation Crawford Kenneth the terms aof becomes irrel- CentCode, custody N.D. as the damage enforcement well light evant report update would investigation an decree do of [the unconscionable duty custody courts do reputation investigator]. agrees The Court custody courts not enforce an justice. investigator’s] analysis [the Just as will illegal, too a, b, c, d, h, so courts and conclusions and finds judgments that are uncon- vacate j should favor The district court Sailer].” [Curtis scionable.” Id. provided analysis no further or explana tion to its support award substantially similar 77] This case Majority argues Curtis Sailer. Like the husband Craw- to Crawford. acceptable district court’s conclusion is be ford, significantly earns more Curtis Sailer custody investigator cause it “observed the Sailer, skills, job security, has than Sandra testify Majority, at trial.” See 35. disparity An even greater home. repeatedly a district court We have stated as Curtis has over exists here *25 regard custody investigator should not a $800,000 and Sailer has in assets testimony guardian ad litem’s and rec Crawford, As virtually assets. in the no Nefzger as See ommendation conclusive. blatantly is “so one- present agreement 119, ¶ 20, v. 1999 ND 595 Nefzger, N.W.2d it rankly and unfair” that should sided so 583; Schmaltz, 212, v. 1998 Schmaltz ND Equally to the applicable not be enforced. ¶ 9, 852; v. Hogan Hogan, 586 N.W.2d premarital agreement of the terms this is ¶ 105, 10, 2003 ND 665 N.W.2d 672. The party in statement “Whether Crawford: responsibility district court abdicated its stipulation agreed has to the terms of custody to make the decision when it re damage in the light becomes irrelevant of garded custody investigator’s opinion the of an unconscionable decree enforcement conclusive, permitted it not to which duty reputation do would to the and 24A Sep do. See Am.Jur.2d Divorce and justice.” to courts do Id. (2008) (“The § cannot aration 883 court IV delegate anyone power to the decide report custody. It cannot make the and Custody investigator its conclusions of conclu respectfully from Part dissent (2008) sive.”); C.J.S. 27C Divorce 1023 majority opinion. Majority, the The IV of (“The [investigator’s] recommendations ¶ 34, acknowledges “[generally, at conclusive.”). are not the of an report ‘court cannot make inde Furthermore, I am unable to investigator [¶ conclusive pendent 79] the basis case v. custody distinguish this from Owan Owan. regarding its the decision Owan, found, In the district court “The this rule is usu children. The reason for testimony phrase worker’s] the social ally expressed by gives [the the trial Court great credibility. power the and deal delegate anyone opinion court cannot North Dakota custody.’ child has reviewed questions to decide Court (N.D. Owan, 14-09-06.2 and does concur Century 541 722 Code Owan N.W.2d 1996) (citations omitted).” findings as fol- Although with social [the worker’s] pertain allegations husband’s] rule lows: Majority correctly [the states the declines, minor. physical appear it altercations ing custody investigators, cases, has and rule In acted analysis, apply [the wife] to the most without Owan, held, has 541 husband] court reacted.” present [the case. district at 721. We concluded the district has reviewed all of ‘best N.W.2d Court “[t]he 14-09-06.2, adopt findings merely court not in could interests’ factors Section expert. chological parent at 722. The district over a parent. Id. natural ¶ 10, in its role even court this case abdicated Be- N.W.2d 834. Here, so than did Owan. more the court applied wrong cause the district absolutely provided district court no test, legal Court re- reversed and custody analysis adopted investi- manded the matter the district court to findings The court gator’s completely. did apply determining the correct test for cus- analyze factors applicable nor ex- ¶¶ A.H.O., tody. In Id. at 11-12. P.A. v. plain awarding custody its rationale for argued the mother the best fac- interest Rather, the children to Curtis Sailer. it given equal weight tors should be merely it reviewed stated had the statute should be awarded to the custody investigator’s report and who has the most factors in her weighing investigator’s analysis with the agreed favor. 2008 58. ND N.W.2d wholly inadequate. conclusions. This is stated, however, Our Court have that we interpreted “equal Finally, I dissent consideration” to also from the (d) analysis mean “a Majority’s of factor of the best mathematical formula which ¶46, Majority, interest factors. The up factors are added person acknowledges “may that the district court the most factors their favor d,” inadequately analyzed factor how awarded Id. fac- custody.” We said some ever, weight concluded that may prove important tors more in one *26 best interest factors favored Curtis Furthermore, situation than another. Id. Initially, Sailer. I note the district court Larson, in Klein v. 724 (d) analyze Rather, at all. factor it concurring dissenting N.W.2d in a merely agreed stated it with the custody opinion joined, which I Justice Crothers investigator’s analysis report and on all the explained that when the district mis- court Secondly, custody factors. investiga the applies law, the this Court should remand analysis on this factor was an incor tor’s so the district can fact- complete court its application of Majori rect the law. As the finding function. He stated: noted, ty analyze district court should A misapplication generally of law war- than physical geo more the structure or rants judgment reversal the re- graphic location of the homes mand so district apply the court can (d). applying when factor While the Ma by relevant to the law facts as clarified jority acknowledges that the district court this Court. the Unless facts are undis- custody may investigator have inade puted, a misapplication district court’s factor, quately analyzed this it did not law does taking not warrant this Court remand for the court to apply district over fact-finding function and decid- by relevant facts to the law as clarified ing the in lieu of case the district court. Gabel, In Court. explained Gietzen v. we just Yet I majority believe the has done when that this Court “unable to say is by that re-weighing evidence and correctly applied court the law for [a best making findings statutory its own under factor],” custody interest award should (f) (m). (d), factors Majority opin- be reversed and remanded for findings ¶¶ 14,17-21, ion at and 25-27. the correct application under of one of the ¶ best interest factors. 2006 ND Likewise, Here, in misapplied

718 N.W.2d 552. the law was Goter below. Goter, this Court concluded the The district district court needs to correct applied court test wrong deciding by applying disput- when error on remand whether should a psy- award ed facts of this case to the law this law, case should be remanded plies used. But instead has directed be Court findings in accordance let the district court so it can make remanding to work, adju- majority of the law. application the correct its complete Thus, of facts case under set dicating this is true of this case. would same persuasive. finds Do- majority reverse the court’s award custo- district majority so, improp- ing I believe dy to and remand Curtis Sailer fact-finding role erly into the stepping analyze court fac- appropriately district to the district court. normally (d). reserved tor dissent from respectfully I therefore Maring Mary Muehlen adjudicat- opinion portions

those entry ordering judgment ing facts and

for Larson.

Klein, 236, 34, 724 ND N.W.2d J., part

(Crothers, concurring and dis- cases These all indicate

senting part). incorrectly ap-

that when a district

Case Details

Case Name: Sailer v. Sailer
Court Name: North Dakota Supreme Court
Date Published: Apr 30, 2009
Citation: 764 N.W.2d 445
Docket Number: 20080114
Court Abbreviation: N.D.
AI-generated responses must be verified and are not legal advice.
Log In