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Saif Corp. v. Allen
881 P.2d 773
Or.
1994
Check Treatment

*1 192 11; Argued May 3, reassigned September submitted resubmitted June reversed; Appeals decision of Compensation the Court of order of the Workers’ Board proceedings September 29, affirmed and case remanded to the Board for further reconsideration denied November In the Matter of the Compensation Allen,

Trina K. Claimant. SAIF CORPORATION Restaurant, Rose’s Respondents Review,

Trina K. ALLEN, Petitioner on Review.

(WCB S40951) 91-09837; A76538; CA SC P2d *2 Karen Stolzberg, Goldberg Mechanic, Portland, & the cause and filed the brief on argued petition reply behalf of on review. With her on the petitioner petition Hooton, Schneider, Denorch, Donald M. Hooton & Galaviz- Stoller, Portland. *3 Runner, General, Salem,

David L. Assistant Attorney With him on the the cause for review. argued respondents General, responses Kulongoski, Attorney were Theodore R. Linder, General, and L. Solicitor Salem. Virginia Harri, Moore, Johnson, & Malagon, Edward Jensen J. amicus curiae Correll, Portland, filed a brief on behalf of Oregon Compensation Attorneys. Workers’

DURHAM, J. and dissented Graber, J., part concurred part J., Carson, J., Gillette, joined. C. filed an in which opinion DURHAM, J. presents

This workers’ case two (1) issues: When the of the Court three-judge panel Appeals a issued a majority concurring and a dis- opinion, opinion, senting 2.570(4), did court with ORS opinion, comply * ** which the “concurrence two requires judges to pro- (2) below, judgment”? nounce Does ORS set out an award of attorney allow fees when an or insurer employer services, denies claim for medical deny but does not expressly of, the compensability for, or its responsibility (1) claimant’s injury condition? We hold: Court (2) with Appeals 2.570(4); complied an allows award of when or insurer services, a claim for denies medical deny but does not expressly of, or its compensability responsibility for, claimant’s injury condition.

Claimant her back injured in 1988 while at employed Her employer’s insurer, Safeco, restaurant. accepted her workers’ claim for the injury.

In claimant went work for a different restau- (SAIF). rant, which was insured SAIF Corporation There- after, claimant back experienced and neck She pain pain. filed an aggravation claim with Safeco and new claim injury with SAIF. agreed insurers that claimant’s 1989 but

compensable disagreed as responsibility. workers’ compensation referee held that Safeco remained for claimant’s lower back responsible condition, but SAIF was responsible her back and neck condition. upper That order was not appealed.

Meanwhile, claimant had moved to Rhode Island.1 She submitted various medical bills to SAIF from providers SAIF Rhode Island. some bills but not others.2 paid *4 Claimant’s SAIF lawyer wrote a letter to on March 14,1991, asking unpaid SAIF four bills that had SAIF

1 By hearing, residing of the date claimant was in Idaho. $11,448.81 14,1991, hadpaidatotal inmedicalpayments As ofMarch SAIF on the claim. 31,1990.3 for making adjustments After

received on October SAIF contended were excessive under Oregon’s charges charges medical fee schedule and for workers’ back condition for which Safeco was related claimant’s 1, 1991, of the bills paid May SAIF one responsible, 1991.4 May 3, two more on claimant filed a form 25,1991,

On July Request checked the boxes on the form: Hearing following “REQUEST MADE A HEARING IS FOR CONCERN- ING ONE OR MORE OF THE REASONS CHECKED BELOW: íjí s{í

£ £ ifc “H MEDICAL SERVICES ORS 656.245 _JX_ ££‡ s-t # - “Q ORS[.] EXPLAIN AND OTHER CITE JL bills; pay medical penalties

Failure to 656.262(10), 656.268, to ORS 656.382.” pursuant “DENIAL,” relating not check the boxes Claimant did “COMPENSABILITY,” or “AGGRAVATION.” Hearing. form Response Request

SAIF filed a medical bills have it, erroneously stated that “[t]he SAIF ’’ box on the SAIF also checked the timely been on a basis. paid “[tjhere no known for an award of basis form stating not check the box assert- fees.” SAIF did penalties/attorney any relating other box affirmed ing that denial should be to compensation. to entitlement as The four bills were follows: Bay Thermography $ 860.00 Medical East MRI, 850.00 P.C. RI-Mass 1,140.00 Diagnostic Lab. Ocean State Chiropractic 427.19 Gate Toll payments were as follows: Those Chiropractic 424.09 $ Toll Gate 5/1/91 MRI, 850.00 P.C. RI-Mass 5/3/91 730.03 Diagnostic Lab. Ocean State 5/3/91 payments is not in issue here. propriety amounts those 14,1991, March after claimant paid medical bills submitted also other SAIF not at issue here. which are

197 unpaid fact, one bill remained at the time SAIF response. respect filed its With to bill, that SAIF contended thermography prior that not was reimbursable without making adjustments authorization.5 Nonetheless, after allegedly charges, paid excessive SAIF fourth and last September medical bill on 23, 1991.6 hearing The referee a convened to determine attorney whether claimant was entitled to fee under ORS 656.386(1), attorney because her instrumental obtain- ing compensation hearing.7 for claimant before the The ref- attorney eree awarded claimant an sentence ORS fee third under the 656.386(1), obtaining “for her efforts payment of medical bills.” The referee found: “It is doubtful paid that the bills would have it been if not had been for attorney’s claimant’s efforts.” appealed

SAIF fee award to the (Board). Compensation Workers’ Board The Board affirmed. sought judicial SAIF then review. The Court of Appeals reversed the award of fees under ORS App Allen, SAIF v. Or 124 861 P2d 1018 (1993). “[a] The court held that claimant is entitled to attor- ney only appeal fees under ORS in an ‘from an ” denying compensation.’ order or decision the claim for 124 App (quoting Or at 185 SAIF, Or 606, 611, Shoulders 300 “ (1986)). explained 716 P2d 751 The court that, ‘where the only compensation appeal compen- issue is the amount of * * * disability[,] sation or the extent of is not ” applicable attorney (quoting fee statute.’ Id. at 186 (1988)). SAIF, 541, 545, Short v. 754 P2d 575 Judge De Muniz concurred, because, view, his Supreme “the Court has indicated that an insurer’s failure to 5 436-10-040(10) (11) (WCD 1-1990) pro so OAR Administrative Order vided at the time. 6 Bay paid Thermography. propriety SAIF to $314.03 East Medical The payment amount of in issue that not here. argue convening Insurer did not to this court to decide to entitlement a fee under the third sentence of ORS renders that inapplicable. Accordingly, question, sentence we do not address that or the related question concerning “rejected” of whether the second sentence of ORS cases, award here. authorizes fee claim for not be

timely respond compensation may de Id. 187. He also construed as a denial.” at said: facto Supreme “[T]he ‘[a]n Court has indicated insurer’s 656.262(6)] required by a claim respond [as failure acceptance v. Spectra [n]or is neither denial.’ Johnson (1987). 49,Or P2d Physics, 303 issue that case was whether an insurer’s inaction could be con- acceptance strued as of claim. conclusion inaction I question denial is therefore dictum. does constitute Supreme really whether the Court intended claimants languish obey requires while insurers failed to the law that ” claims in a Id. at 189 deny timely them fashion. accept *6 original). in (emphasis

He also said: view, accept deny

“In failure to my timely insurer’s denial, ought to considered a and that should a claim entitle the * * be claimant to fees under ORS 187. Id. at He that ORS Rossman dissented. asserted

Judge insurer-paid attorney whenever provides Id. at instrumental in obtaining compensation. is lawyer 189-90. We the peti- for review. allowed petitioned

Claimant Appeals. tion decision of Court of and reverse the majority opin- Claimant’s contention is first not, in do Appeals the Court of concurring opinion ion and the 2.570(4). That provides, statute together, satisfy taken in part: transact busi- necessary of is judges

“The three presence Appeals], except such department [ofthe Court of any ness in by any judge. The in chambers may transacted business as be necessary pronounce judges two concurrence judgment.” task is to deter statute, the court’s interpreting Labor v. Bureau PGE legislature. of the

mine the intent (1993). P2d 1143 606, 610-11, 859 Industries, 317 Or the text are in that determination points starting statutes related includes statute; latter context should usage typically Words common the same subject. meaning. Ibid. natural, ordinary their given plain, 2.570(4) suggests The text of ORS that “concur- required only rence” not as to the as to the result reached in a case and leading

reasoning result, to that it because purpose describes the limited for which “concurrence” is required: “necessary pronounce judgment.” it is The term pertinent “concurrence” is not defined in the statutes. “Con- generally “agreement action”; currence” means or union in “agreement design”; opinion: in union “CONSENT.” Dictionary Webster’s Third New International 1993). (unabridged Dictionary ed See also Black’s Law (6th 1990) (same). ed The term defined, “concurrent” is part, agreement, harmony, as accord, “marked or sim- ilarity tendency.” supra, Webster’s, at 472 effect added). (emphasis ordinary meanings Those of “concur- support rence” the inference stated above. — provision context another subsection of relating operation Appeals

the same statute of the Court of — supports provides, also that inference. ORS part: banc, [C]ourt

“When sits in [of Appeals] concurrence majority judges of a necessaiy participating is pronounce judgment, judges but if the participating are equally divided in their view to judgment given, as to be judgment appealed (Emphasis from shall be affirmed.” added.) *7 phrase In that sentence, the word “concurrence” and the judgment given” interchange- as the to “view to are used ably. “judgment” Appeals turn, In the of the Court of is the rights obliga- final determination of as that court to the — (as parties tions of is, the that the result. ORCP 67 A Cf. procedure, judgment used in the rules civil of a is “the final action”). rights parties determination of the in an only requires We conclude that that judges three-judge panel Appeals a the two of of Court of agree Agreement to, in, is, as to the concur the result. required. leading reasons to that result is not judges agreed Here, result, is, con two being Appeals judgment. in the so, curred the That Court complied with ORS 200 parties’ dispute concerning

We turn next the 656.386(1), the fees in statute under which claimant seeks compensation an cases, case. In workers’ award of attor this statutory only pursuant ney fees be made authoriza can Plywood, Forney 628, 632, 297 Or tion. v. Western States (1984); Curry, 504, 510-11, 686 P2d P2d SAIF v. (1984). 656.386(1) provides: a involving injuries “In accidental where claim- all cases Appeals to the Court of finally prevails appeal ant from an order or Supreme for review to the Court petition compensation, the court shall denying decision the claim attorney attorney. a fee to the claimant’s allow reasonable finally in a prevails cases where the claimant rejected such itself, hearing by referee or in a review the board before the attorney then the referee or board shall allow a reasonable obtaining If an is instrumental fee. held, the not hearing and a referee is claimant Attorney pro- allowed.

reasonable fee shall be or self- paid by for in section shall be the insurer vided employer.” insured interpreting

Again, the court’s task to statute, legislature. Labor PGE v. Bureau discern the intent of supra, Industries, The best evidence of the 317 Or at 610. legislature’s at 610-11. text the statute. Id. intent analysis, court considers the first level of Also, at the statutory including provision other issue, at context of the relating provisions other statutes of the same statute and legislature subject. is not If the intent of the Ibid. the same context, the court considers from the clear text legislative history Id. at 611-12. statute. referee, Board relied on Claimant, and the — providing for fees when of ORS

third sentence — support fee in this case. award no is held Assembly statute Legislative sentence added that previously § ch 1. This court has 1991. Or Laws that sentence.8 construed regarding sentence of ORS the third of an issue We take note third sentence arguments, parties assume In their

is not before us. requires first two Unlike the claim the insurer. a “denial” *8 or expressly denial statute, refer to does not the third sentence sentences rejection by arguments parties, we framed with the of a claim. accordance analyze firstWe the text of the relevant statutes. The 686.386(1) requires attorney third sentence of ORS an fee “[i]f obtaining compen- award an is instrumental hearing by for sation The a claimant and a the referee is not held.” parties right assume that the to fees created predicated sentence is on the existence of “claim for a com- pensation,” phrase appears a which is in the statute’s agree. first sentence. We The term “claimant” in the third sentence of ORS indicates that a “claim” ais prerequisite provides: recovery of a fee award. ORS “ ‘Claim’ means written request compensation from for subject worker or behalf, someone the worker’s or any compensable injury subject which a employer has notice or added.) knowledge.” (Emphasis 656.005(8) provides: “ ‘Compensation’ benefits, includes all including medical services, provided compensable injury subject for a to a worker or the worker’s beneficiaries an insurer or self- employer insured pursuant to this chapter.” (Emphasis added.) disjunctive The term “claim” is defined in the request compensation,” refer to either “a written which request includes a services, for medical “any compensable injury.” phrase The text indicates that the compensation” equally request “claim for refers to a written any compensable injury for medical services and to of which knowledge. an has notice or arguments support

Insurer makes two of its view phrase “denying compensation” the claim for in the injury, first sentence refers to of a denial condition but not request to denial of a written for medical it First, services. phrase claims that the use article “the” in the “the compensation” claim for a reference to the sentence’s introductory phrase, involving inju- “[i]n all cases accidental argues ries.” Insurer that the article “the” was intended to indicate that the claim denies concern that the insurer must injury. compensability responds an Claimant predicate assume but do not decide that denial of claim for is a fee award under the third sentence of ORS argument ignores involving the fact that “cases *9 insurer’s injuries,” commonly both accidental ORS involve in kinds of claims listed in the definition of “claim” ORS 656.005(6). proposition. argues agree We with that She also legislative argument supported that insurer’s the history the insertion of article “the” in ORS behind the

Nothing in or the text context of ORS why appears phrase explains in the under the article “the” legislature the intention of the consideration. Because using phrase clear, “the” in that is not we resort to the article history legislative behind that word. PGE v. Bureau the supra, Industries, 1981, at Prior to 611. Labor compensation.” In referred to “his claim for changed phrasing present legislature to the 1981, the employ gender terminology. Or neutral form an effort § parties evidence, and the ch 25. We find no Laws offer legislature suggest used the article none, any claim context exclude from the fee statute “the” statutory compensation,” for within the is a “claim of those terms. definitions recognize argues statutes the

Insurer also that other compensability dispute of an over the distinction between a compen- injury level of owed on and one over the benefits 656.245(l)(a)9 argues injury. that a It sable cites ORS may, not, need for medical services but denial of a claim injury. compensability dispute the of the over include compen- dispute the between a over The distinction dispute injury sability the condition and a over or However, we is familiar one. claimant’s benefits amount of a fail to see how insurer’s draft supports that distinction the existence of argument. legislature it can has shown particular kinds of address the denial statutes to For intention. when that is its claims for 656.245(2) provides: example, 656.245(l)(a) provides: employer injury, the self-insured every compensable the insurer or “For resulting from provided for conditions medical services cause to be shall recovery process injury or period injury as nature of such for may required after determina- including as requires, such medical services disability.” permanent tion submitting “When the time for a claim under ORS expired, any 656.273 has claim medical services referred for to in this section shall be submitted to the or self- insurer denied, insured If employer. the claim medical services is may request worker submit the board a pursuant to ORS 656.283. the event the worker cannot locate insurer or self-insured if worker employer, is, does not know who the insurer or self-insured or employer if employer exist, the insurer self-insured has ceased to added.) claim shall be (Emphasis submitted director.” legislature made no similar effort to confine ORS to claims in which the insurer dis- putes compensability of an or condition. We legislature’s terminology assume that the choice of the fee purposeful. assumption particularly statute was That rele- legislature because, statute, vant here in the fee used *10 656.005(6) (8). specially terms that it defined in ORS legislature’s special We are bound to followthe defini Compensation tions of used terms in the Workers’ Law. ORS provides: 656.003 where the

“Except requires, context otherwise defini- given tions chapter govern this its construction.” (1994), SAIF, Or 225, 233, v. 319 874 P2d 1329 Astleford the court held that ORS 656.003 calls for use of the defini- specified chapter tions in ORS 656 unless — “the context including the structure and purpose — workers’ scheme as a whole demonstrates given that the of that use definition would he inappropriate, because the result of such use conflict one or would with more of that aspects purpose.” structure or nothing Applying standard, we find Astleford 656.386(1) requires apply context of ORS defini- we “compensation” tions of the terms “claim” and that are 656.005(6) (8). specified different than those ORS judicially argument request Insurer’s nullify amounts a we definition of “claim” ORS one-half 656.005(6). definitions, We cannot do that. Under those compensation” for is a “claim for claim medical benefits 656.386Q).10 under ORS 10 “claim,” legislature’s refuses to definition of ORS The dissent adhere

204 argues reading Insurer that claimant’s of the statute 656.386(2) superfluous. provides: renders ORS That statute paid “In fees shall to be all other cases continue from the claimant’s award of as other- compensation except provided wise in ORS 656.382.” 656.386(2) disagree.

We ORS would still control the payment of in cases in which referee thé awards permanent partial disability for additional OAR438-15-040(1). under ORS and 656.216. We 656.214 See potential purport all cases in do list which ORS payment only would control of fees. We note example that we cite establishes that claimant’s reading of render does not superfluous. argues that court’s have lim

Insurer also cases phrase “denying compensation” in claim ited 656.386(1) disputes compensability injury or over the of an disputes over have excluded the amount of condition and disagrees argues that, even under the Claimant benefits. qualifies relies, fee insurer this claim cases which award under ORS assertion, the latter if Because argument, dispose address it correct, would of insurer’s we doing so, that our authoritative first. In we are mindful implicate interpretations the rule of stare decisis of statute part at if into it of the statute as written and become Stephens Bohlman, 344, 350 6, v. n time of enactment. (1992). are this court has P2d We also aware that apply dictum the doctrine stare decisis to declined to Cutright statutory cases. See earlier construction (1985) Weyerhaeuser 702 P2d *11 Co., 301, 299 Or (court rely “questionable that was a declined to on dictum meaning of a pronouncement” in an about the earlier case statute); Safeway compensation repealed Stores workers’ 656.005(6), analysis misstep context of ORS its of the text and undermines and that 656.386(1). govern payment fees adopted out of has rules Board 656.386(2). subject 438-15-045 See OAR compensation that are in cases (extent settlement); (disputed disability); OAR temporary 438-15-050 claim OAR 438-15-055(1) (extent (claim temporary disposition agreement); OAR 438-15-052 (attorney level); disability and OAR 438-15-080 permanent at the Board or case). obtaining compensation in an own-motion increased instrumental (1953) Agriculture, 43, 81, State Bd. 198 Or 255 P2d 564 (dictum prior construing cases a statute “not within decisis”). doctrine of stare by Several cases cited insurer do not address or decide issue services, whether denied claim for medical unac companied by challenge compensability injury compensation condition, is denied claim for under ORS 656.386(1). Compensation Dept., Peterson v. Or 369, (1971), P2d 216 held that the claimant was not entitled to prevailed employer’s fees, because he not over had denial. only right Instead, he had won to a on his claim. (1975), SAIF, In Cavins v. 272 Or 536 P2d 426 ground insurer denied a claim for medical services on the it was unrelated to work. court held that a medical compensation” services claim a “claim was for and that within the meaning employer’s of ORS assertion injury that the services were unrelated to a work awas denial Ohlig that fell within the ambit ofthe statute. v.FMC Marine Equipment, (1981), & Rail 633 P2d 1279 fol holding lawyer’s request disability lowed Cavins in that a for and medical services for a client’s back condition was a claim and that the insurer’s contention that the back condition an caused at work was a denial of a claim for under ORS supra, SAIF, Insurer cites Shoulders v. which held the claimant was not entitled to under claimant, because the not the insurer, initiated accepting review the Board from an order the claim. The court said that the first of ORS sentence “creates three fees: prerequisites

“1. Claimant must initiate the neither appeal, because appeal an insurer nor an would from order or denying compensation; decision the claim for “2. The must be from an order decision decision denying, compensation; claim for allowing, rather than issue finally prevail

“3. Claimant must on the compensation.

206 must appeal prevail “[T]he claimant initiate the on the added).

compensability issue.” (emphasis at 611-12 Or argues phrase emphasized Insurer that the means compensation” compensability “claim for must concern the of the claimant’s condition rather than a claim for benefits. appears disagree, emphasized phrase We it because the attempt paraphrase prerequisite was an the third set forth prerequisites above. None of the listed is with inconsistent the here. Board’s fee award We conclude that Shoulders v. does not aid insurer. SAIF following

Insurer draws our attention to the state- Forney Plywood, supra: ment in Western States v. only claim for the amount of compensa- “Claimant’s was responsibility claim. Where is not aggravation tion on her due compensation and the the only question issue is amount of due, ordinarily attorney are not authorized under ORS 656.386(1) and the award under only can recoverablefrom 656.382(2).” added).12 (emphasis 297 Or at 632 u. relies this statement in Short Insurer also on supra, SAIF, 305 Or at 545: 656.386(1) fees on review of provides

“ORS appeal claimant did not to the board or denied claims. The from a her claim. Both Appeals denying decision Court that claimant’s condi- the referee and the board concluded only issue on compensation Wherethe compensable. tion was or disabil- the extent appeal is amount of was caused ity, than whether claimant’s condition rather 656.386(1) applicable not the injury, ORS is an industrial 656.388(2) route to the statute and the ORS attorney fee added.)13 (Emphasis court not available.” circuit supra, Plywood, court that ORS Forney held v. States Western had which claimant inapplicable, order from because the Board was any compensation, We are unable to discern appealed not denied it. awarded full had holding. The statement quoted and the court’s between statement connection statutory any any authority, or consideration unaccompanied citation (8). “compensation” in ORS definitions of “claim” SAIF, supra, quoted in Short v. emphasized portion the last sentence Plywood, above. The Forney discussed States Western the statement is similar to SAIF, holding in Short v. relationship court’s question bears no clause denied, granted, Board had not inapplicable, because “claim,” statutory analyze definition court did claim. The statement, listed authority the court for the any As in ORS words analyzing Forney

After the statements in Short, notwithstanding which relies, insurer we that, conclude they they inappli our concerns about whether cable here. correct, are are They purport apply only “[w]here compen appeal sation issue on is the amount of or the disability, extent of rather than whether the claimant’s condi *13 by injury.” SAIF, tion was caused an industrial Short v. supra, below, 305 Or at 545. As discussed we conclude that insurer’s conduct was a claim denial and that the denial did not confine the issue to the amount of or extent disability. result, aAs the cases on which insurer relies do 656.386(1) inapplicable not render ORS to this claim.

We turn to the Board’s that, conclusion on this response record, insurer’s to the claim was a denial. Insurer argues accepted question that whether it or denied a claim is a denial, of fact and that its conduct here is not a de facto otherwise. 656.262(6) provides, part: ORS “Written notice acceptance or denial of the claim shall be furnished by to the claimant the insurer or self-insured within days after the employer has notice or of the knowledge claim.” adopted 436-60-140(3),

The Board has OAR which restates the substance of the first sentence of ORS 656.262(6). provides: The rule give

“The insurer shall the claimant written notice of (90) acceptance ninety or denial of a claim within days of the employer’s knowledge notice or of a claim.” give required by did

Insurer the notice the stat- paid Instead, ute and bills, rule. it some but not others. When requested hearing unpaid claimant on the bills, insurer court, Ohlig three of this citation decisions Shoulders and a and Cavins. As “cf.” above, authority discussed decisions none those statement. The court Appeals, also cited three decisions of the Court of none of which was reviewed rejection Finally, legislature’s court of a bill in that would court. cited if have authorized a fee award a claimant obtained an increase the extent of SAIF, permanent disability. supra, legislature’s n Short v. 305 Or at 547 4. rejection legislative proposed statutory light amendment sheds no on the of a statement, original if in the intention behind the enactment. The taken sense insurer, in the excision of one-half of the definition of advocated would result “claim,” in the context of ORS The court cited no authority support result. that the‘ ‘medical bills have been on responded writing paid That was not timely basis.” statement correct. The Board concluded that insurer had denied the claim:

‘ contends, review, untimely ‘SAIF that this case involves than a denial or a ‘de facto’ medical processing, rather denial of However, we find at least services. one of claimant’s medical was in ‘de facto’ at the services claims denied status hearing, time as SAIF requested accepted claimant had not knowledge denied claim within 90 of notice or days 656.262(6). Moreover, paid claim. SAIF had previously several of bills find no claimant’s medical services but we indication in record intended claimant’s that SAIF Rather, August 30,1991 response last bill. SAIF’s to claimant’s request for stated that claimant’s ‘medical bills have ” timely paid been on a basis.’ response Board’s determination insurer’s meaning

to the claim is a denial within the of ORS law, is a not a of fact. we Accordingly, conclusion finding review the conclusion for error law.14 Board’s (8) provide: *14 “(7) record, a contested be confined the court Review of case shall judgment agency any issue of fact or shall not substitute its for that of as to pro- disputed allegations irregularities in agency In the case of of discretion. which, agency proved, not in the record if would cedure before the shown remand, may Appeals allegations refer the to a warrant reversal or Court findings upon appointed by of fact the court to take evidence make Master agency further action if it finds that them. The remand the order for court shall may proceedings of the action have either the fairness of the or the correctness prescribed impaired by procedure error or a to follow been a material failure procedure. “ (8)(a) affirm, may remand If the court finds The court reverse or the order. erroneously interpreted provision a agency a of law and that correct that the interpretation compels particular has action, it shall:

“(A) order; modify or or Set aside “(B) agency under a correct case to for further action Remand the interpretation provision of law. of the “(b) agency’s agency remand if it finds shall the order The court be: exercise of discretion

“(A) law; range delegated agency Outside the discretion “(B) rule, position, officially agency agency with an stated Inconsistent agency; inconsistency explained by agency not prior practice, if the or a “(C) statutory provision. in violation of a constitutional Otherwise ‘‘(c) the order is the order if it finds that shall set aside or remand The court supported by evidence exists in the record. Substantial substantial evidence whole, permit record, as support finding when viewed would of fact finding.” person to make that reasonable No statute or rule cited the parties or discovered by us defines “denial” for purposes In the Board’s reviewing construction and application “denial,” term we follow the methodology described in Springfield Education School Dist., Assn. v. 217, 233, 290 Or England (1980). See v. Thunderbird, 315 Or 621 P2d 547 Springfield (1993) 633, 638, 848 P2d 100 (applying analysis Tee Albertson’s, v. to statutory term “earning capacity”); (1992) (applyingSpring Inc., 633, 637, 842 P2d 374 analysis term statutory “gainful occupation”). field Springfield, In this court recognized three categories terms: exact statutory terms, inexact terms, and delegative terms.15 The term “denial” in ORS is an inexact term, which means that “the legislature has expressed its meaning completely, but that meaning remains to be out spelled England supra, in the Thunderbird, v. rule or agency’s order.” England supra, Thunderbird, 315 Or at 638. also states: gives “An inexact term the agency interpretive but not legislative responsibility. See Springfield Education Assn. v. Dist., (so School supra, 290 Or at 233 holding for terms ‘employment relations’ and employment’). ‘conditions of respect term, With to an inexact the role of the court is to determine whether agency ‘erroneously interpreted a law,’ provision of 183.482(8)(a), and the ultimate inter- pretive responsibility lies with the court in its role as the arbiter questions of law. Springfield Education Assn. v. Dist., School supra, Or at 234.” Id. whether addressing the Board inter- erroneously

preted the dispositive question of law on review, under ORS 183.482(8)(a), agency

“whether the legislative action is within the policy which inheres in the statutory agency term. An interpreta- may given tion an appropriate degree of assumptive 15Springfield statutory describes the three classes of terms as follows: *15 “1.) precise meaning, parlance, Terms of whether of common or technical requiring only factfinding by agency judicial the and review for substantial evidence; “2.) require agency interpretation judicial Inexact terms which and review consistency legislative policy; with and “3.) delegation legislative require policy of Terms which determination agency judicial policy delegation.” and review of whether that is within the 290 Or at 223. legislative process if was involved in the

validity agency upon qualifications of expertise or if we infer that it has based or its of experience application its because of personnel deference, however, Judicial varying the statute to facts. If inter- unreasoning. or a statute must be not automatic to the facts of a con- applicability to determine its preted case, then, necessary agency express for the tested it is order, degree appropriate magnitude to the or its to the case, demonstrat- reasoning of the contested its complexity policy to advance the embodied ing tendency of the order reasoning will enable the Explicit in the words of the statute. degree of give appropriate judicial court on review Educa- agency interpretation.” Springfield credence to Dist., at 227-28. supra, 290 Or tion Assn. School whether in order to decide We must interpret which the legislative policy Board’s action “coincides with of the statute.” Id. at 228. in the meaning inheres are statute, words legislature’s construing we words Ordinarily, give evidence of its intention. the best natural, ordinary meaning. common their usage plain, Industries, at 611. supra, Labor and PGE v. Bureau of follows: the word “denial” as dictionary defines rejection to, grant, assent or sanction: “1. refusal to * * * 2a. claimed, or felt to be due something requested, statement, charge, imputa- truth of a refusal to admit the ** Dictionary Third New International Webster’s tion 1993). (unabridged analysis, consider, at the first level of alsoWe other issue, including at the statutory provision context of (9), 656.262(1), (2), (8), the same statute. provisions (10) (a) provide: “(1) compensation providing of claims and Processing self- the insurer or responsibility shall be the for a worker their insurers shall assist employers All employer. insured chapter. in this required as processing claims “(2) chapter shall due under entitled directly person promptly paid periodically, knowledge receiving notice employer’s thereto upon is denied claim, right where the except employer. the insurer or self-insured *{ ¤ «{» »¡s í í ÍJ»

“ (8) any duly If an insurer or other agent of on record with the Director of authorized such employer purpose, the of Department

the Consumer and Business Services denies a denial, claim for written notice of such compensation, stating denial, informing the reason for the of the worker the hearing rights Claim Expedited Service and of under ORS 656.283, given A shall be to the claimant. ofthe copy notice of be denial shall mailed the director and to the employer by the may request hearing insurer. The worker a pursuant 656.319.[16] ORS

“ (9) Merely paying or providing compensation shall not be of acceptance considered a claim or an admission of liability, nor acceptance shall mere of such compensation be of right question considered waiver the amount thereof.

“(10)(a) If the or insurer self-insured employer unrea- delays sonably unreasonably or refuses to pay compensation, or unreasonably delays acceptance claim, or denial of a insurer or self-insured employer shall be liable for an addi- tional up amount to 25 of percent then amounts due. Notwithstanding any provision other chapter, jurisdiction director shall have exclusive proceedings over regarding solely the payment assessment and of the addi- tional amount described in this subsection. The addi- entire tional paid amount shall be to the worker if the worker is not represented by If attorney. an the worker is represented by an attorney, the worker shall paid be one-half the additional amount and the worker’s shall receive one-half the amount, additional lieu fee. The director’s action and review thereof shall subject to ORS 183.310 to 183.550 and such other rules procedural as the director may prescribe.”

In the text of 656.262(6), has legislature afforded two to an or options insurer who receives notice knowledge may claim for insurer compensation. The or accept deny the claim. The text provide does option insurer with the to take no or position acceptance 436-60-140(6), implement adopted To Board has OAR provides: which comply “The of denial shall with the rules of Practice and Procedure notice Compensation

for Contested Cases under the Workers’ Law and shall: “(a) legal denial; Specify for the the factual reasons “(b) Expedited worker’s Claim Service and of the Inform the worker right ato under ORS 656.283.” of the claim. The text the Board’s conclusion supports denial insurer’s conduct was denial. also supports context Board’s result. ORS makes the insurer self- “[processing of claims and employer responsible insured for worker.” ORS obli- compensation providing under the insurer due gates entitled thereto upon the law “to the person employer’s where the claim, except of a knowledge notice or receiving the insurer or denied right self-insured *17 added.) ORS cer- promotes employer.” (Emphasis and the execution of those tainty promptness17 respon- the insurer by requiring provide sibilities * * * “[wjritten or denial of the claim acceptance notice of knowledge has notice or of days employer within 90 after the the claim.” include the written the insurer to requires

ORS the denial and information about notice the reason for the The insurer hearing rights under ORS 656.283.18 claimant’s 656.012(2) provides, part: OES objectives Compensa- findings, consequence of the Workers’ “In of these the to be as follows: tion Law are declared “(a) fault, sure, complete prompt regardless medical provide, of and To fair, injured adequate benefits and reasonable income treatment for workers and injured dependents; workers and their “(b) delivery system just of medical provide and administrative for To a fair injured litigation and eliminates workers that reduces and financial benefits to greatest compensation proceedings, extent adversary to the nature of the the practicable; “(c) economically injured physically a self- To worker restore the prac- greatest extent expeditious and to the in an manner sufficient status ticabler.]” provides, as material: ORS 656.283 (2) “(1) 656.319, any party or Subject and ORS of this section to subsection concerning a hearing any question any request may on the at time director claim. “(2) self-insured action of the insurer or dissatisfied with an If a worker is apply assistance, to the the worker must first employer regarding vocational hearing requesting a of the matter before for review director administrative day 60th after application be made not later than the must that matter. Such complete the review shall of action. director worker was notified date the time, otherwise worker’s dissatisfaction unless the within a reasonable only may if it: be modified decision of the director resolved. The

“(a) rule; Violates a statute must the notice of denial to the claimant and mail give copies and the of the of Department Director Con- sumer and Business Services. key procedural component

The notice a denial is a the claim adjudication entitles a claim- system. ant who receives notice of a denial to under request hearing ORS 656.283. claimant or the director must request within the hearing specified time limits 656.319.19 Because notice of denial includes the insurer’s reasons denial, Board, claimant, it enables the the director determine the scope any issues and the disputed proper forum for resolution of those For example, issues. insurer’s assertion that the or condition is not related underlying injury to work would ordinarily lead to a under hearing 656.283(1). A denial of requires vocational assistance dissat- isfied claimant to apply to director for administrative review

“(b) statutory authority agency; Exceeds “(c) upon procedure; Was made unlawful “(d) clearly Was characterized abuse of discretion or unwarranted exercise discretion. “(3) request hearing may any writing, signed by A made or on party including party, behalf of the requesting the address hearing, desired, stating that a and mailed to the board. *18 “(4) hearing request The shall board refer the for to a referee for deter- expeditiously possible. hearing mination as as The be shall scheduled for a date days receipt by request hearing. not more than 90 after the board of the for The hearing postponed except extraordinary shall be beyond not circumstances requesting party.” the control of the 19 provides, ORS 656.319 as material: “(1) respect objection by With to claimant to denial of a claim for 656.262,

compensation hearing granted under ORS thereon shall not be and shall the claim not enforceable unless: “(a) request hearing day A for the the filed later than 60th after denial; claimant was notified of the or “(b) request day of is filed not later than the 180th after notification good hearing there for denial the claimant establishes at a cause day request by failure to the file the 60th after notification of denial. “(2) (1) section, Notwithstanding hearing of this shall be subsection (1) request granted specified even if a therefor is filed after the time in subsection competency lack the of this section if claimant can show of mental to file request period filing within that shall not be time. The for under subsection years by competency, extended more than five lack of mental nor shall it extend ’’ any longer regains competency. year case than one after the claimant mental 656.283(2).20 A under ORS denial raises an of issue 656.307(1)21 covered ORS responsibility by requires to director who shall the claim. these exam- designate others, ples, probably compliance by insurers with the duty timely to of statutory provide written notice a denial information to important parties, furnishes affected Board, and director that them permits guide dispute body within decision-making compensation proper must parties narrows the issues on which the system, prepare of claims litigation, expedites through disposition or settlement. The underscored legislature insurer liable importance compliance making if the money worker for an additional amount of insurer or denial of a claim.” ORS “unreasonably delays acceptance 656.262(10)(a). was late in argument, merely paying

Insurer’s it bills, its to furnish written disregards statutory obligation or days. denial a claim within acceptance notice of also argument ignores importance That an insurer’s adjudication compliance process claim the Board has signifi- Without obligation. question, with that statutes, such as ORS in applying procedural cant experience it, and knows proceedings to claim before can result the administrative effects that deleterious accept disregards duty timely insurer its when an scheme claim. deny we turn to the mind, considerations With those The Board denied this claim. that insurer Board’s conclusion 18, supra. note is set forth at text of 656.307(1) provides: regarding: “Where is an issue there “(a) employers of a claimant subject is the true Which of several

worker; ‘‘ (b) responsible employer a certain than one insurer of Which of more worker; payment to a “(c) employers their insurers or more Responsibility two between injuries; or more accidental payment for two or involving

“(d) employers, employment two or more Joint *19 claim, employers order, if the shall, by designate shall who director “the Payments compensable. shall is otherwise the claim admit and insurers 656.262(4).” any provided in ORS as begin in event “de the term facto denial” to insurer’s applied failure to deny accept required by the claim within 90 as days, 656.262(6). The application Board’s statute coincides with the in statute, embodied to legislative policy, compel insurers to declare whether timely they accept claims. deny construction of the Board’s statute tends to advance the legislature’s generally expressed policies promoting of medical benefits prompt delivery to workers, injured just and a fair system administrative that reduces litigation eliminates the nature of adversary compensation proceedings greatest extent practicable. 656.012(2)(a)-(c). also Board drew attention insurer’s response for a in request which insurer said that hearing, claimant’s “medical bills have been basis.” paid timely The Board was entitled to construe that statement as denial because, in it context, asserted that claimant was not entitled on his claim for medical anything unpaid hills. relies on Johnson v. Spectra Physics, supra,

Insurer but that case not aid insurer. The issue in Johnson does whether an condition, insurer’s notice or knowledge of coupled with the passage days, of 60 could serve an as acceptance condition under the rule in (1983). SAIF, Bauman 670 P2d 1027 This court not, held that it could because

“an regarding aspect insurer’s silence one of a claim acceptance neither nor aspect denial of that of the claim. argue Silence is neutral. One that if an could insurer’s silence regarding implies anything, imply a condition it would denial, acceptance.” supra, not Johnson v. Spectra Physics, Or at 55. here. Johnson concerned the That inapplicable passage requirements application acceptance trigger the Bauman backup denial rule. It did concern the for a denial of a claim for as requirements compensation, Johnson about reason, this case. For that the statement denial is dictum. whether an insurer’s silence can constitute We import do note that the Board’s result here carries Johnson, quoted above, this court’s last sentence its Johnson, the issue logical Furthermore, conclusion. unlike *20 here only did not concern the effect of insurer’s silence in to claim. response a

The Board’s conclusion that insurer the denied claim is the text and context of ORS supported and is legislative consistent with the by that policy exemplified statute, the other statutes cited above that concern claim and adjudication, the legislature’s generally expressed objec- tives Workers’ for the Law. the Compensation Because Board’s action is within the legislative policy behind ORS Education 656.262(6), the did not Springfield Board err.22 Dist., Assn. v. School supra, 290 Or at 227. of dispute the effect insurer’s denial for parties 656.386(1). argues it of ORS Insurer that never

purposes the medical bills because it asserted that was refusing pay them or because it not intended to of decision of claimant’s Claimant injury. the challenge compensability deny failed the responds timely accept that insurer clear that it was law, as and failed to make claim, required of to contest the claimant’s going compensability injury. not all conduct left it free contest She that insurer’s argues claim, of compensability of the aspects including Insurer sought she medical services. injury for which for an a benefit claim is an opportunity that acknowledges claimant condition for which the deny injury insurer insurer refuses that, unless the argues benefits but seeks the condition is not compensable, on the basis that payment 656.386(1). of ORS meaning there no denial within in from an insurer argument We addressed similar Ohlig, accepted it. In the insurer Ohlig rejected and case later, the claimant’s years in Two ankle 1975. injury condition, for back request surgery submitted lawyer at injury. it connected to the that was asserting 436-83-125, rule, pro- OAR A administrative Board 588-89. vided, part: in

in ORS procedures concurring acceptance formal denial We legislature did not and in do are involved dissenting). The hold, Nothing as under ORS intend to in the dissent in the regarding revocation dissent’s case. Board’s order or apply 656.262(6). asserts, argument its definition results this acceptance and issuance insurer Or at 230-31 opinion “claim,” from its flawed “revoked” its suggests (Graber, 656.005(6), premise prior a J., shall partial partic- notice denial set forth with “Every ularity injury or for which responsibility condition legal denied and the factual and reasons therefor. notice shall form for in provided [OAR 436-183-120. Hearing rights appeal procedures pro- and and shall be as (7), vided for claim denials ORS 656.319 and these Rules.” rule, violation of the the insurer no of a gave notice denial the back condition and the factual reasons there- legal

for. When the claimant on the claim prevailed hack sought under ORS insurer asserted that the statute was it inapplicable, because had never denied the back condition and had writing accepted the ankle condition This court writing. rejected that argu- *21 ment, the court’s the effect of the analysis insurer’s failure to make clear its denying reason for the back condition is relevant This here. court said:

“The statutes to which reference is made in the [administrative] rule concern the denial of claims and the procedure for a claimant to contest a denial. The reference to OAR 436-83-120 refers to the Board rule which fleshes out statutory of employers duties who would deny claims. employer

“The here failed to follow the administrative rule fact despite lawyer the worker’s filed a for the claim back condition and the employer refused to accept respon- ** * sibility Certainly for that condition. employer should be in no better position give to the written failure notice required denial than by the rule would have been the case had there been compliance.” Ohlig v. FMC Marine & added). Rail Equipment, supra, 291 597 (emphasis Or at Following we decline insurer reasoning, to allow take its unlawful failure to advantage timely accept or deny the claim. Unless an makes its insurer clear that denial condition, does not of the or dispute compensability injury claimant remains burden to subject statutory prove that the Late injury compensable. payment ORS 656.266. medical bills did the claim or not operate accept policy admit In the of the liability. light ORS from 656.262(6), profit insurer to underlying permitting the basis for its refusal its ambivalence concerning claim in court in would, the words of this Ohlig, com- and involve the worker’s form over substance

“elevate Id. at 595. gymnastics.” in semantic system pensation not conceded insurer’s denial was compensability Because from the contested issue. It follows it remained a here, not confine the issue on the insurer’s denial did foregoing disabil- or the extent of amount of compensation claim the of claimant’s or rather than the ity, compensability meaning quoted of the statements condition, within the and SAIF Short. Plywood v. Western States Forney above in concluding the Board erred does not argue Insurer com- obtaining counsel was instrumental that claimant’s 656.386(1). We con- of ORS meaning within the pensation, compen- in obtaining instrumental lawyer clude within claim for compensation, a denied sation and overcame 656.386(1), doing so. meaning of ORS erred in the Board insurer contends that Finally, insurer’s 656.386(1), because a fee under awarding compensa- delay paying to unreasonable conduct amounts receive one-half only can lawyer which claimant’s tion, for fee. in lieu of an under ORS penalty 656.262(10) provides: “(a) employer unreason- self-insured If insurer or pay compensation, refuses to unreasonably ably delays claim, of a or denial delays acceptance unreasonably for an addi- shall be liable insurer or self-insured due. amounts then of the percent to 25 up tional amount chapter, of this Notwithstanding any provision other proceedings over jurisdiction have exclusive director shall addi- payment solely the assessment regarding *22 addi- The entire in subsection. described tional amount if worker is worker paid shall tional amount represented If the worker attorney. an represented additional one-half the paid shall be attorney, the worker an receive one-half shall attorney and the worker’s amount director’s attorney fee. The amount, in lieu of additional to subject 183.310 to ORS shall be review thereof action and may as the director rules and such other procedural 183.550 prescribe.

‘‘ jurisdic- (b) exclusive does not have the director When payment the assessment regarding proceedings tion over subsection, in this described amount the additional shall subsection in this attorney provided provision proceeding.” in the other apply 656.386(1) 656.262(10) indi-

The text of ORS subjects. address distinct ORS those statutes cates that attorney requires fee award when a a reasonable compensation, prevails over a denial of a claim for claimant lawyer judicial review, if or administrative either on obtaining compensation prior hearing. to a instrumental makes an insurer or self-insured unreasonably delay penalty parties if those liable for unreasonably unreasonably pay compensation, or refuse to represented delay acceptance If worker or denial of a claim. lawyer penalty acts, one of those unreasonable seeks a penalty “in lieu of an of the additional receives one-half 656.262(10)(a). attorney fee.” attorney awarded a reasonable fee under The Board lawyer claimant’s was instrumental because prior hearing. obtaining compensation to a Claimant did delay in that fee as a sanction for an unreasonable not seek delay acceptance paying compensation, or an unreasonable appears, examination of or denial of his claim. It under our statutes, the text of the two that the claim for reasonable ‘ phrase ‘in lieu of an fees is unrelated to 656.262(10)(a). reading appears Although that to fee” in ORS statutes, be the most reasonable construction Accordingly, proceed legislative intention is not clear. we legislative history behind two an examination statutes. legislature to ORS added the third sentence permit recovery of a fee where 1991 to agrees pay compensation claim,

insurer denies the but hearing. legislature prior intended the amendment App holding OSCI, 78, 810 P2d reverse the Jones (1991), App which ruled 230, P2d 558 1318, mod 108 Or 656.386(1), the claim of ORS that under the former version agrees prevail if the insurer in the ant does not compensation, hearing. 1991, Or Laws even on the eve of the § Recording, Tape on Labor Senate Committee ch see 312, 1; Moore) (SB Tape 540), (testimony of Chris 20, 1991, March Recording, 27, Tape Debate, March Floor Senate A; Side Kerans) (statement Tape A; 50, Side of Senator Grattan May Tape Recording, 29,1991, Labor, House Committee Mannix) (remarks Tape Representative 154, Side B. Kevin *23 Nothing legislative history behind the 1991 amend- 656.386(1) ment to ORS suggests it was linked to the 656.262(10) (a) subject sanctions under ORS for unreason- able insurer conduct.

The legislature added the words “in lieu of an attor- 656.262(10)(a) fee” ney to ORS in 1990. Or Laws 1990 (Spec Sess), 2, § ch 15. Prior to the amendment, two statutes addressed the problem of an insurer’s refusal or resistance to 656.382(1) payment At compensation. time, provided:

“If an insurer or self-insured employer refuses to pay referee, due under an order of a court, board or or otherwise unreasonably resists the payment of compensa- tion, employer or insurer shall pay to the claimant or the attorney for the claimant a attorney reasonable fee as pro- (2) vided in subsection of this section. To the extent an employer fees, has caused the insurer charged to be such employer may charged such be with those fees.” 656.262(10).23 The other statute was ORS As a result of those two statutes, claimants were entitled to both an fee award under ORS attorney and a sanction under ORS for similar unreason- able conduct an insurer. To remedy seeming overlap “in statutes, those lieu of legislature adopted 656.262(10)(a) wording fee” in ORS at the recom- mendation of a task force assembled the Governor. for the following only pertinent legislative history is the 656.262(10)(a) that we have discovered. amendment to ORS Talbott, to the Joint Interim Special Annette counsel legal pur- Compensation, explained Workers’ Committee on as joint legislature, of the amendment to a session pose follows: group wanted

“This was an issue the Governor’s as described penalty, that in cases where there is clarify, or an unreasonable delay for unreasonable subsection amendment, provided: the 1990 Before unreasonably delays employer or unreasona- self-insured “If the insurer or unreasonably delays acceptance of a compensation, or denial bly refuses claim, for an additional shall be liable or self-insured the insurer any attorney plus fees which up percent due of the amounts then amount to 25 may assessed under ORS 656.382.” be spelled that’s penalty compensation, to pay refusal regard particularly 10 is the sole—and out in subsection is one half of attorney fee which fee— attorney fee that will amount is the sole additional even if this issue is combined type penalty, awarded on *24 level.” 1990 referee or the Board issues at the with other Session, Compensa- on Workers’ Committee Special Joint Talbott) (statement (SB 1197), 4,1990, of Annette May tion 20, Side B at 40. Tape Kevin Man- Talbott spoke, Representative

After Ms. nix made this statement: a letter to the if the worker wants to write says

“It that does it get attorney he can it. If his get penalty, director to instead of some him, attorney gets penalty half of the for along issue penalty in the attorney add on fee. If the throws hearing, that request of other issues in with a bunch fee, attorney but separate issue doesn’t lead to a penalty question. And that’s a policy half the is the fee. penalty ought And we all just way you you think to. You answer it penalty and piggyback have war stories. But I’ve seen the our fee, and, literally, my in one of attorney where the fee issue cases, No and the was to the worker. penalty was $250 $7 came down I had another one that other relief to the worker. penalty was and the last week where the fee $300 my policy ridiculous. That’s And I think that’s was $10.25. Session, on Workers’ Special 1990 Joint Committee issue.” (remarks (SB 4, 1990, Repre- 1197), May Compensation Mannix) B at 99. Kevin Side Tape sentative those statements construction of The most plausible 656.262(10) designed of ORS is that the amendment for unreasonable Board to award penalty authorize the awarding a Board from and to prevent insurer conduct conduct. fee for the same unreasonable separate that the amend- not indicate of the amendment does history attor- to award Board authority intended to nullify ment was penalties that do not address fees under statutes ney 656.386(1) example, For unreasonable conduct. obtains prevails if the claimant a fee award requires to do nothing It has compensation. on a claim for benefits We think insurer conduct. unreasonable with penalizing would be fee scheme in the attorney change such a significant such an demonstrating history by legislative accompanied However, intention. the testimony regarding the amendment 656.262(10)(a) to ORS 656.386(1). does not discuss ORS We conclude that the 1990 amendment to ORS 656.262(10) was not intended to prevent the Board from awarding a reasonable attorney fee under ORS The 1991 amendment to the latter statute authorizes Board to award a fee if the lawyer is instrumental in obtaining to a prior A hearing. fee award under ORS 656.386(1) is not subject to the “in lieu of an attorney fee” 656.262(10)(a). limitation in ORS To summarize, the claim for medical services was a “claim for compensation” within the meaning of ORS (8). and the definitions in ORS Board’s conclusion that insurer denied the claim is not erro- neous. The denial did not concede that the underlying injury was compensable and, reason, for that the amount of compen- sation was not the sole issue raised by the denial. Finally, Board’s to award a authority fee under ORS is not *25 656.262(10)(a). affected by ORS The Board’s order awarding an fee under attorney ORS If correct. Board order effects an result inequitable for insurers who fail to timely pay requests medical services, inequity must be corrected the legislature, not by this court. Stovall v. Salmon Sally Seafood, 25,Or 39, 757 P2d 410 (1988); Forney v. Western Plywood, States supra, 297 Or at 634.

The decision of the Court of is Appeals reversed. The order of the Workers’ Compensation Board affirmed, the case is remanded to the Board for further proceedings.

GRABER, J., in concurring part and in dissenting part.

I concur in the fully resolution of the first majority’s issue presented in this workers’ case. The compensation Court of with Appeals complied 2.570(4), which requires * * * the “concurrence of two judges pronounce judg- ment.”

I dissent, from however, abandon- majority’s ment of established in principles construction its statutory resolution of view, the second issue. In my does not allow an award of fees when an attorney compen- insurer medical bills late but does not pays deny for, the claimant’s of, or its sability responsibility condition. that,

The starting point principle is the in workers’ cases, an award of attorney fees can be made only pursuant statutory authorization. v. Western Forney Plywood, 628, 632, 686 States 297 Or P2d (1984); SAIF (1984). 504, 511, 686 P2d 363 Curry, As this court in 297 Or at in explained Forney, no holding attorney fees could be awarded under the terms of the workers’ statute involved:

“It is legislature rights fundamental provides and remedies for workers and employers. This court cannot exceed legislative though limitations even inequity or to the employe employer might result. Unless a specific statute authorizes an award of attorney claimant, fees to a added.) this court cannot award them.” (Emphasis Similarly, 297 Or at Curry, 510-11, this court “recognize[d] that this [no result fees in the pre- situation * * * sented] harsh for claimant’s this case. this instance his work will go however, uncompensated; our ability to award fees workers’ compensation cases is limited granted to the authority hy statute. In this case we have authority no and must refuse to make an award.”

In the absence of clear legislative authorization, then, no fees are available.

The statute under which claimant seeks case is which provides:

“In involving all cases injuries accidental where a claim- *26 ant finally in an prevails appeal Court of Appeals petition for review to Supreme Court from an order or denying decision compensation, claim for the court shall allow a attorney reasonable fee to the attorney. claimant’s In such rejected cases prevails finally where the claimant in a hearing before itself, the referee or in a review the board then the referee attorney or board shall allow a reasonable If fee. an obtaining instrumental compensation for a hearing by held, claimant and a the referee is not reasonable fee shall Attorney be allowed. pro-

vided for in this section shall paid by the insurer or self- employer.” insured specifically Claimant relies on the third sentence of ORS — — providing for fees when no is held

support Legislative Assembly the fee award in this case. The added that sentence to the statute in 1991. Or 1991, Laws ch § 312, 1. interpreting statute, the court seeks to discern legislature. the intent of the PGE 0v.Bureau Labor and (1993).

Industries, 606, 610, 317 Or 859 P2d 1143 At the first analysis, level of the court considers the text and the context statutory provision including provisions of the at issue, other relating of the same statute and other statutes to the same subject. legislature Id. at 610-11. If the intent of the is not inquiry, legislative clear from that the court considers the history Additionally, of the statute. Id. at 611-12. when this part court has construed a statute, that construction is Stephens statute ifas written therein. Bohlman, (1992). 350 n 838 P2d 600 appeal parties dispute review, On and on do not denying compensation” that a “decision the claim for ais prerequisite obtaining to a claimant’s a fee under the third 656.386(1). arguments sentence of ORS Their focus on the meant when it used the question legislature of what the phrase denying compensation” “decision the claim for pay Claimant contends that failure to denying medical bill on time is an instance of a “decision compensation,” including compensation claim for because all “includes provided compen- benefits, services, medical 656.005(8). for a injury,” sable SAIF asserts that a “decision denying compensation” the claim for in ORS means

“a decision the insurer not to ground or condition for which give is claimed is not or otherwise does not rise compensable original; compensation.” (Emphasis to an entitlement omitted.) footnote agree follow, I with SAIF.

For the reasons that

225 656.386(1) itself makes SAIF’s First, text of ORS phrase likely. interpretation uses the The statute more added), (emphasis compensation” “denying the claim for “denying compensation.” phrase Failure or rather than the accepted injury or condition hill for an to a medical refusal denying particular by compensation, amount of denies deny generally sought, not the claim but it does benefits interpretation compensation.1 thus of the statute Claimant’s By phrase the statute. “the claim for” out of reads the meaning interpretation gives to all words contrast, SAIF’s (in construing statute, See ORS 174.010 statute. * * * inserted; where what has been court is “not to omit provisions particulars such construction there are several or as will all”). give possible, adopted effect to is, if to be statutory reinforces SAIF’s context Second, reading. law sections of the workers’ Several compensa- to differentiate between a claimant’s entitlement (compensability) amount of owed tion and the (benefits). example, accepted 656.266 if For ORS for the claim * * * injury proving provides “[t]he that an burden of compensable proving and extent of the nature upon any disability resulting therefrom is worker.” 656.262(10)(a)2 added.) expressly (Emphasis Further, ORS unreasonably delaying unreasona- differentiates between (benefits), bly refusing pay compensation” the one “to delaying “acceptance unreasonably or denial of hand, and (compensability), on the other. claim” concerning injury not or condition that has an The submission of medical bill compensation. already accepted See can constitute the claim for been claims); 656.005(3) “claim”); process (defining (providingprocedure ORS 656.262 (notice any injury resulting in an need not be accident form). Moreover, employer a benefit can use particular an insurer or self-insured sought. deny injury are opportunity for which benefits or condition claim as an claims). situations, (providingprocedure process In those See ORS compensation. give of “the claim for” can rise to a denial submission of a medical bill case, in this however. situations is involved Neither of those 656.262(10)(a) part: provides, in delays unreasonably employer or unreason- or self-insured “If the insurer delays acceptance unreasonably or denial of

ably pay compensation, or refuses to an additional claim, be liable for shall the insurer or self-insured * * * additional The entire up percent then due. of the amounts amount represented an worker is not paid the worker if the shall be amount paid attorney, shall be represented the worker attorney. worker is If the amount, attorney fee.” in lieu of an the additional one-half Third, this court’s cases prior recognized “deny ing the claim for compensation” in ORS means asserting Peterson at all. In compensable v. Compensation Department, 257 Or 369, 477 P2d 216 (1970), the insurer denied compensability of the claimant’s claim for an injury. A referee upheld denial, but the Board reversed and remanded the case to the referee for further proceedings relating to the denial. This court held that claimant was not entitled to a fee at the time of the remand, under ORS 656.386(1), because the claimant had not yet *28 Id. at prevailed. 374. discussing history develop statute, ment of the the court said that right “the to an 656.386(1)] attorney fee [under ORS has been and is depen dent on establishing the right to compensation after an of the claim.” 257 Or at 375. See also Cavins original rejection SAIF, (1975) (the 162, 164-65, 272 Or 536 P2d 426 claim 656.386(1) ant was entitled to attorney fees under ORS when the insurer had denied a request for surgery on the ground that was not surgery related causally to the accepted and thus injury had denied compensability of the condition for which the claimant sought compensation); Ohlig v. FMC Marine & Rail Equipment, 291 Or 586, 595-98, 633 P2d 1279 (1981) (the claimant was entitled to a fee under ORS 656.386(1) for overcoming employer’s “partial denial,” when the had employer accepted compensability an ankle but injury denied for a low back liability condition; denying the claim for relates compensation condition for which Forney v. Western States Plywood, claimed); compensation (the supra, 297 Or at 632 claimant could not obtain fees under ORS her “only because claim was for the amount of on claim,” due her compensation aggravation as distinct from for an condi “responsibility” unaccepted (1988) SAIF, Short v. 541, P2d tion); 545, 305 Or 754 575 (this between the of distinguished compensa court amount hand, and the tion or the extent the one disability, question “whether the claimant’s condition was caused other; industrial on the does not injury,” former).3 apply 3 only arguably urges case which this court took the view that claimant (1989). Insulation, 74, case,

on us is Ellis v. McCall 308 Or 775 P2d 316 In that stopped paying chiropractic years insurer for the claimant’s treatments several after compensable injury, accepted, ground they which the insurer had on the were aggregate, prior

In the the text, context, and inter pretations suggest denying that a “decision the claim for compensation” meaning within the of ORS ais pay compensation ground decision not to on the compensable or condition is not or otherwise does not compensation. entitle the claimant to However, because legislature’s regard completely intent in that clear after foregoing inquiry, legislative history I also examine the the 1991 amendment to the statute.

The 1991 amendment to ORS part legislative history enacted as of Senate Bill 540. Senate Bill 540 demonstrates the amendment was purpose overruling enacted for the Duane Jones, L. Van (1990), App Natta 875 in Jones v. OSCI, 78, aff’d App (1991),5 1318, P2d on recons 108 Or 814 P2d 558 purpose authorizing attorney and for the fees when the compensability aof claim for workers’ has been denied and the or insurer rescinds the denial through lawyer. the efforts of the claimant’s

During consideration of Senate Bill a member of prin- the workers’ claimants’ bar who was the cipal hearings witness at the Senate and House testified: requires Bill

“[Senate 540] insurers or self-insured *29 pay attorney’s an employers any compen- fee over and above sation when a denial is prior going rescinded to the matter to hearing. As I say, that was the law and that was practice the in Compensation workers’ until the Workers’ compensable injury. not related to the This court held that the insurer’s failure respond timely acceptance responsibility payment in a of manner was not for of holding, unpaid chiropractic “assume[d] [claimant’s] the In so this court that bills. 656.262(6).” (footnote omitted). Id. at bills were ‘claims’ under ORS 77 That assumption holding, a was not however. 4 include, denying compensation example, for could for that the Other bases compensable employer responsible injury particular or that the claim is not filed too late. was 5 OSCI, Jones, 42 (1990), in L. Jones 107 Duane Van Natta 875 Or aff’d 230, 814 (1991), 78, 810 1318, on recons 108 Or App App 558 Board and P2d P2d 656.386(1) “provide[d] Appeals of no held that the former version ORS the Court employer insurer-paid to a claimant when the an award of basis for request hearing has been claim after the claimant’s withdraws its denial App matter.” at 232. The has decided the filed but before referee compensability of the claimant’s injury. the Jones underlying case was issue App Or at 82. * ** csHeáDuane Jones. year ago

Board issued a case about only reverses the Duane Jones my belief that this bill Kit’s Labor, on March Recording, Senate Committee Tape case.” 4Q, 20, 1991, A. Tape Side to the House witness made similar comments same that this bill when Labor, applies on emphasizing

Committee “rescinds their denial.” employer the insurer or self-insured Labor, 27,1991, May House Committee on Tape Recording, Side B. See also House Committee Tape Recording, Tape (statement B 29, 1991, 154, Side Labor, Tape May testimony, law- Mannix that Representative supporting company convincing the insurance yers who “succeedO would be going hearing the claim was before good fee”). awarded an attorney Senate, floor of Senator Kerans stated

On the known as the Jones Bill 540 reverses what’s that “Senate worked lawyer fees where decision” and permits ‘ it been denied claim, though ‘to even had your advance insurer, insurer, up even to the minutes before if the said, we will no held, reversed field and okay, claim, but, fact, Record- Tape it.” your accept resist longer 27,1991, Side A. Debate, Tape March ing, Senate Floor and of the principal Those statements of legislators acceptance are couched in terms of denial versus witness the Jones And, case, claim. underlying compensability was a case overrule, Senate Bill 540 was designed which had been claim underlying which compensability text, thus confirms what history denied. The legislative A “decision context, deny- interpretations suggest. and prior of ORS within the ing meaning the claim for compensation” on the not to pay a decision compensable is not or condition ground the claimant otherwise does entitle compensation. failure to pay final contention is that the Claimant’s to written bills, at definitively medical least to respond bills, time set statute6 medical within the request days requires respond within that an or insurer *30 applied limit has the time claims for in the first instance. The Board 1983, Billy J. payment in claims for of medical services since (1983). Eubanks, of that This court assumed correctness 35 Van Natta 131 Insulation, 3, supra Ellis McCall application Or 77. note at in a “de facto” denial of the claim underlying for compensation. disagree. I

I note, first, has drawn a legislature distinc- 656.262(10)(a) delay denial. tion between provides for a when an penalty “insurer or self-insured employer unreasonably delays or unreasonably refuses pay compen- sation, or unreasonably delays acceptance or denial of a If claim.” delay paying equivalent were of a claim, denial the two in that statute phrases would be context, redundant. The statutory therefore, weighs against claimant’s suggested interpretation concept denying a claim.

Second, and more claim fundamentally, this could not have been denied silence when claimant submitted the medical bills in question, because the claim already had been v. SAIF, Bauman accepted. In 295 Or 788, 790, 670 P2d 1027 (1983), this court held that version of ORS then effect barred an from a claim employer denying also had accepted. See Johnson v. Spectra previously been (“An (1987) Physics, 733 P2d 1367 insurer’s to a failure claim respond or one of a claim is neither aspect denial”). nor acceptance has been amended that, provide part “if the insurer or self-insured a claim in accepts good faith but later obtains evidence that the claim is not compensable or paying agent evidence that the is not respon- claim, employer, sible the insurer or self-insured at any years time up to two from the date of claim acceptance, may revoke the claim acceptance issue a notice formal added.) (Emphasis claim denial.” Thus, denial claim had previously accepted of a been formalities, which did not occur this case. specific requires not become Mere silence on of a medical bill did receipt denial of the claim. case, SAIF that claimant’s agreed made SAIF responsible and a order binding

compensable, of medical a number claimant’s neck condition. SAIF paid to that condi- $11,400) accepted related bills over (totaling at the four bills issue. tion, before claimant submitted a denial of the four bills was not of those medical late payment *31 and, therefore, claim did not entitle claimant to fees under ORS 656.262(6)

The turns on its head. As majority ORS noted, that an insurer or self- just provides statute faith, insured who has a claim in but employer accepted good claim not compensable who “later obtains evidence that the is is not for paying responsible or evidence that the the agent claim,” may, acceptance within two “revoke the claim years, Also, noted, a of just and issue formal notice claim denial.” as claim, and a order made binding SAIF claimant’s accepted with of SAIF for it. When SAIF four responsible disagreed medical failed them within claimant’s bills and many did days acceptance of SAIF not “revoke the claim receipt, was, denial.” reason and issue formal notice claim The not assert course, then, now, that SAIF did and does not claim is or that it is not for responsible the not compensable claim; it with the amount of four of disagreed the simply more than 90 many paid claimant’s medical bills and them after them. days receiving that, holds because SAIF failed to majority did actually ORS it “revoke the claim

follow for subject doing and was fees acceptance” paying attorney That This was reasoning 320 Or at 209-19. backwards. so. the claim. When SAIF did not follow procedure an accepted 656.262(6) for the claim “revoking accep- set forth ORS revoked, the not claim acceptance the claim tance,” claim. There was no denial of remained claim. accepted stems from reasoning majority the convoluted Perhaps 656.262(6) uses the term the fact that ORS an effort avoid I it is used claim” in the same manner as assert “the — compensation mean the claim for original injury or condition.7 overall regarding legislature clear that used term The text makes regarding provision original for to mean claim “claim” in that distinguishes provision “a text of also between or condition. The overall part: provides example, For and “medical benefits.” claim” denial, backup] “However, [formal requests on such if worker convincing prove clear and evidence or self-insured must insurer claim, responsible paying agent compensable is not or that the

that is not * * * claim, payable of acceptance Pending the claim. or denial ** * expenses. medical or burial does include the costs of a claimant benefits acceptance notice of shall: Even using the majority’s definition of “claim,” under which each of the “claim,” medical bills was a there was no denial. There was late only payment, which penalty 656.262(10)(a) is exclusive of attorney fees. See ORS is exclusive of (penalty for late payment benefits).

A related, and fundamental, error of equally majority its use of the usual statutory definitions “claim” and “compensation.” 320 Or at 201-05. This court construed ORS 656.003 in SAIF, Astleford (1994): 232-33, 874 P2d 1329 respect

“With 656.003, to ORS this court implicitly con Stephen, cluded in (1989),] [308 SAIF v. Or 774 P2d 1103 *32 that the legislature did not uniformity seek of definitions unless compelled, different definition is sought but rather uniformity only so far as it appropriate to the sensible functioning of the workers’ system aas whole. See Webster’s Third New Int’l Dictionary (unabridged 1993) means, ed (‘require’ among things, other call ‘to for as case’). suitable or appropriate particular in a also Ste See (1992) Bohlman, phens 350 n 838 P2d 600 (when Court Supreme statute, construes a that construction statute). part Thus, becomes 656.003, under ORS ‘the * * * requires’ given statutory context apply that a definition not — when context including the structure and pur — pose of the workers’ scheme as a whole given demonstrates that the use of that definition would inappropriate, because the result of such use would conflict aspects with one or more or purpose. that structure We proceed question that standard apply at hand.” * ** standard, Under “the context Astleford 656.003, ORS definitions of requires,” statutory “claim” and are at “compensation” apply not here. There ** * least two reasons “the context that those why requires” in this case: apply definitions not i/ie claim denying refers to “decision added.) The use of “the” (Emphasis compensation.” there is a single, previously

before “claim” implies “(a) compensable. Specify what are conditions “(b) disabling or the claim is considered Advise the claimant whether added.) nondisabling.” (Emphasis — referred to claim for being original defined “claim” bill thereafter condition, rather than medical every injury in accepted sent on the claim. already “denying phrase

This court had construed the other sentences the claim for compensation” for the mean the claim definitively original sentence was condition, before the third disputed concerning Because of those decisions added that section. read majority’s other sentences in a begins who before a hearing claimants ing puts prevail claimants who position different and more favorable than legislature sought prevail place. after takes parity, disparity. summarize, denying was no “decision

To there Claimant is not entitled in this case. compensation” claim I from 656.386(1), and dissent to an fee under ORS contrary holding. the majority’s J., Carson, J., Gillette, join opinion. C.

Case Details

Case Name: Saif Corp. v. Allen
Court Name: Oregon Supreme Court
Date Published: Sep 29, 1994
Citation: 881 P.2d 773
Docket Number: WCB 91-09837; CA A76538; SC S40951
Court Abbreviation: Or.
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