Safford v. StubbsSafford v. Stubbs
- Reporters:
- ,
- Before:
- Magruder
delivered the opinion of the Court:
This is a bill for the partition of 131t|q acres of land, in Madison county, filed by appellants against appellees. Appellant, Ada A. Safford, claims to be the owner of an undivided two-thirds part of the tract, and appellee, Eliza V. Stubbs, claims to own an undivided one-third part thereof. The appellee, Jonathan Berkey, is in possession, and claims to have acquired title by possession and payment of taxes for seven successive years, under claim and color of title, made in good faith, “under the sixth section of the Limitation act. The question is, whether Berkey has brought himself within the provisions of the Statute of Limitations, and whether the bar of the statute can be successfully invoked under the circumstances of this case.
It is said, that Berkey can not claim the benefit of the statute, because neither his title nor his possession has ever been adverse to the title of appellants, and appellee, Stubbs. The facts, upon which this contention is based, are as follows : One Mark Darrah, being the owner of the land in question, died, testate, on August 1, 1850, in Berks county, Pénnsylvania, and, by the terms of his will, devised this land to Josiah Weiser for life, and, after his death, if he should die leaving lawful issue, gave and devised the same to his heirs, as tenants in common, in equal shares, and to their respective heirs and assigns forever. On January 31, 1856, Weiser, being then the owner of a life estate only, executed a quitclaim deed to Reiner, Berkey’s grantor, conveying all of Weiser’s “right, title, interest, estate, claim and demand, both at law . and in equity, and as well in possession as in expectancy, of in and to,” the land in controversy; on July 24, 1863, Weiser died, leaving a widow, Eliza Y. Weiser (now the appellee, Eliza Y. Stubbs,) and two daughters, Florence Weiser, who died on August 26, 1863, and Ada A. Weiser (now the appellant, Ada A. Safford.) After the death of Josiah Weiser, the said Ada and Eliza became, by the terms of Darrah’s will and by inheritance from Florence Weiser, the owners of the reversionary estate, in the proportions of two-thirds and one-third, as above stated.
Darrah’s will, although admitted to probate in Pennsylvania, was never admitted to probate in Illinois, nor was it ever recorded in Madison county, or elsewhere in Illinois. There is no proof, that either Reiner or Berkey ever had any notice of its contents. Neither of them had any notice, so far as this record discloses, that the interest of Weiser in the premises was merely that of a life tenant. The deed from Weiser to Reiner, and the deed from Reiner to Berkey, do not show, or, in any way, indicate the nature of the estate, owned by Weiser. It may be, that Berkey, though he had been in possession and paid taxes for seven years, after the tenant for life died, would- be debarred -from, setting up the statute against the owners of the remainder, if he had had notice, that his ■ grantor’s interest was only a- tenancy pur autre vie. (Dugan et al. v. Follett et al. 100 Ill. 581.) But having had no such notice, he did not enter upon the land, knowing or believing himself to be the owner of an estate for the life of another, and could not be considered a tenant at sufferance of the reversioners after the estate for life ended. His claim was thereafter adverse to the reversioners, and not in subordination to their title. His quitclaim deed from Reiner was such a deed, as v‘ould pass the title no less effectually than a warranty deed with full covenants. (Grant v. Bennett et al. 96 Ill. 513.) It can, therefore, be relied on, as color of title. Holloway et al. v. Clark, 27 Ill., 483.
The interest of Mrs. Stubbs in one-third of the property as well as that of her daughter in two-thirds of it, accrued on August 26, 1863. We have held, that, since, the passage of the Married Woman’s act of 1861, the saving clause, in favor of married women, in this limitation law, has no force, and that the statute, since that time, applies against a marrieS woman equally as against an unmarried woman. (Enos et al. v. Buckley, 94 Ill. 458.) Hence, the fact of coverture, during the running of the statute, cuts no figure in this case.
The decree of the circuit court, dismissing the bill, is affirmed.
Decree affirmed.
Mr. Justice Sheldon does not concur.