Said v. Magdy
2024 COA 109
| Colo. Ct. App. | 2024|
Check TreatmentOpinion Summary
Facts
- The Historic Fredericksburg Foundation, Inc. (HFFI) challenged the Fredericksburg City Council’s ruling concerning its standing to appeal the demolition of a historic structure, the Subject Structure, located near its property. [lines="20-22"]
- The Subject Structure, a two-story detached garage, was determined by multiple engineers to be unsafe and in a state of disrepair, leading the Architectural Review Board (ARB) to approve its demolition. [lines="58-64"]
- HFFI claimed to be aggrieved by the decision, arguing that demolition would negatively impact its historic preservation efforts and property value, and asserted its interest under the Virginia Declaratory Judgment Act. [lines="68-75"]
- The City Council dismissed HFFI’s appeal for lack of standing, concluding that HFFI did not demonstrate a particularized harm different from the general public. [lines="105-109"]
- HFFI filed a petition with the circuit court claiming, inter alia, that the City Council's actions were arbitrary and the standing determination incorrect. [lines="110-112"]
Issues
- Whether HFFI’s claims under the VDJA were moot due to the timing of the appeal after suffering harm. [lines="164-168"]
- Whether the circuit court properly upheld the City Council’s ruling that HFFI did not qualify as an “aggrieved person” with standing to appeal the ARB’s decision. [lines="244-245"]
Holdings
- The circuit court correctly found HFFI's claims under the VDJA to be moot, as they were filed after HFFI had already been affected by the ordinance it sought to challenge. [lines="196-228"]
- The court upheld the City Council’s determination that HFFI lacked standing, concluding that the decision was fairly debatable based on HFFI's failure to show particularized harm. [lines="326-327"]
OPINION
<div><div><div><div id="pdf-container" style="width: 782px"> <div id="pf1" data-page-no="1"> <div> <div> <div> </div> <div> </div> <div> </div> <div>SUMMARY </div> <div>October 3, 2024 </div> <div> </div> <div>2024COA109
<span> </span>
</div>
<div> </div>
<div>No. 24CA0451, <span>Said v. Magdy</span> <span>â</span> No. 24CA0451, <span>Said v. Magdy</span> </div>
<div>â<span> Courts and Court Procedure </span>â<span> Action Involving Exercise of </span>
</div>
<div>Constitutional Rights <span>â</span> Anti-SLAPP <span>â</span> Special Motion to </div>
<div>Dismiss; Civil Procedure <span>â</span> Motion for Reconsideration <span>â</span> </div>
<div>Motions for Post-Trial Relief; Appeals <span>â</span> Time for Filing Notice<span></span> </div>
<div>of Appeal <span>â</span> Tolling </div>
<div>A division of the court of appeals holds that, if timely <span></span>filed, a </div>
<div>motion for reconsideration of an order denying a special moti<span></span>on to </div>
<div>dismiss under the anti-SLAPP statute, section 13-<span>20</span>-1101, C.R.S. </div>
<div>2024, is properly construed as a C.R.C.P. 59 motion <span></span>that tolls the </div>
<div>time for filing a notice of appeal because the trial courtâs o<span></span>rder, </div>
<div>though not final, is nevertheless appealable as required by C.R.C.P. </div>
<div>54, 58, and 59. </div>
<div> </div>
<div> <span> </span>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<div>The summaries of the Colorado Court of Appeals published opinions </div>
<div>constitute no part of the opinion of the division but have been prepared by </div>
<div>the division for the convenience of the reader. The summaries may not be </div>
<div>cited or relied upon as they are not the <span>official language of the division. </span> </div>
<div>Any discrepancy between the language in the summary and in the opinion </div>
<div>should be resolved in favor of the language in the opinion. </div>
</div>
</div>
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<div> </div>
<div>COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS <span>2024COA109</span> </div>
<div> </div>
<div> </div>
<div>Court of Appeals No. 24CA0451 </div>
<div>Arapahoe County District Court No. 23CV31428 </div>
<div>Honorable Thomas W. Henderson, Judge </div>
<div> </div>
<div> </div>
<div>Said M. Said, </div>
<div> </div>
<div>Plaintiff-Appellee, </div>
<div> </div>
<div>v. </div>
<div> </div>
<div>Mohamed Magdy, M.D., </div>
<div> </div>
<div>Defendant-Appellant. </div>
<div> </div>
<div> </div>
<div>MOTION DENIED </div>
<div> </div>
<div>Division A </div>
<div>O<span>rder</span><span> by JUDGE HARRIS </span>
</div>
<div>Schutz and <span>Lum, JJ., concur</span> </div>
<div> </div>
<div>Announced October 3, 2024 </div>
<div> </div>
<div> </div>
<div>Conduit Law, <span>LLC,</span> <span>Elliot</span> A. Singer, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee </div>
<div> </div>
<div>The Paul Wilkinson Law Firm <span>LLC, </span>Nelson Boyle, Denver, Colorado, for </div>
<div>Defendant-Appellant </div>
</div>
</div>
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<div><div>
<div> </div>
<div>1 </div>
<div>¶ 1<span> </span><span>Section 13-<span>20</span>-1101, C.R.S. 2024, colloquially known as the </span>
</div>
<div>anti-<span>SLAPP statute (âSLAPPâ is an acronym for âstrategic laws<span></span>uit </span>
</div>
<div>against public participation,<span>â</span> <span>Salazar v. Pub. Tr. Inst.</span>, 2022 CO<span></span>A </div>
<div>109M, ¶ 1 n.1), requires early dismissal of any claim arising from </div>
<div>conduct protected by the First Amendment that involves a p<span></span>ublic </div>
<div>issue, unless the plaintiff establishes a reasonable likelihood of </div>
<div>prevailing on the claim. § 13-<span>20</span>-1101(3)(a). An order granting or </div>
<div>denying <span>a statutory âspecial motion to dismissâ </span>is immediately </div>
<div>appealable to the court of appeals. § 13-<span>20</span><span>-1101(7)</span><span>; </span><span>see also</span> § 13-</div>
<div>4-102.2, C.R.S. 2024.<span> </span>The notice of appeal must be filed within<span></span> </div>
<div>forty-nine days after entry of the order <span>on</span> the special motion t<span></span>o </div>
<div>dismiss. <span>See </span>C.A.R. 4(a)(1). </div>
<div>¶ 2<span> </span><span>As a preliminary jurisdictional matter, we must resolve </span>
</div>
<div>whether a motion for reconsideration of <span>an</span> order denying a special </div>
<div>motion to dismiss, which did not cite either C.R.C.P. 59 or C.R.C.<span></span>P. </div>
<div>121, section 1-<span>15</span>(11), toll<span>ed</span> the time for filing a notice of appeal.<span> </span> </div>
<div>¶ 3<span> </span><span>We conclude that the motion for reconsideration is properly </span>
</div>
<div>construed as a Rule 59 motion that tolls the deadline for filing a </div>
<div>notice of appeal under the anti-SLAPP statute<span>. </span>And because the </div>
<div>notice of appeal was filed within forty-nine days after entry of <span></span>the </div>
</div></div>
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<div><div>
<div> </div>
<div>2 </div>
<div>order denying the motion for reconsideration, the notice of appeal </div>
<div>was timely<span>. </span> Accordingly, we deny the motion to dismiss this ap<span></span>peal. </div>
<div>I.<span> <span>Background <span> </span> </span></span>
</div>
<div>¶ 4<span> </span><span>Plaintiff, Said M. Said, filed <span>a </span>defamation action against his </span>
</div>
<div>wifeâs ex<span>-husband, defendant, Mohamed Magdy, alleging that </span>
</div>
<div>Magdy had falsely accused him of committing criminal con<span></span>duct. </div>
<div>Magdy denied the allegations and filed a special motion to dismiss </div>
<div>the complaint under section <span>13</span><span>-<span>20</span>-1101</span><span>. </span>The district court denied </div>
<div>the motion on December 29, 2023<span>. </span>Fourteen days later, Magdy filed </div>
<div>a motion for reconsideration. The district court denied that motion, </div>
<div>too, and thirty days later, on March 20, 2024, Magdy filed a notice </div>
<div>of appeal in this court, seeking review of the order denying his </div>
<div>special motion to dismiss. </div>
<div>¶ 5<span> </span><span>Said moves to dismiss the appeal as untimely, arguing that </span>
</div>
<div>the notice of appeal was not filed within forty-nine days of the </div>
<div>denial of the motion to dismiss. </div>
<div>¶ 6<span> </span><span>In response, Magdy argues that the motion for reconsideration </span>
</div>
<div>was effectively a Rule 59 motion that tolled the time for filing <span></span>the </div>
<div>notice of appeal. And, he asserts, because the notice was filed </div>
</div></div>
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<div><div>
<div> </div>
<div>3 </div>
<div>within forty-nine days of the order denying his motion for </div>
<div>reconsideration, it was timely.<span> </span> </div>
<div>¶ 7<span> </span><span>Alternatively<span>, <span>Magdy argues that even if the notice was </span></span></span>
</div>
<div>untimely, the late filing was attributable to excusable neglect, and, </div>
<div>therefore, we should accept the notice out of time. <span>See</span> C.A.R. </div>
<div>4(a)(4) (âU<span>pon a showing of excusable neglect, the appellate c<span></span>ourt </span>
</div>
<div>may extend the time to file the notice of appeal for a period not <span></span>to </div>
<div>exceed 35 days . . . .<span>â</span><span>).</span> </div>
<div>II.<span> <span>Analysis </span></span>
</div>
<div>¶ 8<span> </span><span>As noted, subject to an exception inapplicable here, a notice of </span>
</div>
<div>appeal in a civil case must be filed âwithin 49 days after entry of <span></span>the </div>
<div>judgment, decree, or order being appealed.â <span>C.A.R. 4(a)(1). <span>But</span> <span>as </span></span>
</div>
<div>Said acknowledges, a timely filed Rule 59 motion (i.e., one f<span></span>iled </div>
<div>within fourteen days of the order or judgment) tolls the deadline for </div>
<div>filing a notice of appeal. <span>See <span>C.A.R. 4(a)(4) (â</span></span>The running of the <span></span>time </div>
<div>for filing a notice of appeal is terminated as to all parties w<span></span>hen any </div>
<div>party timely files a motion in the lower court pursuant t<span></span>o C.R.C.P. </div>
<div>59<span>â and recommences on entry of a timely order disp<span></span>osing of the </span>
</div>
<div>motion or the expiration of the time for ruling on the motion <span></span>under </div>
</div></div>
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<div><div>
<div> </div>
<div>4 </div>
<div>C.R.C.P. 59(j).); C.R.C.P. 59(j) (after sixty-three days of its filin<span></span>g, any </div>
<div>post-trial motion that has not been decided is deemed denied). </div>
<div>¶ 9<span> </span><span>Said argues, though, <span>that Magdyâs motion for reconsideration</span><span>, </span></span>
</div>
<div>while <span>filed within fourteen days of the courtâs order</span> denying the </div>
<div>motion to dismiss, cannot properly be construed as a Rule 59 </div>
<div>motion. <span>According to Said, Rule 59 applies only to âpost</span><span>-</span><span>trialâ </span>
</div>
<div>motions for relief from a final judgment, and here, b<span></span>ecause no trial </div>
<div>has yet occurred, the order is nonfinal and therefore not subject to </div>
<div>a <span>Rule 59 motion. We disagree. </span>
</div>
<div>¶ 10<span> </span><span>As an initial matter, our case law makes clear that a motion </span>
</div>
<div>for reconsideration can qualify as a Rule 59 motion even if <span>it</span> does </div>
<div>not cite Rule 59, <span>Cuevas v. Pub. Serv. Co. of Colo.</span>, 2023 COA 64M, </div> <div>¶ <span>13 (â[M]otions to reconsider need not cite or reference C.R.C.<span></span>P. 59 </span> </div> <div>to be recognized as falling within its purview.â) (<span>cert. granted on </span> </div> <div>other grounds<span> July 1, 2024), and even if no trial is held<span>, </span></span><span>see, e.g.<span>, </span></span> </div> <div>Spiremedia Inc. v. Wozniak<span>,2020 COA 10
, ¶ 18 (concluding that <span>a </span></span>
</div>
<div>âmotion to reconsiderâ <span>an order dismissing a case without prej<span></span>udice </span>
</div>
<div>was a Rule 59 motion); <span>Bowlen v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp.</span>, 815 P.2<span></span>d </div>
<div>1013, 1015 (Colo. App. 1991) (concluding that a motion to </div>
</div></div>
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<div><div>
<div> </div>
<div>5 </div>
<div>reconsider an order granting summary judgment was a Rule <span></span>59 </div>
<div>motion). </div>
<div>¶ 11<span> </span><span>And contrary to <span>Saidâs </span>position, we conclude that Rule <span>59 </span></span>
</div>
<div>applies to motions seeking relief from orders that<span>, while not âfinalâ </span>
</div>
<div>in the sense that they resolve all claims as to all parties<span>, </span><span>see Wilson </span>
</div>
<div>v. Kennedy<span>, 2020 COA 122, ¶ 7 (explaining finality of<span></span> judgments), </span> </div> <div>are nevertheless appealable pursuant to <span>a </span>statute or rule<span>. </span> </div> <div>¶ 12<span> </span><span>Rule 59(a) provides<span>, </span>in relevant part, <span>that â[w]ithin 14 days of </span></span> </div> <div>entry of judgment as provided in C.R.C.P. 58 . . . <span></span>a party may move </div> <div>for post-<span>trial relief.â </span>Thus, the rule authorizes a post-trial motion </div> <div>whe<span>never <span>a </span><span>âjudgmentâ is entered </span>under Rule 58. <span>A </span><span>âjudgmentâ </span>for </span> </div> <div>purposes of <span>Rule 58 âincludes an appealable decree or or<span></span>der as set </span> </div> <div>forth in C.R.C.P. 54(a).<span>â</span><span> </span>Rule 54(a), in turn, <span>defines a âjudgmentâ </span>to </div> <div>include <span>âa decree and order to or from which an appeal lies.â </span> </div> <div>¶ 13<span> </span><span>So a <span>âjudgmentâ </span>need not be <span>âfinalâ to be subject to a post</span>-trial </span> </div> <div>motion. Instead, Rules 54, 58, and 59 require that an order or </div> <div>judgment <span>be</span> <span>âappealable<span>.â</span></span><span> </span>And while finality is generally a </div> <div>prerequisite to appealability, <span>see Ditirro v. Sando</span>,2022 COA 94
, </div>
<div>¶ 24, <span>th</span>e rule is subject to various exceptions<span>, </span><span>see, e.g.</span>, § 13-<span>22</span>-</div>
<div>228(1)(a)-(b), C.R.S. 2024 (authorizing an appeal of an order </div>
</div></div>
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<div> </div>
<div>6 </div>
<div>denying a motion to compel arbitration or an order g<span></span>ranting a </div>
<div>motion to stay arbitration); § 24-<span>10</span>-108, C.R.S. 2024 (authorizing </div>
<div>an appeal of <span>an order denying a public entityâs motion t<span></span>o dismiss </span>
</div>
<div>based on sovereign immunity); C.A.R. 1(a)(3) (authori<span></span>zing an appeal </div>
<div>of an order granting or denying a temporary injunction); <span>Feigin v. </span>
</div>
<div>Alexa Grp., Ltd.<span>, 19 P.3d 23, 26 (Colo. 2001) (authori<span></span>zing an appeal </span> </div> <div>of an order denying a motion to intervene as a matter of right <span></span>under </div> <div>C.R.C.P. 24(a)).</div> </div> <div><div>1</div></div> <div> <div> <span>Section <span>13</span><span>-<span>20</span></span>-1101(7) creates such an exception </span> </div> <div>in this case, allowing an appeal from an otherwise nonfinal <span></span>order </div> <div>denying a special motion to dismiss. </div> <div>¶ 14<span> </span><span>Moreover, the relief requested in Magdy<span>âs </span>motion for </span> </div> <div>reconsideration <span>â</span>fits squarely within<span>â</span> Rule 59. <span>Spiremedia</span><span>, </span>¶ 18<span>. </span> </div> <div>The motion sought amendment of the <span>district courtâs</span> findings and </div> <div>of the judgment. <span>See</span> C.R.C.P. 59(a)(3), (4).<span> </span> </div> <div>¶ 15<span> </span><span>For these reasons, we disagree that the motion for </span> </div> <div>reconsideration constituted a motion under C.R.C.P. 121, section </div> <div> </div> </div> <div><div>1</div></div> <div> <div> <span>In</span> <span>Przekurat v. Torres</span>,2016 COA 177
, ¶ 53, <span>affâd</span><span>, </span>2018 CO 69
, the </div>
<div>division determined that a C.R.C.P. 59 motion may be filed <span></span>only in </div>
<div>response to a âfinal order or judgment, not a non<span>-final or </span>
</div>
<div>interlocutory order or judgment.â<span> </span>But we understand the divisionâs </div>
<div>statement, when read in context, to mean that Rule 59 applies <span></span>only </div>
<div>to appealable orders. <span> </span> </div>
</div>
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<img alt="" src="https://icbg.s3.amazonaws.com/media/MM9/Zgu/MM9ZguMTW/pwsU7Hj38Z0aT83wGmUtrM/47S7PRRijEBs%3D?AWSAccessKeyId=ASIA5PHC3MTP3W66MNVQ&Expires=1728856986&Signature=e%2BkKaTUwAsXRxR2k42HLLVtRHgw%3D&x-amz-security-token=IQoJb3JpZ2luX2VjEGwaCXVzLWVhc3QtMSJHMEUCIBUzZ4AJtQRhiZi5tW90i08tEmjreaY%2FvX9K0YdzHR2GAiEAqbt0VL6yr%2FsYUiMp6PA%2F558mlHE4H1fwFo5R68sG7qoquwUIxf%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2FARAAGgw5MjYwNDEyMDM5MzUiDNXOX8IYROToC4JrhiqPBbwzI%2BaA7uMRkZIZ7a4ETFxGp%2FIB2ZezoW13r3xkVYeUdHJkzoTIfBsNqZhRwjCCBQdJtajE9V7xWyL3ACtD%2FapDguQo3cr7cyArr7GktEh8zJo5f4TJc0%2FQ%2FxGNqfk5Ex36aw2i7QJVuKDmIFQip5VGQN0HsIuTg9iVtG2KpWsRQjx%2FaXD1gSh8YT58eWM%2F2OwPoV9TgpaAe7D8Kc26MOvEDJEt2nf5%2FzOGZHyMteTb5X6j7YCUmMfVqlPw5BOwvtpH68VfWXnqN9LxIGPGEAniU%2FHqhj8fXbTbVfazp2zLL18KTBerEitdKhfgB3UEcZCIg5mLFc7uRsC3bg1HFSk%2Bc8QtuS%2FWS3MdfuH4IpD%2FsZgr1gq8r1R6oLkMt2q3E1HZjbVoghKflMB7lQFKzmRfQ5QjPBp80hsZ%2FE91FLXSyn4yk610Y216phMr5UlCklN36BTYrpK9B1e%2FRpvrOA2o%2B2o%2Flf8nhC7csPWk2DZCz03zJasA5XcGAFRzlxqsrFEQ%2BAbn9GGMJaIFYK%2FoSvjvVctNS%2FYQlg%2Fiq%2FMysmxYknS7zMajUeewh8VVpG1%2BhSQDvzRiV46f0Y80eWhkaYWzIgSuhlRC25VGrny8JZ5mr%2FyY%2FYcXqTWD8NRJTx2wmpdpTqbdIgWTWZSYy%2FZzDJTjzqu3xp6Wp%2Fl90jGs6CcpcTIp9g2cPUVmhxHFtrsfv3te48y2k8djABh5Rq3S0xXE1f5Ao7uZNBXqmQiZ52m8YkyxwFkHSm0yb3LpLcJNY8AVOhJUuIaZ0KgsaYXXXCF8Y9VmgAxybbIz7kkN0yS41pOOKQkcIg6t8c7YvxKPAfcVxVMRhv1DlDsiIzbGxzSwMC1zH7gwyiBdN4L7VRowvsuwuAY6sQGOPExJ5lC3sTcGmWVzRXb9bJh3kCB3Z3DTpnPPZsNb27Bukj%2BWtyFeXvRsmNjAlJGLe3pXtWfC6VMIzB9AbJfEE4WiZ8gegyTeQFxa3y%2F%2BkBlqJZj4VaBc23aPGSxfRDy3Gi6lPCJLK5djj3o3Op6O5Ozuz7C8NZ3pDiFiCT6Fq3hWAwOVjU%2BZbZSRaTjkkmby%2B17r%2Ff0SswD48ydWYVO7e8bJ%2BTqFaKfcW0UC8GOhpX4%3D"><div>
<div> </div>
<div>7 </div>
<div>1-15(11), which does not toll the time for filing a notice of <span></span>appeal.<span> </span>
</div>
<div>Rule 121, section 1-15(11) applies to <span>â[m]otions to reconsider </span>
</div>
<div>interlocutory orders of the court . . . other than those <span></span>governed by </div>
<div>C.R.C.P. 59 or 60.â <span>Because Magdy sought relief from an </span>
</div>
<div>appealable<span> interlocutory order, the motion to reconsider was </span>
</div>
<div>properly âgoverned by C.R.C.P. 59<span>.</span><span>â</span><span> <span>Id. </span></span>
</div>
<div>III.<span> <span>Disposition </span></span>
</div>
<div>¶ 16<span> </span><span>The motion to dismiss the appeal is denied.</span>
</div>
</div>
<div><div>2</div></div>
<div>
<div> <span> </span>
</div>
<div>JUDGE SCHUTZ and JUDGE <span>LUM</span> concur.<span> </span> </div>
<div> </div>
</div>
<div><div>2</div></div>
<div>
<div> <span>In light of our disposition, we need not consider Magdyâs </span>
</div>
<div>alternative request that we extend the time for filing the <span></span>notice of </div>
<div>appeal based on excusable neglect. </div>
</div>
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