Saffels v. Bennett

similarities, matters, the for- seems to concede that none of many case at bar have III, standing insufficiency argument set number mer on of evidence out turned require con- to resolving sufficiently prejudicial alone are actionable fraud rather say, attempt goes “appel- to reversal. He then on to Appellants evidence. flicting however, lants, on the basis that call attention distinguish White inexperienced.2 so that the court will lants in the case at bar were court to these matters many This was not indicated as deter- were errors that observation be аware there strengthen to jury minative of the issue but verdict of the not to be only caused the “could appellees upon the court’s statement that the substantial evidence but to based readily not blind themselves to observe prejudice.” on based al- and place available facts reliance saying that This be another way making leged misrepresentation without standing require each error would not alone v. diligent facts.” White inquiry these of nu- reversal but the cumulative effect 1171; Hotel, Ogburn, supra, Gladstone p. require This merous errors would reversal. Smith, Inc. 487 P.2d v. concept is difficult to demonstrate v. Timber Com- Schaffer Standard has made effort court counsel pany, Wyo. appellants prejudiced by show that were at- Finally, appellants direct court’s alleged erroneous the cumulative effect mat- alleged prejudicial tention to several arguendo that Assuming matters. open- improper appellees’ ters: remarks such rulings, of its court did err some statement; ing compliment- trial appears appellants to be harmless error commenting on the ing opposing counsel or jury’s verdict have failed to show that the rulings; a evidence and certain erroneous rulings. was a result of these erroneous issue; the ultimate testimony witness’ Affirmed. by appellees of a witness not calling It is noted in pretrial listed in order. an instruc-

passing judge gave that the trial remark designed improper

tion to cure the The court also opening

in the statement. disregard certain jury

admonished the alleged compliment testimony. The SAFFELS, Minerva Gertrude ap- differently by counsel characterized (Plaintiff), individual, Appellant re- counsel. He characterized these pellees’ “biting marks as and sarcastic and Saffels, Individually, as Per M. Frances uplifted eyes did feel in the flattered Estate Representative sonаl jury.” Guardian Loren Harold analyzed out of Heidi A. We have not set nor Estates of the Persons and Kornegay, prejudicial Kornegay L. mi alleged detail the numerous and Shawn (Plaintiff), argument by appellants matters listed nors attack general III. The broad and number brief does not segment appellants’ in this BENNETT, (Defendant). Appellee Jack scrutiny. Appellants lend to a careful itself 5434. No. argument persuasive have not aided us by specific quotations nor from cases cited Wyoming. Supreme Court support Appellants their contention. June alleged prejudicial generally matters up why us to determine have left In the last prejudicial. these matters brief, appellants’ counsel

paragraph of speculate only whether or We can appellants experienced ranchers. or in- 2. Whether were experience or the lack experienced However, ‍​‌​​‌​​‌‌‌​​‌‌​​‌​​‌​‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌​​‌​‌‌‌‌​​‌‌​‌​​​‌​‍not the deemed of the issue. determinative significant. they were thereof there was evidence experienced, working sheep hard farmers and Peek, H. Casper, signed Richard the brief appeared argument oral lant. Reeves, P.C.,

John C. Brooks of Vlastos & signed the brief Casper, appeared argument appellee. oral ROSE, C.J., RAPER, THOMAS Before *, ROONEY, JJ., D.J. and BROWN Judge argument at time effective District of oral when now retired. Justice of this court assigned upon McCLINTOCK, J., recusal of March ROONEY, 159 N.W.2d 297 Justice. Annotation: affecting alimony,” “Death of husband as summary partial from a appeal This A.L.R,2d (1955); 24 Am.Jur.2d Di- of appellee-defendant in favor judgment Separation, vorce & Minerva appellant-plaintiff otherwise, ac- ‍​‌​​‌​​‌‌‌​​‌‌​​‌​​‌​‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌​​‌​‌‌‌‌​​‌‌​‌​​​‌​‍in a Gertrude Saffels does not contend tion, having express made an the trial court argues rule terminat- general but that the 54(b), W.R. pursuant Rule determination husband doеs ing alimony upon death the just delay that there was no reason C.P. apply legislature pro- here the not because summary judgment partial the W.S.1977, and that “[ejvery in vided was The action initiated should be entered. wrongful for whose person benefit” Saffels, the wife of M. who was Frances by respective prove brought “may action at the time he was Loren Harold Saffels use of damages.” contends that the She in which killed in a two-automobile collision to this words in 1973 amendment these one and he was the driver of automobile heir other than an section authorized those other оne. was the driver of the appellee beneficiary of an the be a the of Loren Harold Appellant is ex-wife death, was wrongful and that she action in joined plaintiff as the com- and Saffels in action. proper party such plaint. amendment, Wrong- the Prior to the 1973 appeal as Appellant words the issue provided: ful Death Act follows: person of a Whenever the death “With awarded ali- Appellant being the act, neglect by shall be caused in the District Court mony payments by act, default, or default neglect or the divorce ac- Wyoming the State of еnsued) (if is such would death had as and the dece- Appellant tion between the to main- party injured have entitled the dent, being the at rate alimony said damages in re- an action to recover tain ($300.00) per Three Dollars Hundred thereof; then, every such and in spect or (10) years period month for a ten who, case, corporation or person the the death, Appellant until Appellant’s which, if death would have been liable having of income that she lost source ensued, be to an ac- shall liable had not dependent upon because damages, notwithstanding the tion for the Appellee causing act of thé although injured, and person death of the Loren the dece- death of Harold shall been caused under the death dent, proper party is the Appellant as amount law such circumstances authority the filed under the degree, murder in the first second Statutes, 1-38-102, Wyoming Provided, manslaughter. 1977?” liable, so person event of the death given We answer negative affirm brought such action estate; question by the trial court. of his . executor or administrator further, if left no estate provided the dece- divorced from Wyoming, court State of within the dent on 1978. There were April upon appli- may appoint administrator marriage. children from that divorce 1— therefor.” Section being cation made de- payment decree directed 1065,W.S.1957. by presented here scribed in the issue “ * * action shall Every such trial found that alimo- lant. The .of, per- the name by, terminat- ny by ordered that divorce decree per- of such deceased representative sonal Implicit ed the death of the decedent. son; every received and the amount finding in this is a conclusion shall be distributed such action settlement. property аward was by provided proportions in the parties and Warren, P.2d 525 Warren v. per- Alaska, law, distribution Kuhns, in relation to the (1961); Estate Kuhns persons dying intes- Ball, by left Neb. sonal estates 550 P.2d 816 Ball v. case, In such every tate. shall When the Probate Code was revised and give such shall they deem fair amended in Death Act consider, just. jury may The court or was taken from the Code of Civil Procedure damages, as elements of the amount the part made a of the Probate Code as fail, by survivors failed or will reason of 2-14-202, W.S.1977, 2-14-201 and §§ death, to receive out of the decedent’s Replacement. Again, only minоr language earnings, any other loss direct- pecuniary changes were changed, made. As 2-14- ly proximately sustained the sur- 201 and 2-14-202 read: including vivors reason of such death “Whenever the death of a expenses, funeral and further the court act, by wrongful neglect caused or de- add, jury may element of dam- fault such as would have entitled the age, a reasonable sum for the loss of party injured to maintain an action to comfort, care, advice and society damages ensued, recover if death had not decedent. The amount so recovered shall person who would have been liable if not be subject any to debts or liabilities death had not ensued is liable in an action deceased; of the provided, that every damages, even though the death was such action shall be commenced within caused under circumstances as amount in (2) two years after the death of such law to murder in or the first second de- 1-1066, person.” deceased Section W.S. gree or If manslaughter. person lia- 1957. dies, ble brought the action may Former changed 1-1066 of the act was § personal representative of his 139, 1973, Wyoming Ch. S.L. of estate. If he left no estate within the to read as follows: state of Wyoming, may appoint the court “(a) Every action 1-1065 under section of personal representative upon applica- the statutes shall be brought by, and in tion.” Section 2-14-201. of, the name personal representative “(a) Every brought such action shall be of the person. deceased by and in personal the name of the repre-

“(b) husband, wife, If the deceased left a of person. sentative the deceased child, father, mother, or no debt of the may deceased pro- satisfied out of the “(b) husband, If wife, the decedеnt left a any ceeds of judgment obtained in any child, mother, father or no debt of the action brought under the provisions of may be satisfied out of pro- this section. ceeds of any judgment obtained in any “(c) The court or jury, may as the case action provisions under the be, in every such action award may such this section. damages, pecuniary exemplary, and as “(c) The jury may court or in the action shall be just. deemed fair and Every damages, pecuniary award such and ex- person for whose benefit such action is emplary, just. as it deems fair Every brought, may prove respective his dam- person for whose benefit the action is ages, and the court or jury may award brought may prove respective his dam- such person damages that amount of to ages jury may and the court or award the which entitled, it person considers such person that amount of to which including damages probable loss entitled, person considers the including future companionship, society and com- damages for probable loss of future com- fort. panionship, society and comfort. “(d) Every such action shall be com- “(d) Every such action shall be com- menced within two years after the death (2) menced within two years-after of such deceased person.” person.” death of the deceased During revision 1977, ‍​‌​​‌​​‌‌‌​​‌‌​​‌​​‌​‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌​​‌​‌‌‌‌​​‌‌​‌​​​‌​‍Civil Code 2-14-202. made minor wording changes in the act and April renumbered it to The Probate effective Code became 1-38-102, 1-38-101 and 1, 1980, §§ 4, W.S.1977. provided in Ch. S.L. § April wrongful brought. was filed death could be The ille- 1980. This Wyoming to is a words subject gitimate child child within the and is therefore 2-14-202, 2-14-202(b), supra, 2-14-201 and used the intent provisions illegitimate recited to child within those include rather to be the act is ex- by appellant. benefited there presented issue with pressed. expressiоn There no such purpose basic wife. reference to a divorced forth Jordan v. Delta is set amendment legislative history 1-38- 102(b) legisla reflects intention (1975), 78 A.L.R.3d * n “ * * the traditional rule stray ture from under the for- jury The court dependence to the extent beneficiary sum lump returned a award. practice mer suggested propounded by according divided arbitrarily It hereto.1 As intro originally the dissent regard intestacy laws of without duced, (b) provided: subsection heir have been entitled fact that one wife, husband, statutory “If left a more or less than the share. the deceased brother, child, father, mother, sister, permits each The amendment child, deceased prove child or children of a claiming loss to demand out recover, deceased be satisfied damage and if debt of the or her individual judgment be fair obtained proceeds any shown to the court brought provi- in under the just.” any action sions of this section.” require- (1) in the specific The statute is “shall The recom- Judiciary ment that the action be House Committee “brother, of sis- personal representa- deletion the words and in the name of the mended child,” deceased,” ter, of a deceased (2) thе direction or child or children tive debt be was so amended. may that “no of the deceased satis- and the bill any judgment” out of of proceeds fied the expressed The thus legislative intention husband, wife, child, if the “left a decedent of be recipients was to the benefits to limit father mother.” the statute. derived from representa- Appellant personal not the is use of has seized satisfy and cannot that tive of deceased 2-14-202(c), person” in “every the words respect. the statute in that requirement of attempt to convince the supra, in an to in enough are broad such words arguendo that Assuming what determining obligation In that the clude an ex-wife. correct her assertion means, to the we must refer “every person” installments payment of future in consideration of entire upon the death Loren enactment did not terminate are words used. would then in which these obligation context Harold out of a debt could be satisfied be which in which the two subsection In same judgment of a proceeds used, are damages recoverable words are “ * * * surviving left a wife inasmuch damages loss include set out to him. society companionship, probable future еle- of these inclusion and comfort.” holding to the Jordan Appellant points suggest damages seems supra, sup- ments of v. Delta “every per- did not intend language the legislature her port contention It is difficult enough an ex-wife. Act to son” to include Wrongful is broad dam- an ex-wife would suffer case believe that simply allow her action. The Jordan socie- companionship, loss age was within illegitimate child because held that conclude there- We must ty, action for person class of for whom the comfort. (1976); Wyo., Town through 481 of Clearmont may Legislative intent determined Commission, Wyо., State, P.2d Highway 357 history. legislative 601 State Padilla v. Voss, (1961). Adoption Matter of P.2d 189 person” “every intestacy. the words were laws of New causes fore that of action more to refer to a restricted class intended persons were not created and entitled appellant contends. person amend- expanded by recover were not suggested ment in Jordan. Jordan did (in The word means each ‘every’ persons not create a new class of entitled to part) group class or dividual number, definite or within whether indefinite in recover but identifies another * *” the- (Emphasis existing аdopt appellant’s class. To exception. without words original.) ory magic ex rel. Pierce v. Kun ascribes a lot of State dert, opening 4 Wis.2d 90 N.W.2d would then be “every person.” We (1958). and innova- floodgates “imaginative “ ‘ * * * Jordan, supra, suggested tive claims” as “every” emphasizes The word 541 P.2d at 42. fact individuals of a class or that all whether definite or group included person” If the words were inter- “every ” (Emphasis indefinite in number.’ who have suffered preted to include all No., v. Dietz Dist. original.) Reich School per-A damage, the list would be endless. 16 of Grant 79 N.D. County, professional son or business 638, 641, N.W.2d great and suffеr partner life invested “every person” The words cannot be if his killed. partner wrongfully interpreted creating to have the effect of employer large An have a investment class persons new and a cause of action employee. university may in a A key did not previously exist. A more rea damaged by profes- death of a sonable interpretation would seem to be newsboy sor. Even the milkman or con- all, each, “every person” every means the death of ceivably damage upon suffer person within a group; class or the class or damage, All оf us suffer even customer. group being that class set out in the subsec loss, financial because of This tion. class has heretofore had a cause close friend. of action under Death Act. not intend to add oth- did 1-1066, W.S.1957, supra, Former fore- § persons er classifications of who could re- runner of supra, clearly provid- § Death Act when Wrongful cover under the

ed that an award be divided in accordance designation “every person” was used. with the laws of The class intestacy. As we said in Basin Electric Power limited, persons entitled to recover was def- Control, Coopеrative v. Board State inite and narrow. takes Appellant (1978): 563 person” words “every out of context and « * * * n intent, ascertaining legislative have would us believe that the use of these must look to the mischief the we statute words in the amended act creates new clas- cure, was intended to the historical set persons sifications of who can recover under enactment, pub ting surrounding its the Wrongful Death Act and creates innu- state, the conclusions of policy lic merable new causes of action. prior contempo the law and all other urges this interpretation liberal even facts and circumstances. Carter raneous ‍​‌​​‌​​‌‌‌​​‌‌​​‌​​‌​‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌​​‌​‌‌‌‌​​‌‌​‌​​​‌​‍though the any act does not mention new 279, 131 Co., Thompson Realty Wyo. 58 of persons class who recover nor does may P.2d 297.” it provide any guidelines. criteria or death stat- holding genesis wrongful This is harmonious with our The of our passage of Lord Drilling Company, supra. Jordan v. Delta ute traces back to the respect With case, the issue in in 1846. The act England Act in Campbell’s Jor- dan merely illegitimate held an rule child reaction to the common-law was a 2-14-202(b), wrong- for contemplated supra, recovery child by which would not allow § Short, 1, 17, recover, further, 42 Wyo. as entitled to that the ful Tuttle v. death. on Recov- (1930); Speiser 1 were to be awarded as fair and 288 P. 529 (2d Ed.), just 1.8 and according ery Wrongful rather than be divided for Death §§

5H Death, 1 and 2 (1975); 1.9 22 be included within that class Am.Jur.2d of individuals §§ on (1965); Statutory 3 Sutherland Con- wrongful who to a parties made (1974). That (4th Ed.), 71.05 struction of the § death action. I believe the focus profitable criticized rule made more much as the majority opinion appellee’s as well plaintiff kill the for a defendant to wrong brief is that as a result both Ed.), (4th injure him. on Torts Prosser appellant’s have claim. mischaracterized 1.5. suрra, (1972); Speiser, § 902 1 p. background More and facts should enact- followed English The act was in addition to those supplied presented same with the ments in the United States majority opinion. The general for the same general provisions and district action filed in the purposes. Saffels, wife of de- brought by Frances M. have Traditionally, statutes of this kind death, personal at the of his cedent time surviving for been the benefit of always of Loren Ha- of the estate representative of the decedent and the family relatives guardian persons and as rold Saffels usually specifi- classes of beneficiaries are Kornegay, and estates Heidi Shawn 3.1; supra, 2 Speiser, restricted. 1 cally marriage, children previous her Wrongful on for Death Speiser Recovery appellant Minerva Gertrude (2d Ed.), through (1975); 10.21 10.1 §§ wife, stepchildren The here. Death, (1965); 47 and 48 Am.Jur.2d §§ filing the joined together in divorced wife Death, 34(1) (1966); 25A 15 and C.J.S. is not While title of action action. 904; Prosser, supra, p. at Annotation: in that have been proper it should as sub- “Right of personal repre- solely in the name creditors,” ject to claims of 35 A.L.R.2d all those entitled sentative behalf of “Brothers and Annotation: W.S.1977, 1980 recovеry, 2-14-202(a), Beneficiaries Within Sisters Deceased as defect. only a formal that is Replacement, Statute,” A.L. State it is a allegations that It is obvious from the R.3d 379 and that the wrongful death action stat- general purpose of these lant here is a claiming to be one on provide remedy whereby is to utes brought. whose behalf the action deceased, who or relatives of family W.S.1977, 2-14-202(c), 1980 Replacement. expected mainte- might naturally record material in the discloses nance or assistance from deceased had had married been lived, compensation rеcover from divorce. prior to their She years loss wrongdoer commensurate with the his surviv- age. was married to years He 15, p. 25A Death 592 sustained.” C.J.S. 2, widow, 43, 1978 age September ing of was March and his date for amend setting the historical He had months later. seven approximately Act, of Wyoming’s ment his wid- of minor children adopted the distributing the recovered purpose its also was ow, the action on whose behalf proven rather damages fairly justly brought. heirs, language equally among summary judg- partial for a The motion do not reflect of the amended act itself appellant and оnly directed a of ment was create new cause legislative intent to had the decedent for whom stepchildren rule action or to from the traditional stray We need obligation support. of by beneficiary propounded legal dependence of I note regard, but in that no decision appellant. make appellee’s position. of incongruity as an this Affirmed. action, pursuant to divorce Appellant, RAPER, Justice, dissenting. by be paid alimony awarded was The award Loren Harold Saffels. my it is compelled I am to dissent since per month clearly required рayment $300 appellant that intended view the decree intended. period years. of ten Under Jordan Delta [Citation.]” to- appellant payments was still entitled to $33,750 at the of her ex-hus-

taling time (1975), A.L.R.3d 1215. However, acknowl- appellant band’s death. therefore, has the Appellant, qualification alimony as far as the edges right to party to be a by intended regular assets of his estate concerned action, damages.2 i. e. death of either upon party terminates damages deprive would not recovery Her Warren, Wyo., Warren v. divorce. surviving damages, wife of nor any (1961).1 Accordingly, 361 P.2d 525 damages stepchildren even the lant, wife, as a divorced does not have a We separately computed. each are cannot claim would entitle the estate which appellant “person” is a and that deny that her to creditor status. just to be fair and she has suffered a seri- Nevertheless, has been dam- ous loss for which she should receive com- aged by negligence appellee. She tort-feasor, pensation from the if fault can right has lost her to the continuation of her allowing reason for not established. The deceased hus- alimony payments from her a recovery from a deceased hus- W.S.1977,1980 2-14-202(c), band. Under § band’s estate does not exist as to a defend- Replacement: tort-feasor, stranger ant to the marital “* * * qualifications the person relationship terminated divorce. for whom are those recovery sought disagree majority’s position I with the which en- establish to the 2-14-202(b)3 2-14- qualifies just titlement to a fair and award 202(c)4 by restricting recovery to “a hus- damages. No more. We cannot amend band, wife, child, or mother.” If father the law clearly to add more than what is intent, legislative had been the stretсh, said and ex- enlarge, expand or should have by inserting language said so tend a falling statute to matters not correlating the ‍​‌​​‌​​‌‌‌​​‌‌​​‌​​‌​‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌​​‌​‌‌‌‌​​‌‌​‌​​​‌​‍two subsections. It did not. within express provisions. its [Citation.] (c) “[e]very person Subsection says, The legislature, by deleting amendment brought.” whose benefit the action is It any reference to the laws of distribution credibility suggest stretches to even estate, any decedent’s has eliminated divorced wife must seek “for question of a heir- relationship between probable loss of ship companionship, future soci- damages. and entitlement to Gener- comfort,” ally, аmendment, majori- when legislature, by ety as inferred has express ty. deleted an of a stat- That suffer provision applies only to those who ute, change presumption Here, is that such loss. the divorced wife seeks Warren, 2-14-202(b), W.S.1977, 1. Dicta in the husband was 1980 Re- placement: alive and court decided award to wife was a Anno., property alimony. settlement not “(b) husband, wife, If the decedent left a majority A.L.R.2d indicates to be the child, mother, father or no debt of the dece- view. proceeds dent be satisfied out of the any judgment any obtained in requiring 2. Alaska has a narrower statute provisions under the of this section.” showing dependency individual to make a being W.S.1977, 2-14-202(c), Replace- the decedent before allowed as a 4. Section party However, wrongful to a death action. ment: supreme court there ruled an ex-wife who “(c) jury The court or irregular received no but and volun- damages, pecuniary award such and exem- tary proper sums from the decedent was a plary, just. Every per- as it deems fair and party wrongful to a death action. Greer Tank son for whose benefit the action is Welding, Alaska, Boettger, & Inc. v. 609 P.2d may prove respectivе damages his (1980). feebly Appellee attempted to dis- jury court or award the that tinguish the case on the basis that in that case amount of person to which it considers the payments voluntary. were However that entitled, including damages for loss distinction in fact indicates that the ex-wife probable companionship, society future and here has a better claim. (Emphasis added.) comfort.” support pursuant she has dered court decree to 20-2- sum only certain then, husband. appears, of her former It that lost with death W.S.1977. the stat- majority loosely The has rewritten must be “person” claim as to each con- in the legislative ute. must find intent We when as whether he or sidered raised to she used, Mahoney conjecture, v. not language is included within the statute. It follows Co., Sheep Wyo. L. L. a of decedent dependent was construed in (1958), a be nor should statute was tak- entitled to recover that which destroys anoth- such a that one section way her, negligent and appellee en from if er, Herrera, Wyo., 565 P.2d DeHerrera v. negligence caused the death. of the stat agree I the purpose can the “estate” We must understand that permit ute a for those “who remedy was to wrongful is in a death concept utilized maintenance might expected naturally sort of crea- entirely action is an different had lived assistance from deceased * * probate which adminis- ture than estate citing and majority opinion, 4See aby assets left decedent. worldly ters the 15, p. quoting from 25A C.J.S. Herrera, supra: As in DeHerrera v. said preclude recovery not this time I would at It be realized must perhaps key employee aby partner or statutes, 1-1065 wrongful death enough to The statute is broad others. 2-14-202, W.S. 2-14-201 and 1-1066 [§§ sweep. within its reasonably those include code, probate part of the 19775], are not claims. There is silly A will wash out appoint- for the though provision made appellant’s about nothing unreasonable designa- The ment of administrator. claim. tion of an trustee is administrator Further, provides W.S.1977 to provide party to file only a device of Civil Procedure all that “The Code any damages collected pay suit and over liberally con- proceedings under shall designated by to statute. the beneficiaries object its and assist the promote strued to The does not become amount recovered ” ** The obtaining justiсe. parties and is not part of the decedent’s estate follow this man- opinion does not majority subject of the estate to liable for debts niggardly con- attempts date. It instead Jordan v. Delta estate administration. and re- statutes wrongful death strue Wyo.1975,541 P.2d never law which previous trench on case 42.” action such as death considered wrong- very design Wyoming The statutes, par- existing presently this under out those ful statute is to look Wyoming’s. approach ticularly Such spe- dependent the decedent some nature, and one in legislative in clearly legislature way. cial sort of join. unwilling am which I Compa- Drilling warned Jordan Delta district court I reversed the would have that: ny, supra, “ * * * to include and remanded for trial say We what prepared damages. lant’s included, might other classifications relatives, stepchildren such as collateral partners but we visual- of a decedent

ize, invitation, imaginative without will be made under innovative claims version of amended law of Wyoming.” fit since then has seen scope any language narrow claiming alimony or- wives

exclude divorced concept expressed change in this ex- physical placement 5. The Herrera, supra. cerpt “Wyoming from DeHerrera does statutes in the Probate Code”

Case Details

Case Name: Saffels v. Bennett

Court Name: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date Published: Jun 19, 1981

Citation: 630 P.2d 505

Docket Number: 5434

Court Abbreviation: Wyo.