342 F.3d 493 | 6th Cir. | 2003
(cid:45) DAMON J. KEITH, Circuit Judge. In this personal injury
Defendants-Appellees. (cid:45) action, the Plaintiffs appeal a September 10, 2001 order (cid:45) granting Defendant United States’ motion for summary (cid:78) judgment and dismissing without prejudice the Plaintiffs’ claims against Defendants Algonac Fire Department, John
Appeal from the United States District Court Stier, Russ Seder, Jerry Doan, and Joe Doan. For the reasons for the Eastern District of Michigan at Flint. set forth below, we REVERSE the district court’s grant of No. 99-40130—Paul V. Gadola, District Judge. summary judgment for the United States and REMAND the case for further proceedings, with the Plaintiffs’ claims
Argued: June 13, 2003 against the other Defendants reinstated. Decided and Filed: August 25, 2003 I. BACKGROUND Before: KEITH, MOORE, and GIBBONS, Circuit Judges. On the night of August 30, 1997, Richard and Virginia Sagan took their boat to Little Muscamoot Bay near Algonac, Michigan. They intended to spend the night in the bay with
1 No. 01-2568 Sagan, et al. v. United States, et al. 3 4 Sagan, et al. v. United States, et al. No. 01-2568 helicopter arrived on the scene. [1] Shortly after the helicopter their friends Greg Grizdowski and Karen Drobot. The Sagans tied their boat to Grizdowski’s boat in shallow water. At arrived, it was determined that the backboard to which Mr. around 11:30 p.m., after he had been drinking for several Sagan had been secured was incompatible with the device hours, Richard Sagan took off his clothes and dove head-first needed to lift him to the helicopter. The rescuers agreed that into the bay. His head struck the bottom of the bay, which transferring Mr. Sagan to a compatible backboard would risk was less than three feet deep at the point of Mr. Sagan’s entry. further injury, and that instead the Algonac Fire Department His spinal column between the C4 and C5 levels was severed boat should transport Mr. Sagan to the waiting ambulance. on impact. Mr. Sagan was transferred to the ambulance at approximately
1:46 a.m. Realizing that her husband was in trouble, Mrs. Sagan jumped into the water, lifted Mr. Sagan’s head, and screamed Mr. Sagan became a quadriplegic as a result of his dive into that he was not breathing. Mrs. Sagan dragged Mr. Sagan shallow water. Within a month of his injury, he began to toward the boat, yelling at her husband to wake up. Mrs. suffer from pneumonia, which his doctors attributed to the Sagan and Grizdowski tried unsuccessfully to lift Mr. Sagan spinal injury’s effects on his breathing, to his having inhaled onto Grizdowski’s boat and then onto the Sagans’ boat. water, and/or to his having suffered from hypothermia. He Grizdowski performed mouth-to-mouth resuscitation on Mr. required complicated pulmonary care, including frequent Sagan, who began to breathe and moan. Mr. Sagan’s suctioning, the use of albuterol, Atrovent and Serevent breathing was impeded by water in his lungs. He told breathing treatments, and percussion and postural drainage Grizdowski that he had no sensation in his hands. therapy. He required assistance to perform most daily
activities, including eating, bathing, and going to the At 11:35 p.m., Mrs. Sagan used the radio on her boat to bathroom. Mr. Sagan also had numerous respiratory contact the Macomb County Sherriff’s Department. At 12:15 problems, including impaired swallowing and ineffective a.m., the Algonac Fire Department arrived on the scene in a airway clearance and tracheostomy. He was unable to breathe boat. Three minutes later, the United States Coast Guard effectively without ventilator assistance. arrived by boat and informed those present that a rescue helicopter was on its way and would take Mr. Sagan to the On February 1, 1999, the Sagans sued the United States hospital. Mr. Sagan was secured to a backboard on the deck pursuant to the Suits in Admiralty Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 740 et of the Algonac Fire and Rescue boat. According to Mrs. seq . Their complaint alleged that the United States Coast Sagan, Captain Joe Doan of the Algonac Fire Department Guard failed to exercise due care while attempting to rescue insisted that Mr. Sagan immediately be taken to a hospital via Richard Sagan after he dove into shallow water, and that the an ambulance that was waiting a mile away from the boats. Coast Guard’s failure to exercise due care caused and/or
exacerbated injuries to Mr. Sagan. The Plaintiffs contend that the Coast Guard seized control of the situation and prevented the Algonac Boat from leaving, demanding instead that they wait for a Coast Guard helicopter. Sometime after 1:00 a.m., the Coast Guard [1] The Coast Guard helicopter had initially gone to Fishe r Bay,
approximately three miles aw ay from Little M uscam oot B ay. The C oast Guard lowered a rescue swimm er near some boats in Fishe r Bay, only to learn that they were in the wrong place.
No. 01-2568 Sagan, et al. v. United States, et al. 5 6 Sagan, et al. v. United States, et al. No. 01-2568 The Plaintiffs filed this timely appeal. [2] In it, they allege Richard Sagan died on August 9, 1999. According to the death certificate, the “immediate cause” of death was the that the district court erred in concluding that there was no quadriplegia from which Mr. Sagan had suffered for genuine issue of material fact as to whether the United States’ approximately two years, and the “underlying cause” was negligence proximately caused Richard Sagan’s injuries. The pneumonia. Plaintiffs ask that their claims against all parties be reinstated
and that the matter be remanded to the district court. They On August 11, 2000, Plaintiff Virginia Sagan filed a further request that on remand, the case be assigned to a Second Amended Complaint in which she alleged that different district court judge to preserve the appearance of Defendants Algonac Fire Department, John Stier, Russ Seder, justice. Jerry Doan, and Joe Doan acted negligently toward Richard Sagan, and that their negligence proximately caused and/or II. ANALYSIS exacerbated his injuries. These Defendants were all part of A. Standard of Review the effort to rescue Mr. Sagan but were not associated with the Coast Guard; hereinafter they will be called “the Algonac
A district court’s grant of summary judgment is reviewed Defendants.” de novo . See Holloway v. Brush , 220 F.3d 767, 772 (6th Cir. 2000). Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no The parties conducted discovery. On September 15, 2000, genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled the Defendants filed motions for summary judgment. A to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). In hearing was held on November 28, 2000, and the parties deciding a motion for summary judgment, the court must presented arguments in support of and in opposition to the view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non- motions. moving party, drawing all reasonable inferences in that In a Memorandum Opinion and Order dated September 10, party’s favor. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith 2001, the district court granted Defendant United States’ Radio Corp. , 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). The judge is not to motion for summary judgment and dismissed without “weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but prejudice the claims against the Algonac Defendants for lack to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.” of subject matter jurisdiction. See Sagan v. United States , Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). 157 F. Supp. 2d 824 (E.D. Mich. 2001). The district court A genuine issue for trial exists only where there is sufficient found that the Plaintiffs had failed to present enough evidence “evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the that the United States proximately caused Mr. Sagan’s plaintiff.” Id. at 252. The central issue is “whether the injuries to survive summary judgment. The district court then evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require held that because the claim against the United States was submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one dismissed, the claims against the Algonac Defendants must party must prevail as a matter of law.” Id. at 251-52. also be dismissed, because those claims were before the district court based on supplemental jurisdiction.
harm resulting from his failure to exercise reasonable susceptible to summary determination.”) care to perform his undertaking, if (a) his failure to [4] exercise such care increases the risk of harm, or (b) the The Coast Guard delayed the rescue of Mr. Sagan by insisting that harm is suffered because of the other’s reliance upon the the rescuers wait for a helicopter rather than transport him by boat to a waiting amb ulance . The district co urt con clude d that the Coast Guard’s undertaking.
actions delayed the rescue by 55 m inutes. T he Plaintiffs continue to assert No. 01-2568 Sagan, et al. v. United States, et al. 9 10 Sagan, et al. v. United States, et al. No. 01-2568 contributed to Mr. Sagan’s development of hypothermia, As the Plaintiffs are quick to point out, the report of an pulmonary and respiratory problems, and pneumonia. expert witness for the defense also lends support to the
Plaintiffs’ argument that the delay caused injury to Mr. In support of this contention, the Plaintiffs point to the Sagan. According to Dr. Alberto Martinez-Arizala, affidavit of Dr. Ralph E. Dilisio, one of Richard Sagan’s treating physicians at St. John’s Hospital. Dr. Dilisio stated In one area, specifically hypothermia, the delay in rescue that “the significant hypothermia caused by the delay did probably had an untoward effect. Hypothermia has contribute to Mr. Sagan’s respiratory complications. detrimental systemic effects that include pulmonary Specifically, the detrimental systematic effects, including the dysfunction and it could have contributed to his pulmonary dysfunction, resulted in Mr. Sagan being respiratory compromise. . . . Upon arrival at St. John’s significantly more ventilator dependent than he would have hospital his temperature was recorded at 86.7° F, which been without the delay, among other complications.” J.A. at is significantly low. So he was significantly hypothermic 844 (Affidavit of Ralph E. Dilisio, M.D.). Dr. Dilisio also and this could have contributed to his complications. stated that the delay “resulted in Mr. Sagan being far more J.A. at 598 (Report of Defendant’s Expert Witness Alberto susceptible to pneumonia,” and that the pulmonary problems Martinez-Arizala, M.D.). Dr. Martinez-Arizala also stated that Mr. Sagan suffered were “far more severe than I would
that “[a]nother complication of his injury that may be related expect from an individual with his level of spinal injury.” Id. to the delay in transportation was the development of Finally, Dr. Dilisio recited the “well-recognized medical aspiration pneumonia”, although “it is likely that it would principle that not appropriately securing a victim’s head and have occurred even if he had been transported sooner.” Id. neck, resulting in movement of the head and neck, after a severe C4-C5 spinal cord injury is an aggravating factor to the
The Plaintiffs note that one of the Algonac Defendants, Joe spinal cord injury.” Id. Doan, also testified as to the importance of transporting Mr. Sagan to a hospital as soon as possible to prevent The Plaintiffs also rely on the affidavit of Dr. Jennifer hypothermia and pneumonia. In his deposition, Captain Doble, who treated Mr. Sagan at Lakeland Center. According Doan, a state-licensed paramedic, stated that he believed Mr. to Dr. Doble, “Mr. Sagan had severe and substantial
Sagan needed intravenous fluids to warm his body. respiratory problems which caused him to be much more ventilator dependent than a typical C4-C5 quadriplegic. In
The district court found that the Plaintiffs had not produced addition, the respiratory problems caused Mr. Sagan to be far evidence that the Coast Guard’s actions caused Mr. Sagan’s more susceptible to pneumonia.” J.A. at 851 (Affidavit of injuries to be worse or more numerous than they would have Jennifer Doble, M.D.). Dr. Doble stated that in her medical been had the Coast Guard not attempted the rescue at all. The opinion, Mr. Sagan died from pneumonia. See id. district court characterized the Plaintiffs’ evidence as “no more than conjecture or speculation” and “insufficient to raise an issue of fact to defeat a summary judgment motion.” Sagan v. United States , 157 F. Supp. 2d 824, 829 (E.D. Mich. 2001). We respectfully disagree. We think the Plaintiffs
that the time of the d elay was in fact one hour and 20 m inutes. T he have produced evidence sufficient to create a genuine issue of evidence is ambiguous regarding exactly how much delay the Coast Guard caused, but the evidence is uncontradicted that the Coast Guard material fact as to whether the Coast Guard’s negligence in caused a delay. No. 01-2568 Sagan, et al. v. United States, et al. 11 12 Sagan, et al. v. United States, et al. No. 01-2568 delaying the rescue proximately caused injury to Richard from carrying out this plan, and the approximately one hour Sagan. The evidence presented to the district court was delay ensued. Thus, the delay would not have occurred had expert medical opinion from physicians who had treated Mr. Defendant United States not attempted the rescue at all. Sagan; it was not merely “conjecture or speculation.” We For these reasons, we find that the Plaintiffs have presented think a reasonable trier of fact could find for the Plaintiffs on
sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact the issue of causation based on the testimony of Drs. Dilisio, as to whether the Coast Guard’s negligence in delaying the Doble, and Martinez-Arizala. All three experts agreed that, rescue of Richard Sagan proximately caused him injury. at the very least, the delay “probably” contributed to Mr. Sagan’s injuries.
2. The Plaintiffs’ Claims Against the Algonac Defendants Furthermore, it is telling that the defense’s own expert 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) provides that “in any civil action of witness, Dr. Martinez-Arizala, stated in his report that “ the which the district courts have original jurisdiction, the district majority of Mr. Sagan’s injuries resulted from his original courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other trauma at the time of his accident, and not from actions or claims that are so related to claims in the action within such lack of actions of his rescuers.” J.A. at 597 (Martinez-Arizala original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or Report) (emphasis added). The United States cites this controversy.” We review a determination of whether a statement in its brief, as though it supports the United States’ district court has jurisdiction de novo . Blakely v. United position. On the contrary, it supports the Plaintiffs’ argument States , 276 F.3d 853, 860 (6th Cir. 2002). for causation inasmuch as Dr. Martinez-Arizala acknowledges that some – “a minority” – of Mr. Sagan’s injuries resulted
After the district court granted the United States’ motion from the actions or lack of actions of his rescuers. Of course, for summary judgment, the court dismissed without prejudice the law does not require a plaintiff to prove that the majority the Plaintiffs’ purely state law claims against the Algonac of his injuries were proximately caused by the defendants. Defendants for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. In their Indeed, in this case, it seems fairly clear that the majority of complaint, the Plaintiffs assert only state law claims against Mr. Sagan’s injuries were caused by his head-first dive into the Algonac Defendants and explicitly state that they are not shallow water. The important question is whether the Coast invoking admiralty jurisdiction as to the Algonac Defendants. Guard’s negligence in rescuing Mr. Sagan caused additional We leave for the district court the issue of whether the state injury, not whether those additional injuries amount to a law claims are preempted by federal maritime law. The majority or a minority of all the injuries sustained by Mr. district court noted that the Algonac Defendants were in Sagan on the night in question. federal court based on supplemental jurisdiction. The Supreme Court has held that “if the federal claims are
We are also puzzled by the district court’s statement that dismissed before trial, . . . the state claims should be the Plaintiffs “have not produced evidence that Defendant’s dismissed as well.” United Mine Workers of America v. actions increased Plaintiff Richard Sagan’s injuries over what Gibbs , 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966). those injuries would have been had Defendant not attempted the rescue at all.” 157 F. Supp. 2d at 829. It is clear from the
The district court’s dismissal of the claims against the record that from the moment they arrived on the scene, the Algonac Defendants was proper in light of its grant of Algonac Defendants wanted to transport Mr. Sagan by boat summary judgment for the United States. However, because to a waiting ambulance. The Coast Guard prevented them No. 01-2568 Sagan, et al. v. United States, et al. 13 14 Sagan, et al. v. United States, et al. No. 01-2568 we now reverse the district court’s grant of summary in its rescue operation. We agree that the district judge judgment for the United States and remand this case for mischaracterized the Plaintiffs’ evidence when he stated that further proceedings, the claims against the Algonac the expert medical testimony in this case was “no more than Defendants must also be remanded based on 28 U.S.C. conjecture or speculation.” Sagan v. United States , 157 F. § 1367(a). See Jackson v. City of Columbus , 194 F.3d 737, Supp. 2d at 829. Accordingly, we have reversed the district 757 (6th Cir. 1999), overruled on other grounds by court’s grant of summary judgment for defendant United Swierkiewics v. Sorema N.A. , 534 U.S. 506 (2002) States and remanded the case for further proceedings. On (remanding a state defamation claim to the district court after remand, the district court will reconsider all of the expert reversing the district court’s dismissal of a federal claim). testimony in the record. We do not think that the district
court’s mischaracterization of the evidence is grounds for 3. The Necessity of Reassignment reassignment. If we reassigned the case every time a district court judge misconstrued some evidence, reassignment would The Plaintiffs argue that on remand, this case should be surely cease to be “an extraordinary power . . . rarely assigned to a different district court judge. We have the invoked.” Armco , 280 F.3d at 683. At oral argument in this authority to do this under 28 U.S.C. § 2106. However, as we case, counsel for the Plaintiffs was asked to provide the court have frequently emphasized, reassignment is an with some limiting principle that would justify reassignment “extraordinary power and should be rarely invoked . . . . here but not in most other cases in which we reverse a district [R]eassignments should be made infrequently and with the court’s grant of summary judgment. Plaintiffs’ counsel was greatest reluctance.” Armco, Inc. v. United Steel Workers of unable to suggest any appropriate limiting principle, and we America, AFL-CIO, Local 169 , 280 F.3d 669, 683 (6th Cir. cannot think of one. 2002); see also Hamad v. Woodcrest Condominium Ass’n , 328 F.3d 224, 238 (6th Cir. 2003). In determining whether Turning to the Plaintiffs’ other arguments, we do not agree reassignment is necessary, courts consider (1) whether the that the district court determined the issue of proximate cause original judge would reasonably be expected to have based upon its own predetermined beliefs on quadriplegia. substantial difficulty in putting out of his mind previously The Plaintiffs base this argument on an exchange between expressed views or findings; (2) whether reassignment is
Plaintiffs’ counsel and the district court, during which the advisable to preserve the appearance of justice; and district judge stated that quadriplegia is an “irreversible (3) whether reassignment would entail waste and duplication condition” and that “[w]e still haven’t found a way to cure out of proportion to any gain in preserving the appearance of somebody from being a quadriplegic.” Appellants’ Br. at 46; fairness. See Bercheny v. Johnson , 633 F.2d 473, 476-77 (6th J.A. at 1039-40 (Transcript of Summary Judgment Motion Cir. 1980). Hearing). Based on this exchange, the Plaintiffs argue that
the district judge in this case “allowed his own The Plaintiffs argue that the district judge in this case failed preconceptions of quadriplegia to interfere with his judgment to consider and/or mischaracterized the Plaintiffs’ evidence of the injuries suffered by Mr. Sagan.” Appellants’ Br. at 48. regarding Richard Sagan’s pulmonary and respiratory injuries, that he determined the issue of proximate cause
We note initially that the Plaintiffs provide no evidence that based upon his own predetermined beliefs on quadriplegia, the district judge’s statements about quadriplegia were and that he was so partial to defendant United States that he incorrect. More importantly, we find no evidence that the initially decided that the Coast Guard had not been negligent district judge here allowed these “predetermined beliefs” to No. 01-2568 Sagan, et al. v. United States, et al. 15 16 Sagan, et al. v. United States, et al. No. 01-2568 influence his decision granting summary judgment for the III. CONCLUSION United States. The district court’s grant of summary For these reasons, we REVERSE the district court’s grant judgment was not based on the irreversible nature of of summary judgment for the United States and REMAND quadriplegia. Rather, the district court granted summary the case for further proceedings, with the Plaintiffs’ claims judgment for the United States because it found that the
against the other Defendants reinstated. Plaintiffs had not introduced evidence sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact with respect to proximate cause.
We also reject the Plaintiffs’ argument that the district judge decided that the Coast Guard had not been negligent, and that this determination represents bias. The Plaintiffs base this argument on a different exchange between Plaintiffs’ counsel and the district court, during which the district judge stated: “I think there are real problems here. I would like to know . . . what evidence there is here that . . . these defendants did not act with reasonable care in light of the extremely unique circumstances of this rescue that was performed.” Appellants’ Br. at 49; J.A. at 1020 (Transcript of Summary Judgment Motion Hearing).
This statement hardly amounts to a determination that the Coast Guard was not negligent. We do not think it is improper for a district judge, in a summary judgment motion hearing, to ask Plaintiffs’ counsel what evidence he has that the Defendants did not act with reasonable care. We find in this statement by the district court nothing inappropriate or suggestive of bias. See Hamad , 328 F.3d at 239 (finding that remarks by the district judge, when considered in context, did not demonstrate that he was partial or that he could not put aside his personal views); Brown v. Crowley , 312 F.3d 782, 791-92 (6th Cir. 2003) (rejecting a request for reassignment despite plaintiff’s claim that “[t]he district court seemed to [analyze] everything in favor of the defendants”). On remand, the district court will consider fully the issue of the Coast Guard’s negligence.
For these reasons, we hold that reassignment of this case to another district court judge is not necessary.
NOTES
[2] The Appellants here are Virginia Sagan, as personal representative of the estate of Richard Sagan, and Virginia Sagan, in her individual capacity. We refer to them as “the Plaintiffs” throughout this opinion. No. 01-2568 Sagan, et al. v. United States, et al. 7 8 Sagan, et al. v. United States, et al. No. 01-2568 B. Analysis Restatement (Second) of Torts § 323b (1965). 1. The Plaintiffs’ Claim Against the United States To prevail in this case, the Plaintiffs must prove that the Coast Guard was negligent in carrying out its rescue of Mr. The Suits in Admiralty Act (SIAA) “is the exclusive Sagan, and that the Coast Guard’s negligence proximately remedy against the United States for maritime torts . . . . In caused some of his injuries. Thus, in order to survive contrast to the Federal Tort Claims Act . . ., the SIAA does summary judgment, the Plaintiffs must produce evidence not incorporate state tort law, inasmuch as maritime tort law sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact as to is federal law.” Good v. Ohio Edison Co. , 149 F.3d 413, 420 whether the risk of physical harm to Mr. Sagan was increased n.13 (6th Cir. 1998). The SIAA does not itself create a cause by the Coast Guard’s negligence. “The test is not whether the of action against the United States. See Good , 149 F.3d at risk was increased over what it would have been if the 419. Rather, a plaintiff must show that the United States defendant had not been negligent,” but rather whether “the would be liable under maritime tort law for the same conduct. risk was increased over what it would have been had the defendant not engaged in the undertaking at all.” Myers v. The United States Coast Guard does not have an United States , 17 F.3d 890, 903 (6th Cir. 1994). affirmative duty to rescue persons in distress. Federal law merely provides that the Coast Guard “shall” establish and With these standards in mind, we now proceed to evaluate operate rescue facilities and that it “may” render aid to protect the evidence in this case to determine whether it gives rise to persons and property at any time such facilities are available. a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the Coast See 14 U.S.C. § 88. However, once the Coast Guard Guard’s negligence proximately caused injury to Richard Sagan.
[3] The Plaintiffs do not contend that the Coast Guard is undertakes a rescue operation, it must act with reasonable care. See Patentas v. United States , 687 F.2d 707 (3d Cir. in any way responsible for Richard Sagan becoming a 1982). Its actions are judged according to the so-called quadriplegic. Mr. Sagan became a quadriplegic when he dove “Good Samaritan” doctrine. See id. at 713-14. Under this head-first into shallow water. Instead, the Plaintiffs contend that the Coast Guard’s negligence in delaying the rescue
[4] doctrine, a defendant is liable for breach of a duty voluntarily assumed by affirmative conduct, even when that assumption of duty was gratuitous. See id. (citing Indian Towing Co. v. United States , 350 U.S. 61 (1955)). The Restatement
[3] The proximate cause element was the foc us of the United States’ (Second) of Torts has described the doctrine as follows: motion for summary judgment and the basis for the district court’s grant of summ ary jud gment. The United States does not appear to dispute that One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to it was negligent, and no one disputes that Mr. Sagan sustained injuries on the night in question. Therefore, our focus will be on the issue of render services to another which he should recognize as proximate cause as well. See American & Foreign Insurance Co. v. necessary for the protection of the other’s person or Genera l Electric , 45 F.3d 135, 140 (6th Cir. 199 5) (“O f all the elem ents things, is subject to liability to the other for physical necessary to support recovery in a to rt action, causation is the most
