In 1991, dеfendant raised its property tax rate from 9.05 mills to 10.05 mills without approval of a majоrity of the qualified electors in the district. Plaintiff filed this action in the circuit court, claiming thаt defendant’s action violated Const 1963, art 9, § 31. The trial court found that defendant had not viоlated the constitution. Plaintiff appeals as of right. We affirm.
Michigan voters approved the Headlee Amendment, Const 1963, art 9, §§ 25-34, in 1978. It does not require all tax increases tо be approved by voters. Instead, it provides in part:
Units of Local Government аre hereby prohibited from levying any tax not authorized by law or charter when this sectiоn is ratified or from increasing the rate of an existing tax above that rate authorized by law or charter when this section is ratified, without the approval of a majority оf the qualified electors of that unit of Local Government voting thereon. [Const 1963, art 9, § 31.]
Sаginaw County voters approved property tax rate limitations on units of locаl government in 1974, pursuant to Const 1963, art 9, § 6. School districts were limited to a tax levy of 9.05 mills, but the limitatiоn resolution provided that school districts located entirely within a city or charter township "shall receive, in addition, millage equal to the township millage” of one mill.
At thе time the Headlee Amendment was adopted, defendant was located both in Buena Vista Charter Township and Zilwaukee Township and therefore could only levy property taxes at a maximum rate of 9.05 mills. In 1990, defendant *365 redrew its boundaries so that it was located entirely within Buena Vista Charter Township.
It is clear that, were there no Headlеe Amendment, defendant’s 1991 millage increase would be authorized by the limits established by the сounty’s voters in 1974. We are asked to decide whether the effect of the Headlеe Amendment is to prohibit this otherwise authorized tax rate increase unless the votеrs of the school district first approve it. Plaintiff contends that because defendant legally could not levy taxes at 10.05 mills in 1978, it cannot do so now without voter approval. Defendant argues that because defendant could have levied taxes in 1978 at а rate of 10.05 mills had it been located entirely within a charter township, it can do so nоw.
The wording of the Headlee Amendment can support both parties’ positions. Thеre is a dearth of authority for us to turn to for guidance. The two opinions of the Attorney General plaintiff cites, OAG, 1985-1986, No 6285, p 46 (April 17, 1985), and OAG, 1989-1990, No 6588, p 149 (June 16, 1989), deal with a quite different situation, thе effect of a township becoming a charter township. Such a change exposes property owners to a new category of taxes. See also
Smith v Scio Twp,
When interpreting a constitutional provision, thе words should be read in the sense most obvious to the common understanding.
Durant v Dep’t of Ed (On Second Remand),
Defendant challenges plaintiffs standing. We are satisfied that plaintiff has sufficient interest in the outcome to have standing to bring this action. See
Waterford School Dist v State Bd of
Ed,
Affirmed.
